doubtingt

No, it is inherent in the concept of "better" "moral" or any other value laden concept. These concepts have no referent outside of a subjective mind. "Which one is longer?" has meaning becuase the trait is an inherent property in the objects. Try and define value laden terms in a way that is entirely independent of any subjective mind.
No one ever considers issues of values and morality, except when the will of one subjective mind is having an impact on another being with a subjective mind. This is because the concept of morality derives its meaning directly from subjective experience.

Value laden words ARE used by most people in reference to subjective preference. When people claim something is moral according to God or any other anthropromorphization of the "universe", they are still pointing to the subjective preferences of those supernatural beings.

Dr. Retard

Whenever two people who speak the same language argue over the inherent meaning of terms, it's stupid. It's really stupid when the terms are philosophical terms, which are almost always contestable. There is no fact of the matter as to whether a term means something, other than how people actually use the term. Since different people will sometimes use the same term differently, some terms have many meanings. British people call French fries "chips" and Americans call potato and corn chips "chips". There's no point in arguing over what "chips" really are.

Now, when some people use "better", "moral", "right", etc. (normative terms), they mean to express matters of (inter)subjective reality -- feelings, affections, customs, conventions). But, when other people use normative terms, they mean to express matters of objective reality -- social utility, mutual advantage, stable cooperative strategy, or simply "right", "just", and the rest shamelessly unanalyzed and unreduced (like G.E. Moore). Both uses exist.

You claim that seemingly objective uses of normative terms are really subjective uses in disguise, because the 'objectivists' are really referring to the subjective preferences of supernatural beings. But this neglects all the naturalist agnostics and atheists who believe in objective moral reality.

You suggest this argument: People call something a moral matter only when it concerns subjective minds interacting. The best way to make sense of this is that morality concerns nothing more than subjective experience. So moral terms are inherently subjective.

But this argument would condemn psychological terms as well. People call something a psychological matter only when it concerns subjective minds. That doesn't mean that there is no objective fact of the matter whether someone is depressed, anxious, sociopathic, bipolar, etc. Psychological terms and claims are about objective facts, even though these facts in turn greatly concern subjective facts. Someone who believes in objective moral reality will likely make the same claim about moral terms and claims. Just because happiness and other subjective states of mind are important factors in the constitution of moral facts does not mean that moral terms and claims are merely subjective.

People have been defining moral terms in natural (ergo, not value-laden) terms for a long time. Utilitarianism is the most famous example, as it aims to define the moral universe in terms of happiness, pleasure, preference-satisfaction, and other purely naturalistic conceptions of individuals' good.

[ October 04, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

Longbow

That is correct.

Correct again. I am not really saying that "ought" cabnnot be derived from an a priori "is", but that is not what the dichotomy really is supposed to be.

Well, this is a straighforward question of where the burden of proof lies. Just because people contend that morality is empirical, that doesn't mean that they think the burden of proving this isn't on them. I think that the burden of proof clearly lies on the empirical moral objectivist to prove that morals exist.

But, it is. It is obviously true that statements about what ought to be don't directly refer to something that is the case. This is what assigns the burden of proof to the empirical moral objectivists. The controversy surrounding the matter is irrelevant.

As for the issue of parsimony, I did not actually bring it up. But, now that the empirical moral objectivists mention it, I do think my model is more parsimonious. In general, I have also chosen the lazy world view -- the one that requires the least amount of justification.

Laurentius

Human beings define themeselves through their ability to create a cultural universe that parallels the natural one.

Oughts are not everything cultures are all about, but they make an important means through which human societies regulate themselves in order to ensure their preservation.

AVE

Dr. Retard

Burden-of-proof disputes are usually pretty fruitless. In any case, I don't have a position on the is-ought distinction, so I'm pretty sure I don't have to defend anything. I'm not sure whether the distinction is any good or not. So this...

...makes me fear that my obvious-o-meter is broken. I don't see it. If I saw an argument for it, maybe I'd come to see it as obvious. But right now, I'm not getting it at all, much less obviously.

One reason for doubting that parsimony can help decide the issue: moral realists (almost?) always hold that moral facts supervene on natural facts. That means that two naturally identical worlds must be morally identical as well. To employ (and slightly alter) David Chalmers's metaphor, when God made all the natural facts true, he didn't have to do anything else -- the moral facts came for free. Classic analogous-example: chemical facts supervene on physical facts. Hold the physics constant, and the chemistry stays the same also. Talk of chemistry is just high-level talk of physics. Similarly, talk of moral facts is just high-level talk of natural facts.

Since nobody's positing any "ontologically novel" entities, but merely new ways of describing the natural world, then perhaps both positions are equally parsimonious.

[ October 05, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

Primal

John Galt Jr. I dispute the question as a loaded one because it is already proposing that all such facts are non-moral a priori. I think an 'ought' is derrived from a moral 'is'.

Primal

Doubting T Why? What if objectively "better" simply means preferred?

I can say "to human beings eating meat,fruits or vegetables is objectively better then eating dung."

Or that "person X is objectively better at running then person Y."

What makes psyhcological evaluations different then other phsyical descriptions? Nothing really.

If you are going to maintain that there is the burden of proof is on you because that is dualism.

LOngbow: You continue to make the same mistakes as Hume. I.E. Saying an 'is' is fundamentally different then an 'ought' why? Because they must be.

And is an ought automatically a moral? I I say "John is moral" that is certainly different then saying "John out to be moral".

Just as it is saying "John is running to catch the Bus" is different from saying "John ought to run if he wishes to catch the bus."

Though the difference is not fundamental, it is merely reffering to different types of descriptions. 1) A given state. 2) A given state with descriptions of actions which need to be taken to accomplish a goal.

Another area where the is/ought dichotomy seems to fail, is that it confuses the two. I.E. What morality is, with what an individual 'ought' to do to adhere to that morality.

John Galt, Jr.

Primal,

From your post I think you have misunderstood my remarks; they were not intended to suggest that there is no moral 'is' (though I am not sure what such a thing is). The claim that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is' is usually understood to mean moral 'oughts' cannot be derived from nothing but nonmoral facts. Moral 'oughts' are distinguished for example, from prudential 'oughts'-- "You ought not to do that (if you don't want to get into trouble with the law)".

Even if an 'ought' (moral) can be derived from a moral 'is', what do you say about deriving a moral 'ought' from a nonmoral 'is'. Do you dispute the claim that this cannot be done?

John Galt. Jr.

Primal

Given that reasoning Galt, no. Though I don't think that's what the is/ought dichotomy is saying at all.


Also I don't see the difference between a prudential and nonprudential 'ought'. Both are prudential, one is merely derived from another set of facts; morality. As all prudentials are derrivatives though I don't see why moral oughts make up a special case,

hinduwoman

Even in moral sphere is should be objective and ought subjective.
The man is a murderer --- it is a statement of fact.
The man ought not to be a murderer --- a subjective statement, that is not echoed by any law in the objective world.