ManM

Devilnaut,

It begins with a definition: God is that which nothing greater can be conceived.

Granting this definition, you cannot rationally think God does not exist, or else you have contradicted yourself. You must grant God the predicate of existence or else it follows that your God is not that which nothing greater can be conceived, for a God who exists is greater than one who does not.

Now, if you say that existence is not a predicate, the argument goes away. The other critique comes if you challenge the idea that an existent being is greater than a non-existent being. I haven't found good evidence for either of those challenges, so I'm stuck. I personally suspect a flaw in the definition, but that is another story for another time.

[ January 26, 2002: Message edited by: ManM ]</p>

Devilnaut

Why would you grant a definition that assumes existence, in a debate over the existence of the thing in question?


editted to add, the basic point I am making is that I believe that this argument reduces to:

1. God exists

~ God exists


I suppose ultimately this is along the same lines as Kant's objection.

[ January 27, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

ManM

You would grant the definition because it is a decent one. How would you define God?

Theophage

Kharakov:

Since our discussion here is off topic for this thread, and since we are already discussing these things in the Materialism thread, I will confine my future responses to you there.

Ender

I have already posted on this subject <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=41&t=000027&p=" target="_blank">here- </a>and thought it might be of some use in this thread.

~Wiggin~

[ January 27, 2002: Message edited by: Ender the Theothanatologist ]</p>

Devilnaut

eh? What do you mean it's a decent one?

You can't define something as "existing" unless it actually exists.


Theists define God as perfect and then attempt to attach existence to their definition. Heheh.. funny stuff..


I dunno, I still feel that Kant's objection to the ontological argument is a load of bull. Why isn't existence a property? I read something by Ender here:

Isn't the reason that the neighbour would think this was ridiculous, simply because that "property" of your lambourghini (sp?) was completely obvious??

Existence is a property, in a sense. The problem with the ontological argument is that God is defined as having this property. It is that simple.. isn't it?

Edit to add (i'm arguing with myself here):

I suppose what proponents of this argument would then say, is that, if God is not the perfect being in the sense that he is imperfect enough to not exist, there is still a being more perfect in that he will have the quality of existence. And this is where Kant's objection comes into play.

However, I would simply conclude that there is no such thing as a perfect being, if existence is criteria for perfection.


[ January 27, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]

Just to elaborate even further, as I think harder about the subject, I would simplify Kant's objection by stating that existence is not a property, in the sense that it cannot ever be a part of something's intrinsic definition.

[ January 27, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

xoc

Yes Ender but all of these "properties" are "complex properties" instead of simple ones. They are "objects" in their own rights, simply denoted as "properties" because they form part of another object, the object in question. Obviously the "Existent" Lambo will cost more than the "non-existent" Lambo, unless one is willing to pay in non-existent funds as well! (IN that case I'll lay down 3 mil on one of those babies).

Still there are "simple properties" that help sell the Lambo; existence is one, "appearence" is another- that it looks cool. These are the things that are more truly called "properties" as they cannot exist in themselves as an object(though I guess Sartre objectified "Being" as something like an object) but are entirely dependent on an object to be made known. You tear the DVD player out of the car and it is still a DVD player, but you can't tear the "beauty" out of anything and continue to hold it as an independent "thing."

Ender

<a href="http://ghc.ctc.edu/HUMANITIES/DLARSON/kanto.htm" target="_blank">Kant’s onto refutation</a>

Since Kant is a systematic philosopher, the fundamental reasons for his arguments or refutations are derived from his epistemology and can help elaborate why existence is not a property or a predicate. The notion of existence as a property violates Kantian epistemology because the act of postulating or asserting the existence of something does not actually mean that something does exist. The idea of existence would be analytically connected to the idea of a perfect immortal- however, the question whether such an entity exists outside the human mind ought be validated by experience- the principle of significance, which P. F. Strawson endorses Kant with, is the claim that concepts applied outside the empirical (spatio-temporal) realm are meaningless.

With that out of the way, I can focus on your question- why existence isn’t a property or a predicate of something. Existence is not an attribute to be added to something. It is not a characteristic that something may have or lack. For instance, you can’t say, “place all the iguanas that exist in one cage and all the iguanas that do not exist in the other.” Instead you say “Place all the green iguanas in one cage and all the brown ones in another.” Kant insists that there is a logical difference between the statements “God is X” and “God is.” Commentators of Kant quibble over the copula and quantifier, but that’s nitpicking. In that manner Anselm’s argument argues only if such a being existed, God would exist, but it does not claim anything more than that in reality.

Ender, previously: the neighbor couldn't hold back his curiosity. he inquired about the mysterious final thing- I replied, 'that costs me extra, but what the heck. It ....EXISTS!!!!"

The obvious “property” of the Lamborghini does not make any difference in the least than a “possible” Lamborghini because existence is misused, and is a wrong logical form. Existence is not a logical predicate, while concepts as a logical matter are defined entirely in logical predicates. This is a metaphysical claim, that an object has a certain quality, i.e. the property of the yellowness of a banana. Since existence is instead an “instantiation” of properties. To writ- how can a non-existent thing instantiate any properties? There is nothing a property can “gum” to. IN order to claim that X instantiates a property A presupposes that X exists. With this narrow beam in metaphysics, existence isn’t a property but a metaphysically essential stipulation for the instantiation of any properties.

~Speaker 4 the Death of God~

Ender

Have you had your proper empiricism training? Have you done your Locke homework? There is a distinct difference between simple (or primary) qualities (or properties, if you wish) and complex (or secondary) qualities- that simple qualities are irreducible, whereas complex ones are amalgam of simple ones. I agree with you to the extent that the “features” of the Lamborghini Diablo are “complex” properties or qualities, but that doesn’t necessarily justify the implication that existence per se is a simple one. A simple property of the Diablo is that of its size, shape, mass, and etcetera. Simple or Primary qualities in the Lockean tradition are objective, whereas complex ones are subjective, and created by the faculties of the mind (color, shininess, metallic sounds, and leather odor). However, existence, in Locke’s epistemology is the undefined “substrata” of objects that holds or instantiates the primary qualities.
Both the “existent” and “non-existent” Lambo possess the same properties in the mental realm- because you can describe the non-existent Lamborghini down to the last detail. By saying it exists add nothing to your description. Existence is not an extra quality- but merely a means to express that there is the thing in itself, containing with all the qualities already given. Capise?
Asserting existence is a “simple” property doesn’t quite do the trick, nor is conflating “appearance” with aesthetics. By saying existence or appearance is a “true” properties because they cannot exist in themselves self-destructs your claim that they are properties in the first place. A property is divisible from the object in itself, i.e. I can discuss about the redness of the Lamborghini apart from the car in itself, but I cannot discuss about the car in itself sans properties. Bishop Berkeley did away with these troubling general abstract concepts a long time ago. I don’t know how the endorsement of “beauty” as a necessary part of the car helps your case that existence is a property.

By the way, Sartre did not objectify Being as an object but rather a transphenomenality of Being.

~WiGGiN~

bd-from-kg

Detached9:

I haven’t read Kant, but I think I understand his point about existence not being an attribute.

Let’s start with ManM’s comment:

But the problem is, what subject are you “placing” in reality? The very use of the verb “place” implies that there is something to be placed.

The real question is whether a sentence like “Unicorns exist” is properly construed as meaning “Some unicorns have the property of existence” or “At least one entity has the defining attributes of a unicorn”.

Now if the first construction were correct, this would have some very weird consequences. For example, if I were to ask “Is George W. Bush the President of the United States”, the correct answer would be “Almost certainly not. There are infinitely many George W. Bushes and only a tiny fraction of them are President. Similarly, there are infinitely many Presidents and only a tiny fraction of them are George W. Bush. It’s true that the one and only George W. Bush with the property of existence is identical to the one and only President with the property of existence, but there are far more senses in which George W. Bush is not the President than senses in which he is. What’s more, for the vast majority of senses in which George W. Bush is President, either the ‘George W. Bush’ in question or the ‘President’ in question doesn’t exist.”

Similarly, if I were to ask “Does the Fred Robertson whose hand I’m shaking right now exist?” the correct answer would be “Well, one of the Fred Robertsons with the property that you are shaking his hand has the property of existence, but there are infinitely many others that do not have the property of existence. So while there is one sense of your question for which the answer is “yes”, there are infinitely many other senses for which the correct answer is “no”.

Needless to say, no one talks this way, which is to say that no one treats existence as a property - except for the special purpose of making the Ontological Argument go through.

Let’s come at this from another direction. First, note that if P is a property, so is not-P. Thus, if being round is a property, so is being non-round; if being perfect is a property, so is being imperfect, etc. So if there is a property of “existence”, there must also be a property of “nonexistence”.

Now suppose that P1 is the property of being a black swan, and P2 is the “property” of nonexistence. (We will assume for the sake of argument that no black swans exist.) If we ask whether any entity has property P1, the answer is “no”: there are no black swans. But if we ask whether there are any entities with “properties” P1 and P2, the answer (according to the “existence is a property” theory) is “yes”: there are lots of nonexistent black swans. But if P2 were really a property, this would be impossible: for any properties P1 and P2, if there are no entities with property P1 there cannot be any with properties P1 and P2.

Of course, one could brazen it out and say that the correct answer to “Are there any black swans?” is “Yes, lot’s of them.” So I want to try to go further and show, not merely that treating existence as a property leads to absurdity, but that it is logically incoherent.

So let’s talk about unicorns. Since no one has ever seen a unicorn, the only possible meaning of “unicorn” is “an entity with the properties U”, where U is a set of properties that define what one means by “unicorn”.

Now consider whether the sentence “Do unicorns exist?” can be construed as “Do any entities that have the properties U also have the property of existence?” For this to make sense, the statement “Some entities have the properties U and also have the property of existence” would have to be meaningful. But in that case the negation of this statement: “All entities having the properties U also have the property of nonexistence” would have to be meaningful. But what exactly could this sentence mean? What observation or test could be done that would have a bearing on the question of whether this statement is true? How could we distinguish between the case in which there are entities having the properties U, but which all have the property of nonexistence, from the case where there are no entities having the properties U ? Obviously we can’t; these are two descriptions of the same situation. But if existence and nonexistence were really properties these would be distinct cases.

Existence statements about specific objects are a little different from existence statements about classes of objects, but not enough to save the argument. Thus, what do I mean by “My friend Tom Tucker is in Paris”? Possibly the proper name Tom Tucker was defined by extension – that is, someone did the equivalent of pointing to the person in question and saying “That’s Tom Tucker”. But God cannot be defined in this way, since it’s impossible to “point” to Him. Entities like God are defined essentially the same way that classes of objects are defined: by listing all of their defining properties.

Now what about the statement “God exists”? As Russell pointed out in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy(p. 179):

So the statement “God exists” is meaningless unless and until we show that the proper name “God” actually has a referent – i.e., that God exists. However, the intended meaning can be “saved” by construing it as meaning “At least one entity X has the attributes G (where G is the set of defining attributes of God), and for any entity Y having these attributes, Y ≡ X.” (Since the attributes G imply the last clause - i.e., there can be at most one entity with the attributes G - this last bit is not important in this particular case.)

But now we find that the Ontological Argument cannot even be expressed meaningfully. At best we could construct an argument along the same lines to “show” that “If there is an entity with properties G, it exists necessarily”. That is, if God exists, He exists necessarily. That’s a long way from proving that God exists. (My apologies to Devilnaut and others who have already made many of the points in this and the previous paragraph several times; the only difference is that (I hope) I’ve provided more support for them.)

Note: There are several cogent arguments against the Ontological Argument that do not depend on the conclusion that existence is not a property. But I’m trying to stay within the parameters set down by the OP.

[ February 01, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>