The AntiChris

Why?

Unless you can demonstrate that anyone has access to objective moral truth, I see no reason for you to approve of anyone adhering to the tenets of "traditional morality".

Of course, you might argue that objectivists not only acknowledge objective moral truth, but also have good reason to know what "it" is. If so, in your view, which objectivists have the "true" answers to our moral questions and are therefore entitled to pay homage to the tenets of "traditional morality"?

Chris

dk

I submit anything that is "an ends unto itself" has intrinsic value that extreme objectivism reduces to a mere impression.

Alonzo Fyfe

I am only asking for the claims of subjectivists, and actions based on those claims, be logically consistent. I do not need to prove that objectivism is true in order to insist that subjectivists be consistent -- any more than you would need to argue that subjectivism is true in order to insist on consistency on the part of objectivists. Any more than an atheist needs to prove the nonexistence of God in order to condemn the Chrisitian's inconsistencies, or Christians need to prove the existence of God to identify inconsistencies made by an Atheist.

The consistency or inconsistency of an argument is internal, and depends on no external criterion or condition.

And I wish to add that in a very real sense my own views are subjective. There are, in fact, very many forms of subjectivism, and my views fall well within one of those forms. So, I am not saying this as an objectivist (in the "intrinsic value" sense of objectivism) condemning subjectivists. I am saying this as a subjectivist (in the sense that nothing has value except insofar as the value is assigned by a valuer) insisting on consistency from fellow subjectivists.

Alonzo Fyfe

Are you interested in translating this into English?

dk

First, maybe you can explain the difference between subjectivism and objective relativism. As I understand any form of relativism, it means that people only perceive value from changing circumstances but really don’t know value at all, so intrinsic value becomes unknowable in itself. I’m arguing that people have intrinsic value as “an end in itself”, knowable in relationship to the intrinsic value of others. For example we can distinguish qualitatively and quantitatively distinctions between temperature , pressure and volume in relationship to one another. We know that temperature, pressure and volume exist by the relationships that govern their nature, as revealed by Boyles Gas Laws. Likewise we (humans) know the intrinsic value of human subjects by the objects that govern the human family, as revealed by moral law.

The argument of interest (to me) presented in this thread have focused on intrinsic good as a suitable basis for morality. You claim to argue for something akin to objective relativism (I don’t want to put words in your mouth) as basis for morality, yet slough off intrinsic good as a misnomer, misperception or semantic nonsense. I’m arguing that if a person exists, then they can (have the potential) to participate in their destiny through moral law, therefore become an “ends unto themselves” as opposed to “means to an ends”. As an ends unto themselves people have the potential to become an intrinsic good. As degenerates people are slaves to their passions or the passions of others therefore become a “means to an ends”.

Alonzo Fyfe

I typically do this by pointing to location as an example of objective relativism. Nothing has an absolute location -- you can't even talk about the location of something without talking about where it is relative to something else. And, yet, there is a verifiable (or falsifiable) scientific fact of the matter as to where one thing is relative to another.

Thus:

Even though location is not "absolute", it is "objective".
Even though location is "objective", it is an objective relationship and, thereby "relative".

Objective relativism.

Value-laden terms describe relationships between states of affairs and desires. Desires exist as brain states in the mind -- the presence or absence of a desire is a knowable, objective fact. The same can be said about the states of affairs being evaluated relative to those desires. But it is a relationship that is being described. Thus, "objective relativism".

By the way, because all value-claims make an ineliminable reference to at least once desire, and desires are "in the mind", there is a sense in which this account is also subjective.

(This is the sense in which I have said in other posts that values live in a ground where "objective" and "subjective" overlap -- they concern, in part, "objective" facts about the human brain.)


This is not how I understand it. Relativism states that the value of a state of affairs is not absolute but depends on some sort of relationship between that which is being evaluated and a valuer.


I am arguing that the only thing that people have are desires. A person has a desire that P.

There are two types of value; value as an end and value as a means.

If a person has a desire that P, then that person values P as an end in itself -- independent of its consequences. But Q may be a useful tool for bringing about P, in which case the person values Q because of its consequences (P), which is desired "for its own sake" or "independent of consequences." Still, P has no value independent of its being desired -- no intrinsic value.

Now, I hold that all of this is true of SIMPLE value. The form of subjectivism that I object to stops here and says that this description accounts for all types of value including moral value. Thus, it fails to distinguish between the value for one type of pizza topping over another, versus the value of crashing airplanes into skyscrapers -- what I call "pizza topping morality."

However, there is an infinite number of complexities concerning which desires to use in making an evaluation, what types of relationships are relevant, and what types of objects are being evaluated. And moral value is value of a specific type.

(1) All desires are relevant in making an evaluation -- any person whose desires are excluded from the moral evaluation is thereby being regarded as a mere tool to be used for the benefit of those whose desires are included. (Whereas agent-subjectivism holds that the only desires relevant in making moral evaluations are those of the agent, and assessor-subjectivism limits the relevant desires to those of the assessor; and, often, to a mere subset of even this limited set of desires, those that the agent or assessor desire to call morally-relevant desires.)

(2) Both direct and indirect relationships are relevant.

(3) The proper object of moral evaluation are desires themselves. A good desire is a desire that tends to fulfilll other desires (independent of who has them), while an evil desire is a desire that tends to thwart the desires of others. Actions are to be evaluated in a secondary sense (a right action is the action that a person with good desires would perform).

The reasons that I favor this account...

(a) It requires no ontological oddities -- nothing but desires, states of affairs, and the relationships between them (unlike "intrinsic value" or "absolutist" theories).

(b) It is both objective (moral claims are knowable and true or false independent of any given agent's beliefs or desires) AND subjective (depends irreducibly on desires -- but ALL desires, not the desires of any one agent), thus reducing the objective/subjective debate to irrelevance.

The AntiChris

You're missing my point.

I'm challenging your premise that subjectivists (some or all?) fail to "abandon the standard tenants[sic] of traditional morality (with its assumption of objectivity)".

Until you provide some evidence or explain what you mean in a little more detail, I can only try to guess what you're getting at.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

In the previous post I gave a reductive formula for values, that value-terms describe relationships between desires and states of affairs (see previous posts for specifics).

Different value-claims are distinguished on three criteria: (1) the desires used in the evaluation, (2) the relationship -- direct and indirect -- between the relevant desires that that which is being evaluated, and (3) the class of things being evaluated.

The agent-subjectivist says that the only desires that are relevant in moral evaluations are the desires of the agent. The assessor-subjectivist says that the only desires that are relevant are those of the assessor. In both cases, the agent/assessor holds the event being evaluated up to his or her "feelings" or "emotions" or "intuitions" -- all of these simply different species under the genus term "desires", in order to reach a conclusion.

The only inferences that logically follow from the subjectivists "morality" are the inferences that follow from a statement of the formm, "I like this" or "I do not like that."

Yet, the subjectivist tends to draw much stronger conclusions than those that are warranted from these times of premises. They tend to draw conclusions of the sort "and you should like this too" and "anybody who does not like this is somehow defective" and "my preference for this justifies me in arresting, imprisoning, punishing, killing, bombing somebody else who threatens what I like."

These conclusions would be warranted if one takes the cause of one's like or dislike to be some sort of external, intrinsic value. If my like for X is caused by X having an intrinsic property in X of "deserves to be liked", then it DOES follow that anybody who does not like X is somehow defective or unable to appreciate this property. But the subjectivist loses all foundation for these types of implications.

The only types of logical inferences that the subjectivist can legitimately draw are those like the inferences that can be drawn for certain types of pizza toppings -- a preference for sausage over achovies. Because, in both cases, all he is talking about is his personal preferences.

If his inferences do not fit within pizza-topping logic, than his inferences are logically invalid (given his premises) and he is being inconsistent.

Perhaps the major difference between agent-subjectivism and assessor-subjectivism is that the welfare of others is considered only contingently. Only if the agent or the assessor cares about the other does any harm or suffering inflicted on the other have any moral worth. If you want to kill me, then my interest in remaining alive only has moral relevance if you deem it to be significance. My moral status depends on your whim. If I say, "but it is wrong for you to kill me," you simply need to spend a moment in quiet reflection, determine if you feel any regret over the idea, if not, you can simply assert that I am mistaken and proceed with your action.

This is a part of the logic of agent-subjectivism and assessor-subjectivism.

I agree that subjectivists very seldom think and argue along these lines. However, this does not change the fact that these are the only types of conclusions logically permitted to them. When they step outside these lines, they are claiming to be subjectivists but acting and reasoning in ways only permitted to objectivists.

DRFseven

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
[B]Different value-claims are distinguished on three criteria: (1) the desires used in the evaluation, (2) the relationship -- direct and indirect -- between the relevant desires that that which is being evaluated, and (3) the class of things being evaluated.

Look. Are kittens cute? The answer to this question lies within the mind of the beholder, not within the kittens. That's because "cute" is a valuation. Valuations are NEVER OBJECTIVE. I personally think kittens are so cute I can hardly stand it; nevertheless, when I say "Kittens are cute" I say it knowing that they are not objectively cute, but that they are plenty cute to me.

Are kittens cats? The "catness" lies within the kitten. "Cat" is not a valuation; the "catness" is intrinsic in the kitten. When I say "Kittens are cats" I say it knowing objectively that they are cats.

This is how you can tell that moral opinions are subjective. Are they valuations? Answer: Yes.

No, no, no. The subjectivist says that morals are opinions and that everybody has moral opinions. Plenty of people think only their own desires count, but that is certainly not restricted to subjectivists! Subjectivists and objectivists, alike, can be asses.

Just like the objectivist.



Values are never intrinsic (you even said this yourself!). The value is in the mind of the one who makes the valuation. They never reside in the thing being valued.

I've already explained that that is not true; the most important element in moral development is the development of feelings of right and wrong, good and bad, about behaviors. This feeling does not exist for pizza toppings. You have consistently ignored my responses to this "pizza topping"contention; will you answer?

Alonzo Fyfe

Yes, yes. This is another whole family of subjectivists . . . belief-subjectivists. Earlier, I had been talking about desire-subjectivists. There are so many different types of subjectivists that it is difficult to keep track of all of them.

[And, to make matters worse, when you combine the distinction between belief/desire subjectivism with agent/assessor subjectivism with individual/cultural subjectivism you get a whole range of subjectivisms from individual-agent-belief subjectivism to individual-assessor-desire subjectivism to cultural-belief-agent subjectivism.]

So, now, if you want to talk about belief-subjectivism, this method has two problems with it.

(1) Beliefs are motivationally neutral -- they do not provide a reason for action.

(2) Belief subjectivism fails to distinguish between the belief and the thing believed -- like failing to distinguish between my belief that snow is white and the color of snow. These are not the same thing, and what is true of a belief does not carry over to the thing believed.




Actually, both agent-subjectivism and assessor-subjectivism are DEFINED this way. Agent-belief-subjectivism states that only the agent's beliefs are relevant to moral evaluations. Assessor-desire-subjectivism says that only the desires of the assessor are relevant to moral evaluation. That is what defines these types of theories.


Yes, values are never intrinsic. No, values are not "in the mind of the one who makes the evaluation." Values are relationships between minds that desire and states of affairs in the universe. It is just as much of a mistake to look at the object alone and state that value resides solely in the object, and to look at the subject itself and say that the value is only in the subject. Value is in the relationship between object and subject.


I do not see how any of this refutes my claim. The way that one acquires a desire or preferences has no relevance to the logical inferences that can be drawn from it. To say otherwise is to commit the genetic fallacy -- to hold that the genesis of a proposition is relevant to the logical implications that can be drawn from a proposition.

(Note: beliefs and desires are both propositional attitudes.)

It does not matter where the feeling comes from or how it was created, it matters what the feeling is. Within subjectivism, moral likes and dislikes may have a different origin than likes and dislikes for various types of pizza toppings (and, if we assume some sort of evolutionary influence, even this can be doubted), they are still exactly the same type of state. They are still nothing more than personal likes and dislikes.