The_Ist

I actually don't think we're disagreeing on as much as it may seem.

I agree that it is fallacious to state that if something exists, we are always morally obligated to commit to it. Your example of gravity is good.

However, the conception of God I hold, and am thus defending, includes the idea that God is the perfect moral standard. Accordingly, if this being communicates to us that it is moral to commit to it, then I think we are morally obligated to make this commitment.

I'm not sure I understand your point here. The fact that God exists seems to imply that we necessarily submit to him (as he is our creator/sustainer), but not that we necessarily commit our existential selves to him.

As described above, I agree that other issues (such as God's supposed moral perfection) need to be dealt with before it can be conclusively stated that we have a moral obligation to commit to God.

I agree that this statement in and of itself is a non sequitur. However, when most theists say this, I think the implication is that "We must [moral obligation] obey God's will because he exists as the perfect moral standard."

philechat

Wait till I spill the Nietzschean drivel that this thread probably needs at times .

Okay. Now I have several objections to your arguments above. First of all is that a value term cannot be equated with an existing object without introducing human judgments. And moreover every time we wanted to show god to be the perfect moral standard we run into the famous objection of Plato. Finally, even if God is shown to be the perfect moral standard, one must show that only if one follow the perfect moral standard could one become more moral.

A Nietzschean objection I will present it later, but right now let's focus on the three points above.

The reason I say perfection is a value term is because it is used to describe the property of a being, a qualitative term that means "the adjective used above best describes (best fits the definition of the adjective) the object." For example, a "perfect circle" means that the properties of the (definition of a) circle best fits the circle observed, a "perfect black" meaning the object fits the best the definition of black, etc.

To make God equating perfection will therefore lead to a truckload of logically contradictory properties, since God cannot be simultaneously a perfect circle and a perfect square, etc., an objection against the ontological arguments of Descartes and Anselm.

Now suppose we want to demonstrate God to be "the perfect moral standard", namely, that God fits the property of being moral the best. Now the problem arises: Who defines morality? Where does the definition of being moral comes from? If it comes from God, wouldn't God become a valuer of morality, which could cause the standard to become subjective?

This objection leads to Plato's Euthyphro dilemma, which would force all moral statements into statements of value. The major theme of Euthythro comes from the idea that if God defines good and evil, then they are subjective statements. Otherwise, good and evil exists independent of God, implying God not to be the definer of good and evil. Now what are we to know how good God is? Is it because God defined a certain action to be good ex nihilo or that God's characteristics are defined by the independent standard of good and evil to be good?

Now the final objection: Do we have the moral obligation to commit our existential self to a being with perfect moral standards? Here let's assume God is indeed demonstrated to be morally perfect (Plato's objection notwithstanding), are we therefore required morally to submit to the will of such a being?

One question might arise from even this seemingly logical argument: How do we know there is only one perfect moral standard? If there are other perfect moral standards, then there is no existential obligation to submit to only one example of the morally perfect standard. Also, who is to say that one will always be less moral if one do not commit their existential self to the perfect moral standard? That is, to show that it is logical to be morally obligated to submit to a given perfect moral standard we must show we are more moral if and only if we existentially commit ourselves to this perfect moral standard.

See above. I will come back to posit a "Nietzschean" objection to the same statements you made in the last post.

The_Ist

You seem to go into detail on all these points below, so I see no point in forming responses to these introductory statements.

I'm not trying to imply that the definition of God is "perfection." If this were the case, then your counterexamples regarding perfect circles and blacks would seem to render this definition meaningless. I am saying that God is "a perfect being." Perfection, generally defined, is "to be without flaw." A perfect circle is one that has no flaw with regard to its circular properties. Likewise for the color black. So to say God is a perfect being is to say that he is a being without flaw. Accordingly, I don't think your objection regarding perfect circles and squares is valid, because geometrical shape and color have nothing to with describing what constitutes a being that has no flaws.

I think the Euthyphro dilemma is a fallacy of bifurcation. Morality can be grounded in God's nature.

1. God is a being without flaw.
2. God is a being with a moral nature.
3. God's moral nature is without flaw.

If God makes a moral command, it is not objectively moral simply because he says so, but because it flows intrinsically from his flawless moral nature. And this objectivity obviously is not independent of God, either; it comes from his nature.

Supposing that objective and flawless morals can be grounded in God's nature (and I think they can), any other moral standard is either different from that which is grounded in his nature, and is then necessarily not flawless, or it is the same as that which is grounded in his nature. If one commits himself to the former, he commits to an imperfect standard of morality; if he commits to the latter, he commits to the same moral standard as the perfect one that flows from God's nature.

Suppose that God is the perfect moral standard. Now suppose that he commands that humans commit their existential selves to him. By default, then, to do so is to act morally, because it is in accordance with God's perfect morality. To not do so is to act immorally. Therefore, in order to become more moral, humans must existentially commit themselves to God.

philechat

But my question is, how is such a "perfect being" defined? By what standard is this "perfection" measured against? And if there is a standard, would it not be a standard defined by humans? You must first have the definition of "a perfect being" (not just being without flaw, otherwise a circle without flaw can also be a being without flaw) before you can say that God fits the definition of the "perfect being", that is to say. Otherwise it will become circular: "Perfect being is a being without flaw. God is without flaw. So God is a perfect being." But by which definition is God measured against when he is said to be "without flaw"? Certainly not the definition of the perfect circle.
Another circular statement? "Objective morals come from God's nature, therefore God is a morally perfect being?" The problem is the lack of external standard of which God can be measured against.
Not true. Take the example of the "perfect circle" again. You can find an infinite number of circles that can be called a "perfect circle" as long as it fits the definition of being a "circle" flawlessly. Similarly, there is no reason to assume that there will only be one standard for perfect morality--since there may be an infinite number of moral concepts that might fit with the definition of being "moral", that is to speak.
Same as above. There is no reason to assume God alone fits the definition of being the perfect moral standard. There may be a countless different beings that may fit in the criteria of being "morally perfect", one of which is God, the way there might be a countless number of circles that fits the definition of being a "circle" perfectly.

philechat

Just for entertainment purpose, and the fact that this thread must go into a sickening discussion about the minite points of logic, I shall put on the Nietzschean hat that was first assumed by the OP, in a way not necessarily based on what we learned in a lecture on formal logic. Come on, eagles, serpants, motley cows, and jesters...

Why would it be rational to assume moral perfection the only kind of perfection? Why must we be lured into such subterranean glorification of the herd, humbling ourselves before those who believed themselves superior because they chose to be moral? Are we not a part of the stars--when our greatness comes from our ability to perform evils and to affirm even the night? To dream not of the static otherworld, but this lovely sky everchanging, rippling as new winds above the abyss? Why must we seek morality, and to soil our hands with all the judgments of "good" and "evil", when we no longer resist suffering and difference? When the terrible beauty of this world is all around us, capable of creation and destruction?

Creators all! It is not peace we seek, nor goods everlasting. Is not evil a part of us, as discordance is a part of harmony, that sublimates our heart? Is not darkness a glorification of the light? Do not judge experience. Do not shun evil--for we are perfections onto ourselves, we lovers of change.

The_Ist

Sorry for the delay, I've been kinda busy lately.

First of all, I think your analogy to circles is flawed (no pun intended). The phrases "perfect circle" and "circle without flaw" are meangingless. What, exactly, would an imperfect or flawed circle look like? If something has the qualities of a circle, it is one. If it lacks any, it isn't one. There is no such thing as an "imperfect" circle. To say a geometric shape is a "perfect circle" is to say nothing more than that it is, in fact, a circle.

I agree that, if God is defined as a perfect being, the attributes, characteristics, etc. that we give him in accordance with such a definition ultimately come from humans. Our definitions and conceptions of perfection are obviously human in origin, because we are human. However, this does not mean that we cannot have any meaningful discourse regarding what perfection entails; to say that because the standard is human we do not have the ability to distinguish between attributes in accordance with perfection and those in disaccord with perfection would be a non sequitur.

I should have been more clear regarding my definition of a perfect being as a being without flaw. While I think your circle analogy has problems, consider the example of an apple without flaw. Would this be an example of a perfect being, since it is flawless? The important point and distinction I want to make is that, when we say we have an apple without flaw, we are only comparing its qualities to those possessed by apples, as opposed to other objects/beings/existents. But insofar as God is concerned, it makes more sense to define him as "THE perfect being." As opposed to the apple, which is only flawless with regard to its apple-like qualities, when someone says God is flawless, he tends to mean that God's attributes are superior to any other contrary attributes that could hypothetically be possessed by any other type of being. IOW, when I say an apple is flawless, I am only comparing it to other apples. But when I say God is the perfect (i.e., flawless) being, I am comparing him to all other beings, and not just those within some limited subset. So, for example, consider omniscience. Insofar as knowledge is concerned, it seems intuitively obvious that a being with some knowledge is superior to one with no knowledge, and that a being with all knowledge is superior to both cases. Therefore, when comparing all hypothetical beings, those who do not possess all knowledge are somewhat flawed, while those that do are not flawed (only with respect to knowledge, of course). So while we may say that an apple is flawless with respect to other apples, we would not say that such an object is the perfect being, because in the grand sense (i.e., in its comparison to all other hypothetical existents) it has obvious flaws, such as the lack of any knowledge.

Now, obviously there may be disagreement between parties as to what attributes are contained in "the perfect being." But these differences do not render such a definition worthless, because what we are aiming to describe is, at least, in common.

Eh, hopefully that made sense.

Uh, I don't see the supposed circularity. If God is "the perfect being," and he possesses a moral nature, then that moral nature is flawless. If it was flawed he wouldn't be "the perfect being," and, therefore, he wouldn't be God. One doesn't need an external standard to determine that God's moral nature is flawless, because such a conclusion follows from the definition of God.


I discussed the perfect circle analogy above.

Let's consider an example: murder. Suppose there is a God, and, in accordance with his flawless moral nature, murder is wrong. Any other moral standard that holds that murder is right, or that it is morally neutral, MUST be flawed, because it contradicts the flawless standard. If, in accordance with this God's flawless moral nature, murder is morally neutral, then any other moral standard that holds that it is either right or wrong is necessarily flawed, because it contradicts the flawless standard. And the same rationale, I think, can be applied to any conceivable action. So if a moral standard differs in any way from the perfect standard, it is necessarily flawed. Therefore, I still hold that there can only be one perfect moral standard.

Obviously it is conceivable for more than one being to be morally perfect, but it does not follow, then, that there is more than one perfect moral standard.

Aerik Von

All things are relative, but to a point we CAN "prove" items by trying them over and over again. If I stab myself in one place seven times and it hurts every time, I can say it hurts. Maybe the amount of hurt can be debated, but it gets the same reaction every time.

God as a matter of logic, history and words does not matter, I believe the god concept and the mystic world fail when put to the test of repeat exposure, and therefore - do not exist.

I may NOT want to believe God exists as well, but the proof will be in the cold expiriment - no matter what .I want to have happen.

Whatever you want in the end, you cant change the truth to fit your needs.