Dominus Paradoxum

Sorry, I don't follow. How does the fact that we first posit an A invalidate the judgement? Would you prefer that we say A=A without positing an A?

SlateGreySky

I think that Fichte would say that in nominating an "A" for the self-identity axiom, we must first identify that "A." By identifying it as an object distinct from all other objects, we presuppose the self-identity claim we mean to prove: how else would we be able to distinguish "A" from "B" unless we already knew "A" to be self-identical?

With "I," we don't have to do that, because we possess the privilege of subjectivity (at least, according to Fichte). The identity claim of "I" is its own self-identity claim, because in order to posit anything about "I," the subject (who is the "I" to begin with) must imply his own identity and selfhood.

Hope that was clear . . . sorry if it came out a bit muddled!

Dominus Paradoxum

But we're not trying to "prove" or "argue" that it's self identical, we're just saying that it is in fact self identical. If we were try to prove it, *then* our argument would ineed be visciously circular, but as a simple identity statement it is not. How about, instead of using the 'A' symbol twice over, we say "the moring star" and "the evening star" in fact refer to the same object, to whit, the planet Venus.

SlateGreySky

Fichte's point about the identity statment is, I think, quite a different one than Frege's point about sense and reference. Read on:

Fichte would, I believe, say something like, "quite the contrary; it is not in fact self-identical, it is in form self-identical." That is partially Fichte's point; we're searching for a first principle that is in fact, rather than merely in form, self-identical. Whereas "A=A" is a truth merely of form, "I=I" is a truth of content.

By asserting A=A axiomatically, we suppose that it presupposes no further (read: more foundational) principle upon which to base itself. According to Fichte, it is the equals sign (=), the subject-predicate relation which is assumed in the form "A=A." A=A, then, presupposes some transcending unifier that grants subjecthood and predication on the same "A." It is the "I" which is this transcending agent. That forms the basis for Fichte's further foundation of "I am I."

The Wissenschaftslehre really is a worthy read if you get the time and are interested. Personally, I think it's profoundly foundational for an understanding of Hegel and later continental figures. A short work, it would be a breeze to read.

John Page

Witt:

Thanks. The above seems to be the center of the debate, then, reveolving around my view that our mind/brains both contain a concept of A (A'ness) that we agree intersubjectively and your view that there is an A that exists independent of our thoughts that can be viewed objectively.

IMO there are entities that exist outside the mind/brain but since we only know them through their form, logic is a system that operates on form (and this situation gives rise tot he above comments by other posters about the positing of A)

Regarding the copies of the name, I'm suggesting we debate A as an object - maybe this is over-complicating things, but then we'd have to say "suppose there is a brick in front of us"... but then the
Truth about Dog-Houses Debate contains some observations on truth and its contingency.

Anyway - did I understand your view on objectivity correctly?

Cheers, john

PJPSYCO

A=A is not a uniquness argument. It is a consistancy argument. I don't care if you have an infitine number of objects with all the same definition. If they have the same definition then they avoid being nonsense. That is the goal. It has nothing to do with the first foundation of the phiosophy as I said. That is way earlier than A=A. The point is to not communicate ideas that cannot be communicated becuase that does not make any sense what so ever. So, you should define consistantly. That's all that A=A says.

John Page

Isn't absolute consistency in every way a duplicate identity? I think the OP is pointing in the direction that if everything is only itself then complete consistency with another object is impossible. Identity, therefore, can be said to spring from known differences.

What do you think of this:

John Page

This also,

PJPSYCO

Consistancy does not imply identity. It only implies consistancy. The problem here seems to be trying to reconcile a communicatable idea to an absolute truth idea. The problem that is being faced here is a conflict in philosophies. The A=A concept though assumed in some philosophies, does not have to be. The little trick is that we can lie to ourselves, and we can lie to others. So, the point is to set up some basic criteria for 'truth'.

Since whatever one beleves will be what one thinks is true, one can be either sporatic, or consistant with ones own definitions. The truth of the definition does not matter, since there is no real checking allowed(you can lie to yourself about the check).

If we ask what about more than one person? Well there is a new point called communication.
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I'm going to skip the argument for the rejection of 'everone else is a figment of my mind' philosophies, since their ideals fit the one person argument again
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So, we have this neat ideal called communiation. In this case we can lie or tell the truth to others. So, we set up the rules for this. All of them have to do with communicating the idea and making sure that the other ones has the same idea. This consept one can easily name universal definition. The basis of universal definition is one of the extension of this concept.

The origional post presuposes that this concept is the implication of existance. It is not. It is far from it. We have more philosophy and many more checks before we get to existance. This just eliminates the possibility of the check for existance because we don't know what we are checking the existance of without this concept. Quite notably the basis of universal definition does not presume materialism or group existentialism, but is used in both. An object in exists only in materialism, however.

John Page

I think I am beginning to see our miscommunication.

If there is only consistency then identity is merely a consistency with the concept of uniqueness (and the concept of uniqueness and uniqueness itself are set by communication as you indicate).

The above seems more like nominalism, with realism at the other end and relativism in between.

Cheers, John