Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by NonContradiction :

Then God cannot bring about the situation in which someone freely wills to learn and this same person succeeds in learning.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

I could just as easily read for "freely," "in such a way that it is not caused by a distinct agent to come about." God cannot bring about the situation in which some person causes herself to learn without some other person causing her to cause herself to learn. I think even under determinism these situations have a content.

bd-from-kg

The problem that I see with all of these examples is in that word "freely". If the freedom involved is of the compatibilist variety, obviously God can cause someone to freely do all of these things. If it's of the "libertarian" variety He can't. But unfortunately (for your argument) the concept of libertarian free will is logically incoherent. So it's not logically possible for anyone to bring about any of the states of affairs in question.

[Edited to add:]

The logical incoherence of "libertarian" freedom has nothing to do with determinism.( Indeed, it couldn't be. Logical incoherence is by definition independent of any facts about the world.) It derives from the fact that an act must be caused by the agent in order to qualify as an "act" at all. (If I'm knocked to the floor, I cannot be said to have acted; my falling is something that happened to me.) But libertarian freedom demands that an act be uncaused. Working back in the causal chain (say from acting to willing to act) doesn't help either. I can only be said to have willed to act if I caused the "willing". Otherwise the willing is itself just something that happened to me.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by bd-from-kg :

I address this in my paper:

rainbow walking

Hi Thomas,
Now that I've had a chance to do a more thorough read of your argument I want to offer some observations, not as criticisms mind you, just more in line with,,,well, my personal observations. I'll try to point out some possible loopholes that a cautious theist is likely to spot.

Intuitions About Power and Omnipotence, Compatability and Possible Worlds down to Stae of Affairs Omnipotence:

What I see as the weak link in your argument under these sub-titles is the building of a deductive argument on an inferred logical link between "availability" and "in-ability". One does not always follow from the other.

Obviously the reason an omnipotent being is unable to learn is based on the logical restriction inherent in "availability". If such a being already "knows" everything knowable, nothing is left "available" to be known or learned. You end up with another psuedo-task similar to square circles and married bachelors that you earlier claimed you wished to avoid.

It was once thought that man was unable to fly. It has since been discovered that he was only unable to do so as long as the "available" technology was missing. Once the technology became available, man's ability to fly followed suit.

You are, in effect, accusing this being of not being able to learn because he already knows everything. This is equivalent to attacking an adult male's manhood because he no longer suckles from his mother's breasts.

Another unsupported, but implied assumption here is that such a being acquired his omniscience via learning in the first place.

And finally, the "task" of learning is not generally accomplished via "power" but intellect anyway. That is why we measure the ability to learn as an IQ or intelligence Quotient. So it's not clear here that you have exposed a weakness between omniscience and omnipotence. All tasks require the guidance of the intellect and not just an assumed ability that stems from power or energy.


State of Affairs Omnipotence:

I will register one general observation in reference to this aspect of your argument, and register one specific objection to a quoted example you gave in support of your argumentation...specifically Morriston's criticisms.

General Observation:

Your argument here leaves you wide open to the objection of "Logical Necessity"

For example, is oxygen logically necessary to sustain human life in any logically possible world?

Thus a theist is likely to argue that eating and counter-feiting are not "logically necessary" to sustain omnipotence in any logically possible world...especially when you posit the additional attribute of immateriality.

Specific Objection:

Since you have supported a good deal of your argument here on Morriston's criticisms I shall direct a few specific objections to your supporting author's criticisms regarding Maximal Power and Moral Perfection.

Morriston has based his criticism on an equivocation in the role of moral perfection. He has, in effect, inverted moral perfection from a descriptive attribute to a prohibitive attribute and based his criticism on this inversion. He assumes moral perfection exists independent of choice and thus prohibits consideration of a specific range of choices that would be construed as "evil".

If we consider that moral perfection is a description based on making consistently morally perfect choices, and evil choices must necessarily be available in that range, (else morality ceases to be a factor), we find that Morriston's criticism is launched against a straw man depiction of "moral perfection" as being a prohibitive limitation to a range of choices that excludes evil choices.

For such a being to be moral he must have an availability of choices that include evil and malevolent alternatives, where he chooses, instead, good and beneficial alternatives. Further, to be morally perfect, he must consistently choose good and beneficial options. This establishes "moral perfection".

From this we can readily intuit that moral perfection is established by choices and not that a range of prohibited choices are established by moral perfection. Thus moral perfection is not prohibitive to the availability of a range of choices, but descriptive of a range of choices consistently made.

For instance, imagine a state of affairs where all range of choices are equally good. No choice made can possibly be anything other than good. A being who makes choices in such a world cannot be described as moral because he has no available range of alternatives to "good choices" from which morality can be defined. Morality, as a concept, only arises in situations where immorality or ammorality are also possible consequents of choice. The concept of morality absolutely requires a range of choices that could be construed as evil or malevolent by someone.

Thus "moral perfection" is a defining attribute and not, as Morriston assumes, a prohibitive attribute. The availability of evil and malevolence must logically necessarily exist to such a being if moral perfection is one of his defining attributes.

Once we straiten out Morriston's equivocational assumption we see that maximal Power, rather than being prohibitive, is actually enhanced by this attribute and no deductive ground is gained. Thus maximal power is sustained and elevated in "moral perfection" far and above malevolent capabilities.

This is all I have time for now.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Yes, just like a man in a bakery cannot eat donuts without leaving the bakery after all the donuts have been eaten, and a woman permanently locked in a room with no books cannot perform "to read a book." I dealt with all this in the paper.

Nowhere do I assert or imply this.

The definitions of omnipotent that I offered would all require the ability to learn. Choose a different definition of "omnipotent" if you don't like them.

Only if human life is defined to require oxygen.

Huh? What does this objection mean? Why don't I say that for any task T I can't perform, it's not logically necessary to sustain omnipotence in any logically possible world, and therefore I'm omnipotent?

By the definition of capability I offered, God is incapable of doing evil. Choose a different definition of "capability" if you want. God is incapable of having an evil will, and I am, and moral perfection doesn't seem to me to require the ability to have an evil will, only the ability, if you're correct, to do evil actions.

NonContradiction

May I ask how you arrived at that conclusion based on what I said to you. I think that I am missing some steps in your reasoning.

Normal

Learning implies lack of knowledge. If god were able to learn this would surely negate his omni-ness.

If god is morally perfect, doing evil would go against his perfection.

Surely, god "committing suicide" is a logically incoherent idea.

God cannot make a rock he cannot lift either.



You seem to be equating god with his creation. If god brings about those states of affairs, he does so as the creator, not as the creation.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by NonContradiction :

Sorry about glossing. My position is that the following is a logically possible, bring-about-able state of affairs:

L: Some person freely wills to learn and this same person succeeds in learning.

So you must show that it is not a logically possible, bring-about-able state of affairs, or that God can indeed bring it about. (Or you can propose a different definition of "omnipotent.")

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Normal :

Right, that's my point. If God were able to learn, he wouldn't be omniscient. That's precisely why omnipotence and omniscience are in conflict.

Right again. So God can't do evil, and that's why moral perfection and omnipotence are in conflict.

Only because God is defined to be a necessary existent. I still understand what it would mean to say God committed suicide. The fact that God can't commit suicide is another limitation on his power.

How does this preserve the compatibility of omnipresence and omnipotence?

I don't understand your criticism. Yes, he is the creator, but certainly he can be part of the creation as well.