Transworldly Depraved

HRG:

Is it obvious that a state of affairs is less perfect if it contains evil? It seems to me that a state of affairs that contains evil can be greater than a state of affairs which contains no evil.

Consider this example. World A is the actual universe we find ourselves inhabiting. World B is a universe just like ours except that no conscious beings ever evolved. World A is better than World B because it is better that we exist than that we not exist. However, "A" contains far more evil than "B" because "A" contains all the evil our world contains and "B" contains no evil at all (just mindless physical particles).

So in this case a world with significantly more evil would be greater than a world with none. (You might deny this argument by saying that you do not think our existence is better than our nonexistence.)

The application to theism is this. A god which contained evil states which are logically necessary conditions for overriding good states could be better than a god with no evil states at all.

So God's ability to bring about or permit evil (and so contain evil in his nature in some sense) would not imply that he is less perfect than a being that cannot do such things.

Of course all of this turns on the evils being logically necessary conditions for outweighing goods as well as the claim that our existence is better than our nonexistence.

Datheron

TD,

Evidently, I'm not getting across to you. To put it again, just because you are allowed to clump everything into solipsist sensations does not mean that it is then immune to tests of complexity. I can still look at the basis itself and determine whether that is complex or not, and obviously, by saying that a solipsist only needs to "postulate the existence of everything", you are then hand-waving over the apparent regularity which the Universe functions by (i.e. scientific theories). Furthermore, if you do in fact accept scientific theories, then you must admit that your level of explanation is not truly basic. Like I also said, the solipsist can still rectify his situation by making special provisions ("The regularity of the Universe is an illusion"), but such methods are ad hoc and are not convincing.

Because the single entity itself has to encompass all functions of its features. The relations don't simply disappear; they are instead abstracted into the single entity (this is the process, IMO, that you're hand-waving over).

As I am a computer science major, I'll draw an analogy from computer science. There are a myriad of ways to program - the two kinds that are analogous to our situation would be procedural and object-oriented. The former stresses programming just one block, with various features within - a single entity with multiple features. The latter operates by objects - independent entities with properties that govern their own operation. The test of time shows that OOP (object-oriented programming) is much more prominent and useful, as it simplifies the process of advanced programs and organization of structures; in other words, it models reality much better than procedural programming.

In fact, that is what we, as humans, do with life. We usually do not try to understand a single entity as a whole, but rather break it down to its simple components and understand those, then place the parts together again to make sense of the whole. Yet, by doing so, we have already admitted the existence of simpler parts, which has aided us in simplifying the entity as a whole.

Yes, you are right; neutophysiology isn't exactly the simplest subject around. And indeed, scientific theories are merely human tools used to approximate the governings of the Universe (such that the Universe really doesn't know or care that gravity involves the multiplication of masses, etc.). The problem here is that by taking this position, you must ignore the accuracy by which scientific theories have predicted your sensations; if you do not want to claim that the laws do not actually rule over your sensations, then you must twist and turn and claim that all scientific predictions are merely coincidences. His sensations themselves are not simple, and there exists explanations which are simpler - that is enough to defeat the solipsist position.

But that is not true. Like I have pointed above, to be simpler than naturalism, you would have to claim that all scientific and naturalistic explanations are mere coincidences. Unless the solipsist is able to change scientific laws at will, he must have some way to rationalize the success of naturalistic explanation, or risk his position as already more complex.

No - the naturalist only has to explain the success of his naturalistic explanations. The solipsist then has to explain the apparent success of naturalistic explanations and the truth that it is all within his mind. The theist then has to explain naturalism and why such devices come from God. As a matter of fact, the solipsist position is simply replacing God with the solipsist's mind; a rather incompetent and not exactly powerful God, but a pantheistic God nevertheless. I see it as nothing more than a derivative of the classic pantheistic position, which is then admitted to be more complex than naturalism.

As for the creationist part, I should have said YEC, for that was what I meant.

Transworldly Depraved

Datheron:

You said:

I never said that the solipsist only needs to "postulate the existence of everything". The only way this could be attributed to a solipsist would be if "everything" means "the solipsist and his sensations".

Also, the solipsist will not grant that there is apparent order in the universe because he sees no reason to believe there is a universe.

The only order he is aware of his the order of his sensations and mind in general.

Next, you said:

The solipsist will see no reason why he must believe the entities referred to in scientific theories actually refer to real mind-independent objects. To the solipsist, they are just a means for him to predict his future sensations. Scientific theories exist in the mind of the solipsist and they describe and predict what his future sensations will be. His sensations exhibit orderly behavior and scientific theories predict it.

You seem to be simply assuming that the entities of physics must refer to things that exist apart from the solipsist's mind. But in that case you are begging the question.

Next, you said:

The solipsist would not say "The regularity of the Universe is an illusion". He would say that there is regularity in reality because his mind is orderly. The regularity he believes exists is just the lawlike behavior of his sensations. You believe there is order in his sensations and want to add complexity by asserting that there is also order in a mind-independent physical world.

Then you said:

This would equally apply to the physical world. So once again you are adding complexity by adding a physical world. The solipsist believes that only he exists yet you go beyond that by believing in the existence of a complex physical world.

Later, you said:

Again, the solipsist does believe that the laws in scientific theories predict what his sensations will be. The solipsist's sensations are orderly and scientific theories take advantage of that order. That is why they are useful to the solipsist. He will want to know why he should think they refer to a mind-independent reality. So far you have not given a reason for him to believe that.

Then you said:

Once again, how can the naturalist worldview be simpler if it postulates everything the solipsist believes plus a complex physical world? Naturalism has all the complexity solipsism has plus the complexity of a mind-independent physical world. I continue to repeat this because it is very important in seeing what is wrong with your objections.

Next, you said:

Why would they have to be coincidental when applied to his sensations and not be coincidental when applied to a system of physical objects?

And why would the solipsist be required to "change scientific laws at will" if he is to accept science?

Also, keep in mind that he will deny that he has reason to believe there are any naturalistic explanations because he does not believe there is a natural world. By asserting otherwise, you are begging the question again.

Later, you said:

The solipsist will not accept that naturalistic explanations are apparently successful. He will accept that scientific theories are successful at predicting his sensations though.

And he will no more see the need to explain why existence "is all within his mind" than a naturalist will see the need to explain why existence "is all that is within the physical universe". If the naturalist does not have to explain that then why should the solipsist?

You said:

So the only similarity between theism and solipsism is that there is a person for which no explanation is accepted. Does anything interesting follow from that?

Lastly,

I see no reason why a theist must be committed to young earth creationism.

[ January 05, 2002: Message edited by: Transworldly Depraved ]

[ January 05, 2002: Message edited by: Transworldly Depraved ]</p>

Datheron

TD,

Oh boy; much misunderstanding abounds.

For simplicity, I have referred to "the solipsist's mind" as "the Universe", in that we can easily compare the two. It would be just rewording "the Universe" as "the Universe within his mind"; mere semantics.

I'm asking the question (and not begging, per se ) just how much of the solipsist knows about the workings of his own mind. The entire point of science is to formulate a set of consistent and well-established laws. If the solipsist was not aware of these laws at birth, then he must admit that there are laws which govern his mind which he is not aware of. That begs the question: exactly how is this "his" mind? I can just as easily claim ownership of the Universe within my mind with the quantum wave function, which will distribute my mind physically and probabilistically throughout the Universe; does that make me a solipsist, then? I think the actual meaning and definitions of ownership is in order here - now it appears to be nothing more than an empty claim.

Not quite. What I'm failing to understanding and that you're glossing over (IMO) is how exactly is this mind under the ownership of the solipsist when he has no control over it other than the small portion which is apparently his inner mind amidst his larger mind which is run by apparently physical laws. How can they be said to be "his" sensations when he is merely being fed them, unable to have any control whatsoever at the things that he is sensing?

This equally applies to all worldviews - the difference here is that the naturalistic position is the simplest position. Its reductionism has tried to give us as basic as possible laws and rules; it is by no means perfect, but rather strives to achieve greater accuracy by continued study and research. Like I said, the crux of the matter here is that "only he exists" is a gloss oversimplification of the complexity of that existence - it has to encompass all that the solipsist senses.

Perhaps I'm repeating myself too many times, like an old broken tape player. The question remains - by what right does the solipsist call this Universe within "his mind" truly his? The laws govern equally for all people; the solipsist is just as much influenced by the four fundamental forces as is any other person on this planet or anywhere else in his mind. There is absolutely nothing that places the solipsist as anything special as compared to anything else in his self-conceived world - it might as well be of a mind that is not his, which then reduces to pantheism.

But I still see this statement as incorrect. Naturalism has the complexity of the physical world, but has none of the solipsist world - what is there in naturalism that can parallel to the apparently extremely realistic and powerful sensory devices of the solipsist? The solipsist must postulate that his mind is like a Universe, by which everything runs in an orderly fashion. Then he must also postulate that this is all an illusion formulated by his own mind, which is complicated enough to give the illusion of an independent world.

Because, as I said above, this are the requirements for the solipsist to call the mind as truly his. By the picture that you are painting and acclaiming (that the solipsist position is simpler), you must then have some way to have some control over it. The pantheistic God has just that - he has, theoretically, control over the Universe as he sees fit in contradiction to his established laws, just that he doesn't use it much of the time.

But the naturalist does - he says that if there is something outside of the Universe, then we have no way of knowing it. The solipsist may try to do the same - that there is something outside of his own mind - but that position is already naturalism. Like I've said before, merely defining your position to be simple and basic is not good enough; if Occam's Razor is indeed used, then we strive to reduce everything to simple terms without overing our bounds and checks for reality.

Everything follows from that. This person is then able to do a lot of things - create an entire illusory Universe within his mind, for example - which is then more complex than just the Universe itself without some shadowing "overmind" running it.

Datheron

TD,

BTW, as to the very last question, it was not meant to be a reference to theists at all, but an example illustrating YEC's and their ridiculous rationalization required to adhere to reality.

Transworldly Depraved

Datheron:

You said:

He only believes in that which he is immediately aware of. It is not as though his mind behaves orderly when he is not aware of the contents of his mind. To him, the only thing that qualifies as a content of his mind is anything he is aware of.

You asked:

Exactly how do fundamental particles have their properties? What is it about an electron that allows it to have charge or mass? It just does. The solipsist will say the same thing with regard to how his sensations are his own.

Then you asked:

A solipsist is a person who does not believe in anything apart from the content of their own mind.

Then you said:

The claim would be no more empty than the claim that electrons "own" their properties. Ownership of mental states is just the having of mental properties. Similarly, electrons have properties.

Next, you said:

By repeatedly referring to an apparent physical world, you are begging the question. The solipsist will say that it is apparent to him that he has no good reason to believe there is such a thing. For a solipsist, it is certainly not apparent that there is a physical world. It does not appear to him that there is anything external to his mind.

Also, I see no reason to believe that the having of mental states in the case of the solipsist would in any way imply that he would have the power to control them. What is the connection? Why could it not simply be the case that he passively has mental events?

Next, you asked:

First, the solipsist would not accept that he is "fed" his sensations. They simply occur. Saying they are "fed" to him presupposes that they are caused by something distinct from them.

Further, do you control every sensation that you have? Is it not the case that you passively are "fed" most of your sensations? Are they not, nonetheless, your sensations?

Again, you asked:

By what right does one say that a property of an electron is its property?

Lastly, you said:

The naturalist believes in everything that the solipsist believes in plus the physical world. They both agree that their mind exists as well as its contents. The naturalist says that the solipsist should believe that his mind and its contents exist and an external physical world exists.

And again, for a solipsist there is no illusion because it does not appear to him that there is a physical world. There would be an illusion only if it appears to him that there is a physical world.

Datheron

TD,

Then you have just complicated the system. The system now includes some mechanism that makes objects disappear from existence when they leave his awareness, then appear again when they return to his senses, in a very systematic manner.

Since most of your paragraphs respond to the same concept, I'll take care of them all in one stroke.

Once again, I see you as trying to establish something as basic and axiomic while it has been shown that deeper explanations exist. Indeed, there is nothing that proves that fundamental particles have their properties - if a scientist can find a law that can explain this, then it will serve as the explanation for your inquery. That is the method suggested by Occam's Razor; we discard the more complicated explanation for simpler and more basic ones exist. The electrons own their properties, and science is currently searching for an explanation. But since we do not have one yet, we will have to temporarily set that as axiomic (much like the transferance between atoms and quirks as basic building blocks). The solipsist position is arbitarily designated, and simply defined as simple although simpler explanations exist. The problem here is that the solipsist does not allow Occam's Razor to operate, and hence sees no reason to go further. This is a circular argument - the solipsist does not accept the Razor, hence the solipsist sees no reason to reduce his position, hence the Razor is useless.

I repeated refer to that because that is what empirical evidence reveals. Like I have mentioned before, the solipsist must invent his own definitions and define himself to be the mind in order to rationalize his position, which is then more complicated than having the physical world as is.

Then, once again, you have complicated the system. You have made some "active" and "passive" mind, with the passive mind having some properties of a naturalistic Universe while also containing a rather magical system of objects winking in and out of existence as they enter and leave the mind. That in itself is more complicated than a naturalistic system.

For the first response, refer to the above response that talks about arbitarily designating a basic point when simpler explanations exist.

For the latter, it is true that I believe I am fed my sensations, but they are indeed my sensations because they come from my senses. By that, I have already differentiated between objects that I myself own and objects that I do not; there is no additional provisions required or any re-definitions necessary.

By the definition of what it means to own or to have:

(www.dictionary.com)

own
1) a. To have or possess as property: owns a chain of restaurants.
b. To have control over: For a time, enemy planes owned the skies.

The first one is a recursive definition, but the second seems fairly definitive and supportive of what I mean by ownership of the mind.

As I have explained above, the solipsist's sensations indeed appear to suggest a physical world. The empirical evidence to a set of physical laws that treat all matter regardless, of the individuality expressed by other intelligent beings and things, etc. all point to a world populated by individual objects. As you have shown, the solipsist must rationalize this by defining his own mind as formulating all these objects; then he must rationalize some passivity in his mind that is ruled by laws that he does not control; he then has to extend these laws to things that do not exist (for they are perfectly consistent there, as if they did). All these steps are not required in the naturalist position...they are in fact a lot more complicated and require a lot of ad hoc rationalization.

Transworldly Depraved

Datheron:

Solipsism is defined as "a theory holding that the self can know nothing but its own modifications and that the self is the only existent thing". Merriam-Webster's definition is a bit misleading because the solipsist can simply lack belief in a physical world or can believe in nothing beyond his own mind.

You said:

What other objects? What do you believe solipsism involves?

The solipsist does not believe that objects disappear when he is not aware of them because he does not believe other objects exist at all.

As to the solipsist's sensations changing "in a very systematic manner", he will point out that the naturalist must simply accept that the physical world behaves in a systematic manner. The solipsist will not feel a need to explain this anymore than a naturalist will feel a need to explain the order of the physical world. They will both just accept that they behave orderly. Why does the natural world behave orderly? Why does it follow natural laws? It just does. The solipsist will give a similar answer.

Next, you said:

I have already pointed out that Occam's razor applies in the context of scientific theories. I deny that it will allow us to adjudicate between metaphysical theories. Notice that no matter what the content of the new scientific explantions you mentioned, which are discovered by the naturalist, it will still be a naturalistic theory. This supports my point further. At no point would you abandon naturalism by applying Occam's razor.

Next, you said:

The solipsist merely recognizes that the naturalist's position includes everything the solipsist's position includes plus billions of fundamental particles and fields of force. The naturalist's position obviously includes more entities than the solipsist's position.

Also, in what sense has the naturalist gone further? Sure, he is willing to allow "deeper" explanations. But they are still naturalistic explanations. They are just variations on naturalism.

The naturalist goes no further than the solipsist with regard to metaphysical views.

And as I have already stated, the solipsist welcomes better scientific theories. They are more useful for predicting his sensations. The solipsist simply does not believe the entities that play a role in scientific theories actually refer to objects that exist. The solipsist can accept scientific progress in that sense.

Then you said:

How can you appeal to empirical evidence to support the claim that your senses are putting you in touch with objective reality? That is blatantly circular. "I know my senses put me in touch with reality because that is what my senses reveal." That is similar to appealing to the Bible to argue that it is the "Word of God". Or similar to saying "I know Smith is not a liar because he told me he is not."

Next, you said:

The solipsist acquires his worldview by noting that he exists and that he is not aware of any reason to posit the existence of anything else. He will probably argue that he is justified in believing that he exists because it is contradictory to claim that he does not. And he will probably go on to say that it is not contradictory to lack belief in things distinct from his mind.

You said:

Active and passive features of minds are also a part of the naturalist's worldview. So solipsism would be no more complex than the naturalist in this regard.

Further, the brute existence of the solipsist's mind is no more magical than the brute existence of the physical universe.

Also, objects do not "enter and leave" the mind of the solipsist. There are no other objects besides the solipsist. Sensations are just states of the solipsist.

You go on to offer a definition of "own" and make some points about that. My only point was that saying a solipsist has sensations and thus properties of some kind is no more odd than saying electrons have properties. If ownership is problematic for one then it is problematic for the other.

Later, you said:

The solipsist will deny that it appears to him that there is a physical world.

Also, it appears to people that they have free will and that it is possible to exist after death and that space is absolute rather than relative. Should people believe these things?

If an appearance as pervasive as free will can be false then why can it not be the case that our sensations are false?

Lastly, you made several claims about solipsism that are not included in solipsism:

1. No solipsist believes there are other objects besides himself.

2. Solipsism does not imply that he will be capable of controlling his sensations. So there is nothing to explain here.

3. And at what point does the solipsist extend laws to things that do not exist? The solipsist would say that the entities in physical theories do not behave in a lawlike way but rather the solipsist's sensations do. Scientific theories are mathematical representations of the behavior of his sensations. And this representation is in his mind.

The naturalist does not need any of these things but neither does the solipsist.

[ January 06, 2002: Message edited by: Transworldly Depraved ]</p>

Tercel

I would argue that 2a is not really correct on the basis that though it is a created entity the analogy with the observed creation events is not sufficiently similar. The creators are different: The supposed event is being performed by an (according to orthodox Christian theology) omnipotent, timeless, non-material being; whereas the observed events were performed by limited, timebound, material beings. The type of creation is also different: The universe is an entire space-time entity in itself; whilst the observed "creations" have occured within space-time.
These differences seem rather important, leading me to conclude that the creation events are not sufficiently analogous as to warrent even a probabilistic conclusion.

I was thinking of Panentheism and Process Theology. I do not even pretend to understand half of what they go on about: But from the little I do, it seems to me that they posit a personal/material dualism down to the fundamentals of God. (I may be wrong)

Tercel

Datheron

TD,

Yes, I understand that. When I say "objects", take it to mean "has the appearance of being individual objects", etc. I'm not purposely begging the question or invoking a circular argument.

Alright - lemme clarify. In more accurate terms, then, the solipsist's perception holds that there are certain components of his mind that disappear and reappear at will, in accordance to naturalistic laws (but are not naturalistic). You're concentrating too much on my sloppy terminology, and not enough on the actual argument, IMO.

But as I pointed out, you already have prostulated a complicated law of the mind to make this work. Allow me to present an example.

Suppose that a flower pot is falling from a building. A person watches it fall from his home, through his window. Now, that window has a frame, with a metal piece going right through the middle, so they are much like those windows that you drew as a child ([+] is ASCII art for this). Now, say that the person watches as the flower pot is falling from the window.

The naturalist will assume that the flower pot exists as an individual object, obeying the laws of gravity, and passing through from the top of the window, through the metal bar, and out of sight from the bottom of the window with little surprise; it is following all the laws of physics. The solipsist, on the other hand, assumes that the flower pot is a part of his mind. As that component is falling from the top of the window, the solipsist assumes that those abstractions known as the "laws of physics" operate on this component of his mind (with the abstraction of a "flower pot"). Then, as the flower pot falls through the metal bar, that component of the mind ceases to exist. It enters existence into the mind again a moment later, in the bottom portion of the window pane. The solipsist notes that even being out of existence, it seems to follow some unknown abstraction initial to the abstract laws of physics and continues to "fall".

The above example illustrates what I'm getting at. Even with the assumption that nothing is apart from the self and that all exists only via sensations, we note that from the solipsist's perspective, things out of existence seem to behave as if they were in existence. When they leave perception, they cease to exist. When they return, they come back appearing having endured the abstract laws of physics "outside existence". This is indeed more complicated than assuming individual objects acting independent of some overmind.

A point of our discussion comes from the idea that Occam's Razor does not apply only to scientific and naturalistic queries; rather, we're arguing over that very question when we ask whether solipsism is indeed simpler than naturalism. You have not shown that OR is limited to naturalistic realms, and I have not shown (to your satisfaction) that it is applicable to metaphysical theories by showing its consistency in their domains.

No - I believe I have went over this point before. You are merely waving hands over the length at which the solipsist has to bend science to make his worldview plausible. Alright - suppose that the solipsist believes that scientific theories are abstractions. Scientific theories, however, postulate the existence of those fundamental atoms, which operate in exact accordance to their laws. Hence, the solipsist can do one of several things:

- admit that these atoms and fundamental particles are abstractions, yet they exist as abstractions, in counter-part to their material naturalistic existence (in naturalism, of course)
- admit that no such particles exist inside his mind, and that all appears to be a coincidence
- claim that these theories are wrong

Then you have defeated your point. Scientific theories prostulate the existence of particles and relations - the solipsist will have to admit that these things exist as abstractions as well, for the purpose of predicting his sensations. You're making the mistake of assuming that abstractions are somehow less complex than physical existence, which is not true if the solipsist is allowed to parallel his abstractions to the materialistic existence of naturalism.

No - I am asserting the object that my senses support the claim that the world appears to consist of objects working individually.

But your solipsist position is just as circular as your claims to mine. There cannot exist any reason for the solipsist to believe anything else exists, for he has already defined that his position as existence and then defined himself to be correct (eerily similar to Christian Presuppositionism). Therefore, his position is correct, for the appearance of individual objects he dismisses as an illusion and he has discredited the use of OR (because they do not make sense to his worldview if they are used).

But they are not the same, and you're equivocating them. The "passive mind" referred to in naturalism does not give the mind the great amount of sensation that the "passive mind" of solipsism gives to that individual.

You should know what I meant - they are analogous to objects in the physical world in the sense that they are within his mind. I would also like to point out that a state is always more complicated than a collection of objects that make up that state. For instance, if we have six coins, there are six objects, but 2^6 states possible.

Once again, you seem to be waving over the details that make each definition of property different and significant - that is, the properties of electrons are contained all contained within the electron itself, clearly defined physically. The properties of the mind are not so well defined, and it appears as though you are purposely using this point of vagueness to skimp over and equivocate the two.

I don't know how this is relevant to the discussion, but it's not that hard to answer. You seem to want me to say that free will does not exist, and we do not exist after death...but I made no such assertions. When I deny free will, I do so in the context of the Christian idea of free will, not of the general concept of free will. Similarly, there is nothing that can prove that life after death is false, only that it appears from evidence that no such thing exists. We may also assume that our sensations are false, but we have no way to falsify such a position without some mechanism such as the OR. Lemme ask you, then, what do you use to falsify or make improbable that we aren't a brain in a jar?

I have answered those points above, so I will not repeat them here. However, my question remains, and that is how you make sense of having a mind that you cannot control as your own without having to manipulate and equivocate definitions. I have explained above that ownership of properties in physical objects is well defined in physical space; but your rationalization of ownership is much less satisfying and vague.