mnkbdky

The meaning of good and bad do not stay constant across cultures--or for that fact individuals. The meaning of good for Singer is drastically different than mine--Good is what is pragmatic vs. Good is what is in accord with natural law. However, that does not mean we cannot distinguish b/t the two and express them meaningfully (or, for that matter, that we don't use the same term to refer to different things). It does mean, though, that we cannot just use the word good. We will have to define them using words that share the same meaning (and, perhaps, referent). A task that plagues interpretation, but is nevertheless possible. But this is what I think you are saying. So, in essence, I agree with the first part--meaning can remain constant across cultures (hmmm, universals?).

I will ask you, though, if good and bad have no referrent, then, how can they have meaning? In the statement, "Mnkbdky is a trafetal gutala", trafetal gutala has no referrent. Furthermore, it has no meaning. In order to give it a meaning we will have to define it. However, we will not be able to define it except by referring to things that actually exist. For if we say, trafetal gutala means, bava bava, then, we still haven't gone anywhere. Bava bava does not mean anything because it does not refer to anything, it does not exist. But if we say trafetal gutala means, "a baby in the womb of his mother", then we have given it meaning. All the terms used in its definition have meaning because they refer to something. Now, it might be objected that there are word that have meaning that do not refer to things that exist, such as the term tooth-fairy. Obviously, a tooth-fairy does not exist. However, the term tooth-fairy would have no meaning if it did not it refer to things that exist, such as a woman, a wand, wings, money, children and teeth.

Therefore, if good and bad/evil refer to nothing, then, they can have no meaning. If they have no meaning, they can have no truth value.

Therefore, "the statements, 'X is good', 'Y is bad' are meaningful, but false, in all instances," is itself false. For good and bad refer to nothing and, hence, may have no meaning. The only way to give them meaning is to have them refer to something.

This is what the MR does. (S)he has the terms good and bad/evil refer to the preferred cultural practice for good and frowned upon social practices as bad/evil. (S)he then claims that, the statements "X is good" and "Y is bad" are false in all instances. However, as I argued before, necessarily, if P is an exhaustive set of contraries or contractories statements, then P must have, at least, one true statement. And since MR claims they are all false, MR is itself false.



As we have seen the meaning of good and bad does not stay constant. But meaning does remain constant across cultures and is express by different terms. However, those different terms that have retained meaning across culture do so only because they refer to things that exist. So, if good and evil have meaning that remains constant, they must have a referrent.

Dr. Retard

I agree with everything you said, except for that the MMN is committed to (4). That looks like a big non sequitur to me.

If "it is good/evil..." is meaningless, then it is not true, and it is not false. That means (1) is false. After all, it is not true that it is good...etc. "It is good, etc." is meaningless. That means (2) is true. (2) accurately reports that it is false that it is good...etc. Since "it is good, etc." is meaningless, it is false that it is good...etc. (3) is right out.

You write:

Quote:

Your (4)' is almost what a moral relativist MR would claim.

I don't get that for one second. How does moral relativism enter the picture? (4)' says nothing about cultural or individual values. (4)' just says that (1) and (3) are false, (2) is true, and (for good measure) that "it is evil..." is false. I should have said that "it is evil, etc." is meaningless and that it is false that it is evil...etc. You get the idea, though.

Quote:

Are you saying that if Good and Evil exist, then, Good and Evil do not exist? For, (4) says, "Good and Evil do not exist . . ." This is a contradiction and, obviously, false.

I'm relying on the fact that:

-p -> (p -> q)

That is, if a proposition is false, then any conditional with that proposition as its antecedent is true.

So, if Good and Evil exist, then "Good and evil do not exist" is false. If "Good and evil do not exist" is false, then (4) is true.

Scorpion

Guys, mnkbdky has opened this same thread in Philosophy (for studying the logical/metaphysical aspects of the argument I suppose) here, and I figure the comments about the logical structure of the argument are better suited there?

-S-

mnkbdky

First, let me say that Scorpion and I have agreed that (1) and (2) are an exhaustive set. (3) is a subset of (2) and, therefore, should be left out.

Secondly, The MMN is committed to (4). Your (4)' is merely the result of the objection. So, in a sense I agree with you. If the MMN objects with (4), the the result is self-refuting, because that would make (2) true and, as you pointed out, (1) false. So, (4) cannot be true.



You are right, (4)' says nothing about cultures/individuals. However, (4)' is a contradiction. So, it must be restated. You could either accept (4) and be an MMN or modify (4)' to (5) and be an MR. It is a choice. I choose to demonstrate both.

Your consequent here is essentially the same as the antecedent. That is, your claim is, if p then p. I have no problem with this, for it is impeccable logic. As I like to say, If I am the center of the universe COTU, then I am COTU. I am COTU, therefore, I am COTU.

However, (4) does not claim ("Good and evil don't exist" is false). Rather, (4) claims ("Good and Evil don't exist" is true).

To restate your argument with the change is,

If Good and Evil exist, then "Good and evil don't exist" is true.

This is clearly false. For its claims, If P then ~P. P, therefore, ~P.

Thanks,

--mnkbdky

dk

I'm confused, if this is a metaphysical discussion about good and evil, then how does the universe manifest itself upon the individual psychologically (passively (realism), actively (idealism) or completely). Metaphysics and psychology must somehow be integrated or the subject presents a double blind that no amount of logic can pierce.

Alonzo Fyfe

You seem to be arguing that if a concept exists across cultures, then it must have a reference. By this argument, it seems that I would have to believe in 'ghosts' and 'magic' as well, because these concepts exist across cultures.

I would even have to believe in 'Santa Clause' because, even though other cultures do not share our practices, they have learned the concept from us, jus as we learned the concept of 'leprachaun' and ''genie' from other cultures. We are now familiar with those concepts.

Clearly, the cross-cultural sharing of a concept does not imply existence.


Now, you have admitted that there are different definitions of the word 'good'. One type of definition clearly does refer to things that exist -- the definition that relates things in the world to tastes and preferences -- like 'a good pizza' or 'a good movie'.

However, people who talk about 'metaphysical moral realism' are often not taken to be talking about this type of 'good'. They are talking about an intrinsic moral property, something that exists independent of preference or desire.

If by 'metaphysical moral realism' you are, in fact, defending the reality of things being liked and disliked, then your thesis is on solid grounds -- though, again, your argument remains just as fallacious. The reality of things being liked and disliked, itself, is not defended through an examimation of the concepts of 'liked' and 'disliked'. but by the fact that likes and dislikes explain observations (e.g., why a person eats a pizza that has sausage on it but not a pizza with anchovies).

mnkbdky

Perhaps you misunderstood. Let's go back to the concept of the tooth-fairy. It clearly true that the tooth-fairy does not have material existence. However, it is not logically impossible that there be a material woman who carries a wand and flies through windows to exchange money for childrens' teeth. This is the definition of a"tooth-fairy". And inside that definiton are terms that have actual referrents. This is why the term "tooth-fairy" has meaning. It is the only way a term can have meaning, referrence.

The same goes with "leprechauns" and "genies". The terms would have no meaning unless their definitions referred to something. A leprechaun is, a short man dressed in a green suit who stands and the end of the rainbow next to the pot of gold. A genie is, a man in a lamp who comes out when the lamp is rubbed and grants the one who rubbed it three wishes. Everything word that has meaning refers. There is not one word with meaning that does not refer. Perhaps the word does not refer directly to the material existence of that which it defines. As we saw, the terms "tooth-fairy", "leprechaun", and "genie" do refer to the material things that make up their definitons. However, they do refer to the material object that constituet their definitons. (I would say, however, that the term does refer to their concepts, their idea or eidos . So in a very real way they do exist as unconscious immaterial abstact objects. They only lack a material and/or conscious existence.

I feel I am going to catch a lot of crap for that statement. But, what can I do. Forms are forms. I can neither create them, nor annihiliate them. They are.

Now if you think you can give me an example of a term that has meaning without it referring to something that actually exists, then, I ask you to demonstrate that to me and show me the error of my way.

The MMN, who says good and evil do not exist, is committed to having the terms good and evil be meaningless. If (s)he says they have meaning, then, they refer and good and evil do exist, perhaps with different meanings to different people, but that is MR not MMN.

Alonzo Fyfe

I am going to go with the easy response here.

Intrinsic prescriptivity is no more meaningless than leprechauns and tooth faeires -- they are a conglomeration of ideas that we get elsewhere.

Intrinsic prescriptivity treats value as a type of radiation. Like heat, light, or sound, the object of value emits some sort of secondary property, and we have a sense organ capable of detecting that property -- a "sense of value" as it were.

All of the parts refer to things we are familiar with. Yet, just as with leprechauns and tooth faeries, the conglomeration of these individual properties does not exist. It is a fiction.

Just like you would not point to any real thing in the world and say "that is a leprechaun" or "that is a tooth faerie", there is nothing to point to in the real world to say, "that is intrinsically good"

It is just an idea -- a piece of imaginative fiction. Nothing more.

Claims about intrinsic prescriptivity are false in the same way that claims about leprechauns are false. A person who points to a real thing and says 'intrinsic value' is not mumbling nonsense, he is making a mistake, the same way that a person who points to a real thing and says 'leprechaun' is making a mistake.

Dr. Retard

What is the contradiction in (4)'? I have yet to see it. I'll play (4)'-style MMNer. How am I committed to a contradiction? Here's (4)' again:

(4)' Good and Evil do not exist, therefore (2) is true, (1) and (3) are false, and "It is evil to torture infants for pleasure" is also false.

Now, I'll 'spell it out':

(4)' Good and Evil do not exist, therefore

* "It is false that it is good to torture infants for pleasure" is true,

* "It is true that it is good to torture infants for pleasure" and It is morally neutral to torture infants for pleasure" are both false, and

* "It is evil to torture infants for pleasure" is also false.

So, first, -p -> (p -> q) does not have a consequent that's the same as the antecedent. The antecedent is -p. That's a proposition -- the negation of p. The consequent is (p -> q). That's a conditional -- if p, then q; that is, p entails q.

The big conditional -p -> (p -> q) follows from the definitional fact that -(p -> q) -> (p & -q). That is, the only way for p not to entail q is for p to be true and q false. So if p is false, then p entails q. That's just straight from the truth table of a conditional.

Here's your (4):

(4) Good and evil do not exist, therefore, (1), (2) and (3) are neither true nor false and, hence, (A) has no truth value.

I took this to mean: "If Good and Evil do not exist, then (1), (2), and (3) are neither true nor false and (A) has no truth value." That would mean, where "Good and Evil do not exist" is p and "(1), (2), and (3) are neither true nor false and (A) has no truth value" is q, that p entails q.

But I guess I misinterpreted you. You wanted it to be a big conjunction: "Good and Evil do not exist, and (1), (2), and (3) are neither true nor false and (A) has no truth value". In that case, if Good and Evil exist, then (4) is indeed false.

mnkbdky

Dr. Retard, you said:



Then, I said:




Then, you replied:



Now, let me explain why (4)' is a contradiction.

(4)' Good and Evil do not exist, therefore (2) is true, (1) and (3) are false, and "It is evil to torture infants for pleasure" is also false.

If good and evil do not exist, then, the terms refer to nothing. If the terms refer to nothing, then, the statement can have no truth value. By saying that (2) is true, (1) and (3) are false you are giving them truth value.

Here is an example:

Is it true of false that Butaldi is next to guylatura?

These terms have no meaning, or referent, the statement in nonsensical. Therefore, it has no truth value. If we knew what they meant or referred to, then, the statement would have truth value. The MMN is claiming that good and evil have no meaning or referent. Therefore, the statement, "X is good" is meaningless and has no truth value.

It is a contradiction, therefore, to say that "X is meaningless and false”; because that would be to claim that "X is meaningless, yet its meaning is false."

In my argument I am merely pointing out that the MMN is forced to take a definition or meaning for the terms good and evil. Otherwise, what is it that they are denying existence? The consequence of taking a definition for good and evil, though, is--as your( 4)' points out--a contradiction. Therefore, the MMN's (4) is self-refuting. If the MMN denies existence to MMR, then, (4) is self-refuting. IF the MMN denies MR, then, (4) is self-refuting. If they say good and evil do not exist, then, I may ask them of what they are denying existence. The moment the MMN defines what he is denying existence is when the contradiction results. Admittedly, ~MMN does not entail MMR. However, it does show that good and evil do exist in some form. It may be MR, but that is a logical impossibility. Since MR states, all moral claim of good and evil are false. It was demonstrated earlier that an exhaustive must have one truth. Therefore, it is false that all moral claims about good and evil are false. At least, one must be true. This is where my argument about natures comes in handy. If one must be true, then good exists. If good exists, then (according to my arguments about essence), then, it has its nature by necessity. If it has it nature by necessity, then, it good does not depend on human will. Therefore, MR is false and MMR is true.

I hope this helped Dr. Retard (That just feels strange to write. It is like I am dis-ing you, but I am not).

Thanks,

--mnkbdky