rainbow walking

Hello Noncontradiction,

You say: It's my belief that we need to eliminate the word "evil" in the PoE since we are not really talking about evil, anyway, but rather pain and suffering. Good and evil are metaphysical constructs that have no basis in the natural world we live in. On the other hand, the pains and pleasures of this life, which we do EXPERIENCE, do have a concrete reference.


To which I say: Indeed, it is precisely from our pleasures and pains that our moral fabric is woven. Are you quite certain moving the goalposts backwards will accomodate PoE? If we remove pain and suffering as a frame of reference, how then will we recognize pleasure and joy, even if it's written in blood?

Tell me, have you ever experienced the exhilirating fear of a roller coaster ride? Or the immense relief of a huge grilled steak after being tortured by the nagging pangs of hunger?

Marz Blak

I am not sure that I agree with this either. To extend the flavor analogy, I might choose chocolate over vanilla because I like chocolate *more* than I like vanilla, but that does not necessarily mean that I *dislike* vanilla, or that being given vanilla when I would prefer chocolate would be anything I could reasonably call painful. It might be even a matter of mood--I might prefer chocolate one day, vanilla the next, for reasons even I don't clearly (or consciously) understand. Whatever the case, it is not clear to me that *less* pleasure==pain, which is what is implied by your assertion.

Would I be displeased at being afforded to have the opportunity to have sex with Mariah Carey, simply because I was more attracted to Jennifer Aniston and didn't have the opportunity to have sex with her? This sort of judgment would seem to be called for by your approach to these matters, and it is laughable to me.

Similarly, it is not obvious to me that in a state of affairs in which evil/suffering were not present or even imaginable, it would *not* be possible to experience pleasure. Isn't the Christian/Islamic Heaven/Paradise concept that of a place in which there is only pleasure, or at the very least, where no inhabitant suffers? Does that mean, then, that Heaven/Paradise are inherently amoral places?

With regard to your statement of implied ethical consideration:
I am not sure I quite agree with you here either. Perhaps it is a matter of semantics: when you say 'pleasing myself is a good thing,' do you mean that, given that I want to please myself, it must be good [to/for me]? Or do you mean that that which I want to do I must consider good [to/for me], by definition? Do you distinguish, as I do, between what might be good to or for a given individual, and what might be good in some more universal sense? [Edited to add:] It seems as if there might be an equivocation in the usage of 'good' here by you; good as in *pleasing* is *not* the same as 'good' in an ethical sense, it seems to me. Or in other words, that which is good in any individual's ethical framework need not necessarily be that which is pleasing to that same individual, to my thinking.

Even if you are not equivocating with your usage of 'good,' I am not sure, quite frankly, that we are using comparable working definitions of the word. I can certainly, for example, fully imagine instances in which I might want to do something, there might be something I want to do which *pleases* me, which I nonetheless consider to be *bad* or *evil*, according to how I define the terms, and it seems to me that any non-equivocal interpretation of your usage of the word would not allow this to be the case. Or am I wrong?

[edited to add:]
The more I think about it, the more I am troubled by the assertion that there is an implied ethical consideration in every preference choice. To my thinking, there are many sorts of preference choices which are morally/ethically neutral or ambivalent. I think we may have a larger semantic issue in our working definitions of ethics as well.

Marz Blak

rainbow walking,

I got off on the other aspect of one of your posts, and it seems I was distracted from something you said which I was most interested in responding to, in your reply to shinobi:


With all due respect, it seems to me that the PoE does not assume that an omnimax being could bring about a given state of affairs sans evil, but only that it could bring about this same state of affairs with less evil/suffering than is extant. This is a vital distinction, I think, and one I would like to discuss more (when I've had more time to think about it). Your Best Of All Possible Paths To The Best Of All Possible Worlds approach is one I haven't seen before, and also it seems to be the heart of your argument, so it is something I'd like to focus on (again, when I've had more time to think about it).

NonContradiction

Who is suggesting moving the goalposts backwards? I think that many people equivocate on the word "evil". For example, some people argue that God is evil for not preventing evil in the world. However, they are commiting the fallacy of equivocation because the word "evil" here is being used two different ways within the same argument. If people want to argue that God is being immoral, assuming that He does exist, for not preventing pain and suffering in the world, then the argument should be stated as such, without equivocation.




Is pain the absence of pleasure? Is pleasure the absence of pain?

Eric H

Hello Shinobi,
Quote Shinobi: The standard attempt at refuting the PoE rests on the assumption that when evil is witness by us, such as the killing of 6 million Jews in Nazi Germany, it’s not really evil because it serves a greater good (planned by God) that we are unable to comprehend. But if this were true then that would mean that we could commit no evil.
----------------------------------------------


Being a Christian I look at this from another angle, but being truthful I must first state that my thoughts do not seem to be in line with Christian teaching.

Anyway:

If there is a God who has no beginning, then he must have had a few million years to work out a greatest good purpose to create the universe.

If he had the time to work out what this greatest good is, and then decide to create something less good, then he would not be a very great God.

From a philosophical point of view I believe that you can find this greatest purpose by finding answers to three questions.

Only search for the greatest meaning and the greatest purpose as you read this.

1; What greatest purpose can God have to create children in his own image?

From humanities point of view what would be the greatest reason to be created by a God?

Would God want to create life that would need to be forgiven and shown mercy?
Would he want to create life so that it would conform to his way of doing things?
Would it give him pleasure, to sit back and look at the wonderful universe and life he has created?

The greatest reason God can have to create children is love.
Therefore the ultimate God humanity can have is a God who loves in the greatest way.

There must be a God who willingly loves all of mankind as he loves HIMSELF, for all time and unconditionally.

Would this be a love so great, that even God could not love in a greater way?

This is the same language used in the greatest commandments.
Can it be that the language used in the greatest commandments applied to God first?
If we were created in the image of God, would it make more sense if humanities greatest purpose hangs on the greatest purpose for God?

2..To find a greatest purpose for all God’s children.

What greatest purpose could God set for humanity? Would it be for everyone to turn to His kind of religion and pray the way that he stipulates, or would it be to banish poverty, gain intellectual superiority, conquer sickness and death, and conquer the universe or is there more?

If the greatest reason God can have to create mankind, is to love each and everyone of us, as he loves himself, then God could create mankind, with the freedom to return God’s love

All of mankind to be created with the freedom to love God the creator unconditionally.

God willingly loves everyone as he loves himself; we also need this same freedom to love everyone in the same way, so that the truth can be complete for God and mankind.

All of mankind to be created with the freedom to love all of God’s children (neighbours) as they love themselves, unconditionally.



3..What greatest thing can God create?

God could create all the stars and planets of the universe; he would then become God the builder.
God could create a whole variety of life with almost no intelligence like plants; he now become God the gardener’
God could create life with more intelligence to hunt for food, look for shelter, mate, and breed a future generation. If the knowledge and intelligence is limited he has now created the animal kingdom. He now becomes God the farmer, a pet owner; their behavior should not cause him too much trouble
God could create life with a progressive way of gaining knowledge and intelligence. God could create life in his own image, a life that could understand him. Creating life in his own image is the greatest form of creation open to him. He now becomes God the Father; his children must be real children to him. He can create nothing greater because he cannot create anything greater than himself.

We can marvel at the great attention to detail that is evident in everything from the tiniest single cell of life and right up to the giant structures of galaxies.

Can you find any greater purpose for all this to exist by challenging the above statements in your mind in an honest way, test them against any religious beliefs, test them against any form of logic.
Did God have the ability to keep sin and evil from man? If the answer is yes, then we can conclude that He had a purpose great enough to allow evil and sin to exist.
Is the freedom to love in this way a purpose great enough to allow evil to exist? Can there be any greater purpose for God to create life? Can there be any greater purpose for humanity to exist?

peace

Eric

Marz Blak

rainbow walking,

Getting back to your Best Of All Possible Paths To The Best Of All Possible Worlds construct, you say:

I am sorry, but I am not sure I buy this best-process argument either. Presupposing an omnimax God, it would have been possible for it to have created creatures of the sort it desired without necessarily going through this process. This being the case, then, in order for your best-process argument to hold, there would have to be some inherent ethical *value* in the gratuitous suffering/evil inherent in the process in and of itself, since an omnimax God could have obtained the same results without setting up the conditions which allowed for all the gratuitous suffering/evil. I have a difficult time imagining what inherent value this gratuitous suffering might have, so to me, assuming that there must be a valid reason for it is nothing more or less than an argument from ignorance.

I have similar objections (I think of them all as being *marginal,* in the economic sense) with the entire "Best Possible World" (BPW) argument that your best-process argument fail to address in my view. For example, taking the matter of "freewill" (which I put in quotes because I believe it to be an entirely unworkable concept, but that's another argument, certainly), there are objections centered around the inherent limitations of frewill included in the manner in which what we commonly refer to as the fundamental laws of universe which are not addressed; there are moreover arguments about the nature and level of empathy, compassion, and other ethical attributes generally taken to be positive, etc., that are extant in human nature which I also fail to see addressed by your argument.

rainbow walking

Hi Marz,
Thank you for your response. I’ll do my best to make my position as coherent as possible. I do hope we don’t fall into a semantics tug-o-war but if you feel I’m using improper terminology or definitions please don’t hesitate to call me on it. Also, I’m going to try and answer all your posts in this one response. In addition you can find the answer to many of your objections in the thread I started entitled “POE?” http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.p...threadid=53610

If you have time to read through this thread it might help you to understand my perspective a little better. But I’ll try to cover my position as briefly as possible here as well. (brevity is not one of my better qualities)


Marz: I am not sure that I agree with this either. To extend the flavor analogy, I might choose chocolate over vanilla because I like chocolate *more* than I like vanilla, but that does not necessarily mean that I *dislike* vanilla, or that being given vanilla when I would prefer chocolate would be anything I could reasonably call painful. It might be even a matter of mood--I might prefer chocolate one day, vanilla the next, for reasons even I don't clearly (or consciously) understand. Whatever the case, it is not clear to me that *less* pleasure==pain, which is what is implied by your assertion.

rw: My initial response was based on your question about normative values, (you used the term “ethics”), in relation to simple choices like favorite flavors. All of this stemmed from my assertion that in a state of affairs sans evil and suffering we’d have no frame of reference for such concepts as “favorite” and “preferred” and any other term associated with assessing value simply because these terms are derived on the basis of the existence of their converse and come as much from the option of evil as the option of good; from the option of pain as much as the option of pleasure; from the option of right as much as the option of wrong. If you take good and evil to be the summation of all these lesser value assignments, and you enter a state of affairs where the concept of evil never obtained, then you’d also find yourself in a state of affairs where the concept of good never obtained, and this would flow, domino style, all the way down the grid of our existence such that even these simple choices would become incomprehensible to us. Good absolutely requires a backdrop of evil to be a meaningful concept. You wouldn’t have the capacity to measure your preferences by degrees because the concept of preference is derived from normative association as much as the concept of good is. A world without good and evil is a world devoid of normative association. Nothing can be said to be good or preferred, unless something exists that can be said to be bad or despised. There must be a frame of reference.

In our world there is evil and lesser degrees of evil. There is also good and lesser degrees of good. There is also a grey area where lesser degrees of evil and lesser degrees of good merge. It is in this grey area that all objects of our world exist until we assign to them a value. For instance a tree in the middle of the forest exists as an object in our world. By itself it exists in an amoral state…the gray area. When some one of us comes along and decides we need this tree or it is in our way, it suddenly acquires a value to us. Our value system is based on what is good or bad/evil for us. Remove all evil and you remove the framework by which we can adjudge a thing to be good, hence you remove all value assignments and consequently any reason for us to make a decision about anything. And this would work equally as effective were you to remove all good. So, in one respect, it can be stated that the only way to eradicate all evil is to eradicate all good. Without good or evil we would exist only in that grey area where all things have equal value. This is part of the philosophy that led Marx to communism. But it just couldn’t work because our ecosystem has programmed us to assign value to that which furthers and sustains our lives and forces us to compete for these assigned values.

Marz: Would I be displeased at being afforded to have the opportunity to have sex with Mariah Carey, simply because I was more attracted to Jennifer Aniston and didn't have the opportunity to have sex with her? This sort of judgment would seem to be called for by your approach to these matters, and it is laughable to me.

rw: What causes you to view Jennifer Aniston as more desirable than Mariah Carey? Your own personal preference? And where did you derive these preferences? From a world that is dependent on competing for assigned values. And if you found yourself in a world where no such values could be assigned, would you be motivated to have sex with either of them? Seeing how sex is generally a pleasurable act, in a world devoid of suffering how would you know or recognize pleasure as a value to be pursued?

Marz: Similarly, it is not obvious to me that in a state of affairs in which evil/suffering were not present or even imaginable, it would *not* be possible to experience pleasure.


rw Oh it might very well be present but you’d have no frame of reference to recognize it if it was.

Marz: Isn't the Christian/Islamic Heaven/Paradise concept that of a place in which there is only pleasure, or at the very least, where no inhabitant suffers? Does that mean, then, that Heaven/Paradise are inherently amoral places?

rw: According to NT text there was or is or will be, (hard to tell), a war in heaven, so it doesn’t sound like you’re operating from a correct conception of the biblical heaven.

Marz: With regard to your statement of implied ethical consideration:



cont.: I am not sure I quite agree with you here either. Perhaps it is a matter of semantics: when you say 'pleasing myself is a good thing,' do you mean that, given that I want to please myself, it must be good [to/for me]? Or do you mean that that which I want to do I must consider good [to/for me], by definition? Do you distinguish, as I do, between what might be good to or for a given individual, and what might be good in some more universal sense?

rw: Oh, I quite agree, but they are both ethical in nature. There always exists a tension between the individual and his community as to the parameters of good in both respects.

Marz: I am not sure, quite frankly, that we are using comparable working definitions of 'good.' I can, for example, fully imagine instances in which I might want to do something, there might be something I want to do which *pleases* me, which I nonetheless consider to be *bad* or *evil*, according to how I define the terms.

rw: And what would you do in this situation?

Marz: [edited to add:]
The more I think about it, the more I am troubled by the assertion that there is an implied ethical consideration in every preference choice. To my thinking, there are many sorts of preference choices which are morally/ethically neutral or ambivalent. I think we may have a larger semantic issue in our working definitions of ethics as well.

rw: Well, I would certainly entertain any suggestions you might have as to what they are.


Marz’s 2nd post: With all due respect, it seems to me that the PoE does not assume that an omnimax being could bring about a given state of affairs sans evil, but only that it could bring about this same state of affairs with less evil/suffering than is extant. This is a vital distinction, I think, and one I would like to discuss more (when I've had more time to think about it).



rw: Sans all evil and suffering is implied, unless otherwise stated. It just isn’t logical to argue PoE for one specific evil or less evil simply because, were such an omnimax being to comply, how long would it be before we’d be after him to remove yet more evil etc. and so on. If you’re going to access omnipotence why not go for broke instead of trying to negotiate away evil and suffering a little at a time. As long as any evil or suffering remains, PoE can still be argued.




Marz: I am sorry, but I am not sure I buy this best-process argument either. Presupposing an omnimax God, it would have been possible for it to have created creatures of the sort it desired without necessarily going through this process.



rw: What sort of creatures might that be? You seem to have some built in assumptions under foot here that are emerging as unsupported assertions. Could you be a chap and describe these creatures for me, so that I too might consider the possibility you claim this god had as an option?

Marz: This being the case, then, in order for your best-process argument to hold, there would have to be some inherent ethical *value* in the gratuitous suffering/evil inherent in the process in and of itself, since an omnimax God could have obtained the same results without setting up the conditions which allowed for all the gratuitous suffering/evil.


rw: Well, that would be contingent on the sort of creature you assert this god could have poofed into existence fully featured. Surely you’ve seen good come of evil on many an occasion…yes? It is an unsupported assertion and a gross assumption to say this god “could” do this until and unless you can describe what these results would resemble. Details would be nice, like how these folks recognize freedom and peace and good health and prosperity, seeing as they were poofed into these things without having ever been subjected to their converse in slavery, war, sickness and poverty. I really can’t accept these sweeping “god could haves” just on your say so when you make no effort to enlighten me as to the inherent ethical value of this new and improved lifestyle created for us out of magic and fairie dust.

Marz: I have a difficult time imagining what inherent value this gratuitous suffering might have, so to me, assuming that there must be a valid reason for it is nothing more or less than an argument from ignorance.

rw: Imagination is not required. Just a thinking brain cell or two will do. So we’re now on gratuitous suffering, are we? O’kay, assuming you mean amoral causes of suffering here, let’s see, how about science, technology, industry, medicine and higher education. Take away all gratuitous suffering and how far along do you think we’d be from the caves and swamps?


Marz: I have similar objections (I think of them all as being *marginal,* in the economic sense) with the entire "Best Possible World" (BPW) argument that your best-process argument fail to address in my view. For example, taking the matter of "freewill" (which I put in quotes because I believe it to be an entirely unworkable concept, but that's another argument, certainly),



rw: Determinism?

Marz: there are objections centered around the inherent limitations of frewill included in the manner in which what we commonly refer to as the fundamental laws of universe which are not addressed;

rw: You mean the theoretical laws of our universe we’ve ascertained thusfar like quantum physics and Heisenburg’s Principle of Uncertainty?




Marz: there are moreover arguments about the nature and level of empathy, compassion, and other ethical attributes generally taken to be positive, etc., that are extant in human nature which I also fail to see addressed by your argument.

rw: As in valuing one another? I assume your anticipated description of these creatures, you’ve postulated this god could poof up, bypassing evil and suffering, would include an explanation as to how they came to have these qualities, as well?

Marz Blak

rw,

Good, thoughtful post. It should certainly come as no surprise for me to concede that you've obviously spent a good deal more time thinking on this matter than I have, and so I will have to read and think about what you've written here before attempting to respond. So please allow me a day or two to do that. In the meantime, I *will* reply to a couple of your responses off-the-cuff, as it were, below:

...

Marz: Isn't the Christian/Islamic Heaven/Paradise concept that of a place in which there is only pleasure, or at the very least, where no inhabitant suffers? Does that mean, then, that Heaven/Paradise are inherently amoral places?

rw: According to NT text there was or is or will be, (hard to tell), a war in heaven, so it doesn’t sound like you’re operating from a correct conception of the biblical heaven.

I am no biblical/koranic scholar to be sure, but even taking as a given that the Bible does speak of a War in Heaven/Paradise (and I *do* believe I've heard this before), it doesn't necessarily follow that there is not an absence of suffering there. It seems contradictory its face, but I *do* know enough about the Bible to not be surprised by its inclusion of yet another naked contradiction. So I don't see how my question about the nature of Heaven/Paradise is answered by your response here.

...

Marz: I am not sure, quite frankly, that we are using comparable working definitions of 'good.' I can, for example, fully imagine instances in which I might want to do something, there might be something I want to do which *pleases* me, which I nonetheless consider to be *bad* or *evil*, according to how I define the terms.

rw: And what would you do in this situation?

Not to be flippant, but it would depend on the particulars of the situation, I imagine.

...

Marz: [edited to add:]
The more I think about it, the more I am troubled by the assertion that there is an implied ethical consideration in every preference choice. To my thinking, there are many sorts of preference choices which are morally/ethically neutral or ambivalent. I think we may have a larger semantic issue in our working definitions of ethics as well.

rw: Well, I would certainly entertain any suggestions you might have as to what they are.

Interesting. If I read you correctly, your belief is that it is impossible to make any preference choice absent some ethical consideration, correct? I can only say that such a choice as whether to have chocolate or vanilla ice cream for desert seems like such a choice to me, along with any arbitrary number of such similar preference choices. I understand what you are saying about value, I think, but I am quite frankly having trouble connecting the dots, as it were. Seems like I have some boning up to do here. Any reading suggestions?

...

Marz’s 2nd post: With all due respect, it seems to me that the PoE does not assume that an omnimax being could bring about a given state of affairs sans evil, but only that it could bring about this same state of affairs with less evil/suffering than is extant. This is a vital distinction, I think, and one I would like to discuss more (when I've had more time to think about it).

rw: Sans all evil and suffering is implied, unless otherwise stated. It just isn’t logical to argue PoE for one specific evil or less evil simply because, were such an omnimax being to comply, how long would it be before we’d be after him to remove yet more evil etc. and so on. If you’re going to access omnipotence why not go for broke instead of trying to negotiate away evil and suffering a little at a time. As long as any evil or suffering remains, PoE can still be argued.

I don't think I'm with you here. I read the other thread to which you referred, and there was a similar interchange of positions there. I don't think your 'slippery-slope' objection is persuasive, as it seems clear to me that the occurrence of even one less instance of gratuitous suffering is ethically preferable, and your objection does not address this point.

...

Marz: I am sorry, but I am not sure I buy this best-process argument either. Presupposing an omnimax God, it would have been possible for it to have created creatures of the sort it desired without necessarily going through this process.

rw: What sort of creatures might that be? You seem to have some built in assumptions under foot here that are emerging as unsupported assertions. Could you be a chap and describe these creatures for me, so that I too might consider the possibility you claim this god had as an option?

...

Perhaps this is the rub. I would hold that a an omnipotent, omniscient being capable of setting up a process leading to the certain evolution (and that is what you are suggesting, isn't it?) of moral agents capable of making a Best Possible World should certainly be able to simply create such beings from scratch, as it were. After all, what are we talking about? Your beings' ability to "recognize freedom and peace and good health and prosperity" are simply a matter of brain function, right? And the presupposed all-knowing, all-powerful being--even accepting your limitations on its abilities as being capable of only that which is logically possible--could certainly create beings--hard-wire them, as it were--to have the sort of brain function leading to such things as compassion, the recognition of freedom and health, etc., as good things, etc., your Best Possible Path argument presents as the final objective of all this business, right?

...

rw: ...Seeing as they were poofed into these things without having ever been subjected to their converse in slavery, war, sickness and poverty. I really can’t accept these sweeping “god could haves” just on your say so when you make no effort to enlighten me as to the inherent ethical value of this new and improved lifestyle created for us out of magic and fairie dust.

Inherent ethical value? Define, please. I don't believe I've suggested that I believe there is such a thing, and I certainly won't take it as a given.

Marz: I have a difficult time imagining what inherent value this gratuitous suffering might have, so to me, assuming that there must be a valid reason for it is nothing more or less than an argument from ignorance.

rw: Imagination is not required. Just a thinking brain cell or two will do. So we’re now on gratuitous suffering, are we? O’kay, assuming you mean amoral causes of suffering here, let’s see, how about science, technology, industry, medicine and higher education. Take away all gratuitous suffering and how far along do you think we’d be from the caves and swamps?

Firstly, the "brain cell or two" comment was uncalled-for, incivil, and rude, and I don't believe I've given you any cause to speak to me in such a manner. If you persist, I shall have no choice but to end this discourse.

Your choice of 'amoral causes' is selective, to be sure. But what I had in mind were the more typically cited examples: painful congenital diseases, children anonymously smothered in mudslides/earthquakes, etc. I think it very difficult to argue against the proposition that there are at least some such instances of suffering which have no discernable moral/ethical component without essentially resorting to some sort of argument from ignorance, unknown purpose, etc. Your earlier slippery-slope objection to this sort of thinking notwithstanding (i.e., we'd never be satisfied with the reduction of such instances until all such suffering was eliminated), it is an objection I don't believe you've rebutted satifactorily.

Regarding your (rhetorical?) question at the end of the preceding paragraph, you seem to be implying that we are all better off in somehow by virtue of having had the wherewithal through civilizational growth to make our living circumstances raised above the level of subsistence. If this is what you are trying to say, then I certainly agree with you from a sort of utilitarian POV. However, it has seemed to me that your entire argument was based on an ethical theory more, well, abstact than simple utilitarianism, so I am not sure this is exactly what you were implying here. Could you expand on this a bit?

...

Marz: there are moreover arguments about the nature and level of empathy, compassion, and other ethical attributes generally taken to be positive, etc., that are extant in human nature which I also fail to see addressed by your argument.

rw: As in valuing one another? I assume your anticipated description of these creatures, you’ve postulated this god could poof up, bypassing evil and suffering, would include an explanation as to how they came to have these qualities, as well?


I happen to believe that most if not all of what we think of as the virtues--compassion, empathy, etc.--are nothing more than biological programming. This being the case, I would imagine that this postulated god could have simply hard-wired us into having these attributes, rather than using millions of years of positive- and negative- feedback-based conditioning to do it instead.

rainbow walking

Hi Marz,
I appreciate your continued interest and insightful challenging questions. Again, I’ll do my best to respond as briefly as possible.

marz: Good, thoughtful post. It should certainly come as no surprise for me to concede that you've obviously spent a good deal more time thinking on this matter than I have, and so I will have to read and think about what you've written here before attempting to respond. So please allow me a day or two to do that. In the meantime, I *will* reply to a couple of your responses off-the-cuff, as it were, below:


rw: Excellent. To reduce redundancy I’m going to snip as much of our previous comments as feasibly possible and just respond to your latest replies, unless I feel something of the subject matter would be lost in so doing, in which case I’ll put such remarks in quote brackets.

marz: I am no biblical/koranic scholar to be sure, but even taking as a given that the Bible does speak of a War in Heaven/Paradise (and I *do* believe I've heard this before), it doesn't necessarily follow that there is not an absence of suffering there. It seems contradictory its face, but I *do* know enough about the Bible to not be surprised by its inclusion of yet another naked contradiction. So I don't see how my question about the nature of Heaven/Paradise is answered by your response here.


rw: It goes towards any anticipated argument that heaven, (provided such a place exists), if it has the capacity for war, cannot be the ideal that proponents of PoE would envision as an example of the BOAPW’s. War presupposes some degree of suffering as there are generally winners and losers in such contests. It would also seem to indicate a conflict of interests and a competition over something…perhaps dominion. At any rate, I’m not a theist so I wouldn’t put much stock in these postulates anyway. If you’d like though I’ll fetch the chapter and verses where this is detailed.



marz: Not to be flippant, but it would depend on the particulars of the situation, I imagine.


rw: Situational ethics?


marz: Interesting. If I read you correctly, your belief is that it is impossible to make any preference choice absent some ethical consideration, correct? I can only say that such a choice as whether to have chocolate or vanilla ice cream for desert seems like such a choice to me, along with any arbitrary number of such similar preference choices. I understand what you are saying about value, I think, but I am quite frankly having trouble connecting the dots, as it were. Seems like I have some boning up to do here. Any reading suggestions?


rw: Jacques Thiroux’s Ethics: Theory And Practice fifth edition Simon and Shuster copyright 1995 is a good read. Every choice we make has the potential of being right or wrong, even if only to us personally, and thus has some ethical quality to it. Of course these mundane choices that revolve around personal preferences rarely have any major effect on our state of mind or well being except maybe in a cumulative sense where we might over-indulge and inflict ourselves with health problems like putting on weight from eating too much chocolate ice cream. I know it seems extraordinary to think that eliminating evil and suffering from our conscious awareness could affect something as simple as our culinary preferences, until you connect the dot of why we eat at all with what occurs when we don’t. If you’ve ever been extremely hungry you’ll understand where I’m going with this.



marz: I don't think I'm with you here. I read the other thread to which you referred, and there was a similar interchange of positions there. I don't think your 'slippery-slope' objection is persuasive, as it seems clear to me that the occurrence of even one less instance of gratuitous suffering is ethically preferable, and your objection does not address this point.

rw: And I agree in principle, it’s just that PoE, in its original form, implied all evil and suffering and it only seems to me more logical and preferable to go for broke if we’re going to invoke omnipotence to do our work for us. I think the modification of PoE down to just one instance of gratuitous evil is a later reaction to the realization of the scope of their original stance. It is easier to argue one such instance, to be sure…shrug. Obviously, the proponent of PoE isn’t interested in the least in the eradication of any or all of such gratuities but only the logical deconstruction of the claim that such a being exists. But if I’m to take the opposing side I must question their every assumption so I pursue their postulates by extrapolating out from their claims to demonstrate that, (were such a being to have actually designed their hypothetical state of affairs), the result would be anything but a showcase of omni-benevolence.





marzPerhaps this is the rub. I would hold that a an omnipotent, omniscient being capable of setting up a process leading to the certain evolution (and that is what you are suggesting, isn't it?) of moral agents capable of making a Best Possible World should certainly be able to simply create such beings from scratch, as it were.

rw: Of course, but that isn’t PoE’s argument, it’s my counter-argument, and represents a world where evil and suffering could still obtain, but has been contained, if you will, by man rather than magic. PoE’s solution is to have this being eradicate evil and suffering and by-pass man’s participation. Their scenario isn’t one of control and containment where all value related concepts still apply, but to eliminate all basis for arriving at any value related judgment whatsoever, which is basically to eliminate man. And that’s the rub.

marz: After all, what are we talking about? Your beings' ability to "recognize freedom and peace and good health and prosperity" are simply a matter of brain function, right? And the presupposed all-knowing, all-powerful being--even accepting your limitations on its abilities as being capable of only that which is logically possible--could certainly create beings--hard-wire them, as it were--to have the sort of brain function leading to such things as compassion, the recognition of freedom and health, etc., as good things, etc., your Best Possible Path argument presents as the final objective of all this business, right?


rw: I don’t think your solution solves anything. If such a being is created “poof style” into such a condition, without any hands on comprehension of the hurdles created by evil and suffering, he still has no reference for his choices. Good and evil, and their counterparts in ethics, right and wrong, are matters of knowledge acquired by experience. Unless you know of a way to genetically hard-wire this into such beings you’re calling for something inconsistent to man’s nature.



marz:Inherent ethical value? Define, please. I don't believe I've suggested that I believe there is such a thing, and I certainly won't take it as a given.

rw: If such beings were poofed into existence without passing thru the fire, so to speak, any ethical or moral quality they had would have to be inherent, wouldn’t it? Weren’t you just advocating a hard-wired compassion?

marz: Firstly, the "brain cell or two" comment was uncalled-for, incivil, and rude, and I don't believe I've given you any cause to speak to me in such a manner. If you persist, I shall have no choice but to end this discourse.


rw: Ah, perhaps I should have placed one of those wicked grins after that comment because it wasn’t intended as a slur or insult but only as dry humor. I’m sorry you took it the wrong way. I’ll make a better effort to communicate any future stabs at such humor so as not to offend you.

marz: Your choice of 'amoral causes' is selective, to be sure. But what I had in mind were the more typically cited examples: painful congenital diseases, children anonymously smothered in mudslides/earthquakes, etc.


rw: Suffering incurred by natural causes would entail an alteration of this state of affairs that, on the surface, might seem minor until you get into the science and inter-relatedness of phenomena and begin to realize the depth and scope of the alteration would entail virtually an entirely different universe that operates by different physics than this one. Many, if not all, of these causes of suffering can be minimized, if not entirely eradicated, by man either now or at some time in the future. Of course, it would be nice if some supernatural being poofed them out of existence but if one exists with the ascribed attributes and didn’t, it wouldn’t follow that he isn’t omni-benevolent if he knows that man can do this for himself. What better way for man to learn benevolence than to have to face the results of such suffering and decide to do something to minimize it on behalf of his fellows.

marz: I think it very difficult to argue against the proposition that there are at least some such instances of suffering which have no discernable moral/ethical component without essentially resorting to some sort of argument from ignorance, unknown purpose, etc. Your earlier slippery-slope objection to this sort of thinking notwithstanding (i.e., we'd never be satisfied with the reduction of such instances until all such suffering was eliminated), it is an objection I don't believe you've rebutted satisfactorily .

rw: I don’t recall arguing for such a conclusion about the “causes” of suffering, only that suffering itself contains a moral factor. Some “causes” of suffering are premeditated and some are natural. But the suffering they inflict and the victims of that affliction would certainly view their suffering as bad, if not plain evil.

marz: Regarding your (rhetorical?) question at the end of the preceding paragraph, you seem to be implying that we are all better off in somehow by virtue of having had the wherewithal through civilizational growth to make our living circumstances raised above the level of subsistence. If this is what you are trying to say, then I certainly agree with you from a sort of utilitarian POV. However, it has seemed to me that your entire argument was based on an ethical theory more, well, abstact than simple utilitarianism, so I am not sure this is exactly what you were implying here. Could you expand on this a bit?


rw: Progress itself incurs a multitude of ethical
considerations, even if they spring from utilitarian pursuits, but if you’d like examples of specific ethical progress I can point to a standard bill of human rights, rules of war, an almost universal consensus against slavery and genocide, the recognition of human nature as set forth in the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness…clearly all recent advances in human affairs, many of which have been established legally and, if not consistently applied, at least represent a foundation for future generations to build on. None of which occurred, or likely would have, without great struggle, suffering and sacrifice.




marz: I happen to believe that most if not all of what we think of as the virtues--compassion, empathy, etc.--are nothing more than biological programming. This being the case, I would imagine that this postulated god could have simply hard-wired us into having these attributes, rather than using millions of years of positive- and negative- feedback-based conditioning to do it instead.

rw: Indeed. And what fans the flames of compassion and empathy if not suffering in one form or another? I would find it rather odd if you were proposing that people feel compassion and empathy towards everyone equally at all times. But I also disagree with your postulated hard-wiring origin since I view these emotions as being learned reactions based on value assignment as much as any other emotion. I guess it depends on what you mean by "biological programming".

Marz Blak

rw,

Once again, thanks for the thoughtful response, and allow me to offer a counter-apology to yours, as, accepting your explanation of your remark, it is clear that I misapprehended your intention in making it.

You've given me much to think about, and it is clear to me now that, as a dilettante in philosophy, I have much more to learn before I reach a level at which I am sufficiently well-schooled to trade ideas with someone like you. I will take your reference to hand, along with some other materials I might be able to gather, and perhaps I'll be back to discuss this further at a later time.

Once again, thank you for your time and input. I truly appreciate it.

Cheers,