Bill Snedden

Well, no, actually we can't.

There is no requirement to prove an argument unsound. As the one making the argument, you bear a burden of proof to demonstrate the soundness of your argument. Unless you are able to do so, everyone else is quite justified in labeling your argument unproven (or unsound) without further argument or need for proof.

Unless, of course, you want to do away with the excluded middle and declare that there are three categories of truth for arguments: sound, unsound, and indeterminate.

In the last case, the inability to prove an argument either sound or unsound renders it indeterminate with regard to truth. In praxis, of course, an "indeterminate" argument would have the same value as an "unsound" argument, so the distinction would seem of little merit.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

anonymousj

Tom Cooper,

Ihave titled it "A proof that there is a God" because I hve provided a sound argument for the existence of God and nothing that anyone has provided shows that it is not sound. You say that I have an argument but no proof. If, according to you I must show that the premises are true in order to be able to offer it as a sound argument, then you must, by parity of reasoning, show that one or more of the premises are false in order to say that it is not a proof. Otherwise, all you are entitled to is something such as 'I don't know whether it is a proof or not." There is a signifcant difference between 'I don't know if it is a proof or not' and 'It is not a proof'.

I don't know if you are assuming that I am assuming that my argument is a proof only because no one has shown that the conditions on proof have not been satisfied. Many seem to think that this is what I am doing. This is not my view, and it plays no role in my thinking. It is my view that whether or not any particular person believes or knows that a premise is true, is, in general, irrelevant to the truth of the premise. (there are certain exceptions to this-- my statements of my beliefs, for example (with certain qualifications).

cheers,

anonymousj

Principia

Oh good!

*Another* DJB. Can I play? Please? Please?



SC

anonymousj

Bill Snedden,

You said,

Why don't you reread what I said (in the passage that you quoted) and then reformulate your objection.

I did not say that there is a (general) requirement to prove an argument unsound. I said that If one wants to show that the argument is unsound one must show that one or more of the premises is false (given that the validity of the argument is obvious). I assume that you do not object to this latter claim.

When you say, "Unless you are able to do so, everyone else is quite justified in labeling your argument unproven (or unsound) without further argument or need for proof", if you mean by 'unproven' something such as 'It doesn't convince me', well and good. If you mean 'not shown to be sound' well and good. If you mean that everyone else is justified in calling it unsound, and mean by this that they are justified in saying that the conditions on soundness have not been satisfied, then you are mistaken.

cheers,

anonymousj

anonymousj

Bill Snedden,

One other point.

You said, What is issue is not three categories of argument status, as it were, but three catergories of 'epistemic attitudes' toward arguments. 'It is sound', 'It is unsound', and 'I don't know if it is sound or unsound' The second status would enable to make one sort of assessment-attitude of another who claims to have produced a sound argument, while the third status would permit only a much 'weaker' assessment attitude.

The third does not allow one to say that 'There are no proofs for the existence of God'-- only something such as, perhaps, 'There are no proofs for the existence of God that I find convincing'.

The importance of this distinction to philosophy cannot be oever-emphasized. AN appreciation of this difference undergirds the life that the great figures in the history of western thought continue to enjoy.

cheers,

anonymousj

Koyaanisqatsi

I'm not quite sure why you're doing this, anon, but you are, quite simply incorrect.

It is your burden to demonstrate all of your premises are true in order for your syllogism to be considered sound.

That is irrefutable.

You may petulantly object all you want and stomp your feet like a child and claim that no one has demonstrated it to be unsound (as all of your recent posts seem to be saying, IMO), but that will not change the basic rules of logic that you keep hiding from.

It is your burden.

Regardless, your syllogism is trivial and pointless as it stands, as has been conclusively demonstrated ad nauseum here, so what is your point?

That you can concoct a technically valid, unsound syllogism? We can all do that as has also been demonstrated ad nauseum.

The point of logic is not to try and slip in a transparent shell game as you are here attempting; it is to derive the "truth" as accurately and as demonstrably as possible.

If you think for one second that you have revealed logic's "Achille's heel," or that you have used the formal rules and terminology of logic to prove God exists, you are grossly and demonstrably mistaken.

Please tell us what is your point, because if this is just all about your ego refusing to acknowledge that you have misunderstood your burden regarding the soundness of your proof, no one can help you but yourself.

And as to your ridiculous claim that you have offered an indirect demonstration that "there are proofs of God's existence," likewise you have provided nothing salient beyond a transparent semantics shuffle.

Who cares if there are proofs that aren't sound (i.e., all premises demonstrated to be true)? That's the only thing that matters.

So, fine, let's just correct the statement accordingly:

There are no sound proofs of God's existence.

Happy?

[ May 02, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

tommyc

anonymousj,

Can I just ask, is this thread an attempt to prove that there is a God (as the title suggests), or a discussion on the philosophy of arguments? With a quiet nod to the KK paradox (ie. Whether you can know that know something).

cheers

Tom

Adrian Selby

"If one wants to show that the argument is unsound one must show that one or more of the premises is false "

In relation to the premise "If something exists, God exists" you are looking for someone to prove the statement false. You are also not looking to offer evidence of its truth. Do you feel as though you're not obligated to offer evidence of the truth of this premise, and, in not offering evidence, aren't you being merely evasive? The fact that you might criticise others here for being evasive by them not offering arguments against the truth of your position does not mean that your position is correct by default, regardless of the truth status of everyone else's arguments. I'm suggesting you help us out here.

Despite this point, it is apparent that the only thing approaching a necessary truth about things existing is that 'if something exists, something exists'. You have said that if something exists, God exists. For it to be necessarily true the term God would have to be entirely interchangeable with the term something, which I'm sure, being the christian God, it isn't. You state somewhere if I recall that necessary truth isn't, well, necessary. Fine, I have another kind of problem with your premise though.

I do not understand what the christian God is. I do not understand how the christian God existing has anything to do with something existing. The concept of God as I understand it is logically incoherent. This is because, to give one example, God cannot make a sphere that has 3 corners. God cannot therefore be omnipotent. If God is not omnipotent then God cannot be all powerful, therefore the Christian conception of God is flawed (and I've used the term God to mean that, as you have also indicated), therefore the christian God cannot exist, because to be the God the Christians believe in means believing the God to be omnipotent which cannot be the case. It therefore cannot be true to say that if something exists God exists, where you mean the Christian God, because such a God cannot exist.

This is an example, however stale, of how your first premise is not true. I appreciate its a simplistic example, and that's a comment for everyone here, but until you prove this example wrong, you cannot claim that the God you refer to in the first premise exists, and while you cannot claim that, you have not shown how the premise must be true rather than false.

My example has the benefit only of brevity, but of course, it should be apparent that there are many more compelling problems with the notion of what a Christian God is that render the concept problematic right through to incoherent, so I suppose, if others here want to rehash, you'll have to address these problems in order to show how we're wrong to question the first premise, and how the first premise must contain a higher probability of truth than falsehood.

Adrian

Principia

1. If the argument P (NB: P, not G) is valid, then anonymousj's God does not exist.
2. anonymousj's argument P is valid.

3. anonymousj's God does not exist.

The truth of this statement is independent of whether or not anonymousj believes I have a valid argument, by analogy to P. Furthermore, he cannot simply claim that I have any burden of proof, because by parity of reasoning, he has to show that my premises 1 and 2 are false to defeat my argument.

Until anonymousj can successfully disprove this argument, then I am satisfied that the argument for the nonexistence of anonymousj's God is sound.

SC

Bill Snedden

You are correct. If one is attempting to demonstrate that an argument is unsound, one must show that one or more of the premises is false OR that there is no reason to accept it as true. The former will demonstrate that the argument is unsound. The latter that its soundness is questionable.

Again, there is no reason for anyone to attempt to demonstrate an argument unsound. The burden of proof is entirely on the one advancing the argument.

With your argument, for example, numerous posters have already provided numerous reasons why there is no reason to accept your first premise. Therefore, the soundness of your argument has definitely been called into question.

No, in fact, I am not mistaken.

Your first premise can be denied without contradiction. Unless you can supply further argument or evidence to support it, there is no reason to accept it. If there is no reason to accept your first premise, there is a possibility that your argument is not sound. If there is the possibility that your argument is not sound, there is also the possibility that your argument is unsound. Because the pragmatic consequences of "unsound" and "unproven" are identical, we are justified in assuming your argument unsound until you demonstrate otherwise.

I am assuming, of course, that we agree that "sound" means "true", in the sense that the conclusion of a sound argument cannot be denied without contradiction.

Therefore, the "conditions for soundness" of which you speak would seem to me to have to include some level of non-contradiction, which your argument does not possess.

To the question you asked of Kenny: "Could you be more explicit about what you mean by 'informally begging the question'. I have heard/seen this notion used to describe arguments in which the premises used are not formally question-begging, but also highly controversial (as controversial as the conclusion perhaps). Is this all that you mean?"

If I may be so bold as to presume to speak for Kenny, I believe that what he may have meant was that your first premise seems to have hidden assumptions, or to be a conflation of additional premises, one of these quite possibly being "God exists". In other words, the first premise seems to depend upon an assumption that existence itself is dependent upon the existence of God. As the argument is a formal attempt to prove the existence of the same God, the inclusion of this assumption within the first premise is begging the question.

To your other posted point:

Of course, that's true. However, I think it still precludes you from declaring your argument "sound".

I certainly don't need to construct a formal argument to prove my own existence to myself. I already have incontrovertible evidence of my own existence. Likewise, most theists probably don't need formal arguments to prove to themselves that God exists; they already believe.

It seems to me that the only real purpose of an argument purporting to prove the existence of God would be to convince non-believers (or, alternatively, to strengthen the faith of "fence-sitting" believers). Thus if the crucial question of "soundness" must be an epistemic one, upon whose judgement ought we to depend in order to determine if our argument meets the criteria?

Regards,

Bill Snedden