rainbow walking

rw: Really? Then describe such a world for us, sans evil.

rainbow walking

philo: Then what exactly is your argument?

rw: That Lob's assertion an omni-max being is to be held responsible for the phenomenon of addiction is ludicrous. If such a being exists he incurs no moral culpibility in the case of addiction because people know before they indulge in addictive things that these things are addictive.

I also offered a counter explanation for addiction that it was nature's way of addressing over indulgence. The human body is a limited resource. You can't continue to abuse this resource without adverse effects.

philo: Okay, but what is the purpose of a crack baby in the context of the PoE?

rw: I'm not sure I understand this question. A crack baby is evidence of the irresponsibility, and tragic consequences, of people who ignore the warnings about certain addictive substances. Is it your contention that such a being bears a moral responsibility for man's choices? If so, why?

It seems dangerous to me to blame such a being for our choices. It sort of gives one the impression they can do whatever they want and just claim an omni-max being made them do it. They couldn't help it. On the other hand xianity, in some expressions, does just this except it has the concept of a lesser deity called satan to blame.

Philosoft

Obviously, not everyone knows that smoking crack twice might lead to hopeless addiction. What's the point of the implied danger of addiction for an individual who doesn't know about it?

Which Lob and I both pointed out, and to which you agreed, was a spuriously simplistic way of categorizing the indulgence/addiction continuum.

Because a crack baby suffers needlessly. An omnipotent being does not need to addict innocent children to crack before they're even born to remind the rest of us that crack is addictive.

I'm not blaming God for all of humanity's ills, but I have a hard time judging crack babies as somehow necessary for an omnipotent being to bring about some change in other humans.
Given God's necessary dominion over Satan, this is usually a rather unconvincing defense.

rainbow walking

philo: Obviously, not everyone knows that smoking crack twice might lead to hopeless addiction. What's the point of the implied danger of addiction for an individual who doesn't know about it?

rw: The knowledge of the addictive attributes of crack exists and has since it hit the market. Are you arguing that such a being is responsible for every person's willful ignorance?

philo: Which Lob and I both pointed out, and to which you agreed, was a spuriously simplistic way of categorizing the indulgence/addiction continuum.

rw: I don't recall agreeing to anything being spurious. I think I used the term viscious cycle to describe the effect in relation to indulgence.

philo: Because a crack baby suffers needlessly. An omnipotent being does not need to addict innocent children to crack before they're even born to remind the rest of us that crack is addictive.

rw: And how is such a being responsible for these addictions? I suppose the mother's abuse plays no role in it? The knowledge that a pregnant woman must be careful about the substances she indulges in while carrying a fetus is a matter of pediatrics. Again, where knowledge exists, those who refuse to consider its implications are responsible for the consequences...not this being.


philo: I'm not blaming God for all of humanity's ills, but I have a hard time judging crack babies as somehow necessary for an omnipotent being to bring about some change in other humans.

rw: As you say, that is one of humanity's ills. It's not a necessary ill but it exists nonetheless. As long as it remains one of humanity's ills it remains humanity's responsibility to address it, which I think we are via the law and medicine.


philo: Given God's necessary dominion over Satan, this is usually a rather unconvincing defense.

rw: I agree.

NonContradiction

A few comments:

1) Some people here are arguing that an omnibenevolent God should and would prevent ALL pain and suffering in the world. That position seems to me to be absurd because it implies that God isn't an all-loving God if He allows someone to get a scratch. Such a position, to me, seems pointless to even argue over, so I won't.

2) Others here seem to be allowing for some pain and suffering to exist in the world, while claiming that the existence of unnecesary evil conflicts with a Tri-Omni God. I don't really understand the necessary and unnecessary distinction. If God wants us to experience some pain and pleasure in this life, how is it that God's wants become logically necessary? Perhaps, I just need more clarification by what people mean by necessary evil.

3) The other distinction that some people are making involves the gratuitous and nongratuitous distinction. Am I correct in assuming that nongratuitous evil isn't in conflict with the existence of a Tri-Omni God? Also, I need clarification by what people mean by gratuitous evil. Are they referring to the level of evil in the world or are they referring to a type of action? For instance, being rude to someone would not be considered, IMO, as gratuitous evil, whereas torturing a child would be. Are we talking about the type of action or the quantity of evil in the world?

4) Finally, I would like to say that the AfE isn't an empirical argument or an apriori argument. It's a moral argument. Although moral arguments may contain empirical propositions, the fact that they contain empirical propositions doesn't make them empirical. Empirical arguments don't contain any moral propositions. Also, moral arguments are not apriori, analytical arguments because they don't lead to necessary contradictions if their basic assumptions are denied, in the same way that apriori arguments do. Moral arguments are not logically necessarily true.

If God is omnibenevolent, then he should prevent gratuitous evil is a moral proposition. It leads to the conclusion, by many people, that God isn't a moral God for not preventing gratuitous pain and suffering in the world. However, the problem is that moral propositions cannot be supported in the same way that analytical or empirical propositions can. For people to pretend that they have an empirical argument that proves the nonexistence of God means that they are only fooling themselves. The AfE isn't an empirical argument anymore than I am mother Theresa.

Dr. Retard

The phrases "unnecessary", "gratuitous", "unjustified", etc. evil bear, for most users, the same meaning. The idea is that some evil is such that God would be morally justified in allowing it to happen. This evil is "necessary", "justified", and "non-gratuitous". For example, evil that is a necessary prerequisite for an outweighing good. Or evil such that, if God intervened, the intervention would only make things worse.

Other evil, controversially, is not like this. Some evil is such that God would not be morally justified in allowing it to happen. If this evil exists, then God doesn't exist. This evil is "unnecessary", etc. There are a few philosophers who try to show that such evil is in fact compatible with God's existence (e.g., Michael Peterson, William Hasker). But they're a minority, even among theists. Theistic philosophers and atheistic philosophers tend to agree: if this evil exists, then there's no God. So the question is whether this evil exists.

Here is a PDF article you can find online about the topic of gratuitous evil: 'Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil' by Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder.

Quote:

4) Finally, I would like to say that the AfE isn't an empirical argument or an apriori argument. It's a moral argument. Although moral arguments may contain empirical propositions, the fact that they contain empirical propositions doesn't make them empirical. Empirical arguments don't contain any moral propositions. Also, moral arguments are not apriori, analytical arguments because they don't lead to necessary contradictions if their basic assumptions are denied, in the same way that apriori arguments do. Moral arguments are not logically necessarily true. If God is omnibenevolent, then he should prevent gratuitous evil is a moral proposition. It leads to the conclusion, by many people, that God isn't a moral God for not preventing gratuitous pain and suffering in the world. However, the problem is that moral propositions cannot be supported in the same way that analytical or empirical propositions can. For people to pretend that they have an empirical argument that proves the nonexistence of God means that they are only fooling themselves. The AfE isn't an empirical argument anymore than I am mother Theresa.

You're taking a lot of controversial meta-ethics for granted. Some philosophers think that moral propositions are necessary and a priori. Richard Swinburne, I believe, takes this position. Some think that moral propositions are identical to empirical propositions.

And I question your use of "empirical argument". Suppose I tell you about my friend Gary, saying "Everything that Gary does is morally proper". Then we encounter Gary raping a child to death. You might say that my judgment about Gary has been proven false by the evidence. That seems like a legitimate claim to me. The evidence is in, and Gary's actions are sometimes less than morally proper.

If you want to bite the bullet and say that when an argument partakes of value judgments, it's automatically disqualified as an "empirical argument", then you're welcome to your use of the phrase. In that case, though, I don't care whether the AfE is an empirical argument on your definition. I care whether it's a good argument.

NonContradiction

Thanks for the link. I enjoyed reading it because it was very informative. However, how does the link support your position? The authors tend to think that Van Inwagen's objection to the AfGE is very strong, whereas Michael Peterson's and William Hasker's isn't.

Hawkingfan

Picture heaven without god or christians and you'd have a good idea.

Wiploc

LOL! :notworthy
crc

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by NonContradiction :

Okay. I'm surprised anyone here would advocate that. Most likely, they'd claim God should prevent all useless (gratuitous, unnecessary) pain and suffering if he is morally perfect. We (atheists) think that there's probably some gratuitous intense suffering in the world, and if God exists, there will be no gratuitous intense suffering in the world.

Some evil E is necessary for some good G iff in any possible world where G exists, E exists.

Yes.

Gratuitous evil = unnecessary evil.

I think there's a (temporarily successful) way around this. The argument need not contain any normative statements at all. The idea is not that God should prevent gratuitous suffering, but that a morally perfect God would prevent gratuitous suffering -- this is a factual statement. Of course, there's still the problem of analyzing moral perfection. But all you have to do is to get the interlocutor to agree to:

it is morally better to prevent intense gratuitous suffering than to allow it, all else equal

And I'd be surprised (and disturbed) to find anyone who would not assent to that.