Alonzo Fyfe

No, this would be my definition of objective values, but not moral values. Moral values are a specific type of objective values.

(Think of it like the difference between a definition of an animal, versus a definition of a horse. You have here the value equivalent of my definition of an animal, but you are saying that it is my value-equivalent definition of a horse. That is incorrect.)


This is an ill-formed question.

Who determines "animalness?" Who determines "squareness"? Who determines "moleculeness?" Who determines "massness?"

Who gets to decide that an elm tree cannot be an animal? That a square cannot have three sides? That a single atom cannot be a molecule? That gravity cannot be a mass?

More importantly, do these questions in any way imply that biology, geometry, chemistry, and physics do not qualify as a science capable of containing propositions that are objectively true?


A lot depends here on what you mean by the "moral imperative of morality."

If you are talking about what gives it its specialness, and that this description of related desires cannot provide it, then I am going to answer you the same way that I would answer the person who says that when I deny that humans have a soul I cannot account for the specialness of humans.

It is not there to be accounted for. It never has been. It is a part of this fictitious "intrinsic value" the same way that the "specialness" of being a human is part of the fiction of having a soul.

If you mean something else, I need to know what that something else is.

If you are going to tell me that morality without this specialness is not properly called morality, I am going to answer that this is like saying that a human without a soul cannot properly be called a human.

Technically, a desire that P is fulfilled if and only if P is true.

A desire that P is thwarted if P is made incapable of being true.

If a person has an aversion to pain (a desire that "I not experience pain"), then inflicting pain on him thwarts his desire.



Note: Yes, I am a determinist.

Norge

Okay, Alonzo. I thought you might be a determinist, but I wasn't quite sure because your posts seem all dressed up with language I didn't recognize. The other determinist I debated talked a lot more about biology, but anyway, good to know where you stand. Now to address the points you raise.

Below is my quote and your reply:
quote:
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Originally posted by Norge
So who determines "rightness?"
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You: This is an ill-formed question.

Who determines "animalness?" Who determines "squareness"? Who determines "moleculeness?" Who determines "massness?"

Who gets to decide that an elm tree cannot be an animal? That a square cannot have three sides? That a single atom cannot be a molecule? That gravity cannot be a mass?

More importantly, do these questions in any way imply that biology, geometry, chemistry, and physics do not qualify as a science capable of containing propositions that are objectively true? "

Me: Well, you are right in identifying morality as something that is objectively true (although I'm not sure you wanted to do that), like geometry and physics.

However, even given this, I'm not sure you're understanding me, because you don't appear to understand what I mean by moral imperative. Morals are framed in "you should" or "you shouldn't" phrases. That's the imperative. Your account simply describes these things as objective, as far as I can tell. I presume you account for them due to evolution, which is fraught with problems, but that's for another time. The point, however, is that accounting for their origins doesn't account for their prescription value, which is what morality is all about. You can describe as long as you like, but I want you to tell me why I "should" act in a certain way and not another way. If you say that you can't, then I'll handle that when it comes.

To expedite the conversation, do you see moral values as prefrences, like ice cream. You like this, I don't like it, so what? Or do you characterize moral values differently?

How extraordinary that you should chance upon a true intuition, as follows:

"If you are going to tell me that morality without this specialness is not properly called morality, I am going to answer that this is like saying that a human without a soul cannot properly be called a human."

Exactly. I do happen to believe that. Because without a soul and accountability, there is no intrinsic difference between us and animals and certainly no real moral imperative. Why "should" we act in a certain way, while we don't make these statements with regard to say, monkeys or lions? Reason, because we're different to monkeys and lions. More on that later.

Now, if you're going to say that "should" doesn't really exist, then I would be interested, because it seems that all you're left with is preference. That's why I asked you the question above.

Interested to hear your response.

Alonzo Fyfe

Granted


Well, then, let's go into Immanual Kant's "categorical" and "hypothetical" imperatives.

Hypothetical imperatives are conditional, "If you want X, then you should do Y." Well, hypothetical imperatives are very easily associated with desires. "If you desire X, then you should do Y."

Categorical imperatives are unconditional -- they exist independent of any desire. There is no such thing. They're an invention -- another word for "intrinsic value."

Moral imperatives are not categorical imperatives. They are the largest and most inclusive of the hypothetical imperatives, that incorporate all desires rather than the desires of just the agent (for example).

One of the ways that Kant described his categorical imperative is to "treat all others as an end in themselves and not merely as a means." This is quite easily incorporated in the universal hypothetical imperative, "Any person whose desires are not included in the over all calculation is being treated merely as a tool having value merely as ameans for those whose desires are included, so include all desires."



Nope, I don't. Our desires are, certainly, shaped by evolution. But the origin of the desire is irrelevant. All that matters is its content.


P.S., to see my view on determinism, it may be useful to check out my Ethics Without God series and read Part VIII.

The AntiChris

But this surely misses the point?

Even if the slave owners, and the population at large who 'benefitted' from the proceeds of slave labour, could be persuaded to include all desires in their "moral calculation", it is quite possibly the case that slavery would be morally permissable purely by virtue of the fact that slaves would comprise a minority of of the total set of desires.

This of course applies to the situation of any oppressed minority - so long as they remain a minority, they would be morally obligated to accept their lot according to your theory.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

I have heard this example a lot, and I have always found it a question-begging, internally inconsistent example.

How can it even remotely qualify as "slavery" if every effort is made to fulfill every desire of the "subject" group?

What you need to do in order for me to see this example is provide me with a description that does not use the word "slavery", because I take the word "slavery" to be denying one of the premises of the assumption, which is the premise that the interests of the "slaves" are fully considered. The very definition of a "slave" is a person whose interests are NOT considered -- people who are treated as mere property, something owned -- as beings whose own interests and desires are considered irrelevant in any moral calculations.

So this example is saying that the interests of the "slaves" both are and are not being considered. A contradiction.

Alonzo Fyfe

I want to argue separately that any anti-utilitarian objections have a significant problem.

The only way that these objections can have merit is if the "intuitions" with which utilitarianism is said to come into conflict picks out some sort of desire-independent super-value. No matter how distasteful the utilitarian conclusion may be, the prospect of desire-independent value is several orders of magnitude more problematic. The presumption that the problem exists in utilitarianism, and not the intuition, must be defended and, as far as I can see, can only be defended on the basis of fictitous intrinsic values.

And I do not see ANY grounds for an argument that says, "if I do not like the conclusion, then the conclusion must be wrong -- because only the conclusions that I like can be right."

The assumptions that rest behind these types of objections are so wildly problematic that I cannot see any reason to take them seriously.

Furthermore, desire-utilitarianism allows a second line of defense against these objections that act-utilitarianism does not allow.

You do not like the conclusion. Desire-utilitarianism asks another question. Is the dislike for this type of conclusion "good" in the real world? All things considered, does an aversion to slavery (a desire that there be no slavery) lead to more overall desire fulfillment? Important: we cannot eliminate the part that asks about the merit of the desire IN THE REAL WORLD, because these likes and dislikes are REAL WORLD likes and dislikes. The affect not only our reactions to these conclusions, but our reactions to real-world events in our every day lives.

If the aversion is "good" in a desire-utilitarian sense, then disliking the conclusion raises no objection to utilitarianism. Utilitarianism says that you are SUPPOSED to have this type of reaction, that it is good. But, you are reacting to the conclusion, not to the argument. But, it is not a contradiction, because you are having a real-world aversion to a hypothetical-world conclusion -- and there is no reason to hold that both cannot be correct.

dk

I'm a little disappointed Alonzo Fyfe. You claim to want to change the world, but you go on ad nausium about the trivial while you refuse to acknowledge the hard questions, and hard problem that the real world presents to morality.

Alonzo Fyfe

You think I am ignoring you, right?

I have your arguments in hand. However, they do not avail themselves to quick replies that these other do. If I answered you and ignored everybody else, then THEY would be levelling these accusations against me. Either way, I seem to be in a no-win situation.

Your writing style suggests that you incorporate a lot of existentialist (esp. Kierkegaard) and post-modernist assumptions into your arguments. To some degree, this means that you and I lack a shared language -- at least to the same degree as with others. This makes answering your questions far more difficult because of the translation that is required.

Besides, I suspect that those whose opinions you dismiss so casually here as "trivial" do not share your assessment of their posts. And neither do I.

dk

I apologize. There is a lot of value in the propositional logic, and the reflections upon desire, belief at which you excel. I'm locked into the idea of objective morality being a catalyst that facilatates (but doesn't cause) a good life. So I don't disagree with much of what you say.

DRFseven

What we know is what we believe to be true. It becomes a part of our truth structures, with which we form our model of "the way things are." These structures can change, subject to new input, but at any given moment, we have some specific truth structures.



Except that most often, people don't have beliefs about obtaining J because they don't know about J, or about physiological mechanisms underlying behavior.

She means mistreating kittens is a bad behavior, and the two-year-old child incorporates that information about bad behavior into her "primitive" truth structure, just as she has incorporated the information that houses and elephants are big, and caterpillars and ants are little. Later, she will begin to understand that people use reasoning to determine how things are bad, good, big, and little, themselves, and that sometimes it gets complicated. She will apply reasoning to new information, as well as to existing structures, though the reasoning, itself, will be subjected to these structures. In the end, she will still think that mistreating kitties is bad and she will teach her children the same thing; she will have reasons to "back up" her feelings, but her young children will only know that behavior is wrong.

Quote:

Now, even if this is the best interpretation of what the mother is actually saying, it does not make it true. Indeed, it is not true. But, if we look at the speech act itself and the way it functions within the language for native speakers, at its implications and uses, this interpretation makes the most sense. Which carries me back to my objections to individual subjectivists -- that they are logically inconsistent in reducing moral claims to one of these non-intrinsic-value meanings, while still holding to all of the linguistic traditions and implications that only make sense in the light of an intrinsic value interpretation.

I hope I have shown you that, while to the two-year-old child (and to the family dog), bad means "that which is designated as 'bad' ", at thirty-two, people perceive reasons for things being bad (the family dog never reaches this conclusion because his behavioral constraint system doesn't permit it - things are always "bad" if so designated).



This makes no sense; they are being sincere. When they are two, they are not subjectivists. Thirty-two-year-old subjectivists have reasons.

Quote:

Evolution contains no such principle. You assume that traits can be atomized, that it is possible to cut one and change a second without influencing the others, and this is not the case. There is no more reason to believe that this is any more true of behavior than of physical traits -- particularly since behavior is determined by physical traits (e.g., the physical structure of the brain).

The structure of the brain is also determined by behavior, which is determined by environment in light of structure. They are interdependent.