Evangelion

Thomas Metcalf -

Correct. But such propositions can only be advanced on the basis of foreknowledge – which is itself a logical consequence of the propositions in question.

*snip*

This is another version of Nelson Pike’s argument (see God and Timelessness, 1970.) I find it wholly unconvincing because it makes logical leap from (2) to (3), without ever considering the possible causes of (2.)

For example, if (2) is true regardless of my personal decision, then (3) necessarily follows. But if (2) is true as a result of my personal decision, then (3) immediately evaporates.

At the end of the day, all you have done here is to reiterate Devilnaut’s argument (necessarily involving a causal connexion between freedom and foreknowledge, with foreknowledge as the catalyst), but (like Devilnaut) you have not been successful in your attempts to vindicate his proposal.

Yes, I’m a compatibilist. Free will and free choice can coexist harmoniously with foreknowledge.

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Evangelion ]</p>

Evangelion

Philosoft –

Thanks.

Why does this not surprise me?

Really? So I’m not allowed to say that something’s very difficult for our finite minds to comprehend? Remember, I did not advance this as the proof of my argument; it stands without further qualification. I am simply observing that it is very difficult for a finite mind to comprehend exhaustive foreknowledge. Surely that’s a reasonable comment?

Straw man. I have done nothing of the kind. I have not agreed that my proposal results in a logical contradiction, and I see no evidence that it is. I have simply pointed out that God’s foreknowledge is logically contingent upon our future (freely-chosen) actions. Yes, this is a bit difficult for us to wrap out heads around, but it’s not impossible, and the proposal itself is not self-contradictory.


Oh, absolutely! I’ve been hammering this point ever since we began!

The correlation is this: that God’s foreknowledge is logically contingent upon our (freely-chosen) future actions.

I’ve lost count of the number of times I’ve had to say this.

Kharakov

Wrong. The preference to resist another desire (hunger...) is a desire as well. If desire is the cause of your actions, your actions are not uncaused.
Pretty simple.

For free will to exist it must be totally uncaused.

If you have a reason for doing something (a preference as to what you do) you are not acting without cause. No free will here.

Just pay attention to yourself for a little while. Pay attention to how you make decisions. Pay attention to the actual desires that motivate you (Why am I resisting/not resisting the desire to eat, sleep, etc.? Why do I desire to respond to or not respond to this post?). If you notice that you can control what you desire (decide which thing you would like to desire) what is the motivation behind you deciding to desire something or not? If you are making a decision, doesn't that indicate that you have a desire about the outcome of that decision?

Kharakov

The question was simply a setup for the next paragraph, it was not intended to setup a strawman. Look at the message holistically instead of sophistically.

The answer to why is desire, which is a cause. Desire is the cause of all intentional actions.

Evangelion

Kharakov ("the modern Holbarch") - unfortunately, you are off-topic. This is supposed to be a thread about the compatibility (or otherwise) of God's foreknowledge and human free will.

You have chosen to debate something else entirely; the existence of free will itself.

Additionally, you have not addressed my previous point; that insofar as we are capable of resisting our inclinations, we are not bound by them, in the way that your argument requires. Simply referring to my refusal to act upon such a desire as "another desire", makes no sense at all.

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Evangelion ]</p>

Devilnaut

Back for more freewill fun. Thanks for the great discussion Eva. Anyway, on with it...

That is still my claim.

This is not, and never has been and never will be my claim!

It would be far more accurate (and could even be gleaned fairly simply by plainly reading my posts in this thread) to say that the existence of his foreknowledge belies the fact that the future is determined! If the future was not determined, how in the heck could anyone (even a super powerful being) know how it will turn out? It really is that simple.

To repeat myself, I said:

To which you replied:

Which, as far as I can see, is a non-sequitur. The purpose of my analogy was to demonstrate that even though the existence of foreknowledge showed the future to be predetermined, in no sense could it be said that the foreknowledge itself had any causal relation to the actual event.

If I have complete knowledge that Big Red will win tomorrow's horse race, we can all bet on her and win a great deal of money. But who in their right mind would claim that my knowledge caused the horse to win the race? That I have this knowledge means one thing and one thing alone: that it was possible for me to trace the causal chain of events leading up to Big Red's victory back to present time. If this is even a possibility in the case of human decision, goodbye free will.

More quotes from me and then you:

What is wrong with "denying the concept of foreknowledge itself"?? I'm trying to show that free will and foreknowledge are incompatible. If I grant for a moment that free will can exist, then obviously I'm going to be denying the concept of foreknowledge.

So God can know today that you will choose shreddies tomorrow, yet you can still freely choose cornflakes? This is an obvious contradiction.

Excuse me, but if you will choose shreddies tomorrow, then your choice has not happened yet! How could God see it? If God is able to travel forward in time and actually witness your decision first hand, and if this choice of yours is truly "free", then the "knowledge" that God has taken from watching you choose is still no guarantee that you will choose the same way when the time period of your decision rolls around for us! If it was, then your choice could not be considered truly free.

Allow me to attempt a clarification here, since we seem to be going in circles.

When you claim that you have free will, as in, the ability to make a decision free of all forces, you are claiming that at the exact moment in time of your decision you are able to freely choose between several alternatives. This means that if we were able to rewind time to a couple of moments before your decision, you might actually choose differently! It follows then that the only moment in time that the information about the outcome of such a decision could possibly exist is at the exact moment it is made, or after. It follows from here that foreknowledge of such a decision is simply not possible. If it were possible, then your decision could not be said to be free!


Editted to clarify wording a little. (Okay, more than a little.)

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

Devilnaut

Davo:

I agree that such a disctinction between temporal and causal priority is important to this discussion. However, as to your above paragraph, I'd argue that any information about the outcome of a truly free choice cannot possibly be known about before the choice is made. Otherwise, the choice is no longer free.

Kharakov

I did address your point about inclination. I rephrased it for you below...

Actually it does. Show me a case when your refusal to act upon a desire is not motivated by a greater desire to deny the desire.

This line of reasoning is not off topic because:

1) free will cannot coexist with desire
2) humans are motivated by desire therefore they cannot have free will
3) which renders any compatibility between omniscience and human free will moot

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Evangelion:

"For example, if (2) is true regardless of my personal decision, then (3) necessarily follows. But if (2) is true as a result of my personal decision, then (3) immediately evaporates." (Emphasis original.)

But (3) is not intended to follow from (2). Remember, the two are independent premises. Here's the argument in full:

(1) If I will have cornflakes tomorrow, then today it is true that I will have cornflakes tomorrow.
(2) If it is true today that I will have cornflakes tomorrow, then there is no chance that I will not have cornflakes tomorrow.
(3) If there is no chance that I will not have cornflakes tomorrow, then I do not have free will.
(4) If I will not have cornflakes tomorrow, then today it is false that I will have cornflakes tomorrow.
(5) If it is false today that I will have cornflakes tomorrow, then there is no chance I will have cornflakes tomorrow.
(6) If there is no chance I will have cornflakes tomorrow, then I do not have free will.
(7) Either I will or I will not have cornflakes tomorrow.
(8) Therefore, I do not have free will.

It's just a constructive dilemma with hypothetical syllogisms. So I think you'd have to object to (3) or to (6), because it's obviously misguided to claim either of them doesn't follow from anything else.

Now, I trust you would say that (3) and (6) are false, because the reason there's no chance that I will or won't have cornflakes tomorrow is because of a person's own choice. So libertarian free will still fails to obtain, but as you're a compatibilist, this shouldn't bother you.

We're still determined to make these choices, I take it, but we're not coerced into making these choices by other agents and we're antecendently unaware of the outcomes of our own decisions. That is, there was no chance of us not making these choices, but as long as they're determined in the right way, they still qualify as free. Right?

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

Devilnaut

That's an excellent way of putting it Thomas. I'd like to point out that if Evangelion is a free will compatibilist and believes (as tronvillain does) that an individual's lack of real options doesn't matter and that as long as causation takes place internally the will is free, then I have no argument with his position.

But, this doesn't seem to be what he is advocating.


I believe a 'true' free will advocate (a non-compatibilist, who believes the will to be free of causation entirely: the kind that is necessary to absolve God of the creation of evil) would be forced to take issue with premise 1 of your argument,

and suggest that in no sense is whatever choice he will make tomorrow, true today. His choice only manifests itself when he uses his "free will" to make it.

This position, however, contradicts with God's omniscience.

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>