Mr. Sammi

Gee,

I have heard that in some QM machines 2-state OR 4-state representations, P & not(P), can be made simultaneously true. HOW ABOUT THAT! I was once kicked off a philosophy board inthe UK, for flatly stating (predicting), P & not(P) can be both true in parallel systems. How about those uppity logicians & moderators. (1999).

Take for example another system, the internals of a mdern CPU, something like a PenV, the branches are pre-calculated & both the P & not(P) branches are PROVISIONALLY TRUE. How about that! Clutch at that 1.


Sammi Na Boodie ()

Hawkingfan

The universe cannot be considered a PMM because a PMM by definition creates energy from nothing ("for free"). PMM's would violate the 1st and 2nd LoT.

Mr. Sammi

Just to be ignorant, a PPM would be something of the following sort.

Consider raising an Object S, to a height J, then letting it free-fall through a chute and converting the energy of free-fall into useful Energy, let us call this, EF. The energy it takes to raise the Object, S to a height J, we label EH.

In the consideration of the system described, we would have a PPM (Perputal Motion Machine) iff (if and only if) EH is less than EF. This means it takes less energy to raise the object THAN what can be converted into useful energy. In other words you get more out than what you put in.

* * *

Scoundrels are a type of PPM, they rip people off, putting hardly anything into the things they get out of people. Thieves are also a sort of PPM, they steal from others, who have worked hard to acquire what they have.

AND who said they were no PPMs on Earth?


Sammi Na Boodie ()

anonymousj

Clutch,


As far as I can tell, you did not answer the questions that I asked. If you did not,will you now answer them? If you did answer them, then indulge me-- put the answers in other words for me.

Will you agree that one cannot show that it is possible that a belief that LNC is an unrestricted axiom of every system of logic might not be true by merely saying that 'the dialethicist will offer reasons why you should regard that belief as mistaken'. Will you agree that one cannot show that it is possible that a belief that LNC is an unrestricted axiom of logic might not be true by producing a dialethicist who offers reasons (he/she thinks show) why one should regard that belief as mistaken?


You said, I am well aware of what you are talking about here. BUT, you know full well, I assume, that the existence of variant logics has no bearing on the possibility of "Bill Clinton is the current President of the United States and Bill Clinton is not the current President of the United States" being true. You also know that this line of discussion has abolutely nothing to do with anything that I have said in my earlier posts.

anonymousj

Clutch

Gosh, j, your questions are sort of hard to parse, and their relevance is opaque. If you have a point to make, why not just make it?

Besides, since I know you to be a time-waster, I thought I could simplify the process by explaining my actual points yet again in easy-to-understand language, and let you engage them specifically should you choose to. This I have done. If you choose not to engage them, of course, that is your business.
Er... no, I don't know that, because it's false.

If the question is whether LNC is an unrestricted axiom of every system of logic -- and that is indeed the example belief about the "laws of logic" that I considered -- then the fact that there are systems of logic in which LNC is not an unrestricted axiom strikes me as rather obviously relevant.

anonymousj

Clutch,

You saidI know that there are logics in which the role that "(P & ~P)" plays in some systems is not the role that "(P & ~P) plays in other systems. But I have made no claim at any time about whether or not LNC is an unrestricted axiom of every system of logic, and I don't know why you keep addressing questions about "whether LNC is an unrestricted axiom of every system of logic". My question was a question about how one goes about showing something to be epistemically possible, since I understood your response to Hawkingfan (the response which prompted my first questions) to be one intended to show that his claim was not epistemically certain. Perhaps I am simply having difficulty understanding what you are saying.

I saidTo which you responded Is it your view that the fact that "there are systems of logic in which LNC is not an unrestricted axiom" shows that the falsity of

"Bill Clinton is the current President of the United States and Bill Clinton is not the current President of the United States"

cannot be/is not epistemically certain?

anonymousj

Clutch

This is what's false.

You asked,I pointed out, first, that I was discussing empirical beliefs, and second, that your talk of (P&~P) being true is unfelicitous. (That's a schema, not a proposition; it may have or fail to have true instances.)

But I considered your off-topic point anyhow, sharpening its considerable vagueness, and answering it by considering an example of a "belief about the laws of logic" that has plausibly become warranted when it was once thought inconceivable -- in particular, one relevant to the question of whether it can be rational to believe that there are, in some domains, true instances of P&~P.

The example I chose was the belief that LNC is an unrestricted axiom of every logical system. For many hundreds of years, expert opinion would have held this to be known a priori; however, today there are logical systems in which LNC is not an unrestricted axiom.

(I might also have considered the belief that LEM is an axiom of any coherent system of logic -- once thought so obvious that LEM was called a "law of thought", but now clearly false. But I chose an example relevant to your concern with LNC.)

These are "beliefs about the laws of logic" that seem to serve as data for the same sort of meta-inductive reasoning I have discussed repeatedly, though I am happy to enter into an actual discussion of this if an actual discussant surfaces.

If these were not the beliefs about the laws of logic that you wished to discuss, you can blame the imprecision of your own question, to which I have clearly delivered a relevant answer. If your new obsession with Bill Clinton is intended to make some other point, I implore you, yet again, to -- brace yourself, now -- make the point.

excreationist

If the universe eternally has big bangs and collapses then it would be perpetually "moving"... (so it could be considered to be a "perpetual motion machine")

anonymousj

Clutch,

I am curious about remarks you have made here and there in responses that you have posted since I entered this discussion. These remarks seem to be shared by others who have been posting.

For example, you saidAlso
On the surface, your statements of your views in the above quoted passages strongly resemble views that I take to be mistaken. I am not surprised when amateurs are mistaken when talking epistemic justification/epistemic possibility/epistemic certainty, etc., but it is always surprising when professionals are mistaken (as I recall, you did say somewhere-- not in this thread-- that you are an academic, i. e., professional, philosopher).

I am curious about what supports such a view/such views and I am trying to find out what supports these views in a way that is easy for me to understand so that my target will be clear if I think these views are mistaken. Toward that end, I ask again,

Is it your view that the fact that "there are systems of logic in which LNC is not an unrestricted axiom" shows that the falsity of

"Bill Clinton is the current President of the United States and Bill Clinton is not the current President of the United States"

cannot be/is not epistemically certain?

anonymousj

Clutch

Why -- he asked again -- don't you explain what these views are that you take to be mistaken, and your reasons for so judging them? I'm not surprised when amateurs attempt punctilious games rather than just giving a substantive argument, but I believe you wrote somewhere -- not here -- that you teach or have taught critical thinking or logic.

Perhaps the view you reject is one I would assent to, and your objections to it cogent. But even if the view you reject is ultimately one that nobody here holds, it would be interesting to see both it and your objections. Whereas your approach so far is astonishingly uninteresting. I have explained my view repeatedly. If you have concerns about it, by all means feel free to make an actual point.