bd-from-kg

John Page:

My purpose was to find a logically coherent interpretation of the things that people actually say when using moral language. I think the resulting theory is “objective” in the sense used by most moral philopophers. I also think that this is a point worth making since there is considerable confusion on these boards about what “objective” means in the context of moral philosophy, but it’s basically a side issue.

Of course it is. It is objectively true that in my interpretation of moral language, if a specific act is “right” for anyone at any time it is “right” for everyone at all times. In fact, this is required by the logic of moral discourse.

Also, almost all moral philosophers agree that this is a necessary condition for a moral theory to be “objective”. Some even seem to imply that it is a sufficient condition. In any case, it’s pretty important. Theories that satisfy this criterion are fundamentally different from ones that do not.

Not so. In my theory an act’s “rightness” is evaluated in terms of how well it achieves goals that a sufficiently rational person with enough K&U would desire. It’s possible, at least in theory, that these goals are not actually desired by anyone.

Certainly. Desires, being mental states, are by definition subjective. I suspect that this point did not escape the many brilliant philosophers who have believed that there are objective moral truths. Presumably what they meant by this is consistent with the subjectivity of desires.

Obviously my theory relates the “rightness” of an act to some possible desires. So does classic utilitarianism. (In fact, John Stuart Mill made this connection explicitly in arguing for the theory.) But the latter is almost universally regarded by moral philosophers as a objective moral theory. Thus, in the context of moral philosophy, the terms “objective” and “subjective” are not used in such a way that theories that relate “rightness” to subjective desires are considered subjective on that account. If you want to use it that way, feel free. But I find that it facilitates communication to use terms in a standard way unless there is a compelling reason not to.

Not so according to my theory. An act is only “right” if any sufficiently rational person with enough K&U would approve of it. This is the very opposite of “fickle”.

Since you give no reasons for saying that this is not an objective reason for preferring my theory, I’m at a loss. It seems self-evident to me that it is.

I took a crack at a partial definition a while back; although it was not meant to be comprehensive, it should give you some idea of what I mean.

Are you saying that there is no objective difference between being rational and being irrational? That the difference between a sane person and a madman is merely a matter of social convention?

Yes, of course there is. But Alonzo Fyfe apparently disagrees, which is the only reason I bothered to say it.

Since at this point I have no idea what you would mean by saying that a judgment is “right in an objective way,” I am not in a position to comment.

Not so. According to my theory, if they would make these different choices even if they were perfectly rational and had sufficient K&U, neither course is “right” in the moral sense.

That depends on what you mean by “subjective discourse”. If I say that I have a headache, I’m clearly saying something meaningful. You might call this “subjective discourse” on the grounds that the subject is a subjective mental state. In that case we have an example of meaningful subjective discourse. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to consider this statement “objective discourse” on the grounds that it is objectively true or false that I have a headache: if Jones asserts that I do not have a headache, we are disagreeing about something real.

I’m not aware of any such “negative moral connotations”. No one thinks it immoral to prefer strawberry milkshakes to chocolate malts on the grounds that this is a subjective preference. On the other hand, it is generally frowned on to be obsessed about little green men following you that no one else can see.

However, the logic of moral discourse dictates that, if moral statements are expressing propositions, they must be propositions whose truth is independent of who expresses them. Thus, if Smith says “X should do Y and Jones says “X should not do Y”, it just doesn’t make sense to say that both are correct. The logic of moral discourse requires that Smith and Jones are disagreeing. Thus if Smith’s statement expresses a proposition, Jones’s statement expresses the negation of this same proposition. To say, for example, that Smith is merely saying that he has a certain feeling towards X’s doing Y while Jones is merely saying that he does not have this feeling, is incompatible with the way such language is used. It is reasonable to say that neither statement expresses a proposition at all, or it is reasonable to say that the statements express propositions that contradict one another. But it is not reasonable to say that they express propositions that do not contradict one another. In other words, some “noncognitivist” theories appear to be tenable, but most commonly held “subjective” theories of ethics are out of court. Thus I reject most “subjectivist” theories on logical grounds.

Sure. Love thy neighbor as thyself.

[ July 13, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

bd-from-kg

The AntiChris:

Obviously there is no general rule. But in any specific case there is clearly such a point. For example, if you were to experience for yourself some of the anguish and hardships that killing someone would cause to his family, you would have a good enough idea of the rest of it. Coming to know and understand the rest of it in intimate detail wouldn’t change your decision not to kill him.

I think you’re asking how you would know that you had “sufficient” K&U. The answer is that you could never be sure that you had enough. Even if (per impossible) you had complete K&U relevant to a choice, you couldn’t know that you did; you wouldn’t know that there was no other relevant information that you didn’t know about.

This kind of problem is inherent in talking about justifying almost any kind of action, in any sense. For example, one might say that the evidence that the planet Neptune exists is compelling, but what does this mean exactly? Any attempt to define it seems to lead to something like this: if a sufficiently rational person were familiar with enough of the relevant evidence, he would be convinced that predictions based on the existence of Neptune can be relied on with a high degree of confidence. Obviously, in the real world no one can be familiar with anything remotely approaching all of the relevant evidence. (And by the way – take note, Alonzo – even if one could there is nothing in the evidence that logically entails that one “should,” [in any sense of “should”] believe that Neptune exists.) And, of course, it is impossible to be sure that there is no evidence that you don’t know of that would indicate that Neptune doesn’t exist after all. Does this difficulty mean that the statement that the evidence for the existence of Neptune is compelling is meaningless?

Similarly, one might tell someone that it’s in his best interests to go to college. But what does this mean exactly? Again, any attempt to explain the meaning seems to lead to something like this: if he were sufficiently rational and understood sufficiently well the consequences of going to college and not going, and considered only his own interests, he would choose to go to college. Besides the fact that it may or may not be true in a given case, this has the same problems as the statement about Neptune.

It seems that almost any statement to the effect that one “should” do something, if analyzed carefully, turns out to mean something of this sort. So the fact that my analysis of “moral-should” yields something of the same kind should hardly come as a surprise. Unless one is prepared to declare that all such statements are meaningless, this is not a valid criticism of my interpretation.

I’m not noted for being politic.

Maybe some subjectivists should rethink the way they use the terms “objective” and “subjective” with reference to morality. It’s really rather tiresome to see people making the same old boring point about desires being subjective, etc. We all knew that going in.

Anyway, the main point of my theory is that there are objectively valid reasons for acting in certain ways rather than others, which any sufficiently rational person will find compelling. It seems to me that this is significant. Whether one wants to call the theory “objective” or not is of little consequence. What matters is whether it’s true.

It seems to me that we’re having an interesting discussion as it is.

John Page

Not true. How about carnal knowledge? Arguably there can be no desire without knowledge, otherwise how could you learn of something in order to desire it?

John Page

You pick an interesting example which highlights the dichotomy in your supposition of objective morality as something that rational people are capable of.

Let's say you live next to a homicidal manic that you know rejects all advances of help by murdering those who try to help. An extreme example I know but my point is:

1. A "rational" person would probably move neighborhoods as soon as possible, immediately if they have kids.
2. A "moral" person sadly enacts your objective moral truth, never to be heard of again.

Logic and moral behavior can also be seen at odds in this link to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/" target="_blank">The Prisoners Dilemma</a>, where seemingly logical actions taken to achieve a defined objective result in sub-optimal outcomes. Maybe "logic" isn't as logical as one might think.

Thus, your example doesn;t even pass criteria #1. I don't think moral behavior can be treated any differently than any other aspect of reality, one can optimise moral behavior given known circumstances and objectives but stray outside those bounds and you're back in subjectiveland.

I'll make a separate post for other parts of your response.

Cheers, John

[ July 13, 2002: Message edited by: John Page ]</p>

John Page

I guess you could use a specific "right" as a benchmark but taken literally your claim is ridiculous.
P.S. You can make about your own interpretation of moral language is being true, but only in the context of your interpretation. Its "objectivity" is thence limited to your interpretation, which itself is subjective.
Let me recast your statement in a different context: "Belief in a god is required for theism but this doesn't make theism objective." The fact that there are moral philosophers doesn't annoint them with special powers over reality.

I think you human moral behavior can be objectively studied. I think moral behavior can be evaluated in the context of goals or objectives.

Objective morality, however, IMO is an oxymoron. Why? Because the behavior itself comes from within the subject. Futhermore, I don't care whether its theistic, non-theistic, humanist or badgers, moral behavior is to do with self-interest. You can include altruism but that amounts to the same thing through vested interest.

BTW, I'm still assuming we're using AntiChris's "A common definition of objective is
"Existing indepently of the human mind."

I don't have any problem with experimentation to determine how morals are developed and used (objective moral theory) but to claim that there is such a thing as objective morality is where I stop. As human societies have developed they have codified moral standards into laws of statute and precedent that can be more objectively applied, but such laws are still only right or wrong in the minds of humankind.

Your use of a theoretical "sufficiently rational person" to determine what is "right" exactly proves my point.

Note: Your use of the words "sufficiently rational" in the above is redundant - human behavior is human behavior, period. Is sexism rational? Is racism rational? I could put forward damn good arguments why these biases have become so ingrained in the human psyche but it doesn't make them "right". IMO these are prime examples of why conventional feelgood humanism is a crock, if you start with the premise that humans are intrinsically "good" and can do the "right" thing then you're sunk.

A truth, be it logical, moral or otherwise is a product of the human mind. Establishing the truth of a proposition is achieved by convention (note that I put this in a different category than factual or existential claims which are physically verifiable) and there are a number of different logics to choose from.

Consider the evidence, where can I see, feel, hear or touch a "truth"? To rest the case for the existence of an objective morality upon the existence of a objective logical truth (i.e. outside the human mind) doesn't hold water.

Cheers, John

The AntiChris

bd-from-kg



Sure. I just had the impression you were growing weary of defending the objectiveness of your theory.

Chris

The AntiChris

Your explanation is fine so long as your gravity analogy is valid. You're assuming that intrinsic moral value, if it existed, would exert an effect as equally irresistible as gravity. In effect, you're defining intrinsic moral value out of existence.

Surely the point is that proponents of objective morality based on intrinsic value clearly would not accept this analogy (how could they in the absence of universal moral consensus?). I'm guessing, but I suspect they'd say that although we're all aware of intrinsic moral value, we often allow self-interest to take precedence.

Chris

The AntiChris

bd-from-kg

This is fine for a "should I, shouldn't I?" type of question. What if I were trying to determine what percentage of my salary I should donate to charity?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

I do not understand the point you are trying to make.

Certainly, an increase in knowledge may involve learning that we desire something. But this is not a case of desire derived from knowledge, any more than learning that my brother's care is green means that the greenness of my brother's car is derived from the fact that I looked at the picture.

The two following mental states are distinct.

A desires that P.
A knows that A desires that P.

The second state is not considered relevant in explaining action.

For example, say I want (desire) some ice-cream, and I believe that there is ice cream in the freezer. This is sufficient (in the absence of counter-weighing desires and physical barriers) for me to go to the freezer and get some ice cream. We do not need to add yet a third mental state, "I believe that I desire some ice cream" in order to cause an action. It may be (and probably is) the case that I believe that I desire some ice cream -- but this is still an extra mental state not needed to explain the action.

Psychological literature is fulled with discussions of people who act on desires they do not know they have, and in many cases even deny having.

Also, your example of 'carnal knowledcge' is particularly relevant -- animals, for example, desire sex without (we may assume) having any sort of belief at all that they desire sex.

But, ultimately, the point of my original statement is that you can not pile any stack of beliefs together, no matter how long, and yield or even weakly infer a desire as a conclusion. If you think it can be done, them simply show me an example. It would take the form:

X believes that B(1)
X believes that B(2)
...
X believes that B(n)
-----
Therefore, X desires that D

Now, I am not limiting this to strict deductive argument. Any form of induction or abduction is just fine. My point is that the conclusion is a different type of thing and is logically independent of any of the premises.

And the thesis that any change in knowledge and belief suggests even in the weakest sense a change in desire is false.

[ July 14, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

Actually, no. The same type of argument can be made even if the "force" under investigation is weakened significantly.

Let us assume that you were looking for a fifth physical force in nature -- an extremely weak force, so that its effects are often masked by the four known forces.

You would do so by looking for signs of motion that are not fully accounted for by the four existing forces already known to exist. However, if everything you look at can be fully accounted for using the four known forces, then you have no reason to postulate that the fifth force exists.

The argument against intrinsic values says that desire is sufficient to explain all intentional action. Nobody can name even the weakest instance of some other force influencing intentional action other than desire. And since desire is a mental state all value is mind-dependent (or subjective, in one relevant sense of the word).

I will accept that the ''different cultures disagree' is not the clearest way to present the argument. I think it is better just to cut to the quick and say that in no intentional human action is there even the slightest evidence of an intrinsic value.

Because intrinsic value has no explanatory or predictive role to play, it does not exist -- or, more precisely, we have no reason to believe in its existence. Like God, angels, bigfoot, Pegasus, and ghosts, intrinsic values are not relevant to real-world decisions.