Bill Snedden

I'm not going to comment on the validity of the argument itself, but it seems to me that Rw is "walking" down the wrong road, here.

This is a distinction without difference. You're both saying essentially the same thing, but using different terminology.

I've seen this issue several times in cosmology discussions. I define "universe" exactly as Theophage defines it and define what Rw terms "THIS UNIVERSE" as "the current time-space continuum" (TSC) or somesuch.

It is clear, as both of you have pointed out, that the current TSC had a beginning. It is not clear that the universe itself (as Theophage defines it) had a beginning. This relates directly to your next point.

"Non-existence", as a putative state of affairs, leads to a logical contradiction and would thus seem to be an impossibility.

The concept of "non-existence" only exists as the negation of "existence". But if anything actually exists, "non-existence" is not the case. Even the possibility of "future" existence would be "something" and therefore, as something clearly exists now, "non-existence" can never have been the case (ex nihilo, nihil fit, right?).

In other words, "Existence" exists; "something" has always existed. Which again, leads to your next point.

Again, this is largely a distinction without difference. The only material difference I can see in the above two statements is that the theistic foundation has consciousness and purpose and the non-theistic one does not.

The rest of your argument, that concludes with the statement above, hinges upon a distinction between "universe" and "existence"; a distinction which, based on the definition Theophage offers, has no real difference.

I'm particularly puzzled by your apparent confusion because you explicitly state the very point Theophage is making in the first paragraph I quoted, above. You recognize that "existence" consists of more than just "THIS UNIVERSE" (to use your definition), and that the "more" could be nothing but the different attributes of "THIS UNIVERSE" that existed prior to the "first cause".

The only real distinction between your two positions boils down to your attribution of reason and purpose to the "first cause". Unfortunately, this places your objection in exactly the same position as his argument. I.e., it is subject to the same analysis you perform in your final comment:

For the theist, the mechanism responsible for God remains a mystery and ultimately becomes the victim of the regress.

At some point there must be a "brute fact"; something that stops the regress. For theists, this is God. He contains within Himself the reason and cause of His own existence; He exists necessarily.

For non-theists, the "brute fact" is simply existence (or "the universe" as Theophage defines it.). It contains within itself the reason and cause of its own existence; it exists necessarily.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Theophage

Aw, Bill. I would really appreciate your opinion on my argument,even if it is a harsh one :^)

Or, falling short of that, could you at least give your opinion on Datheron's criticism regarding the unknown properties of "outside" and how it would affect the causal relationship? Would you say that Datheron has the right idea, or that I do, or that neither of us does?

I hope you decide to comment further here.

Daniel "Theophage" Clark

Theophage

rainbow walking wrote regarding the idea of "north of the North Pole":

Actually there are many points north of the North Pole. That is the nature of THIS UNIVERSE.

and

Implied in that grid system is the notion of direction on a universal basis. Just because the grid itself is unique to the earth doesn't mean that the concept of direction ends at the north pole.

I'm sorry you cannot seem to grasp this fairly simple example, rainbow. No, there aren't any points north of the North Pole by defintion.

It's not the "concept of direction" we were speaking of, but the "concept of north", and yes, the concept of north does end at the North Pole. Thus the statment "north of the North Pole" is a self-contradictory statment, just like "outside space" or "before time" are also self-contradictory.

Anyway, that was the point. I didn't think it was really that complicated...

[ January 16, 2002: Message edited by: Theophage ]</p>

theophilus

This is a popular, but false myth. The ancients had significant knowledge of natural phenomenon. They may not have understood specific mechanisms, but they the basic concepts of natural effects.

Besides, that's not the point to which I was responding, which was the statement "I know I exist and that's all I need to understand everything else (paraphrase).

I'm still waiting for you to explain how, as a Hindu, you have any input into these discussions. Doesn't Hinduism deny all material reality, including the existence of your computer and the people with whom you're communicating?

rainbow walking

rw: Really? Then why do we have a North Star?

rw: I always thought "north" was a DIRECTION. Check this out for some cool effects: <a href="http://micro.magnet.fsu.edu/primer/java/scienceopticsu/powersof10/index.html" target="_blank">http://micro.magnet.fsu.edu/primer/java/scienceopticsu/powersof10/index.html</a>



[ January 16, 2002: Message edited by: rainbow walking ]</p>

Bill Snedden

Okay, you twisted my arm. I think that most of what I'm going to say has already been said, but perhaps not in quite the same way.

While our intuitive notions of causality certainly do seem connected to temporal order (effect always follows cause), does this have to be the case?

We can also understand causality in non-temporal senses. In his second book of Physics, Aristotle identifies four causes that he believed were necessary to understanding "why" things are as they are. While three of these causes (material, formal, & efficient) do seem to contain an assumption of temporal priority, the fourth (telos or "end") has to do with the reason or purpose of a thing's existence, which might be seen as concurrent or coexistent and not necessarily temporally prior. If a thing is postulated as a sort of "teleological" cause, then the requirement for temporal priority may not be necessary.

However, for the moment, let's grant that if one is speaking of an agent that "causes" through some type of action, then temporal priority would seem to be required and P1 would stand.

Granted, however as your discussion with Rw has revealed, the manner in which you (and I) define "universe" should be made explicit. That's going to be important when we get to P3.

Agreed (based upon granting the relation of causality to time). I also agree that so-called "simultaneous" causality is not a problem for your argument up to this point.

Here I see the first real difficulty for your argument, and it's in two parts.

1) P3 and your own definition of "universe" would seem to entail a logical contradiction. If you define "universe" as "all that exists", then it must necessarily contain God. However, a being that creates itself would violate the law of non-contradiction as it would have to both exist and not exist in the same time and in the same place.

2) While Christians do postulate God as the creator of the universe, this belief does not encumber God's self-creation. Christians necessarily place God outside of the universe. They are obviously using a definition that is different from your own (as Rw points out). Using your definition, therefore, I see no reason why a Christian must necessarily assent to P3 and good reason why they would reject it.

However, we should be able to restate P3 to remove the apparent contradiction:

P3) God is defined as the cause of the universe

Here is where it becomes important to understand of exactly what type of cause you are speaking. P1 pertains to causes that are necessarily temporally prior (and perhaps simultaneous) to their effects. However, it does not explicitly rule out teleological causes, which would not seem to be temporally dependent.

If we accept the definitions of "universe" (all that exists) and "cause" (temporally dependent) that you have used, I think that the argument is sound and that C2 cannot be rationally denied.

However, I see no reason why a Christian must accept those definitions. If I define God as the foundation of existence and therefore the cause of existence in a teleological, rather than temporal, sense, then I may rationally deny both C1 and P4, and therefore C2.

It does seem to me that these definitions and objections depend upon a more panentheistic understanding of God, rather than the strictly theistic interpretation, however there are modern Christian theologians and thinkers (Tillich, Kierkegaard, Spong, etc.) who seem to define God in this sense and yet retain some connection to Christianity. Accordingly, pantheists and deists may also have reason to reject the same premises and conclusions for the same reasons.

As far as Datheron's objection goes, I think that you both have good points, but my personal opinion is that you're both wrong.

In order for language to be of any use to us, words must mean something. To speak of the possibility of the validity of cause-effect, "A follows B" relationships outside of time renders the very idea of such relationships incoherent. We can't even discuss them rationally, so I don't see any value in raising that objection.

However, as I've noted above, while our intuitive notions of causality are concerned with cause-effect relationships that are temporally bound, we can also understand causal relationships that are not of this nature and hence not necessarily temporally bound. This is essentially the essence of one of the objections I raised.

Anyway, that's my $.02

Bill Snedden

[ January 16, 2002: Message edited by: Bill Snedden ]</p>

rainbow walking

Bill: I'm not going to comment on the validity of the argument itself, but it seems to me that Rw is "walking" down the wrong road, here.

Rw: Hi Bill,
Glad you dropped by and I appreciate your input. Let’s see if we can arrange some distinctives here to assist us.


Bill: This is a distinction without difference. You're both saying essentially the same thing, but using different terminology.
I've seen this issue several times in cosmology discussions. I define "universe" exactly as Theophage defines it and define what Rw terms "THIS UNIVERSE" as "the current time-space continuum" (TSC) or somesuch.

It is clear, as both of you have pointed out, that the current TSC had a beginning. It is not clear that the universe itself (as Theophage defines it) had a beginning. This relates directly to your next point.

rw: The distinction falls somewhere within the difference between “this” and “the” in reference to UNIVERSE. As Theophage appears to be equating all of existence with “the” universe, it is then contradictory for the two of you to hold that “the” universe encompasses ALL of existence and then claim that “the” universe had a beginning.

Especially when you privilege existence by declaring non-existence to be an impossible contrast. Something has to go here.

Either “the” universe encompasses all of existence including, as Theophage said and you concurred, “everything that exists (or has ever existed, since we're talking about the beginning).”, which effectively excludes anything prior to existence thus eliminating a beginning because a beginning from non-existence is indeed a contradiction.

Or “this” universe had a beginning and was derived from pre-existing attributes meaning EXISTENCE supercedes THIS UNIVERSE and renders it just one more TSC in the inexorable march towards something. I think if you’ll think about it carefully you’ll realize that physics and cosmology support the latter.

So there is a distinction even if I haven’t concisely elaborated upon it.

Bill: "Non-existence", as a putative state of affairs, leads to a logical contradiction and would thus seem to be an impossibility.
The concept of "non-existence" only exists as the negation of "existence". But if anything actually exists, "non-existence" is not the case. Even the possibility of "future" existence would be "something" and therefore, as something clearly exists now, "non-existence" can never have been the case (ex nihilo, nihil fit, right?).

In other words, "Existence" exists; "something" has always existed. Which again, leads to your next point.

Rw: Again this depends on how you define “existence”. If you include abstract conceptualizations of possibilities and potentials divorced from the minds necessary to conceive of them then yes, you have a point. On the other hand, in as much as the majority here ascribe to the MN epistemology I can’t see you justifying such a definition. If existence encompasses only those natural perceptual attributes of this universe, then non-existence is a real concept with the same value as zero in mathematics.

Bill: Again, this is largely a distinction without difference. The only material difference I can see in the above two statements is that the theistic foundation has consciousness and purpose and the non-theistic one does not.

Rw: I’m not so sure you can make this distinction either Bill since the metaphysical naturalist’s prior mechanism remains undefined. For all we know there could be discovered conscious building blocks from which a naturalistic explanation could be proffered. I think the distinction is found in the concept of God as a self contained basis for existence whereas the MN’s absence of any reasonable alternative leaves a void that “mechanism = (mechanism)” is insufficient to fill and counter intuitive as well.

Bill: The rest of your argument, that concludes with the statement above, hinges upon a distinction between "universe" and "existence"; a distinction which, based on the definition Theophage offers, has no real difference.

Rw: I think you are mistaken here, Bill. There is a very real distinction. There would have to be to posit a beginning to THIS UNIVERSE. When I say “THIS UNIVERSE” I am referring to all events from the big expansion to the present. If that is the limit of EXISTENCE then we have another contradiction. I don’t think most cosmologists would hold to such a definition either.

Bill: I'm particularly puzzled by your apparent confusion because you explicitly state the very point Theophage is making in the first paragraph I quoted, above. You recognize that "existence" consists of more than just "THIS UNIVERSE" (to use your definition), and that the "more" could be nothing but the different attributes of "THIS UNIVERSE" that existed prior to the "first cause".

Rw: Yes? I’m particularly puzzled how you see this to be confusing? THIS UNIVERSE is an event or EFFECT that has been unfolding since its inception in the BEGINNING. It has required every attribute, each in its own specific class or state, to continue this unfolding. But this in no way means that these attributes couldn’t have existed prior to their incorporation into this event. For this event to have had a beginning EXISTENCE has to have priority over UNIVERSE.

Bill: The only real distinction between your two positions boils down to your attribution of reason and purpose to the "first cause". Unfortunately, this places your objection in exactly the same position as his argument. I.e., it is subject to the same analysis you perform in your final comment:

For the theist, the mechanism responsible for God remains a mystery and ultimately becomes the victim of the regress.

At some point there must be a "brute fact"; something that stops the regress. For theists, this is God. He contains within Himself the reason and cause of His own existence; He exists necessarily.

For non-theists, the "brute fact" is simply existence (or "the universe" as Theophage defines it.). It contains within itself the reason and cause of its own existence; it exists necessarily.

Regards,
Bill Snedden

Rw: For theists no mechanism is required to account for God. For theists all mechanisms that have ever existed including existence itself are accounted for in God. This is the anchor against regress and the least assumption dulling the effects of the RAZOR much more than mechanism=(mechanism) because mechanism can’t account for existence…and remains to be seen if it can even account for the existence of THIS UNIVERSE. To date no such accounting has been able to balance the books. But it’s good to hear from you Bill and I do appreciate the time you put into your reply. Thnx.

Bill Snedden

I think you've got our actual position somewhat reversed, here. Using your terminology, we do equate "existence" with "the" universe, but we do not claim that "the" universe had a beginning.

Our understanding is, just as yours, that "this" universe had a beginning. This is why I stated that yours is a distinction without difference. Only our terminology differs.

However, I did not realize before deconstructing Theophage's argument exactly how he is relating "the" and "this" universe. I think there is some equivocation there, but I'm not sure it really damages the validity of the argument. If causality (in the sense of an action that leads to an effect) is in fact inextricably linked to time, then a "pre"-existent state can have had no effective causal relationship upon the "beginning" of "this" universe.

As I noted in my comments on the argument, this is a potential weakness depending upon the theistic understanding of God's causal relationship with "this" universe.

Could God be the creator of "this" universe? No, not if effectual causality is dependent upon time.

Could "this" universe still exist only because of God? Yes, if God's causal relationship with "this" universe is teleological instead of effectual.

This is one of the points upon which Theophage's argument hinges. If "effect" is defined as "the result of a cause, "this" universe cannot be an effect as it did not have a cause.

Interestingly enough, however, I pretty much agree with the rest of your statement. Existence must have priority over "universe". However, this priority cannot be defined in terms of time or causality.

The first part of your statement is exactly as I had noted: no mechanism is required to account for God. God is the brute fact that accounts for existence.

However, God would not seem to be the "least assumption". God has intelligence and conscious purpose (among other attributes). But are any of God's postulated attributes necessary elements of existence? Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate. The non-theistic alternative, which is that Existence itself is a brute fact in need of no explanation, surely has less "entities" or postulates than the theistic one. It would therefore seem to be the more parsimonious.

Existence doesn't need to "account for" itself. Existence exists; as I pointed out earlier, denying this fact leads to a logical contradiction. As "this" universe is not an effect (as Theophage's argument holds), there is also no need to explain the causal "mechanism" by which it came into existence as no such mechanism could possibly exist.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Theophage

Thanks for your commentary, Bill. I really don't understand the idea of a teleological cause, but I'm going to read as much as I can (online) about it. And yes, I really should define the terms in my argument better.

rainbow walking

Bill: I think you've got our actual position somewhat reversed, here. Using your terminology, we do equate "existence" with "the" universe, but we do not claim that "the" universe had a beginning.

Our understanding is, just as yours, that "this" universe had a beginning. This is why I stated that yours is a distinction without difference. Only our terminology differs.

Rw: Then would I be correct to describe your position to be that “EXISTENCE” has no beginning but “THIS UNIVERSE” does? Does that clarify the essential distinction?

Bill: However, I did not realize before deconstructing Theophage's argument exactly how he is relating "the" and "this" universe. I think there is some equivocation there, but I'm not sure it really damages the validity of the argument. If causality (in the sense of an action that leads to an effect) is in fact inextricably linked to time, then a "pre"-existent state can have had no effective causal relationship upon the "beginning" of "this" universe.

Rw: The only objection I would raise to this, and I think it is one bone of the Achilles’ heel to Theophage’s argument, is that we have no definitive means to establish if cause/effect are dependent on time or if time is dependent on cause/effect. If the latter prevails then time needn’t have any decisive role in the initial cause but would have appeared to begin in concert with that cause.

Bill: As I noted in my comments on the argument, this is a potential weakness depending upon the theistic understanding of God's causal relationship with "this" universe.
Could God be the creator of "this" universe? No, not if effectual causality is dependent upon time.

Rw: Exactly. But if the converse is true a teleological argument needn’t be the only option. In fact, it seems more intuitively gratifying to assert time as being causally dependent

Bill: Could "this" universe still exist only because of God? Yes, if God's causal relationship with "this" universe is teleological instead of effectual.

Rw: I tend to lean towards a combination of both.

Bill: This is one of the points upon which Theophage's argument hinges. If "effect" is defined as "the result of a cause, "this" universe cannot be an effect as it did not have a cause.

Rw: I’m still uncertain if you are referring to THIS UNIVERSE as encompassing all of existence or not in this statement so I better wait for clarification.

Bill: Interestingly enough, however, I pretty much agree with the rest of your statement. Existence must have priority over "universe". However, this priority cannot be defined in terms of time or causality.

Rw: How would you define it then?

Bill: The first part of your statement is exactly as I had noted: no mechanism is required to account for God. God is the brute fact that accounts for existence.

However, God would not seem to be the "least assumption". God has intelligence and conscious purpose (among other attributes). But are any of God's postulated attributes necessary elements of existence? Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate.

Rw: If you include life, consciousness and intelligence in that EXISTENCE it seems entirely counter-intuitive to assert that these are products of a dead, non-conscious, oblivious something called EXISTENCE that is defined only as a brute fact. This sort of closes the doors of investigation. Death and taxes are also brute facts but we don’t attribute to them the existence of the Empire State Building.

Bill: The non-theistic alternative, which is that Existence itself is a brute fact in need of no explanation, surely has less "entities" or postulates than the theistic one. It would therefore seem to be the more parsimonious.

Rw: Perhaps in a non-living, non-conscious, oblivious state of inanimate matter and mechanistic motion completely determined yes…but in THIS UNIVERSE it is an entirely unsatisfactory and counter-intuitive postulate.

Bill: Existence doesn't need to "account for" itself. Existence exists; as I pointed out earlier, denying this fact leads to a logical contradiction. As "this" universe is not an effect (as Theophage's argument holds), there is also no need to explain the causal "mechanism" by which it came into existence as no such mechanism could possibly exist.

Rw: Well Bill, nobody is denying that existence exists. That it is eternal is another question altogether. That it is un-caused yet another speculation as well.

If this universe is not an effect it must be a cause. In such a case we have a greater contradiction on our hands. Since all that exists must exist in either one or the other categories of cause or effect, to posit this universe to not be an effect means you hold it forth as a cause. To hold forth a cause as un-caused is also a contradiction and damning to Theophage’s postulate that this universe is regulated by causality. The two of you seem to be equivocating on this point among others.