Alonzo Fyfe

I am going to have to ask you, what it is that we "know" in this example?

In many cases, we find out when we observe ourselves pointing to the dress and saying, "I'll take that one." In short, we find out at the same time that everybody else finds out, at the point that there is observable behavior to be expained. At that point, if asked, we come up with a theory (in terms of beliefs and desires) to explain our own behavior. A theory which might (as research evidence suggests) be incorrect.

Some set of beliefs and desires explain our choice, but we do not have any type of "special access" as to what those beliefs and desires are.

Now, the elements that you describe may be a part of what is happening when we make a choice. However, the question "what is going on here?" and "How do we find out what is going on here?" are two different questions.


I get a sense that, to understand desires, we will need to pay attention to the distinction between wanting something as an end in itself, and wanting something as a means?

A "desire that P" is a proposition attitude that the agent is motivated to make or keep the proposition P true in the world. Insofar as P is truly the object of a desire, the agent desires P as an end in itself -- with respect to P the agent wants only P to be true.

An agent can also want something else (Q) in virtue of its usefulness in bringing about P. A person who wants Q as a means has a desire that P, and a belief that Q will bring about P. He values Q because of its consequences (as a means), and P independent of its consequences (as an end).

Now, with respect to jolt J and dress D, what is happening? It seems that the most accurate description is that an agent values D as a means to J. The agent has no desire for D, the agent has only a desire for J (more accurately written as a desire that "I experience J") and a belief that B causes J.

Hedonism states that ALL human behavior can be explained in this way -- in terms of a desire for J and beliefs about the means of obtaining J. (Actually, hedonists also allow for a parallel process concerning an aversion to pain -- or a desire that "I not experience pain". However, just to prevent a lot of repetitve writing, let's just leave this as an unstated corralary to hedonism).

One set of behavior that creates problems for hedonism is behavior where the means do not produce J. This includes self-sacrificing behavior where the agent causes his or her own death before J can be obtained. Another problem with hedonism concerns the evolutionary argument that I mentioned earlier -- that "lion -> run" is far simpler and thereby far more compatible with evolution than a system that requires making associates with J and acquiring beliefs about the relationships between running from a lion and J before an agent (animal) can take an appropriate action.



In response to my question, what makes it the case that "mistreating kitties is . . . bad and awful and horrible and shameful," true, and that "there is no wrong choice in pizza toppings" also true?, you answered: Mommy saying so.

But that doesn't answer the question.

The question still remains, "What is mommy saying when she says so?" What does "mistreating the kitten is wrong" really mean?

Does it mean, "Mommy doesn't like mistreating the kitten?" Clearly not. The daughter would be making perfectly good sense to answer, "Then don't do it," and continue with her plan.

Does it mean, "Daughter does not like mistreating the kitten?" Probably not. If it meant this then, if the mother were to discover that the daughter didn't care one way or the other, the mother would have to infer, "Well, I guess I was wrong. Carry on, then."

Does it mean, "Mother does not like daughter mistreating the kitten?" Well, if this is what the mother means, then when the daughter repeats this (say, to her son twenty years later) the daughter would be saying, "Mother does not like me mistreating the kitten." At this point, the son would be making perfectly good sense to answer, "Then don't do it," and continue on with his plan. Whatever the mother was trying to say to the daughter, it is something that the daughter can repeat without changing the meaning, and without it becoming trivial.

I can continue to go through examples like this, but I will instead hasten on to what I think the mother does mean, which has nothing to do with the mother's likes or dislikes. She is telling the daughter that mistreating the kitten is intrinsically bad. This is a phrase that the daughter can repeat to others without a change in meaning while still carrying exactly the same implications.

Now, even if this is the best interpretation of what the mother is actually saying, it does not make it true. Indeed, it is not true. But, if we look at the speech act itself and the way it functions within the language for native speakers, at its implications and uses, this interpretation makes the most sense.

Which carries me back to my objections to individual subjectivists -- that they are logically inconsistent in reducing moral claims to one of these non-intrinsic-value meanings, while still holding to all of the linguistic traditions and implications that only make sense in the light of an intrinsic value interpretation.

I am a subjectivist (in the relevant sense). I am not offering this as a defense of intrinsic values. But I do hold that subjectivists, if they want to be consistent, can't talk about value in the same way that most people talk about value. They have to make some changes.



Evolution contains no such principle. You assume that traits can be atomized, that it is possible to cut one and change a second without influencing the others, and this is not the case. There is no more reason to believe that this is any more true of behavior than of physical traits -- particularly since behavior is determined by physical traits (e.g., the physical structure of the brain).

Norge

I'm jumping in here, I'm afraid. Forgive me if this has already been covered. I've been reading the last person to post, Alonzo Fyfe, and if I've understood correctly, you oppose subjectivism in favor of objective value. Is that correct?

You also wrote further up that the explanation for morality is different from its justification. Yet you seem to be an evolutionist. So, how do you justify the moral imperative not to torture, for example? I'd be interested to know.

Thanks.

Alonzo Fyfe

It depends on what you mean by "objective value."

One sense of "objective value" (which I refer to as "intrinsic value" and is also associated with "absolutism") holds that there is a type of value that is built into the very fabric of certain types of acts, character traits, objects, and states of affairs that give it value independent of anybody's valuing it. This type of value does not exist.

The other sense of "objective value" holds that propositions of the form "X is good" and "X is bad" can be objectively true or false, and that truth value is independent of what the agent believes. (In other words, believing that "X is good" is true is not enough to actually make it true -- it can still be false.) This type of value exists.

The way that you can have objectively true value statements without intrinsic values is by holding that "good" and "bad" describe relationships between states of affairs and desires. Desires describe physical states of various brains, and whether a particular and relevant relationship exists between a desire and a state of affairs is objective. A person who makes a statement of the form "X is good" (meaning, "the correct type of relationship exists between state of affairs X and desires D1, D2, D3 . . . Dn") can be mistaken.

One way that these types of statements can be true independent of the beliefs and desires of the person making the claim "X is good" is that the relevant desires he is talking about need not be his own. Jack can use the phrase "X is good" to describe a relationship between X and Sue's desires. In this case, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether "X is good" is true or false, and this truth does not depend in the slightest on what Jack believes or wants.

Another type of value claim that Jack can make is to describe a state of affairs relative to all desires that exist. Jack's own desires, then, are such a small fraction of the overall set of desires that the truth of "X is good" is substantially independent of Jack's own beliefs or desires. "X is good" is substantially objective.

Because this view holds that all value requires a subject that values, it IS subjectivist in a very important sense. So, I do not "oppose subjectivism." What I oppose are subjectivists who talk like objectivists (in the intrinsic value sense). Subjectivists should only use value-terms that are consistent with subjectivism.


I could interpret this question as a challenge to justify the intrinsic badness of torture. I can't do it. Intrinsic value does not exist. All true value describes relationships relative to desires.

Moral values (X is morally good) evaluate desires relative to how they stand in relationship to all other desires. A desire that tends to fulfill all other desires is a virtue; a desire that tends to thwart all other desires is a vice. The desire to torture falls into the latter category.

The right act is that act which a person with good desires would perform. A bad act is an act which a person with good desires would not perform. Torturing is something that a person with good desires would not do. For all practical purposes, "torturing is evil" is an objectively true statement.

But it is not a statement about the intrinsic badness of torture. It is a statement that reflects the fact that people with a fondness for torture tend to thwart more desires than they fulfill.

Valmorian

Huh? What if they desire torture? I assure you there are people who desire such things.

It is meaningless to speak of 'good' and 'bad' unless you take into account the goals of the person involved.

How can you say "Torture is bad" OBJECTIVELY? What makes it independently bad?


Edit to clarify: You seem to be stating a Subjectivist view here, and trying to claim it as objective. For example:

"Jack can use the phrase "X is good" to describe a relationship between X and Sue's desires. In this case, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether "X is good" is true or false, and this truth does not depend in the slightest on what Jack believes or wants."

In this case, all you have shown is that "Jane should consider X to be good". Not that it is OBJECTIVELY good.

Alonzo Fyfe

You seem to be making the mistake in confusing the two different types of "objective" that I spoke about. At least, your use of the word "independently" means that you are taking me to be speaking of "bad" in the intrinsic value sense. Intrinsic badness cannot be defended.

The objective badness that I am talking about means that it is an objectively true statement that a desire to torture is bad relative to all of the other desires that people tend to have. An aversion to torture is (all things considered -- considering the interests of all people) will make it generally easier for people to fulfill their desires.



There are two different meanings of "objective": objective(1) and objective(2).

It is not possible (it would be a contradiction) to state that a statement is both subjective(1) and objective(1). But it is not a contradiction to hold that something is subjective(1) and at the same time objective(2).

Values are subjective in the sense that there can be no value without a valuer. But propositions about values can still be objectively true or false in that they refer to events in the real world. It's just that, they have to refer to relationships between valuers and things valued to refer to something real.


Actually, "should" allows for multiple meanings as well, and any recommendation as to what Jane "should" consider depends upon which definition of "should" one is using at the time.

For many definitions of "should", I have said nothing about what Jane should consider.

All I have said is that propositions describing relationships between states of affairs and desires are capable of being objectively true or false and that their truth value is independent of belief. Don't read anything more into it than that.

The AntiChris

Presumably this is a simplified version of your own theory?

Ignoring the question of whether slavery was technically "good" using your theory, it seems to me that the slaves themselves would have been morally obliged to refrain from complaining about their circumstances.

Isn't this a weakness of desire-inclusive subjectivism?

Chris

Valmorian

This depends greatly on what their desires are. If they desire to inflict pain and suffering, then I would say that torture might very well be advisable for them to indulge these desires.

You can say that it is objectively true that Person X should view Y as good because they have goal Z. This is simply subjective morality however, since it basically states the value of an action is related to the subject.




This is true in that subjective morality calls objectively exist. This doesn't make any subjective morality call objectively TRUE, however.

A person can be confused about what would be in their best interest, this is true. Are you suggesting that Jane subjectively could believe that, say, stomping on someone's feet is 'good' when she doesn't desire the reactions it will give?

In such a case, I would agree with you, in that it would be a poor decision for her to continue the stomping, and in that sense it would be considered a 'bad' thing.

However, foot stomping could quite easily be a 'good' thing for someone else, who enjoys the reactions it gets.

Alonzo Fyfe

I have problems with this type of example because of the definition of slavery. A slave, by definition, is a person whose desires are excluded from the moral calculation -- that is treated merely as property -- as a thing. This type of theory says that all desires, by definition, are to be included in the moral calculation. So, it would seem that slavery gets ruled out at the start, and any being that is having its desires excluded from the moral calculation has every right to complain.

Norge

It depends on what you mean by "objective value."

Alonzo,

You deny objective value. See below:

One sense of "objective value" (which I refer to as "intrinsic value" and is also associated with "absolutism") holds that there is a type of value that is built into the very fabric of certain types of acts, character traits, objects, and states of affairs that give it value independent of anybody's valuing it. This type of value does not exist.

This is your definition of moral theory, as far as I can tell:

"The way that you can have objectively true value statements without intrinsic values is by holding that "good" and "bad" describe relationships between states of affairs and desires."

"I could interpret this question as a challenge to justify the intrinsic badness of torture. I can't do it. Intrinsic value does not exist. "

So objective values do not exist, Alonzo, but then you write the following:

"The right act is that act which a person with good desires would perform. A bad act is an act which a person with good desires would not perform. Torturing is something that a person with good desires would not do. For all practical purposes, "torturing is evil" is an objectively true statement."

You obviously don't mean "right" in the objective sense that there is something actually transcendantally right. So who determines "rightness?" I guess your answer is simply to give me something about the desires that we have. What has desire got to do with a moral imperatives? Nothing. You need to account for the moral imperative of morality. You cannot move from descriptive to prescriptive. Simply lumping all the desires of the world into a pot and stating that "good" is those which produce a beneficial effect for the majority firstly doesn't describe morality in the slightest and even if it did, it doesn't account for the moral imperative nature of morality, such that we "should" do certain acts and not others.

This last statement is the most ill-conceived:

"But it is not a statement about the intrinsic badness of torture. It is a statement that reflects the fact that people with a fondness for torture tend to thwart more desires than they fulfill."

What does "thwart" mean? And how do we arrive at moral theory on the basis of how many desires we have? Or on desires at all?In fact, often morality has nothing to do with our desires, but on compulsion from outside. More on that later.

Are you a determinist? If so, then we can talk about that. Thanks.

Alonzo Fyfe

I am talking about ALL desires, you are talking about a limited subset of all desires (those of the agent). We are talking about two different things.


Huh?

I am saying that Person X should view it as objective true that Y has desire for Z (or that Z is an object of Y's desire). X should view Z as being good for Y, that's all.

For "Y is good" to be true, then Y has to be desired and/or useful in bringing about states of affairs that are desired. Y can be good for X if Y fulfills X's desires. Y can be good all things considered if Y fulfills all desires regardless of who has them.

Y can be morally good (in virtue of having a desire for Z) if this desire for Z generally causes those who have the desire to act in a way that is compatible for the fulfillment of all peoples' desires.


Well, not "the subject" per say. In some cases (e.g., moral value), value is related to all subjects, not just a small subset of subjects (e.g., not just the desires of the agent, or assessor, or me, or the master race, or the masters, or those who are evolutionarily fit, or whatever limited subset of desires a limited-subjectivist may want to toss out).

You need to explain this to me.

What prevents a statement of the form "Y is desired by X" from being objectively true?

What prevents a statement of the form "Desire Y, if universally held, would tend to cause actions which bring about states of affairs that are themselves desired," from being objectively true?


No, I am saying that it is quite possible for it "Z believes that X desires Y" to be true, and "X desires Y" to be false. It is even possible for "Z believes that Z desires Y" to be true, and "Z desires Y" to be false, as is the case with subconscious desires.