bgponder

Goliath:

Your insertion of "I have argued for evolution" in your reply to me is ad hoc. Further, Seak'er's "Atheist" definitions in his initial posts have been dutifully addressed by many, with the result that he re-formulated his position accordingly, earlier. Since then the discussion has evolved with the crux of his position clearly manifest as a comparison of the internal consistencies of Christian Presuppositionalism with other worldviews/metphysical systems. The definition(s) of atheism, and the necessity for the clarification of the difference between abiogenesis and evolution are non-issues in the present stage of the discussion, and your rehash of his first posts is presently irrelevant.

Peace, Cornbread and Happy Holidays!!! Barry

SingleDad

SeaKayaker

Indeed.

Well, I don't want to digress too much. Suffice it to say that one can privilege perception and induction, and induce that induction itself is a special case of a more reliable logical structure. Again, start a separate thread and I would be happy to share my thoughts on this view.

It should be noted that, to the naturalist, the existence of logic (or, more propertly the fact that the universe appears to work in a way that is describable logically) is part and parcel of what just is, along with the existence of the universe itself. It is my contention not that MN gives a "better" account of logic than CP, but that CP's account of logic is not better than MN's, and is actually less parsimonious without offering any explanatory power.

The point is that you determine that a god is a god of order because you observe and know order; you do not know about natural order from knowing god.

It is an observed property of the world that one can talk about it sensibly using the language of logic. It thus appears to be true that the world behaves in a logical manner. That logical manner of behavior seems to be objective. Two observers can agree on the same logic; and one cannot impose an arbitrary logical system on statements about the world. Thus it appears to be both objective and real to say that the world behaves according to a particular kind of logic. This is an abstract property (e.g. there is no specific physical "logicalness" particles one can point to), but it is real nonetheless.

This is not the point of my comment italicized above. When we talk about logic, we talk about axioms and derivation rules on the one hand and theorems on the other. When one derives a theorem, one has deductive certainty that the theorems are as true as the axioms. Obviously one cannot hold one's derivation rules with deductive certainty.

When we find that earlier actual scientists were wrong we hold that one of two thing happened: Either the scientists were not doing science (there is a flaw in their methodology) or that their theories were true and remain true according to the facts at their disposal at the time. Two classic examples are Freud and Newton. We're finding Freud was wrong about a lot of things and we also find that his method (examined independently of his conclusions) was flawed. Newton also made mistakes, but he was missing a lot of facts, including detailed measurements of the speed of light and a complete theory of electromagnetism. But Newton's method was sound (again examined independently of his conclusions) and, when conditions match the facts at his disposal, his conclusions are actually true (and still used).

CP makes a much stronger statement: It says that science itself is not reliable. It says that even if you use the methodology perfectly you will come to a conclusion that is false with regard to the available facts. This happens because CP has a different definition of fact than science, considering the literal meaning of bible verses actual facts. Now if the methodology of science actually failed with regard to perceptual fact, scientists would change the method.

CP claims (or appears to claim) that the method of science should change because it does not fit biblical facts. However, it appears on a literal reading of the bible that very solid conclusions from perceptual facts entirely contradict biblical facts, from the pervasive (e.g. the age of the universe) to the trivial (bats as kinds of birds). And it appears that the only way to make a consistent theory is to virtually abandon reliance on perception itself--if reliance on perception can lead to such a gross error as an age of the universe wrong by at least six orders of magnitude, then it appears so unreliable that it must be intentionally misleading. It seems necessary to invoke ideas like that Satan hid the "information" about the early universe to lead us astray.

Science depends on the presupposition that perception is indeed the ultimate judge of ontological reality. If you don't accept perception as ultimate, then you must simply reject science. If we can be so fooled by perception as believing things so grossly out-of-whack with "reality" then one can have no confidence at all in the method. Science is very interdependent; you cannot remove even a few threads and expect the garment to hold together.

These are not equivalent statements. MN stands on by itself, it is not held to be true because all others are false. MN is not held (as is CP) by a process of elimination.

Of course. But again these are not equivalent statements.

This is not the case. The truth or falsity of CP is not held as a presupposition but rather as a conclusion. What MN presupposes that christianity is not necessarily true. Again, these are different statements.

Sure. I arrive at all my conclusions from presuppositions. This is not an interesting statement. However, the truth or falsity of christianity is not embedded in my presuppositions, it is (apparently) embedded in the nature of perceptual reality. Indeed, absent a posteriori perceptual information, I cannot come to any metaphysical conclusion about christianity from the presuppositions of empiricism.

I have arrived at the conclusion that christianity is false from both the presupposition that perception is the ultimate judge of reality and a careful examination of what I have perceived.

I simply fail to see where in the bible it gives any sort of description of the scientific method.

It should certainly be able, at least in principle, to answer every well-formed question within its domain. Perception is the ultimate authority of science for answering determinable ontological questions.

Since the bible speaks of determinable material facts, it lays a definite claim to ontology. Why does it declare science grossly, ludicrously wrong about matters of fact such as the age of the universe, but accept uncritically the conclusions of science about quantum mechanics, except when QM compels us to interpret radiometric dating compels the conclusion of an old earth? And the CP does this while remaining silent on the scientific method itself, preferring instead to tack on an ad hod proviso that the bible (sometimes) overrides science.

[ December 18, 2001: Message edited by: SingleDad ]</p>

SeaKayaker

Xyzzy,

Welcome to the discussion.

The question here is not whether people can physically use logic, but rather whether they can consistently use logic.

You are attempting to directly evaluate my worldview from your worldview. The issue here is whether Christianity or metaphysical naturalism is internally consistent. In order to evaluate the internal consistency of a worldview, you must place yourself into that worldview. I would say that, for someone in the Christian worldview, it is not at all unreasonable to presuppose God’s existence.

How do you know this? Although I am not necessarily disagreeing with you, I see no way for you to make this claim.

Not only does this beg another question (thus failing to answer the first), but it also requires you to assume that there is order in the universe. Is there any justification for this in the rest of your worldview?

I would answer that God is logical. He is the source of logic, so in that sense He did not exist before logic.

Well, how about if we see where this takes us. If we agree that presuppositions are necessary, the fewest a person could have would be just one. Therefore, let us see if I can create a worldview with one presupposition. A good start would be that I am always right. This is just one presupposition, so it must be better than or at least as good as any other worldview. Just imagine how it could shorten our discussion! I think that you will agree that there must be another judge of presuppositions aside from quantity.

Do you not also have to assume the opposite of the presuppositional presuppositions? What happens if you have contradictory presuppositions (in your entire worldview, dealing with epistemology, metaphysics, and morality)?

SeaKayaker

SeaKayaker

SingleDad,

According to your other presuppositions, though, it would seem that there could not be order in the universe. At this point, there seems to be a contradiction between your presuppositions, an inconsistency. Is there a way that a universe could have the order that is a prerequisite for logic, science, and induction according to your worldview?

From the Bible (which I presuppose to be the inspired word of God), I can see that God is a God of order. I can then see this order in the world around me.

I do not disagree with you here. I am wondering why the world acts in a “logical manner,” though.

How do you know that the scientists now are doing science (if you had asked earlier scientists, they would have said that they were doing science)?

I find your second option very interesting, though. Just to be sure, are you saying that the conclusions of these scientists are objectively true? It seems to me that you are saying that they are valid but unsound. They are still wrong, though. Could this be the case with some scientific theories today?

Are you saying that Newton’s reasoning was valid but unsound, making his conclusions false?

I think that we have different ideas of “reliable.” I do not have a problem with saying that science is generally reliable, but I do not think that this means that it is always right. You seem to think that because it is not always right, it cannot be generally reliable. Is there a problem if is say that it is not perfect but still generally reliable?

If we wish to discuss the importance of perception, does the metaphysical naturalist even have any reason that he should trust his perception? If not, does not Christianity actually place more value on perception than metaphysical naturalism?


Maybe I am just not seeing something here, but I still do not see how metaphysical naturalism could be true if any other worldview (or at least any theistic worldview) were true. Therefore, it seems that metaphysical naturalism must argue that all other worldviews are false.

By holding the presupposition that Christianity is not necessarily true, you are denying Christianity. According to Christian presuppositionalism, once you do this, you have actually presupposed the falsity of Christianity. If Christianity is true, this thinking is futile and will not lead you to the truth. In other words, this attempt at neutrality actually results not in neutrality, but rather in your deciding against Christianity.

SeaKayaker

Vibr8gKiwi

CP has a "bootstrap" problem. What did you presume before you could read the bible? It would appear you learned to read (and do other complex, orderly tasks) with some other presumption basis, with CP then coming later. Perhaps SingleDad is pointing out this first presumption you likely held that was based on examining your environment (of which the bible is just another part). Also it's interesting you apparently change your presuppositions at the drop of a hat... or rather the reading of a book. What if you had read the Koran at that early, suggestible stage in your life? Would SingleDad then be making similar points to an MP

[ December 19, 2001: Message edited by: Vibr8gKiwi ]</p>

SingleDad

SeaKayaker

I don't see this at all. I don't see how my presuppositions exclude the possibility that the universe could be ordered.

Yes, if orderly behavior is a property of matter (materialism) or if orderliness actually exists (platonism).

My point, though, is that you cannot formally derive the theorem "the universe is orderly" from presuppositions about god. You have to observe that the universe acts orderly, and then presuppose that orderliness exists even to read the bible and have any degree of confidence that your reading and understanding is accurate.

In other words you have to presuppose orderliness to get at the bible; without this presupposition, the text of the bible cannot have any meaning.

Perhaps it just does. According to MN, the orderliness of the world (phrased either materialistically or platonically) is a brute fact, indentical in metaphysical nature to the brute fact of a god's having an orderly nature in CP. CP offers no more reason why god has an orderly nature (as opposed to a surrealistic or random nature) than MN offers for why the universe behaves in an orderly manner.

In other words, I'm claiming that you have not removed the brute fact of orderliness, but rather just moved it around and rephrased it.

By examining their method. The methodology of science has a (reasonably) objective definition, most importantly including framing hypotheses in an evidentiary manner, and evaluating hypotheses according to perceptual evidence.

Depends on what you mean by "objectively true". Like any other linguistic term, "objective" and "true" mean what you define them to mean. According to the definitions of metaphysical naturalism, yes, the conclusions of scientists are objectively true.

According to MN, a theory is true or false relative to a specific set of facts, just like the statement "2+2=4" is valid according to the axioms of ordinary arithmetic and true according to physical systems that behave arithmetically, meaningless according to the axioms of mod 3 arithmetic, and invalid and false according to relativistic velocity adding rules for physical systems that behave relativistically.

Good scientific theories today are true relative to the facts at hand. Even if we get new facts that compel new theories, we will still find that today's theories are still true as a special case. They are not wrong (because a theory is never claimed to be true without regard to the facts; such a claim is scientifically meaningless), they are just limited.

Newton's reasoning is valid, sound and true, in relationship to a specific set of facts; indeed, one can find many circumstances where the facts hold, and Newton is is valid, sound and true in those circumstances.

I think you are not examining your assumptions carefully enough. If you believe that the method of science is reliable, then you believe that if the method is applied correctly, its statements will be true. If you believe that if the method is applied correctly, false conclusions can be drawn, then you do not believe science is reliable, unless you can specify a way to determine when the method will produce true results without actually referencing a particular result.

In short you must be able to determine under what circumstances science is reliable and under what circumstances it is not reliable.

It is a brute fact (from a phenominological perspective) that our perception has inescapable importance. In otherwords, the importance of perception is self-evident. Indeed, this is a proposition difficult to even deny; if perception is not important, then why do you open your eyes when you drive? If perception has no importance but the spirit of god does, why not close your eyes and rely on what is important?

First, "true" and "false" are metaphysically defined terms. It is not really meaningful to call other worldviews true or false according to MN (because it uses strict hierarchical formal axiomatic systems); formally all that means is that other worldviews are different from MN.

What we can do, however, is construct a meta-metaphysical system that talks about metaphysical systems (which is really what we're doing here). According to that system, we can define true and false such that it is meaningful to claim that if MN is true, then CP is false (and vice versa).

&lt;shrugs&gt; Whatever. By holding a particular set of metaphysical axioms, I am not holding an infinite number of alternative metaphysical axioms. All you are saying is that MN does indeed differ from CP. This is stipulated. So what?

By holding CP, you are presupposing the falsity of MN. No offense intended but if you want to define your metaphysical system in such a manner, that's really your problem, not mine. Again, so what?

Synaesthesia

SeaKayaker,
If to evaluate a position you must assume it to be true it is in principle impossible to prefer one theory over another.

Reasonability is irrelevant. Truth is irrelevant. Consistency is totally irrelevant. If your presupposition is unreasonable, the definition of reason must change to include it. If your presupposition is untrue, you will believe it to be true anyway. If your presupposition is inconsistent, consistency and the laws of the universe must mould themselves to your paradigm. Your method of epistemology is unable to avoid this totally absurd consequence.

Your reasoning is fallacious, even though you presupposed that it is valid; Most christians do hold that it is logically possible for Christianity to be false and yet are Christians still.

Seakayaker, I think it would be wisest to judge other people’s opinions based upon what they say as opposed to what your dogma holds. It does no credit to your position to repeatedly assert that it entails obvious falsity. (Namely regarding the assumptions of other people.)

You have asserted that the naturalistic use of logic is inconsistent before. Since we are all aware of the claim, perhaps you would care to support it.


SD,
Of course in that case, we must also reject the bible as “ultimate”, since all of our knowledge and understanding of it depends wholly upon perception.
I think it’s important to remember that a correct application of scientific methods CAN result in false (highly inaccurate) conclusions. However the likelihood of highly inaccurate conclusions decreases exponentially as lines of evidence converge and more useful information is derived from a theory. “Nature is subtle but not perverse.”

Regards,
Synaesthesia

Vibr8gKiwi

It seems to me that CPers don't really trust their supposed presupposition but actually rely on perception as you point out. I've tried to explore this in some other threads but can't get any CPer to actually put the bible to the test over empiricism. They will not agree to any test that would show they trust the bible over their perceptions (or that would put their presupposition into jeopardy of being shown completely unsupported by reality).

It's interesting that there seems to be a projection of their own presuppositional distrust onto others going on here.

SeaKayaker

Vibr8gKiwi,

Something that was wrong.

Just because a set of presuppositions allowed me to learn to read does not mean that they were consistent.

Does this have any impact on my argument?

Well, would it be scientific of me to hold onto presuppositions if I believed that they were false?

Is this supposed to be a logical argument? If it is, could you please flesh it out a little more, since I see no logos in it?

SeaKayaker

SeaKayaker

Goliath,

Welcome to the post. I am sorry that I have not addressed your posts, but Barry has addressed your points well (just as a notice, it might be a bad sign for your arguments when someone who is on your side, so to speak, refutes them).

If you have any other ways that the universe could have come into existence, I would like to hear them. The term “random chance” is very broad, covering most options not involving God. If, however, you have a more neutral term, please tell me.

Yes, if SeaKayaker wants to debate abiogenesis, he should be clear on it. However, that was not my goal. I was simply using an illustration that was merely intended to shed some light on our presuppositions. I was not arguing that either (macro)evolution or abiogenesis were impossible. On the contrary, I was assuming for the sake of the argument that they both could happen. I was keeping the terminology as simple as possible, partly as an indication that I did not want to head down the path of discussing the origin or life or of the species.

SeaKayaker

[ December 21, 2001: Message edited by: SeaKayaker ]</p>