NialScorva

Why does the problem of free will exist in the first place? What issues does free will raise that need to be addressed?


Can I assume that we all agree that we have at least the illusion/appearance of free will (within certain boundaries), if not the reality?

The page on compatibalism is interesting, it exclusively focuses on our ability to draw moral conclusions in the face of determinism preventing any other outcome from occurring. I think they draw the wrong conclusion about determinism, though. In summary it's saying that if everything is predetermined, we are not morally justified in drawing a conclusion. However, if determinism is true, we cannot draw any moral conclusion in the first place. Morality is about what should be, and under strict determinism there is no "should", only "is". So under a deterministic universe we only have the option of debating morality under the illusion of choice, while under a non-deterministic universe we have the ability to debate morality under the reality of choice. Free will and morality are only meaningful within the real or illusory ability to choose.

Which begs the question, how do you escape the rules of the game to determine whether the ability to choose is real or illusory? From an epistemological standpoint, this is the same philosophical masturbation that leads to debates over whether we're in the matrix or not, right?

If I act as if people should be punished for their choices, then I'm completely justified no matter whether we have free will or not. If we do, then I acted accordingly. If we don't, then it doesn't matter because moral conclusions cannot be drawn anyway, or are meaningless. This is an issue if you believe in a all-powerful all-knowing god that may or may not be justified in punishing people, but for those within the game itself, how does it affect anything?

Are there any non-moral ramifications to free will? How is this not a self imposed problem, or an artifact leftover from thousands of years of religious apologetics?

John Page

Nial:

Consider the concept of "free will" as a hypothesis to answer the question "How is it that we can choose what we do?" This question might serve as the problem statement you ask for.

The key issue, then, would be understanding the mechanism(s) that permit us choice that is different from, say, simple physical determinism. Imagine you have two choices and a selection mechanism driven by 100 input variables. Now layer outside the selection mechanism and anti-bias mechanism that weights the inputs so the selection mechanism ends up with a neutral result for each input. We are now choice-neutral. Alongside the anti-bias mechanism you place an objective criteria selection mechanism, this allows you to place yourself in imaginary situations (e.g but what if I can only afford 99 cents) to tinker with the drivers.

The above model woudl confirm what others have observed in this thread, if there is no preference no choice results, or at best a choice influenced by arbitrary coin tossing etc. This begs the conclusion "if a choice is made, something must have determined that choice".

So in defining free will, the "free" part refers to freedom from 'outside' influence. The "will" part refers to the actions of the mechanism used to perform selection.

I haven't added much to the debate hitherto but here's my punchline. The greater the selection mechanism is "free" of undue influence the more objective the decision becomes. Take away our individual preferences, bring in rational open tendering procedures [joke] and we all end up with Chex. (NOTE: Except that we interact with the same reality and the price of Chex will go up causing different price driven results etc.)

Conclusion, the illusion of free will may have a very similar mechanistic origin to that which enables us to be objective. Anyone agree?

Cheers, John

tronvillain

As always, I suggest reading Dennett's Elbow Room. Not only does no one have "free will" of the strong variety, it doesn't seem like something anyone would want.

jpbrooks

This is an interesting topic, but I only have time for a couple of brief observations.

Ok. So how can we differentiate an "Intent" that is "free" from one that isn't?

Hello, Nials.

The only other possible ramification to the issue of "free will" that I can think of right now is that of accounting for the origin and function of our conscious awareness and feelings. How, for example, does the brain produce psychosomatic conditions in the body when determinism dictates that mind/body causality should work the other way around?

Sorry that I only have time for brief replies. I'll be back later.

[ June 12, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

WJ

...interesting thoughts. I'll share one. It is probably no great revelation that the analogy to determinism is a computer. The computer's existence comprises all possible combinations of results based upon user input. Only when one chooses freely, within those parameters (program) as predetermined by the design of the machine, does a determined result occur. I think the illusion relates to the fact that since we are volitional creatures by our mere use of consciousness, it is considered that our free-will is not really free at all. But rather, a fixed state of inputs and outputs from a 'predermined program' of life.

Walrus

Liquidrage

I'm going to pick it up tonight.

I've only been really interested in free will/determinism for the past month or so.

I've seen Elbow Room recommended very often.
Thanks for the tip.

Liquidrage

Ex.

I'm not claiming that you adhere to this.

This quote is from the first link you posted. It doesn't really get any better.

Some human behavior is caused by the choices of free human beings. If we accept determinism, we are forced to give up moral responsibility. And we don’t want to give up on moral responsibility. Therefore, we must reject determinism.

I got a chuckle out of that.

Maybe if I close me eyes tight enough when I look at my pay stub they wont take my taxes out?

The second link is a nonsensical view of compulsion being the justification for moral punishment and in a round-about-way defeating determinism.

Doing my own search on this "ism" it doesn't appear as if this "ism" accepts both free will and determinism at the same time.
To me it appears that they redefine free will in order to accept both determinism and moral responsability.

Though as a side note, if I wanted I have the freedom to say,
"Determinism and free will are both true all the time everywhere."
Just because it can be said doesn't mean it makes sense

excreationist

Actually <a href="http://web.syr.edu/~jddraege/compatibilism.htm" target="_blank">that link</a> says that compatibilism is against that quote...

First it explains why some people think determinism makes free will impossible.

Then it explains why some people think free will makes determinism impossible. (Which you quoted)

Then it says "...Free will and determinism *seem* to be directly opposed to one another....Compatibilism – Free will and determinism can be true together..."

It is actually talking about how to decide whether an act is relatively voluntary or free - or not. (e.g. they may have been threatened by another person to do something) It is saying that people should only be held accountable for their actions if they did it "freely" or voluntarily. Since they also believe in determinism their act was inevitable but it was relatively free if no-one was threatening their life, etc.

Maybe you aren't doing the search properly... look at these [/url=http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF8&oe=UTF8&q=compatibilism+%22fr ee+will%22+determinism]google results for compatibilism "free will" determinism[/url]

I think the definition of "free will" is fairly debatable.

It depends what the will is free from... if you're talking about it being free from threats from other people and unfavourable external circumstances (flat tires), etc, then it can be compatible.

excreationist

John Page:
I pretty much agree with the earlier part of your post but I think I disagree with that conclusion.

This is why I think we have an illusion of free will - we don't know what our final decision will be until we have retrieved lots of memories and weighed it all up. We don't know in advance what we are going to decide. And if we were told what we were going to decide, we might change our mind, even if that would be a stupid thing to do because we might value our independence over the negative side of the bad choice.

So from our perspective our will is free because we are ignorant of our final decisions until we arrive at them. This is assuming you put a lot of effort into making your decisions. If you follow a simple set of rules (e.g. obey your master) then your behaviour is very predictable by yourself and not free, from your own perspective.

I think we want to be objective mostly for practical reasons - so we can anticipate things and seek/repeat/avoid things in the most effective ways possible.

Liquidrage

Ex.

Our issues (my view and your view on the links for example) seem to (mainly) rest only the definition of free will.

When I use free will I only mean "the ability to make choices without constraints".

Otherwise it's a non-issue. There's nothing worth arguing about, etc. No one (at least that I've ever seen) debates that people make choices.

When I use determinism I mean that "future events are directly dependant on past event".
It's important to note that I do not associate the ability to predict the future with 100% certainty to determinism.

The links seem to use a different definition then I do.

The reason I use this definition is noted above. Anything less isn't worth talking about.

I guess I could some it up this way.

I see the choices that people make as being the result of natural laws at the chemical/quantum level and not of a mechanism that it outside of natural laws.
When a person decides to go buy a bag of chips I don't feel they every had a free choice. It seems like it. But the chemical/quantum functions occuring in their mind is what made the choice.
That is my belief, right or wrong.

Unless someone can show me how the choices are not a result of physical laws then I will probably continue to believe this.