John Page

You locate software by searching for instances of things that fit the concept denoted by the word software.
Thus, how you locate the concept of software is relevant to locating actual "software".
I'm asking you to explain why because you said your mind is concrete!! Here's what you wrote "If I was speaking about your mind or my mind, I'd be speaking about a concrete entity." Alternatively, please explain why I can't see a picture of something concrete.

Here's my interpretation of what you just said:

1. Owleye half admits that empirical realism contains contradictions when using dictionary definitions.
2. Owleye is not going to explain anything because owleye can't unless he/she starts changing dictionary definitions, which he/she is accusing John Page of.
3. Owleye uses an ad hominem attack on John Page as a defense of last resort, suggesting he go to school.
4. Having no refutation, Owleye hides behind Kant.
I'm suggesting it is best considered an abstract entity, what are you describing it as?
Thought processes occur in the brain. Not all thoughts are conscious thoughts. Where do you think they occur?
No it isn't and I don't see how you reach this conclusion. Let me try again. I perceive the image of a penguin, the perception of the penguin is real. I had my eyes shut, I perceive there is/was no actual (physical) penguin. The penguin was, therefore, really an imaginary penguin.

Thus, perception is real but not everything we perceive has a real, actual, counterpart in physical reality. Perhaps you are confused by my insistence that perception is a real, physical process and therefore the imagination of the penguin physically existed.
How do you distinguish between belief and true belief? Also, from the subjective view of the child, how do they distinguish?
?? I don't understand the issue you think exists.
Is this, Ok you agree with this assertion or OK you are just noting it? (This would be helpful in my trying to understand your comments).
Because perception is a time-related event.
Oops apologies for the typo. I ment to write "In fact, there have been no discoveries of pictorial images in brain measuring equipment. I do realize absence of evidence is not proof there is no "pictorial processing" and thank you for your suggestions on how visual information might be encoded. It is very curious to me that we perceive images and sounds and smells etc. apart from each other but the underlying brain process for handling information from the senses is the same, i.e. the brain cell.

Cheers, John

crocodile deathroll

In a autopsy room there are three human organs sitting on a bench, one is a kidney, one is a heart and another is a brain. A kid from elementary/primary school could easily tell the difference. Even if a dogs brain was thrown in the kid could still easily discern the difference.
They can know the difference because there is a universal genetic pattern for the morphology of the human brain and the same applies for the dog. But if there were two human brains displayed and one happens to be out of a Russian who could only speak Russian and the other one from an Englishman who could only speak English then with all labels removed could a neural scientist tell which is the English speaking and which is the Russian speaking brain. When the 1990s was proclaimed the year of the brain, it did not mean a certain one Englishman's brain or a Russian's it inferred about the Brain in general.

Even if the Englishman and Russian were both alive then how about if we do an experiment with them. We will put them each in a PET scan and display a page of two columns of text, the one column is written in Russian and the other column is written in English. Lets assume the semantics for both columns of text were identical. Then if both the subjects had not opened their mouths during the whole experiment . Can a neural scientist tell which is the English speaker and which is the Russian speaker by looking at the brain image monitors?.

My theory is, that I do not think the individual mind is established until there is some grasp on a language to tell us who or what we are and all consciousness converges to just a genetic blue print for the human brain before then. A genetic propensity to acquire language is a part of just what it means to be human, which is a collective principle in any case.
Before there is any grasp on language the boundaries on individuality are all smeared out to a single unified collective proto-consciousness.
So a baby does not had any sense of an individual identity as its neurons are still fully just a genetic instruction to migrate to their respective position in their little brains.



[ July 06, 2002: Message edited by: crocodile deathroll ]</p>

crocodile deathroll

Procedural thoughts like riding a bike of swimming after you have already learnt, but the act of learning how to ride a bike is a conscious thought. Even typing your next message rides of a background of preexisting procedural thoughts like knowing where to put you fingers on the keyboard.
I think the weirdest thought processes that do not involve consciousness are that when I am trying to solve a problem then answer does not come to me no matter how hard I consciously apply myself. Then I forget all about it, and a hour later the answer comes to me right out of the blue without me even giving it any conscious thought. That has happened to me frequently.

owleye

excreationist...

"Yes... and plants would have existed before people saw them, and the inside of the moon exists with some specific composition that we may not have explicitly observed yet."

The question dealt exclusively with the so-called theoretical entities forming part of the Standard Model of Physics.

"I think scientific theories are just the best theories that account for current observations that we have. They don't guarantee that things will act the same way in the future although it is probable IMO that they have good predictive value."

If the answer to this is No, it is likely that because you answered Yes to question 1, your view of unobservables represents a departure from standard views that philosophers have held. The response to question 2 is suggestive of an instrumentalist view of theoretical particles, not a realist view, whereas the answer to question 1 is a realist view, not an instrumentalist one. That is, even though the particles are known only theoretically, you believe they are real, while at the same time you suggest that the theories by which these particles are derived is only the best explanation we have, and might be overthrown in the future. On the surface this seems inconsistent and is undoubtedly why your view is at odds with standard views that philosophers have held.

"Well if someone is seeing a shape that they recognize to be the moon then either it is a hallucation/dream or the experience is involves the detection of the moon. I guess "observe" implies seeing real objects (rather than imagined ones) so it would rule out hallucinations/dreams so the moon would be seen and be real."

"Note that sometimes my answers aren't certain - i.e. that thing is *definitely* real, etc."

The question is not an epistemological one. It is not a matter of how sure you are that observations are true. It is a matter of a systematic understanding of what is real and what is exclusively a construction of the mind. Note that one view of reality is that the object of perception could be real, but not as it is represented to us -- this being a pure construction. This could be what you are getting at.

"I guess our minds aren't real then... ?"

There is no obvious reason why minds could not exist apart from (other) minds and, therefore, could be real.


"Also, concepts that no mind has ever imaged or is capable of imagining would exist apart from our minds... Are those things are real as well... ?"

Considered as objects, concepts could be real and exist apart from the mind. This has to do with the "invention/discovery" issue of abstract entities, which I suspect has been discussed in this forum.

"More later..."

Looking forward to it.

owleye

owleye

John...

"Second, I hope excre will correct me if I'm wrong but the proposal is that we have an internal "first-person" account of conscious experience, the brain generating an internal commentary. One example given is the perception of voices in the head."

What I'd been seeking as support would be something which shows that voices in the head are in fact voices in the brain. I did not find anything.

"The underlying cause seems to be a defective migration of cells during brain development, in turn caused by genetic abnormality. What I am suggesting is that the epilepsy example of voices in the head is a manifestation of the process proposed by excre."

It may very well be a manifestation of it. This is a far cry, however, from supporting the view that mental activity is brain activity.

"The function of the PFC may thus be defined as "active, transformational process in which sensory data are synthesized into the simplest possible representation for the purpose of maximizing behavioral efficiency" (Shobris 1996),"

This seems to relate to the functionality of the brain, about which I have no objection.

"Basis of these emergent capacities could be selforganizing mechanisms or architectures offered in constructivistic theories as concept of selfreference and selfexplicativity."

This may very well be true, but it doesn't yet get at what is sought. After all, it is known that muscles have memory, and could therefore be said (in a metaphorical sense) to have a mind of their own, but this doesn't imply they have mental experiences in the first person the way we do.

"This final quote, I think, shows at least tentative conclusions out of PreFrontal Cortex activity studies that the brain forms beliefs and uses them to plan activities and, indeed, to test the beliefs themselves."

I disagree. It only shows that the brain may be involved in producing mental activity, such as believing and planning, but it fails to show that brain activity is mental activity as is alleged.

owleye

Ierrellus

owleye,

Checking the thread--sniff, sniff--my two scents:

If Kant had not respected Newton, I doubt he would have even allowed noumena. How would Kant react in a time when Einstein and Mendel flourish? In a time in which sites of emotion and cognition have been proved to correlate with neuronal activity?

In diehard fact, if humans cannot conceive of what is other than human, with some degree of accuracy, we might as well negate all written history and scientific discovery. There is no subject/object dichotomy!

N. Humprey(1992) suggests than an evolution occurred in which sensation started at an organism's skin and evolved into a feedback loop that depended on the brain's surrogate model of the human body.(Penfield). The shortening of the feedback loop caused a reverberatory activity which accounts for the sounds and pictures "in
your head".

I have known guitarists who can play off feedback to make a sound that could probably not be described rationally.

Ierrellus

PAX

owleye

John....

"You locate software by searching for instances of things that fit the concept denoted by the word software.
Thus, how you locate the concept of software is relevant to locating actual "software".

The first part of the above, I believe, is generally true of all objects of experience. One has to know what something means (or is) before one knows that a particular instance of it is being observed. We cannot observe X without having in our possession the concept according to which observable instances of X can fit. How we, developmentally, attain such concepts is interesting, but, generally speaking it seems to be the case that perception itself requires a prior developed conceptual framework.

However, the second part, I would question. While the concept of the car is relevant to observing cars in the first place, what makes the location of the concept of a car relevant to the location of a specific car I make reference to?

"I'm asking you to explain why because you said your mind is concrete!! Here's what you wrote "If I was speaking about your mind or my mind, I'd be speaking about a concrete entity." Alternatively, please explain why I can't see a picture of something concrete."

Because being concrete doesn't require that I can see a picture of it. Do I have to get out the dictionary for you. Why do you require that a concrete entity by physical?

""1. Owleye half admits that empirical realism contains contradictions when using dictionary definitions."
2. Owleye is not going to explain anything because owleye can't unless he/she starts changing dictionary definitions, which he/she is accusing John Page of.
3. Owleye uses an ad hominem attack on John Page as a defense of last resort, suggesting he go to school.
4. Having no refutation, Owleye hides behind Kant."

Much as you would like me to be, I'm not your adversary. The above is more about you than it is about anything I've presented. For some reason you think that the "contradiction" you've found justifies your own view. Too bad for you I think.

"I'm suggesting it is best considered an abstract entity, what are you describing it as?

And I've been suggesting that calling it an abstract entity is making a category mistake about the use of 'abstract'. Nothing in what I've said suggests I think it is a physical thing. I should have suggested an alternative for you, e.g., "an ideal entity." Perhaps we would not be having this kind of argument.

"Thought processes occur in the brain."

Do they? This is the bone of contention I'd had with a physicalist interpretation of mental activity.

"Not all thoughts are conscious thoughts."

Really? What thoughts are not conscious?

"I perceive the image of a penguin, the perception of the penguin is real."

Let's suppose then you are merely offering that all mental activity is real, whether or not the objects of such activity are real. If so, this is not different than what Descartes said of the mind. If this is as far as your ontological framework goes, then one might suppose that only minds exist.

"How do you distinguish between belief and true belief? Also, from the subjective view of the child, how do they distinguish?"

You tell me. I think you have elsewhere referred to such things as evidence and third party testimony. I would tend to agree with this except that I would characterize it as developing an objective view. You, on the other hand, seem to be obsessed with using the term 'subjective', for all such views.

owleye

owleye

Ierrelius...

Thanks for chiming in here. Kant's metaphysics remains relevant today principally because of his transcendental logic and his transcendental ideality. The noumenal realm is not so much a separate ontological realm as it is a "standpoint" that our minds are (or reason is) capable of. (Spinoza may be a forerunner of this idea.) For the most part the science of the time had identified as a force of nature only gravitation quantitatively. This made it difficult to understand how things which appear to be governed solely by inner principles could be governed by natural laws. Indeed, though he was quick to adopt the views of Lavoisier, he differed from him by his realizing that solidity was the more fundamental problem that needed an answer, and not fluidity. I suspect that Kant would have adjusted to modern science better than most. The status of the philosophy of science today is rather in shambles and I suspect could use a Kant to get itself out of the pickle it is in.

owleye

John Page

OK. Could you tell me prior to what? Clearly, the concept must exist as a precondition to having "sense data" (for example) compared with it to generate the perception. Do you mean prior to the event of perception or do prior to the existence of a mind or some other condition?
The actual location of the concept is flexible, as is the location of the car being perceived. All I am asserting is that for perception to occur, both the concept of car and the car must exist at some time/space locations. If this were not so, comparison of the concept and the sense data from the object could not take place (unless there is some hitherto unknown physic that enables this to happen).
Because a concrete thing is a material thing by definition. If you provide me an example of something that is concrete but not detectable using light then I will proceed to ask you how you can prove to me such material thing exists, ... this takes us into the realm of physics. All this harks back to by suggestion that "physical" is a better opposite to "abstract" than "concrete".
I do not consider you my adversary. I was assuming we were having a debate about potentially differing points of view on defining the Mind/Body border. I've stated what I think the contradiction is between empirical realism and certain dictionary definitions you provided and you started getting personal. If you do not wish to consider the contradiction that's your decision, I do not intend getting personal in return.
Care to define "ideal entity" so we can discuss the relation between things falling under such category and physical/imaginary entities?
Yes, but I seem to remember the descriptor "in" is something you're not happy with. Is it better if I say "Thought process are synonymous with brain activity"?
Please see thread on
<a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=56&t=000256" target="_blank">Blindsight</a> for links to examples.
This is not the limit of the ontological framework I'm exploring. Again, if you want more info on the ontology please provide me an email address I can send you a file that contains details. You can do this privately by clicking on the icon of a stamped envelope at the top of any of my postings.
IMO any conclusion is limited by the scope of what has been tested and found repeatable. This provides us reliable conclusions about the nature of our environment. However, these conclusions are limited by the viewpoints considered, variables accounted for an tested etc. So, a scientific experiment carried out in both space and on earth can be considered more objective. But we cannot reach absolute objectivity because we cannot test all variables in space and time. Hence, to suppose that an objectively reached conclusion will hold good for all space and time is irrational. What I believe is that all conclusions, because of the limited scope of human consideration, are to some extent subjective.

So, with respect to an individual, true belief would be less subjective than belief alone. The child distinguishes with the benefit of experience, as do we. Hope this goes some way to explaining why objectivity is useful but can never be held to be absolute.

Cheers, John

Coleman Smith

The mind is what the brain does.

These issues are discussed in a special edition of <a href="http://www.sciam.com/" target="_blank">Scientific American</a> Volume 12 # 1

Coleman Smith
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The assertion that the universe is surround in grape jelly is more creditable than the assertion that we are the immortal pets of some deity.