Normal

This argument is as fallacious as the cosmological argument. If the world began, and all physicality with it, what was the cause for it's beginning? Keeping in mind that physicality could not of caused it because it didn't exist yet?

Spenser

Alright, for the sake of argument (remember I'm an atheist and pretty much agree with what you are trying to say):

1) What does this actually say? Everything in the known universe is 'physical' is it not? How do we know that whatever is outside of the universe (if there is anything outside of the universe) is physical or nonphysical, and if the latter whether or not it can cause physical substance or events. Simply because we have not observed such a thing as of yet in the universe does not make premise 1 true. Further, if in the future we observe such a 'thing' (for lack of a better word) might we not then label it as physical? This seems much like an atheistic presuppositional argument, meaning it is only valid if we assume premise 1 to be true. Without premise 1, the argument fails and premises 2-4 are fruitless. I'll go onto them anyhow...

2) Are you sure? Might he be physical outside of our universe much like a programmer is real outside of his software?

3) I whole heartedly agree

4) I also whole heartedly agree, though not because of premises 1-3...

fishbulb

1) There exist absolute truths
2) It is true that logically sound arguments that use absolutely true premises produce certainly true conclusions.
3) Humans have knowledge of certain absolute truths.
4) Therefore humans can construct purely logical arguments to draw conclusions which are certainly true.

The critical problem with arguments based on deductive logic and non-falsifiable premises is that no independent verification of the argument is possible. If I make an argument based on empirically verifiable premises and draw an empirically verifiable conclusion then I can, at least in principle, go out and test both my premises and my conclusion and see if they actually coincide with real experience and observation. Moreover, there is at least the possibility that I will be able to use the conclusion to accomplish something useful like predict where drilling for oil will be successful or what tactics will make the cute girl at the coffee shop fall madly in love with me.

Deductive arguments are deemed true if they meet certain structural requirements: the premises are true and the argument is valid. In other words, they are true because they are defined as true. But they are not useful unless the truth status of the conclusion can actually be correlated with something in the real world.

Any logically valid argument that is based on premises which are non-falsifiable can be re-stated thusly:

If A (and B and C...) are true, then X is also true, but we have no way of verifying that A (and B and C) are true and no way of verifying that X is true, so we really have no clue whether or not X is true, but our argument is valid anyway.

Deductive reasoning is a wonderful tool that can be used to solve some very real problems. But the keys are verification and application. If you can't find evidence to corroborate the conclusion and your new knowledge doesn't allow you to do anything new then (1) you can't be certain your premises are right and (2) you have accomplished nothing of practical significance. Knowledge is valuable because it allows you to do something you couldn't do before. "Proving" that god does or doesn't exist using unsupported premises doesn't allow you to actually go out and find god, stop the floods from washing away your village, or correctly predict the coming of the apocalypse. It is just playing with logic and knowledge, in the same way that using a circular saw to cut up a board into little pieces--for no reason besides the fact that it's fun to cut things into pieces--is just playing with power tools.

ComestibleVenom

Again and again we are confronted in our conceptual universe with breakdowns of causality.

I agree with Normal. The foolishness of physical/non-physical 'interaction' doesn't even enter the picture if we have rejected the tacit premise that causation is a necessary element of how we eludicate the very early origins of the universe.

TheGreatInfidel

Most of your disagreements, have to do with premise 1), I also believe it's questionable. It's the million dollar question, yet in this argument it's asserted off-handedly. The reason I posted is to see what feedback I would get and what things your responses would get me to think. I guess for the purpose of enquiring further into the subject.

I think prior to judgements becoming universal judgemendts, such as what premise 1) from the OP purports to be, they go through a period of merely being and inductive inference. For example:

1) All observed A's have turned out to be B's,
2) It has never been observed that an A isn't a B.
3) Therefore, It is likely that the next observed A will also be a B.

That is not a deductive argument, it is an inductive argument. It still allows for the possibility of an A not being a B.

But I think there comes a time that inductive arguments become deductive due to forming universal claims. In other words, once it has been observed repeatedly that all observed A's happened to be B's, by custom we become convinced that in fact *all* A's are B's. Our conception of A begins to include B and to us it becomes analytic that an A is a B. This affords us inferences of this sort:

1) All A's are B's.
2) x is an A
3)Ergo, X is a B.

I think, now it can be safely said analytically, that all men are mortal. After all, our conception of men, includes mortality and we have formed the universal judgement that "All men are Mortal". Therefore we make such inferences as:

1) All men are mortal.
2) Socrates is a man.
3) Ergo, Socrates is mortal

But I think there was a stage when we didn't make the the universal claim in premise 1). A skeptic could easily point out, " You are not omniscient or omnipresent; you have no way of knowing that somewhere, some place in the entire universe, there is a man that isn't mortal." All we had was a contingent inference:

1) All observed men have turned out be mortal.
2) There has never been an instance of a man not being mortal.
3) Ergo, it is likely that the next man will also be mortal.

How does this apply to our discussion? Well, what I'm trying to get at is that although it's been the case that all observed instances of physical effects have had physical causes, we still are skeptical towards the claim that "all physical effects only have physical causes" and unwilling to make it a universal judgement.

So, just as a skeptic can contest the universality of "All men are mortal", by saying,"how do you know that all men are mortal? You have no way of knowing that there is no place in this entire universe, where there is a man that is not mortal; you are not omniscient. Have you looked everytwhere? Everywhere in this universe?" On those basis he can deny the soundness of:

1) All men are mortal.
2) Socrates is a man.
3) Ergo, Socrates is mortal.

Likewise a skeptic can also claim, "how do you know that somewhere some place there isn't a physical effect with a non-physical cause. Have you checked everywhere? " and hence deny the universality of "all physical effect have physical causes" and therefore deny the soundness of the OP.

In other words, just as the universality of premise 1) of the OP is being denied throughout this thread, *any* universal judgement can be denied. You guys are doing exactly what the proponents of the Transcendental argument do - inductive skepticism.

Edited to state:

Somewhere in some message someone questioned the practicality of arguments of the sort I posed in the OP. Well, my reply is,.....since when do people that enquire on what there is (philosohers?), give a rats ass about what practical use we have for a deductive argument of that sort?

Spenser

The problem is that when you say:

is that you are talking about observed instances of physical effects have had physical causes that are only observable within the universe and trying to apply them to unobservable things outside the universe. There is no justification for asserting that things should work the same way outside of the observable universe as they do within. Its a mystery, some people name that mystery God, some just say we don't yet or may never know.

Something to think about is as we go back through time and close in on a singularity all laws of physics break down (or so I read from Mr. Hawking) which give us no reason to think things outside the known universe would or should act any particular way...

TheGreatInfidel

Well, I never said anything about outside the universe. The universal judgement of premise 1) from the OP, is about what holds in the universe and not outside of it. The conclusion is about the world and not necessarily the whole universe.


Perhaps I should qualify it, something like this:

1)Within the universe, physical substances or events only have physical causes.
2) God is purported to be non-physical.
3) The world is physical and it is within the universe.
4) Ergo, god did not cause the world.

Edited to say:

Perhaps I should say earth and not world.

1)Within the universe, physical substances or events only have physical causes.
2) God is purported to be non-physical.
3) The earth is physical and it is within the universe.
4) Ergo, god did not cause the earth.

Spenser

Then the open question is did God create the universe which eventually caused the world?

TheGreatInfidel

In my argument we were able to make the inference that god cannot cause the world because god is non-physical, the world is physical, and within the universe (which the world resides in), the laws state that only physical stuff can cause physical stuff.

But to consider what you are asking we would have to know what is it that the universe resides in ( call it superuniverse) and know what are the laws of the superuniverse concerning whether a non-physical substance (god) can cause a physical substance (the universe).


Side issue:

If god created the universe and the universe created the world. Does that mean god created the world?

If A caused B, and B caused C, and C caused D........etc......and Y caused Z. Does that mean that A caused Z?

Spenser

Sorry if I am at a complete loss for your point but you did post this in the EoG forum so I would assume your argument is trying to disprove God which it doesn't. You make that quite clear with your own words which were much along the lines of my objection to premise 1:

I guess I actually assumed your OP to be this:


------------------------------------------------
1)Non-physical substances cannot cause physical substances or events.
2) God is non-physical.
3) The world is physical.
4) Ergo, god did not cause the universe
------------------------------------------------


but you seem to be referring to Earth and if this is true what could you possibly hope to accomplish with this argument? Please correct me if I got something wrong here...