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Anyway, let’s try this again. X creates Y, which he chooses to give certain properties. I say that it would be unjust for X to then punish Y for having those properties. You disagree. Quite honestly, I am completely unable to understand this point of view. No amount of verbal gymnastics can make this self-evidently unjust act appear just.
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What I am suggesting is that, in this case, X does not so much give Y certain properties by creating Y, but that those properties follow from the very nature of Y such that X could not have created Y without them. That “creating Y with certain properties,” in this instance, simply reduces, in a non-trivial way, to creating Y. Hopefully this will become clearer as I elaborate.
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In attempting to defend the indefensible, you point out that, in giving Y these properties, X is creating something different from what he would have created if he had given it different ones; one might say that he is choosing to create Y rather than Y'. This is self-evidently true, but so what? Where I speak of giving Y certain properties instead of others, you speak of “actualizing” Y instead of Y'. But these are just two ways of saying the same thing. How can using different words turn a transparently unjust act into a just one?
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I’m not talking about giving Smith blue eyes instead of brown or something like that such that the blue eyed Smith is a different Smith than the browned eyed Smith. I’m talking about the set of essential characteristics which make up a particular possible person. By the label, “Smith,” I am referring to a particular possible person. I’m sure that you’re familiar with the concept of essential verses accidental properties, but for those readers who might not be, let me elaborate.
An accidental property is a property which is held by an individual in some possible worlds but not in all of them in which that individual exists. In some possible worlds, for instance, I weigh less and in others I weigh more, but I am still the same individual in those worlds as I am in this one. Essential properties are properties which are such that they define a particular individual in all possible worlds in which that individual exists. In other words, alter any of those properties and you are no longer talking about the same individual. Alter the essential properties which belong to Smith, and you are no longer talking about the same possible person named Smith as you were before. My contention here is that properties reflecting deep moral choices, choices that an individual would make in all possible worlds, may be part of the essence of what makes that individual the particular person that they are as opposed to another person. In other words, had Smith been created such that he would have made a different moral choice, he would no longer be the same “Smith” anymore. The person, Smith, that we had been talking about would have never existed, and a completely different person would have been there in his place.
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But “Smith” is just a convenient tag for whoever God is creating. In the terminology of formal logic, it’s a variable rather than a constant. What’s the difference between saying that God created an (unspecified) defective person and saying that He “actualized” a possible person with a defective nature? It seems to me that you’re just playing word games here.
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In the latter case, God did not create Smith’s nature or give Smith the nature he had (more on this latter). God simply selected Smith’s nature from the set of possible persons and chose to give it actuality. God could not have created Smith with any other nature. Had God chosen to actualize a different nature instead, then the person we are referring to as Smith would have never come into being. The former case might suggest that there are no essential properties to individual persons and that the set of properties which make up an individual person are wholly arbitrary such that God can create a particular person anyway he wants. The latter view suggests that possible persons are made of sets of interconnected logical properties such that it is impossible to actualize a particular possible person without actualizing that whole set of those properties. This would mean that God is logically restricted in the manner in which He can create a particular possible person and that he can’t just make a particular possible person anyway he wants. God may have been able to select someone other than Smith for existence, but He could not alter the essential properties that make Smith who he is.
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Of course God created Smith’s nature, in the only possible sense: namely, He brought into existence a creature with this nature. In what other sense can God be meaningfully said to create anything? If God didn’t create our natures, He didn’t create us. For that matter, He didn’t create the (physical) universe; He just “actualized” one possible universe out of the many “possible universes”.
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On the view I am espousing, a creature’s nature is something distinct from the creature itself. A creature’s nature is an abstraction – the set of properties that creature holds in all possible worlds in which it exists. As a Platonist, I do not believe that God created abstractions. Rather I believe abstractions are mental objects which reside eternally in the mind of God. I believe that God did create Smith, but that He did so by selecting Smith from the set of possible persons and giving Smith’s nature actuality. The set of possible persons itself, however, was simply a given. God had no choice over which possible individuals occupied that set, only over which possible individuals to give actuality from that set (and that choice may have been further restricted by other factors such as the possibilities which have been suggested up to this point). For more on this sort of Platonist view of natures, see Plantinga’s
The Nature of Necessity
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This appears to me to be nothing but a way to obfuscate the issues by adopting a vocabulary so weird and novel that its’ difficult to think clearly in terms of it.
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Actually, there’s nothing “weird or novel” about the terminology I’ve been using. It’s standard fare in philosophy of religion and discussions of the application of modal logic to God and the doctrine of Creation.
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This argument suggests that God would not be culpable for Smith’s actions even if He did not have a good purpose for creating him. And this entails that God would not be culpable if He chose (for no particular reason) to create an army of murderous thugs whose nature was such that they would do everything in their power to eliminate (for example) every black person from the face of the earth. After all, it would be the thugs who would make the choices and commit the acts; God would just be an innocent bystander.
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God is not culpable for Smith’s actions insofar as those actions are directly caused by Smith and not God. God
could, however, be culpable for creating Smith knowing that He would do certain evil actions if God did not have a morally sufficient reason for doing so, just as I might share a certain measure of responsibility for not preventing evils that I could have without a morally sufficient reason for my restraint. However, since God is defined as all-powerful, all-knowing, and completely good, it follows that God does have morally sufficient reasons for creating Smith.
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Let’s consider another case. Say that God creates a universe filled with an infinite number of immortal creatures who are not only capable of unimaginable suffering, but who in fact by their natures suffer unimaginably from the very moment they are created. Would God be doing anything wrong by creating such a universe? By your reasoning the answer is “no”: God did not cause the suffering, nor is he responsible for the fact that it’s their nature to suffer; he merely actualized a great many beings whose nature it is to suffer! What could be wrong with that?
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I would argue that in order for God to be justified in actualizing a world with a certain measure of evil, there must be some greater amount of good which permitting that evil allows. Furthermore, the moral dignity of all personal beings must be respected. If these two criteria are not fulfilled in a particular possible world, then I would argue that God would not actualize it. Every evil that takes place in our universe, I believe, creates a greater good in terms of the context of the whole. Furthermore, I would argue that God treats all personal beings with justice and fairness, so that their moral dignity is upheld.
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The point is whether an entity can be culpable for the fact that God chose to “actualize” it. Again, it seems self-evident to me that it can’t; how can it be culpable for something God did?
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No being is culpable for the fact that God chose to actualize it. Beings are not responsible for that which they have no control over, especially the fact of their existence. They are culpable for how they choose to act, given their existence.
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And finally, there is the question of whether an entity can be considered culpable for doing what it can’t help but do; what it must do because of its nature. And again the answer seems to me to be self-evident: it cannot.
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Actually, I would argue that an entity is culpable for what it does acting out of it’s own nature precisely
because it is its own nature out of which it acts. A being’s
nature is simply the abstract set of characteristics which describe the essential qualities of that being. To say that a being acts from it’s own nature is to say that it acts from within
itself. If a being were not acting out of its own nature, then something else besides itself would be compelling it to act rather than itself. It’s nature is not, in itself, a causal force that holds some sort of power over the agent; but merely an
abstract description of that agent.
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OK, let’s change the example slightly. My purpose in creating Smithy was not to eliminate Jones; in fact it was something completely unrelated to Jones, and was not furthered in the least by Jones’s death. It just happened that the only way available to me to accomplish it was to create someone whose only purpose in life was to kill Jones. Now, how does this affect matters? Would it be just to punish Smithy in this case, because of the existence of some purpose of mine of which he knew nothing, but unjust to punish him if my purpose in creating him had been to have him kill Jones?
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I would argue that if Smithy is a free moral agent who, acting from within himself, freely chose to kill Jones, then yes, Smithy is culpable for the act, and worthy of punishment. Your culpability in the matter hinges on whether you had morally justifiable reasons for setting into motion a chain of affairs which you knew would result in the murder of Jones, but your culpability for the murder and Smithy’s culpability for the murder are two separate issues.
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At this point it should be clear that, while the existence of such a purpose might have some bearing on God’s culpability in creating Smith, it has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it would be just for God to punish Smith. The relevant factors, so far as I can see, are these: (i) God designed Smith for a purpose; (ii) achieving that purpose (for some mysterious reason) required the existence of a creature who would inevitably reject God; (iii) Smith fulfilled God’s purpose (perhaps by simply existing); (iv) he did exactly what he was designed and intended to do; (v) in so doing he made the Universe a better place than it would have been. It’s not his fault that he was designed in such a way that he must inevitably reject God. So how can it be just to punish him?
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I think iv is questionable without qualification. It may have been that Smith was created for some purpose, but his other actions may have been a necessary, but still undesirable by-product of that purpose. It may be that God would much rather have it that Smith not act in the manner He does, but sometimes not even God can have His cake and eat it too. Furthermore, v also needs qualification for two reasons. There may have been a difference between Smith’s intention in committing an action and God’s intentions in creating Smith. Smith may have meant to cause harm or to do that which he knew was wrong. God, in creating Smith and permitting His actions, did so for some good morally sufficient reason. Intention, I believe, is part of moral culpability. Second, in fulfilling the purpose for which God created Him, Smith may have made the universe a better place, but that still doesn’t mean that all the other things that Smith did weren’t contributing to the positive amount of moral evil in the world. Furthermore, even if Smith’s actions did contribute to the overall good, they still could be evil on Smith’s part. Say for instance that someone had chosen to kill Hitler when he was a boy (not knowing anything about what he would do latter). That may have resulted in a lot less evil in the world, but the act of the person who committed the murder would still have been evil.
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The mythologies of primitive tribes are of little interest to me. Let’s forget about the nonsensical doctrine of original sin and ancient stories about a mythical creature and talk about what I was discussing in the first place – namely, what’s rational
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Well, what you call the “mythologies of primitive tribes” is what primarily informs my views about God, namely the Bible, so I can’t help but refer to it. Regardless of what you might think of its truth value, it still may contain logically possible scenarios which are of relevance.
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You suggest that we don’t want to “submit” to God. Yet a creature who understands both his own nature and God’s fully enough will understand that submission to God is the perfect fulfillment of his own nature, it is what he is intended for, and the only thing that will satisfy his deepest longings. And this is quite aside from the fact that it will result in eternal bliss. He will also understand that rejecting God is a denial of his own nature, that in the end it can only lead to misery and despair, and that ultimately this rebellion against his own Creator must fail. Anyone who understands all this understands that there are absolutely no rational grounds for rejecting God. And anyone who understands this and still chooses to reject God is being completely irrational. Anyone who does something knowing that there is no rational reason for doing it, even in terms of self-interest, is insane.
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I believe that it is
always irrational to refrain from choosing the good. So, if that view and your arguments here are correct, anyone who knowingly chooses evil is insane. I disagree. I think that we can knowingly and culpably choose evil even though it is irrational to do so. We can also culpably engage in forms of self-deception because we do not want to face up to the rational consequences of our choices.
God Bless,
Kenny
[ March 15, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>