Primal

Longbow: Again that's circular reasoning and easily refuted by a quick counter-example. Cheetah X should run 50 mph to catch Gazelle X. Cheetah X did this. Hence what did happen is the same as what should have happened.

No, the burden of proof is on the side not yet established. I fail to see how the is/ought dichotomy is established, and as it is a new unecessary dichotomy, it is superfluous hence the burden of proof is on you.

For example lets say I wanted to make the moving objects/atoms dichotomy, is it your job to prove that there is an undeniable argument which bridges the "gap" between being a moving object and being made of atoms? Nope, because the category is superfluous. Kind of like the distinction between micro and macro evolution.

Understood though I disagree with the first part.


They can be independent or the same. Saying that because this *is* independent now doesn't mean it will always be.


So then what could have happened can be same as what did happen.


Good to know.

quote riginally posted by Primal:
For example: I cannot say how fast a gazelle should run to escape from a cheetah on the basis of how fast it did run today, lets say, to migrate. However I can say how fast a gazelle has to run to escape from a given cheetah if I know how fast that given cheetah can run.

They are not necessarily the same but they can be.


Well then that is not the is/ought dichotomy because that is supposed to be universal.

But many descriptive, traditional *is* statements require context as well. How fast does a gazelle run? It requires knowledge of a gazelle. Likewise how much a gazelle needs to eat in order to survive(knolwedge of its digestive system,food stuff and energy expenditure) etc, all of descriptive statements demand context so this cannot be what makes an insurmountable distinction between an is and ought.

Yes but that amounts to question begging. If one is equating good with a specific thing then the question becomes meaningless. Moore's line of argument only works for an indefined vague defintion of the word good: which is exactly what's under scrutiny.

I dnot think this is the case. Pleasure for example is not ultimate end but many short lived ends.


It's possible to question anything, lets say you were trying to define atoms and I rejected to "naturalistic" definition of proton, neutron, electron etc. To every definition I can go "but why is that an atom?" and without presupossing the scientific definition the question would make sense, but this would hardly constitute a refutation. Mainly because the definition of atoms is what is being proposed, same with naturalistic morality.

Likewise I can with atoms, to the very end of time, unless the definition is presupposed or accepted at the fundamental level. However this hardly refute atomic theory or establishes an "atom"/"definition" dichotomy.

Yes I know, but the answer to that question would be presupposed by one's definition of morality, which is what is under question. Hence the line of questioning is fruitless.


Of course, for any given word there are many potantial definitions. This hardly inavlidates them all or establishes a dichotomy.


I don't see why. Showing that an *ought* is an *is* very much speaks against some is/ought dichotomy.

Again question begging. You must presuppose "ought" to exclude "is" a priori to argue for this.

Again this is merely circular reasoning: oughts cannot be derived from is because they are fundamentally different. How are they fundamentally different? Because oughts cannot spring from an is.

Ah yes, but I think one must first prove a gap exists before one can bridge it.


Again true, if there was a gap I would have to bridge it, but I have not been shown there is a gap. That makes all the difference.

No problem.

quote riginally posted by Primal:
But see I want to know how this is proven? What makes you think morality, even if its not a science, is not open in any way to scientific considerations?

But all this presupposes the deontological viewpoint. Again that is what's being questioned.

I don't think it amounts to deontology. Again I am questioning this.

But that wouldn't prove anything, it'd just define my viewpoint as invalid before the argument began.

Well to conclude that something being possible equates to it being actual or probable is a big leap. The existence of ghosts is not impossible, but it still isn't reasonable to believe in ghosts.

quote riginally posted by Primal:
For example, if neurologists found that every time someone had a moral reaction, or made a claim about morality: certain parts of the brain were activated and certain chemicals were released, I think science would have a lot to say about the nature of morality. Do you?

But physics isn't being proposed as an intrinsic trait of humans whereas morality is. In that manner we could say neurologists could say a lot about pleasure via observing the brain but not math. If anything though, it could tell us about how physicists think and reason.


No because my explanation is less superfluous, I add no extra entities, I use only nature which we know exists.


Intuitive or not, I imagine this varies by person, the dichotomy is still suoerfluous in light of evidence for it. This is a take on morality, in that you are right, but it is a less superfluous take.

Just like both natural and supernatural explanations for anything represent different takes, they may be different but not equal. Because supernaturalist explanations are superfluous.

[ September 30, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Primal

Lowder: Because all facts require appropriate context. For example I could say how fast a gazelle runs by watching gazelles run, but not by watching a gazelle sitting down.


I could in theory. Lets say they define morality as a mental state, certain chemicals released in the brain during what we call "moral" evaluations. Scientists can then see if these chemicals apear if one commits unjustifiable harm.

That depends on if morals are allowed to refer to what is actual, the very subject in question. If you define morals as "unnatural" then of course scientists cannot test it via definition of science. If however you define morals as some aspect of nature then science is able to test it in some manner.


Then science would be involved in moral discussions according to the latter statement. The first again, assumes an answer to what is being questioned a priori.


Ambiguous or vague? By that I am reffering to when people condemn something as immoral or moral. For example, when a Xian condemns abortion. Scientists can see what the brain state is like during such condemnation and hence analyze morality.

Glad you agree, but I do not see the relationship as puzzling because I do not really see them as anything different. An *is* refers to some aspect of morality, morality to be real must hence be an *is*. I do not see how it can be otherwise besides saying that morality is a fiction or invoking the unnatural.

[ September 30, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Primal

Doubting T:


Again though aren't aspects of human nature and psyhchology objective, things? Isn't knowledge of human nature a fact? Given that one can see if rape can be evaluated on a exegentic basis as immoral in which the question can be answered "rape tends to be immoral to humans". In this sense the statement would be objectively moral "rape is immoral to humans on an exegentic basis". Just as pleasure sensations are considered subjective but can be studied objectively and even see objective in a light. For example one can say "for the vast majority of humans sex is pleasurable" and that could be described as true and is not a matter of mere opinion.

But this is not the is/ought dichotomy as I understand it. As the is/ought dichotomy proposes that morals cannot be reduced to anything natural, either psychological states or some intrinsic trait.

K

I don't believe there is any such thing as an objective "ought". Any ought must have some kind of goal as it's foundation. Without a god or other absolute standard, any goal will be subjective.

I believe our morality has evolved as one of our most powerful survivability aids. So, you could say that we ought to act morally to ensure the survival of the human race. But this ought has absolutely no meaning outside of the context of assuring the survival of the species.

I actually believe it goes even deeper than that. I believe that we have no options other than behaving in a moral fashion. Just as the vast majority of people will seek out food when the evolved drive of hunger sets in, the vast majority will also submit to the drive to behave in a moral manner.

Longbow

That's not circular reasoning. It would be circular if I defined it that way. But, I am merely observing that meaning of the terms. And your "counterexample" is non sequitur. Even in your "counterexample" saying that what did happen should have happened is a different statement with a different meaning than merely saying that it did happen.

The sentence "X should be" means something different that "X is". Done. If your argument is that these two sentences mean the same thing, then that's ridiculous. If it is not, then you clearly have the burden of proof to demonstrate that you have the correct interpretation -- whatever it may be.

Now you are not talking about whether or not they are the same concept but whether or not such a distinction is relevant. Do you think that saying that an object is moving is the same as saying that it is made of atoms? Saying that when someone says that some outcome is morally required is not the same as if they said that a particular outcome did, in fact, take place is not even questionable. It is ridiculous to thin that a moral statement is a statement about what took place.

It is certainly possible that what ought to have been was in fact the case, but that has nothing to do with the is/ought dichotomy. The is/ought dichotomy is saying that what is isn't necessarily what ought to be and what makes something "ought to be" is not that it is.

The is/ought dichotomy doesn't nor has it ever been thought to mean that what ought to be can never actually happen. The is/ought dichotomy is not statement like that morality can never be realized.

In the most extreme it is a statement about how moral statements can be justified, specifically that they cannot be justified by observing nature. In general, it is just the fact that saying that something is the case is a different kind of statement than saying that it ought to be the case.

If most distinctly and definitely does not mean that whatever is the case cannot ought to have been the case.

All statements require context. A moral statement has no physical context. Traditional is statements about the physical world can be tracked back to other things in the physical world to figure out what they mean and to determine if they are true or not. Moral statements lack that kind of context.

A moral evaluation is not a statement about physical reality.

It certainly isn't question begging. Not being able to answer Moore is question begging. And that is the problem -- defining "good" in terms of some natural phenomenon always begs the question.

It is ironic that you picked such an example. The ultimate end, then, would be to always seek pleasure (if that was what the moral philosophy was based on). It is called an "ultimate end" because it is the end which all moral reasoning is based on. That it can only be realized temporarily from moment to moment really has nothing to do with it being a so called "ultimate" end.

We don't have a preconceived idea of what atoms are. Or if we do, then there is a simple way to directly answer the question of why our model of the atom really is a model of an atom and not something else. But such is not the case with morality. For example:

Morality isn't like that. There is not a clear definition of "good". Everyone has one that they like, but there is no one obvious definition that we all use.

No you can't. Or at least you cannot do so meaningfully the way you can with moral philosophy. You ultimately come up against observations -- experiments -- that both define what the subject is and determine what we know about atoms. With morality that is not the case. Morals are not physical objects that you can observe, and if your contention is that they are, then you have to prove they exist.

The whole point of making moral statements is that they be true not just for you based on your definition of "morality", but that they apply to everyone based on our common definition of morality.

No, there aren't. If the definitions of terms was up for grabs, then it would be impossible to communicate. What terms like "morality" mean certainly varies depending on context, but it cannot vary from individual to individual since otherwise the word would be meaningless. There would be no way for me to ascertain what you were saying when you used the term if the definition of it was arbitrary.

Look, the sentence "X ought to be" and the sentence "X is" mean two different things. What you would like to show is that "X ought to be" is some form of a different "is" type sentence -- "Y is," perhaps. If that is your contention, then you clearly have the burden of proof since we have to start with the fact that "X ought to be" and "X is" are two different sentences with two different meanings.

Are you seriously contending that "X ought to be" literally means the same thing as "X is"?

No. Question begging would be where you just define your position to be true as you are. It is clear that "X ought to be" and "X is" are two different sentences with two different meanings. Arguing otherwise is absurd even for internet discussion groups. So, now if you claim to know the connection of "X ought to be" to the statement "Y is", then you clearly have the burden of proof to show that the connection exists. Otherwise we are left with a sentence "X ought to be" that apparently makes no statement about what is the case.

This is both monotonous and ridiculous. Are you seriously saying that "X ought to be" means the same thing as "X is"?? That's absurd!

No. What it presupposes is that it is merely possible for someone to propose deontology. Even if deontology is mistaken, someone can still merely propose the view.

What it would show is that there is an is/ought dichotomy where "ought" is understood to be the deontological "ought". And my contention is that the the mere existence of such a dichotomy will force the rest of the result.

Well, that all depends. If someone makes an assertion and you can find a counterexample to that assertion, then you would say that something being possible does make it the case. Namely, you would say that because there are some cases in which a given statement is false (there is a counterexample to the statement), then the statement is said to be false. The whole subject of metaethics and what ethical terms mean is an a priori subject like logic. The existence of possibilities tends to determine the actual state of affairs.

So, my contention that I have already been defending is that the mere fact that deontology is conceivable forces certain facts about morality that might not have otherwise been the case (had deontology not been conceivable).

I certianly am not proposing it as an "intrinsic trait of humans". And, I would think that anyone that adheres to the is/ought dichotomy could not consistently do so.

But that doesn't adequately explain the phenomenon of moral discourse, and besides that, I use less than even nature. I use reason only.

Well, a naturalistic view of morality si certainly not the parsimonious one, if that is what you are driving at. It fails to be parsimonius for the same reason that a naturalistic explanation of mathematical facts would be.

Longbow

I agree with you. The only objective goal would have to be circularly established by morality in the first place. This is why objective morality cannot be ends-based or teleological. Instead it must be means-based or deontological.

Primal

K given these standards even if there was a God who gave us moral codes, one could not say these were "objective morals" because then they would be God's opinion and could be questioned. Likewise with any supernatural end point, given this definition of morality as something that cannot be based on ends, that too would crumble. Clearly such a definition is far too narrow and seems to rule out any equation of morality with something concrete 'a priori'. In which case it is circular reasoning as the division is superfluous.

Primal

How was my counter example a non sequitut, it was made to show that an *is* can be equavalent to an *ought* and it did so, you said this was "insurmountable" I showed otherwise. You maintain that my example is off the mark because they "mean" different things *is* and *ought* but they are reffering to the same fact. It seems to me that such an objection requires an explanation, how can they mean different things when they refer to the same fact and how do you establish that they mean different things as a refutation when that is exactly what is under debate?


I'm saying they can mean the same thing. Calling it ridiculous does not refute my argument. The burden of proof is still on you, merely calling a claim ridiculous does not switch the burden of proof among parties.


Not even questionable? That sounds bit dogmatic. I do not think that saying an object is moving is the same as saying an object is made of atoms. That's a straw man. I am saying that saying there is some sort of division between moving objects and objects made of atoms would be superfluous. Simply because someone cannot infer that "an object is made of atoms" because an "object is moving or expected to move under these conditions" is no basis for forming a dichotomy and in no way places the burden of proof on another to prove that objects, when moving, stop being made of atoms.

Again callling my claim ridiculous does nothing to refute it.

Again to argue from lack of necessity in this case does little to establish your position. It is not necessary to suppose that planets on the other side of the planet are made of atoms. I can imagine them for some reason being made of monads for example. Many things we believe in are not necessary, however that doesn't warrant disbelief or make such beliefs irrational. In study one tends to contend one's-self with probabilities far more often then necessities.


Yes, and I am saying morals, as a part of nature, must be justified by observing nature either by observing ourselves via introspection or a given organisms traits, or history when relevant to discussion or traits. To suppose otherwise is to suppose morals are something unnatural, which to me is superfluous.

Well before you said there was an insurmountable gap between what *is* and what *ought* and they can never be one in the same. I showed an *is* that is also at the same time an *ought*. If the idea of the is/ought or fact/value dichotomy is that facts cannot be seen as values, and this is universal, then one is in essence saying saying that oughts cannot be facts. To say "morals cannot be realized" is very different then saying that "this ought is also a fact" btw. I was attacking the latter claim, not the former with my examples.

And I'm asking you why you think this is true? Why can't I say morals are physical? Isn't it superfluous to suppose that morals are the world's first nonphysical thing?

I beg to differ, when someone disaproves of abortion for example he or she is making an evalution about some aspect of physical reality.


I cannot answer Moore's question because it is a loaded question. In that Moore has already assumed that morality cannot be equated to anything natural, so to point to something natural as morality will not be acceptable by Moore Because it's natural. .

For example lets say I promote the pleasure/fact dichotomy. I can ask "Is that pleasurable?" to any example you give, and if we do not equate pleasure with anything concrete or natural before hand I will still make sense. You can point to the feeling during sex as pleasurable and I can ask "Is that itself pleasurable?" and so on forever. There is no example which you could give where I would be forced to be satisfied with your answer and in the end you would never be able to show me anything natural as pleasurable.


I agree and to further complicate matters, there are diffferent qualities or types of pleasures demanded at different times for different reasons so to call pleasure "a" ultimate end makes little sense.


Not to sound condescending but this line of reasoning reminds me very much of the first cause argument for the existence of God.

1) Premise all must have a cause because infinite regress is irrational.

2) God is that cause so God exists.

Now what caused God? Nothing. So isn't God then subject to the infinite regress? Nope, because God just isn't.

In this manner goodness is something that be questioned forever and make sense.

But not something like the atom. Why? Just cause.


The physicist can propose a model of an atom, and to all models I can ask "but why should I suppose that is an atom?"

Eventually such a man will go on forever or come to an end point, saying "just is".

But if atoms can be defined so as to equavailent to a description with qualification then why can't morals? Saying "because one can question it and make sense" presupposes that morals cannot be natural, because if they were the question would not make sense. In the end then to argue from such questions amounts to circular reasoning.


But again I can ask "why are these atoms?" or why are they called atoms. Suppose I'd rather call the same exact things monads.

Again this is circular reasoning. ANd how would I prove they exist? Introspection and observations of humans. Just the same way I prove other human traits like emotions, pleasure and pain exists.


There is no common definition of morality though, that is in fact hotly debated and what is being debated about now.

Only if they were not refering to a given fact in order to explain it. It is a fact that many people have feelings they call morals, what they are is up for grabs. Other words like life, science, mind, intelligence and such are likewise somewhat up for grabs but everyone knows more or less what others mean. They just don't know it perfectly, it is aproximated but based on common observations and experience. It is this common observations, experience and brain mechanisms that allow there to be meaning in absence of an official definition, mainly because there is aproximation.


I'm not saying it is arbitrary, I'm just saying its hotly debated. For example: If someone said morals= catfish. No one would agree. If someone said morals=pleasure. Some may agree, some may not. There are obvious lines but there are also places where the issue is not clean cut at the same time.


Again I do not accept the dichotomy or difference. I have yet to see you prove that an ought cannot be an is or matter of fact. Arguing that the burden of proof is on me because they are "just different" is no argument at all. Because I do not see any radical difference.

I'm saying this can be the case.


I'm sorry but that certainly looks circular to me.

Also question begging is not defining a proposition but apealing to definition when explanation is required or supporting a claim not yet established with a claim not yet established.

Example 1) Why did your team win? Because we scored more points.

This is an example of question begging because winning in this game=scoring the most points by definition. Now defining victory as scoring the most points is not question begging, that's defining. There is a difference.

Example 2: I believe in God because the Bible told me he existed. I believe that the Bible was accurate because it was written by God.

Here there is no apeal to definition yet the argument is circular, because neither God nor the Bible are themselves established and hence they are both unable to establish each other.

Again question begging. "I am right because if you disagree with me....you're being absurd". That's not an argument, saying "it's obviously true" does not establish the dichotomy because it is not "obvious". It is a new category, uneccessary, used to cut ethics off from facts. That to me needs more to support it then "it just is" type reasoning.

This is very humorous as now you are simply repeating yourself verbatim. You already asked me this question and my answer has not changed: yes I do. I think an *is* statement can be literally the same as an *ought* statement.Why not? And don't say "because its absurd", I see no violation of logic or the rules of evidence there. Nor do I see anything at odds with sense experience. So it is not obviously absurd. Hence you have to do more to refute me then simply declare me absurd.

Of course but merely proposing the view does little to establish it.


Well then you are saying that proposing the deontological viewpoint as possibly true establishes deontological morality. However a viewpoints mere possibility does little to establish it, it is possible for a lot of things to be true. Bad air may possibly be the real cause of disease, yet merely proposing possibilities proves nothing.


No sorry, using that sort of reasoning I could basically establish anything. Even the existence of ghosts.

You could make a counter-example but if we go by possibilities alone, I could explain away those counter-examples with more possibilities.

For example you could say: Well no research proves there are ghosts.

To which I will reply: That's cause ghosts hide from researchers.

See possibility cannot be used as evidence to establish something. One needs evidence for that.

Utilitarianism is likewise concievable, as is egoism. As is Xian morality. Does that mean they are all true?

It seems as if your method leads to contradictions. As do all methods based on mere possibility.


I do and I do not adhere to the is/ought dichotomy, so that's irrelevant to me. However then, you would have to ignore brain states made during moral judgements as completely irrelevant, and I don't see how that works. That seems more like ignoring empirical evidence then anything.


Ah, but to assume that reason exists apart from nature is even more superfluous still.

I don't see how naturalistic explanations for math is supefluous.

To suppose that you must believe that math is somehow based in a netherworld, made of different substance then the rest of nature. And such dualism is by nature more superfluous then a naturalistic/materialistic monism.

If you think math exists apart from nature then where exactly do you think math exists and what substance do you think math is made of? And how do you solve the problem of dualism?

It seems that you are trying to defend a questionable assumption(the is/ought dichotomy), with other rather questionable assumptions(math-reason/nature dualism).

Longbow

That they talk about the same physical event does nto make them equivalent statements. "X did happen" and "X did not happen" are about the same event and physical objects, X, but they certainyl don't say the same thing. "X is" and "I like X" both talk about the same thing, X, but don't mean the same thing. The is/ought dichotomy says that what a statement about what ought to be says is not about something that is.

It is obviously true in a very local sense concerning just the statement itself. that is, you cannot replace "ought to be" with "is" in the statement "X ought to be" without changing the meaning of the sentence. How true that is in terms of not even being able to possibly tie a statement about what ought to be in any way to a statement about what is is perhaps disputed to one extent or another. Hume thought that there could be no such connection. If you think otherwise, then it is on you to make the connection. If you proceed assuming one exists, then you are begging the question.

For starters, I don't think that math "exists". Secondly, the a priori nature of mathematics is plain. In order to square these indisputable and rahter mundane facts with your radically empiricist world view, you must view math as being more like a construction or a convention than a body of knowledge. I am not going to go into all the problems with such a view, but there are plenty. In no case, am I making the assumptions. I am correctly interpretting moral sentences and correctly characterizing mathematics. You, on the other hand, are trying to slide a two assertions in by shifting the burden of proof, namely

1) There is a naturalistic interpretation of moral statements

2) Nominalism is the correct answer to the problem of universals.

(You may not know what I am talking about on the last one, but I cannot think of a better way of putting it succinctly off the top of my head.)

Primal

I'm saying an ought statement can be factual not that it can be equated with every single fact. I am not saying that for example I can see a spider spin a web and go "I derive though ought to be honest" from that.

I am saying that statements like "A Gazelle ough to run over 60mph if it is to escape from a cheetah" such a claim is both factual and has an ought.


They can be. For example: Billy says "I like ice cream" vs "Looking at Billy's brain states I deduce he likes ice cream". Fact and value in one.


No, it's saying that an "ought" cannot be an "is".

Sure you can. The gazelle ought to run faster then X to escape. The Gazelle is running fatser then X....this will allow it to escape.

To an extent I suppose, though I am merely defining more then justifying or explaining. However my position is still less superfluous.


That makes no sense. You think it's all imagination/fiction? Or is actual nothingess?

Yes, I agree but see the a priori as completely natural.


I'm not an empiricist.


Yes I know and that's why I'm not an empiricist.


Me experience contradicts that statement.

I am somewhat familiar with nominalism and realism actually and reject both schools. As don't see concepts as either set in stone or made-up/mere labels. I see them as things that develope within our minds from data or operations of the brain in processing data or being data.I guess this is sort of conceptualism. Though I don't see things as that black and white, there are grey areas where definitions are under dispute. I think a lot of the problem in this area involves using the term universals in two different senses and thinking them all the same. But that's a bit off topic. I'm just trying to show I'm not a nominalist.

Assumption one is correct though and I think it is warranted in face of other unecessary of unproven alternatives, as it only generalizes and deduces from what we already know exists: the natural world. Without creating new categories.

[ October 01, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>