Amen-Moses

Well he was the best general of WWII, at least on the western side.

Although I must admit that if MacArthur had not been stymied by the US govt he would probably have been #1 with ease. Why he wasn't given Eisenhower's job is a mystery in my opinion, at least MacArthur had battle experience!

Personally I reckon if MacArthur had been supreme commander then Patton would have been sent home in disgrace after his fuck up in Tunisia, Monty would have been given free reign against Italy (MacArthur would have invaded long before the Germans got in) and the whole European arena would have gone far smoother.

Amen-Moses

Amen-Moses

What a pile of bollocks! The landings (Operation Torch) did not have any effect on the axis positions in North Africa for over a month! It took 2 weeks for Eisenhower to get the French to stop fighting and after that the forces landed had a 500 mile journey just to engage the axis forces (a journey that took months rather than the days planned for and which led to Patton suffering a major defeat).

By the time the Torch forces were even engaged Monty had pushed Rommel back into Tunisia (Libya is a fucking big place btw!).

Amen-Moses

Vorkosigan

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Amen-Moses
What a pile of bollocks! The landings (Operation Torch) did not have any effect on the axis positions in North Africa for over a month! It took 2 weeks for Eisenhower to get the French to stop fighting and after that the forces landed had a 500 mile journey just to engage the axis forces (a journey that took months rather than the days planned for and which led to Patton suffering a major defeat).

Not relevant. When the US landed troops in Rommel's rear, the game was up. If Monty had never moved the outcome would have been exactly the same, minus, of course, all the dead, and the risk of a battle commanded by that idiot Montgomery.

As for the overall competence of either the Brits or the Americans, the Allies produced few commanders with the brains, grit, determination and drive. Some of the mid-level and local commanders had the magic, Patton, of course, Dornan-Smith, Richard O'Connor -- his capture was one of the great defeats of the war for the British -- Orde Wingate, but in the main Allied Generals were competent managers rather than great battle leaders. Monty was a serious chump who preferred set-piece battles. Sorry, but a preference for set-piece battles is the sign of a bad general. The difference between a real battle general and Monty is captured in this sentence right here:

"At this crucial stage, General O'Connor had the victorious 4th Indian Division taken from his command for action against the Italians in Eritrea, and was awarded the 6th Australian Division as a replacement. He decided not to wait, and instead gave chase to the disorganised and humiliated Italians."

That's what a real general does. He doesn't wait. And that's all Monty did -- wait.

Vorkosigan

Amen, Monty wasn't even the best general of his own country. And the idea that he was a better general than Patton, O'Connor, Dornan-Smith, Wingate, or a hundred other men is simply laughable.

Vorkosigan

Amen-Moses

Well I can't argue with someone daft enough to believe that Patton was a good general! Maybe you've not served in the military but usually someone who refuses to take orders, backstabs his own (far superior) boss and instead of carrying through with complicated battle plans sends his troops off to unimportant towns and villages miles from the action just for the glory isn't promoted he is shot!

Even the Germans thought the guy was loony, Rommel threw everything against Monty for a damn good reason, because he knew that was where the main danger was.

I was actually amazed that the book I referred to (Feuding Allies), which is so anti-British it has to be seen to be believed, shows up the faults within the allied command and especially the theatrics of the US side. After reading the book I noted that near the end of it there is a quote from Brooke giving his opinion of the US commanders, that opinion exactly matched the impression I got from reading the book, it's a pity that Monty didn't have Brooke's diplomatic skills (of all those in the book he comes across as probably doing the least desk thumping, tantrum throwing one in the high command but he does have his moments ).

Monty's main difficulty was that ten minutes after having plans agreed by Ike, Bradley would pay Ike a visit and he would completely change his mind! Then when a decision finally had to be made (which was Ike's job after all) he would ask Marshall (sitting in an office 3000 miles away) to make the decision, Marshall would ask Roosevelt, Roosevelt would ask the joint chiefs in Washington (mostly naval types). Then Roosevelt would get back to Ike through Marshall with the decision and Ike would go to Churchill who would tell Brooke who would finally phone Monty to tell him the plans he was under the impression had been agreed were now changed! How on earth he managed to operate in that sort of chaos is a bloody miracle. To me it is no surprise that Market Garden failed because the German's were waiting at the drop zones, with all those telephone calls Hitler probably knew about the plans before Monty had given a single order.

Amen-Moses

Vorkosigan

I guess we'll just have to disagree, Amen.

Vorkosigan

Amen-Moses

Don't we always?

Anyhow I'll just leave you with a few quotes from those who were there to mull over:

"General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander. I personally think that the only thing he needs is a strong immediate commander. He loves the limelight but in seeking it, it is possible that he does so only because of the effect upon his own soldiers, who are certainly devoted to him. I have great confidence in him as a combat commander. He is intelligent, a good talker, and has a flare for showmanship. Like all other senior British officers, he has been most loyal - personally and officially - and has shown no disposition whatsoever to overstep the bounds imposed by allied unity of command."

- Eisenhower

"Eisenhower complained that Dempsey was leaving all the fighting to the Americans. His attention was drawn to my basic strategy, i.e. to fight hard on my left and draw Germans on to that flank whilst I pushed with my right. It was pointed out that he had approved this strategy and that it was being carried out; the bulk of the German armour had continuously been kept on the British front. Eisenhower could not refute these arguments. He then asked why it was we could not launch major offensives on each army front simultaneously - as the Russians did. It was pointed out to him that the German density in Normandy was about 2.5 times that of the Russian front, and our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25 per cent as compared to the 300 per cent Russian superiority on the eastern front. We clearly were not in a position to launch an all-out offensive along the whole front; such a procedure would be exactly what the Germans would like and would not be in accord with our agreed strategy. We had already (on the 25th July) launched the break-out operation on the right flank. It was an all-out offensive; it was gathering momentum rapidly. The British Second Army was fighting to keep the Germans occupied on the left flank. Our strategy was at last about to reap its full reward. What was the trouble?"

- Monty

"I thought he (Montgomery) was very cautious, considering his immensely superior strength, but he is the only Field-Marshal in this war who won all his battles. In modern mobile warfare the tactics are not the main thing. The decisive factor is the organization of one's resources to maintain the momentum."

- Wilhelm von Thoma (German commander of Afrika Korps whilst Rommel was on sick leave)

"Operation Market Garden was duly launched on the 17th September 1944. It has been described by many writers. I will not go over it all again. We did not, as everyone knows, capture that final bridgehead north of Arnhem. As a result we could not position the Second Army north of the Neder Rijn at Arnem, and thus place it in a suitable position to be able to develop operations against the north face of the Ruhr. But the possession of the crossings over the Meuse at Grave, and over the Lower Rhine (or Waal as it is called in Holland) at Nijmegen, were to prove of immense value later on; we had liberated a large part of Holland; we had the stepping stone we needed for the successful battles of the Rhineland that were to follow. Without these successes we would not have been able to cross the Rhine in strength in March 1945 - but we did not get our final bridgehead, and that must be admitted.

There were many reasons why we did not gain complete success at Arnhem. The following in my view were the main ones.

First. The operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters as the spearhead of a major Allied movement on the northern flank designed to isolate, and finally to occupy, the Ruhr - the one objective in the West which the Germans could not afford to lose. There is no doubt in my mind that Elsenhower always wanted to give priority to the northern thrust and to scale down the southern one. He ordered this to be done, and he thought that it was being done. It was not
being done.

Second. The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective - the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1st Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so.

Third. The weather. This turned against us after the first day and we could not carry out much of the later airborne programme. But weather is always an uncertain factor, in war and in peace. This uncertainty we all accepted. It could only have been offset, and the operation made a certainty, by allotting additional resources to the project, so that it became an Allied and not merely a British project.

Fourth. The and S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem. area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was quickly brought into action against the 1st Airborne Division."

- Monty

"Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale. He rightly boasted that, after the battle of Alamein, he never suffered a defeat; and the truth is that he never intended to run the risk of a defeat; that is one reason why he was cautious and reluctant to take chances. There is, however, much to be said for his attitude when we consider that, up to October 1942, we had not won a single major battle since the start of the war - except Archie Wavell's operations against the Italians and some local victories against the Axis forces in the Western Desert.

Yet I can't disguise that he was not an easy man to deal with; for example, administrative orders issued by my staff were sometimes objected to - in other words Monty wanted to have complete independence of command and to do what he liked. Still, no serious difficulties arose over these very minor disturbances, he was always reasonable when tackled."

- General Harold Alexander


At least Monty wasn't removed from military command for almost starting a war with the "mongols" was he? Apparently the US command decided to remove Patton from command on the recomendation of a US psychiatrist who after reviewing his tapped telephone conversations regarding SS divisions that he refused to disband decided that he was psychotic. Luckily for the US command (or maybe it wasn't luck?) he died after a car accident before any official action was required.

Amen-Moses

Amen-Moses

The only officer who could be deemed superior was Brooke, he agreed with all Monty's plans, i.e North Africa, Scicily, Normandy etc, and was in fact the guy who in late 41 predicted the eventual strategy that won the war.

Alexander was a good general but was never the instigator of any of the plans (although he was a good facilitator of them).

The only US general that comes close to Monty (and in fact would have been my choice for supreme commander) was MacArthur, he I will admit was the US version of Monty and had as much regard for the safety of his troops as he did for glory. Unfortunately other US commanders did not have this ability and I include Nimitz (who MacArthur himself slated for his inability to minimize losses) in that assessment. (along with Bradley, King and Marshall - all desk bound commanders with no actual experience of battlefield conditions)

Amen-Moses

seanie

I've read General Slim as being regarded as the best British General in WWII, although I don't know much about him.

Any comment?

Sabine Grant

SULLSTER : I thought I would give you another opportunity to support your claims on the ineffectiveness of the French resistance.... you may not have seen that post a few pages back.