Davo

Devilnaut,

But why? It's often asserted that foreknowledge conflicts with free will, but it's never really demonstrated why it does.

My contention is that God's foreknowledge is caused by our future freely made choices. How does something in the future cause something in the past? Well, I'm a four-dimensionalist, meaning that I view all times, past, present and future, as real. The past still exists, as does the present, and the future is not indeterminate. As such, temporal order is largely irrelevant to causal order. Even though past events generally cause future events, there is no reason for holding the presupposition that future events cannot cause past events.

So, considering that all times are as real as one another, it is possible for our future decisions to cause God's foreknowledge of what these decisions will be.

Just because someone knows what your future decision will be doesn't mean you're not free. Please demonstrate why there's a logical contradiction between foreknowledge and free will using either a formal proof or at least an argument in standard form with premises and a conclusion. I think once you set out your argument clearly you'll find it easier to see the hidden assumptions you're making.

Evangelion

Devilnaut –

And fun for all the family, it is!

Cheers. I’m enjoying it too.

OK. That much is clear, at least. But how do you intend to prove that God’s foreknowledge precludes our free will? To date, you have merely asserted it.

Well, that’s a bit strange, then. Because when you say that God’s foreknowledge precludes our free will, you’re clearly laying the blame at the feet of God’s foreknowledge. What you should be saying, is that our free will is precluded by determinism, and that God’s foreknowledge is only a consequence of this determinism.

Which means that you really have to prove determinism without reference to the foreknowledge of God, before your argument can get off the ground.

Yes, yes, you’ve just said that.

But all you’re doing is denying the possibility that an infinitely powerful being can know the future. Determinism doesn’t enter the equation at all.

Speaking for myself, I conclude that if we begin with the premise of an infinitely powerful being, foreknowledge just isn’t going to be a difficult task for said being.

*snip*

*snip*

Because we’re supposed to be assuming the possibility of foreknowledge for the purpose of the debate, remember? Your task is not to disprove foreknowledge, but to show how it conflicts with free will. Iin order to do that, you must first assume the existence of both free will and foreknowledge.

You’re still not getting it. God knows what I will choose. His knowledge is of the final outcome. For this reason, it is always correct.

No, there’s no contradiction here at all.

Irrelevant.

Ummm… is this the part where I have to explain the “fore” part of foreknowledge? I’ve been assuming that you understood the meaning of this word. Correct me if I’m wrong.

But that’s not what I’m proposing. I’m proposing that God has perfect, exhaustive foreknowledge of future events, without recourse to time travel.

No, that’s not true at all.

Yep.

No, you’re still looking at this from a strictly non-supernatural perspective. Again: all you’ve done is to deny the possibility of foreknowledge, which we’re supposed to be assuming for the purpose of the debate.

Your task is to prove that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. To date, you have not done this.

Evangelion

Thomas –

You’re losing me. If (3) is not intended to follow from (2), you don’t have an argument.

Agreed.

Agreed – because in this case, the statement “It is true today that you will have cornflakes tomorrow” is clearly contingent upon the premise that your decision will not change between now and then. Conversely, the statement “It is possible that you will have cornflakes tomorrow”, is based upon the assumption that your decision might change between now and then.

The former can be accepted as a hypothetical statement of fact, without recourse to supernatural foreknowledge or determinism. The same is also true of the latter.

False. You have not addressed the possible reasons for (2). (See above.)

True.

True.

False. (See my answer to (3).) The state of “no chance” is contingent on at least two possibilities. You’re trying to pretend that one of these possibilities doesn’t exist.

What I am saying is that any consideration of the statement “There is no chance that I will have cornflakes tomorrow”, must take into account the reason why you won’t have cornflakes tomorrow.

This could be:

• That you do not possess free will.
• That will not change your mind between today and tomorrow.

The statement “There is no chance that I will have cornflakes tomorrow” merely assumes one of these two premises. So the statement “There is no chance that I will have cornflakes tomorrow” does not necessarily preclude the possibility of free will. If it is the result of an unchanging decision, it remains true without compromising free will. Remember, it is simply a statement about the final outcome; not a statement about the preclusion of free will.

True.

False.

Correct.

Define “libertarian free will”, please. I am arguing in favour of the premise that total free will is perfectly compatible with foreknowledge.

Correct.

Correct.

No, if we’ve already decided what to do, then we obviously know the outcome before it occurs. But that’s not the same as saying that we have the perfect, exhaustive foreknowledge of God.

No, there was every chance that we could have done something else. Remember, the foreknowledge of God is the knowledge of the final outcome, not merely one particular decision which may or may not see actuality.

As long as they’re determined by ourselves (independent of coercion), they’re obviously free, yes.


* Edited for clarity. (As one tends to do in this type of debate.)

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Evangelion ]</p>

John Page

Evang:

1. If I have foreknowledge, does that mean I'm god?
2. If Kharakov has more foreknowledge than me does that make him more of a god than me?
3. If I have more foreknowledge of weather than Kharakov and he has more forknowledge of tides does that make me god of weather and him god of the sea?
4. If god has complete foreknowledge of everything, including our foreknowledge that belief in god will be proven to be a feature of the human mind rather than existential fact, does that make him Zeus?
5. In a nutshell, if I can predict the behavior of a worm I become the/a god of worms and the worm has no free will w.r.t me because I can predict "worm outcomes". Substitute god for me and me for the worm I have no free will.

Enjoy life while you can chose to do so (after w while you will become boring and predictable according to my foreknowledge).

Cheers, John

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: John Page ]</p>

Devilnaut

For Davo:

Yes, I am arguing with the assumption that for us, time flows forward. This means that causes always temporally precede their effects.

If you do not share this assumption then my conclusion doesn't apply. That's fine with me

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

Evangelion

John -

Nope. (I already addressed this in a previous post.) OTOH, if you (like God) have perfect, exhaustive foreknowledge, you're in a fine position to pick up Randi's $1m.

Nope. Why would it?

Nope. Why would it?

Nope. Why would it?

Non sequitur.

I'll continue to enjoy life regardless of whether or not you have foreknowledge of my actions.

Davo

Devilnaut,

So, you're admitting that foreknowledge only conflicts with free will if you hold your presupposition? In other words, it's certainly possible for foreknowledge to be consistent with free will?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Evangelion:

"You’re losing me. If (3) is not intended to follow from (2), you don’t have an argument."

For a premise Q to follow from P, "P --&gt; Q" must be true. My argument depends upon (8), which does follow from (1)-(7). The argument is valid, but I do not believe it is sound, because I believe (3) and (6) are false.

"Define 'libertarian free will', please. I am arguing in favour of the premise that total free will is perfectly compatible with foreknowledge."

Person S had libertarian free will at decision D iff for any D made by S, there is a transworldly identical person S' in a nearby possible world who chose an alternate decision, D'. In other words, it is alethic modally possible for S to have chosen some other decision. If God has foreknowledge, it is not alethic modally possible for S to have chosen some other decision.

"No, if we’ve already decided what to do, then we obviously know the outcome before it occurs. But that’s not the same as saying that we have the perfect, exhaustive foreknowledge of God."

As long as we don't antecendently know what we're going to do. That is, we don't have a justified true belief to the effect.

"No, there was every chance that we could have done something else. Remember, the foreknowledge of God is the knowledge of the final outcome, not merely one particular decision which may or may not see actuality." (Emphasis original.)

Wait a minute; maybe you didn't edit quite enough for clarity here. You mean the final outcome of the decision? If He knows the outcome, it's analytically true that it's true that the outcome will be the way it is, and this means there's no chance it'll end up any other way.

Here's how I define free will. Person S had free will at decision D iff S did not know what decision she would take at D, and S was not coerced into the decision she took at D. And then coercion is either when some other agent decides the outcome of D, or the outcome is removed from S's occurrent mental processes (such as would be the case if she were suffering from a severe form of mental illness, or if causality didn't exist).

[ December 10, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

John Page

Evang:

1. If you are not god, how do you have such foreknowledge?
2. If you are god, you negate your own assertion. Perhaps a minor deity would be allowable.
3. If I had perfect foreknowledge (whatever that is) I wouldn't need the $1m.
4. Just because you make up a story about an imaginary entity that has perfect forknowledge doesn't make it real. Got any evidence, by chance?

I knew you'd like the non-seq! That makes you the worm and me the god this time round.

Cheers, John

Devilnaut

Possible in a world where time can flow both backwards and forwards, sure.

My response to Eva is forthcoming