Alonzo Fyfe

As I said, this is a view that is defended by many moral realists, and even accepted by anti-realists such as J.L. Mackie.


Mackie is a skeptic about an "objective" morality in the sense of "objective" that refers to intrinsic moral values. That is to say, Mackie argues that an assumption that intrinsic values exists in our moral language and in our moral arguments. But that this assumption is a mistake, and that those traditional moral arguments are invalid.

Yet, even though Mackie is a skeptic about real, intrinsic moral properties, he is also a Utilitarian. Morality is not a discovery, it is a useful invention -- like language itself.

The arguments that I present here follow the same pattern. An assumptionj of objectivity is a part of our traditional moral language. To the degree that this assumption is incorporated in that language many traditional moral arguments taken to be valid are in fact invalid. However, if we remove this assumption of intrinsic values and made the relevant modifications to the moral arguments we accept as valid and invalid we have the opportunity to invent a useful morality. In the same way, even though words contain no objective, intrinsic meaning -- meanings are assigned to words subjectively, we still have done well for ourselves by inventing a language.

dk

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
As I said, this is a view that is defended by many moral realists, and even accepted by anti-realists such as J.L. Mackie.(snip)
dk: A moral skeptic by logical necessity attacks any moral basis. Were Mackie to take any other postition he'd undermine his own skepticism.

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
In the same way, even though words contain no objective, intrinsic meaning -- meanings are assigned to words subjectively, we still have done well for ourselves by inventing a language. '

I assume you think intellegence makes language possible, so does intellegence have intrinsic value? No.

And if you think evolution produced intellegence then does evoloution have intrinsic value? No.

And if the big bang invented the Laws of evolution, then did the big bang have instrinsic value? No.

And if nothing made the big bang, does nothing have intrinsic value?

And if nothing lacks intrinsic value then everything has intrinsic value.

hmmm

The AntiChris

Ok, but I think I had good reason:

Anyway, I think think this horse is pretty much dead and buried.

What is it that you think might motivate a non-subjectivist to refrain from "acting violently etc.." that doesn't exist for the subjectivist?
Nothing you've said on this thread supports this claim. I'm sure your observation can't rest solely on the mere fact that the vast majority of subjectivists actually do value the "welfare of others", so I can only assume that it's based on your particular interpretation of the language they may use. If so, I think you're wrong.

In a response to dk you said:
Now how does this represent any kind of logical inconsistency? Surely, these subjectivists would only be inconsistent if they used "moral language in its traditional way" and accepted the assumption that is built into the language?

The worst you can accuse them of is a misuse of language as you perceive it has been traditionally used. In any event I don't accept that moral language in current usage necessarily presumes intrinsic values.
You appear to be suggesting that the only (compelling?) arguments that can brought to bear against these activities are ones that depend on the belief that welfare for others is a "necessary component of moral value". This is clearly absurd so I'm sure this isn't what you're saying.
I'm afraid this looks like gobbledegook to me.

What does it mean say "2% true and 98% false"? From whose perspective?

If you're trying to say that 2% agree and 98% disagree, then you're stating the patently obvious and I've no idea what your point is.

Chris

DRFseven

But nothing, under ANY moral system is necessary for its own sake. Things are only necessary in order to reach certain outcomes. That is certainly no fault of subjectivism.

Alonzo Fyfe

I am talking about logical necessity, not ontological necessity.

Furthermore, I have not said that this lack of necessity is a fault of subjectivism. The inconsistency between saying (1) morality is subjective, and (2) these wrongs are necessarily wrong is where I have a problem.

I have raised no objections against a subjectivist who is consistent. A subjectivist whose moral logic is functionally identical to pizza topping logic is not speaking inconsistently.

dk

Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
This is not my idea, a great many moral realists (and error theorists such as J.L. Mackie) hold that traditional moral language presumes intrinsic values or "moral realism."
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On the other hand, some subjectivists continue to use moral language in its "traditional" way even though they reject the assumption that is built into that language.
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Now how does this represent any kind of logical inconsistency? Surely, these subjectivists would only be inconsistent if they used "moral language in its traditional way" and accepted the assumption that is built into the language?
The worst you can accuse them of is a misuse of language as you perceive it has been traditionally used. In any event I don't accept that moral language in current usage necessarily presumes intrinsic values.
dk: I dislike the vagueness of the term “traditional”. No matter what kind of moral universe a person appears to operate in, morality governs their conduct. “tradition” follows ambiguously from the realms of Plato’s spiritual forms, Aquinas’s Natural Law, Idealism, Materialism... etc... So, we aren’t at odds on a specific contradiction, but the broad inhospitable conundrum laden with contradictions. I contend morality is like a diet, except poeple do not live by bread alone.

Alonzo Fyfe

Let me address the overall view this way.

The only values that exist describe relationships between states of affairs and desires. Nothing has value except insofar as it is desired, or it is useful in bringing about something that is desired.

When determining the value of something, one relavant question is whether we are talking about its value as an end (it is desired), as a means (it is useful for bringing about that which is desired), or both.

When determining the value of something, the other relevant question is which desires are relevant in determining its value. Whose desires are we going to look at in determining whether X is good or bad?

Agent-subjectivists hold that the only desires that are relevant in making moral evaluations are the desires of the agent. Which means, in the case of a sadist or rapist, that so long as the agent desires and has no aversion to their own sadistic acts or a rape, that the torture or rape is good. The moral relevance of the welfare of anybody other than the agent requires that the agent have some level of concern for (desire for the well being of) that other person. Absent such concern, the other person has no moral worth; his desires has no moral relevance.

Assessor-subjectivists hold that the only desires that are relevant in making moral evaluations are the desires of the assessor. Which means, in the case of a sadist or rapist, that so long as the assessor desires and has no aversion to sadistic acts or a rape, that the torture or rape is good. The moral relevance of the welfare of anybody other than the assesspr requires that the assessor have some level of concern for (desire for the well being) that other person. Absent such concern, the other person has no moral worth; his desires has no moral relevance.

Egoistic-subjectivists hold that only the desires of the individual himself are relevant in making moral evaluations. If I was an egoistic-subjectivist, I would assert and argue that the only desires that are relevant in making moral evaluations are the desires of Alonzo Fyfe. Nobody else in the world has moral relevance except insofar as Alonzo Fyfe cares about their welfare. Any other talk about moral worth that does not refer to what fulfills the desires of Alonzo Fyfe is speaking nonsense, and their words can be dismissed.

Now, I cannot dispute that "value relative to the desires of the agent" and "value relative to the desires of the assessor" and "value relative to the desires of Alonzo Fyfe" are all real relationships. Unlike those who speak of intrinsic values, all of these different types of subjectivists are talking about something real. I cannot say that those who talk about these relationships are talking nonsense.

Also, language is an invention. There is no natural law of language that says that words must be used one way and may not be used in any other. So, if a person wants to "invent" a language in which "moral value" refers to "value relative to the desires of the agent" or "value relative to the desires of the assessor" or "value relative to the desires of Alonzo Fyfe", then this is not a mistake.

It COULD BE (and, I would argue, IS) a mistake if the individual subjectivist says that this is what people generally mean when they talk about something being morally good or bad. What people generally mean when they say that "X is morally good" is "X contains an intrinsic property of moral goodness that all people with a functioning moral sense should be able to detect and acknowledge."

It COULD BE (and, I would argue, IS) a mistake if the individual subjectivist draws implications from "X is morally good" that is not literally true of "agent likes X" or "assessor likes X" -- that is to say, when individual subjectivists treat moral preferences different from other types of preferences such as pizza-topping preferences.

But the individual-subjectivist need not make these or any other mistake.

Individual subjectivism is just one family of subjectivism. Subjectivism expands from here to include more and more desires of more and more people. Cultural subjectivism holds that right and wrong depends on what fulfills the desires of people in a particular culture; intersubjectivism holds that right and wrong depends on the desires of a sufficiently large portion of a population.

Ultimately, the most inclusive forms of subjectivism hold that all desires, without exception, are relevant in making evaluations. Universal-subjectivist theories include some (though not all) forms of utilitarianism, contractarianism, and some forms of impartial-observer theories. What all forms of universal-subjectivism have in common is that the welfare of others is logically NECESSARY and not CONTINGENT. That is to say, "value relative to all desires" necessarily implies that no desires are left out -- where as all less inclusive forms of subjectivism only contingently implies that no desires are left out.

dk

Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
Let me address the overall view this way.
The only values that exist describe relationships between states of affairs and desires. Nothing has value except insofar as it is desired, or it is useful in bringing about something that is desired.
dk: Here’s what I gather. The only relationships that can be proven to exist are governed by experiential or abstract systems. Broadly stated, as I understand you, objective relativism advocates a form of consequentialism that differentiates states of well-being with informed desire theory. The theory hypothesizes that a rational informed person succeeds by objectively fulfilling their desires. Morality governs the “well being” of people at many independent different levels i.e. social, political, emotive and psychological desires.

• Alonzo Fyfe: When determining the value of something, one relevant question is whether we are talking about its value as an end (it is desired), as a means (it is useful for bringing about that which is desired), or both.
  dk: Ok, but this determination should include any kind of content analysis (judgment by active intellect), how about desire, +belief, +emotions, +hopes, and +wishes(intentions).
• Alonzo Fyfe When determining the value of something, the other relevant question is which desires are relevant in determining its value. Whose desires are we going to look at in determining whether X is good or bad?
  dk: I submit “value” in any objective sense depends upon the sort of property being evaluated. a “value” assessment arises from sensation to be classified, ranked and ordered by the active intellect (through an act of judgment). The object of the intellect being truth, or the highest desire of the intellect being truth.

The AntiChris

What do you mean by "draws implications?

If I understand you correctly, the individual subjectivist would be "mistaken" if he reacted with anything resembling strong disapproval for the activities (rape, torture, murder...) of any other agent? And this reaction would be equally "mistaken" if these activities were directed towards the individual subjectivist himself?

Is it your belief that anyone who endorses an individual subjectivist position is ignorant (they just don't know the rules) or that they're simply insane?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

False.

The individual subjectivist is mistaken if he takes a reaction of strong disapproval to be anything different from a "strong disapproval" that he might have for anchoves on his pizza and draws implications from the former that he would not draw from an equally strong reation to the latter.

The individual subjectivist is mistaken if he takes or in any way implies that a "strong disapproval" is better than or more appropriate or having more merit than "strong approval".

The individual subjectivist is mistaken if he denies that it is mere chance or luck that determines that the victim ought not to be harmed, because "strong approval" has just as much merit as "strong disapproval" and, in the former case, says that the rape, torture, or murder is not only permissible but even obligatory -- simply because the person doing/evaluating the rape/torture/murder in this case happens to really be into it.