Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Vanderzyden · 10-26-2002, 03:54 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
The ability to perform any logically possible action, which is a coherent ability, seems to produce a more powerful being. You have still not provided reason to reject "able to perform any logically possible action."

There are logically possible actions that cannot possibly be performed. For example:

1. No being can count to infinity.

2. No being can create something too heavy for it to lift.

While neither of these are actually possible, they are logically possible.

Quote:

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
V: "You have not shown that it does not agree with our intuitions."

T: Of course it doesn't. I don't have the resources to take a survey, but I have a feeling most people would say being x is more powerful than being y if x can perform a trillion more actions than y can perform.

For the purposes of our discussion, a survey will not help us advance towards the truth. And again, you have not SHOWN that numerically superior abilities contribute to the POWER of a particular being. You did not have an answer for me when I asserted this previously.

Let me respond directly to one of your previous comments:

Quote:

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
...You don't think the abilities to eat, to learn, to forget, to delude oneself, to surprise oneself, to perform an evil action, etc., count as any powers? But you do grant that if God suddenly gained a billion new abilities, He would be no more powerful, as long as these abilities don't fit your definition of "power."

Power manifests itself in action. If a being cannot act on a particular ability, then it does not have power with respect to this ability. If a being cannot act, it has no power. If, somehow, new abilities are acquired by the hypothetical omnipotent being (which, I notice you provide no explanation of how this might be possible), there will be no corresponding increase in power if they do not collectively supersede the Great Power. Certainly, there will be no increase in power if none of those abilities may be acted upon.

We have been over your examples: Abilities such as "surprise" and "delusion" are weaknesses. And again, there can be no ability to learn when all possible truths are already known.

The primary difficulty I see, Thomas, is that you desire to cling to the weakly omnipotent definition. Tell me, what prevents you from abandoning this definition? Why must you rely on opinion polls and popular views to acquire support for your argument?

John

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]

Kharakov · 10-26-2002, 04:11 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

There are logically possible actions that cannot possibly be performed. For example:

1. No being can count to infinity.

Actually, that is not a logically possible action. Infinity is not a defined number.

Quote:

2. No being can create something too heavy for it to lift.

Most people can.

Kharakov

Thomas Metcalf · 10-26-2002, 04:13 PM

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"So even if there are states of affairs which Sam can bring about and God cannot, there will necessarily be corollary states of affairs which Sam cannot bring about and God can (i.e. If God can't cause Sam to freely do S, it is also true that Sam can't cause God to freely do S)."

But there is a further soa, "Sam freely does S," which does not seem to have a counterpart in God's repertoire for a few values of S. Sam can't ever cause God freely to do S, but sometimes "God freely does S" is a logically impossible soa and therefore will not present a problem for Sam's omnipotence. Less often, "Sam freely does S" is a logically impossible soa.

I think we can look at this in a different direction. Suppose God somehow lost the power to perform some action. Your position seems to me to require that God would still be just as powerful as He was before. Is that accurate? And if God somehow gained the ability to perform some action, again, He would be just as powerful but not more?

"Moral perfection may simply be a matter of making moral judgements w/out error."

What if the world were unfortunated enough to contain a being, Jerry, who made a correct moral judgment every time, but always decided to be immoral? That is, given any moral choice between p and q, Jerry would say correctly, "Well, the morally correct thing to do would be p," but would follow that with "So I will do q!" I do not think this being is morally perfect, but I have a feeling I may be reading your definition uncharitably. By "without error" do you mean God can always figure out what the morally correct course of action would be, or that He can figure it out and further, always takes it?

Vanderzyden · 10-26-2002, 04:33 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Kharakov:
Actually, that is not a logically possible action. Infinity is not a defined number.

Are you saying that calculus, which employs the concept of infinity, is illogical?

Quote:

Originally posted by Kharakov:
V: No being can create something too heavy for it to lift.

K: Most people can.

Can what? I am not speaking of fabrication or craftsmanship. People are not creators, as has been discussed at length in this thread.

John

Philip Osborne · 10-27-2002, 10:03 AM

But there is a further soa, "Sam freely does S," which does not seem to have a counterpart in God's repertoire for a few values of S. Sam can't ever cause God freely to do S, but sometimes "God freely does S" is a logically impossible soa and therefore will not present a problem for Sam's omnipotence. Less often, "Sam freely does S" is a logically impossible SOA.

The strongest line of argument this seems to suggest is that Sam can freely intend to do evil, whereas God cannot. For Sam freely intending to do evil, there is no corollary state of affairs which God can bring about, because God cannot freely intend to do evil (evil in the sense of not bringing about greater evil, but evil for the sake of evil). In this sense, you are correct.

However, there is a similar counter-example in favor of God which may be just as damning. Sam is able to do any logically possible action; hence, Sam can commit suicide. That means that Sam can freely bring about the SOA in which Sam ceases to exist. This necessarily implies that the SOA "Sam ceases to exist" is possible. If it is possible, then it can be brought about by God. But if God brings it about, then obviously it is not in virtue of Sam's free will that it happens. So, God can bring about the SOA in which Sam dies against Sam's will. Sam cannot do this; nor can he bring about the SOA in which God dies against His will, since God, according to strong theistic tradition, has necessary existence (note that if we say that Sam exists necessarily, then Sam cannot commit suicide, and he is no longer a being that can do any logically possible action). In the case of God causing Sam not to exist against Sam's will, there is no corollary state of affairs which Sam can bring about.

I think we can look at this in a different direction. Suppose God somehow lost the power to perform some action. Your position seems to me to require that God would still be just as powerful as He was before. Is that accurate? And if God somehow gained the ability to perform some action, again, He would be just as powerful but not more?

My position does not require this; it only requires that if God lost the power to do some action, then it would still be true that there would be no beings more powerful than Him. This is not logically equivalent to saying that God would be just as powerful as before.

What if the world were unfortunated enough to contain a being, Jerry, who made a correct moral judgment every time, but always decided to be immoral? That is, given any moral choice between p and q, Jerry would say correctly, "Well, the morally correct thing to do would be p," but would follow that with "So I will do q!" I do not think this being is morally perfect, but I have a feeling I may be reading your definition uncharitably. By "without error" do you mean God can always figure out what the morally correct course of action would be, or that He can figure it out and further, always takes it?

God always determines the correct course of action, and always takes it. I take "judgement" to include both the judgement about some moral situation and the action taken on that situation.

Sincerely,

Philip

Silent Acorns · 10-27-2002, 10:17 AM

Vander,

Quote:

Again, the creature cannot limit the Creator. However, the Creator knows his limits. Surely you'll agree. I am not stipulating what God can't do: I make direct inferences from the Bible and from nature.

It is still the case that he cannot do something that he can't do, such as lie

How can you say that god cannot lie and "I am not stipulating what god can't do" at the same time?

Quote:

"Anything he wants" does not equate with "anything at all", or "anything logically possible". Do you understand the distinction?

You have agreed with me that your defintion amounts to "God can do whatever he wants to do". What I am saying is that this begs the question, what does god want? You have also said that we are mere creatures and "no creature can fully comprehend the Creator". It logically follows that we can't know what god does not want. If god can do whatever he wants, and we can't know what he does not want, then as far as we are concerned god can do anything.

Are you saying that you know what god wants and does not want?

Thomas Metcalf · 10-27-2002, 02:59 PM

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"1. No being can count to infinity."

But "to count to infinity" is a logically impossible action.

"2. No being can create something too heavy for it to lift."

By your definition of creation, to create something to heavy for its creator to lift is a logically impossible action, because the creator of an object can always lift that object.

"If a being cannot act on a particular ability, then it does not have power with respect to this ability."

Right. God cannot act on the ability to learn, because God does not have the ability to learn. Therefore, He does not have that power.

"If, somehow, new abilities are acquired by the hypothetical omnipotent being (which, I notice you provide no explanation of how this might be possible), there will be no corresponding increase in power if they do not collectively supersede the Great Power."

I don't think that follows. They need not supersede the Great Power to produce an increase in power. If I have the power to destroy any of eight planets in the solar system, and I gain the power to destroy the ninth, I think I have gained in power, but the power to destroy Pluto in no way "supersedes" the power to destroy the first eight.

"Abilities such as 'surprise' and 'delusion' are weaknesses."

You used nouns in place of verbs. "To surprise oneself" and "to delude oneself" are indeed actions, but actions cannot be weaknesses. And I don't see how the ability to perform some action would be a weakness, ever, just the potential to make oneself weaker.

"Tell me, what prevents you from abandoning this definition?"

No one has yet shown it to be faulty.

Thomas Metcalf · 10-27-2002, 03:27 PM

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"Are you saying that calculus, which employs the concept of infinity, is illogical?"

This is at least the sixth time in this thread you've made this mistake, not accurately representing what "logically possible action" means. There is a difference between an action that is "illogical" and a logically impossible action.

Quote:

Instance #1 (10/5/02 3:11pm):

You said: "i think this definition fails on the term 'logical'. For example, is it logical that the son of God would come down from heaven? Is it logical that God would not immediately annilihate any creature that rejected him?"

I answered: "When philosophers say 'logically possible,' they mean something very specific. If an action a is logically possible, that means it does not express a contradictiont to perform it." (Italics original.)

Quote:

Instance #2 (10/15/02 10:32pm):

You said: "Though these statements are 'logical', both lead to contradictions, since no being is capable of doing either action."

I said: "We've been through this before. Logically possible actions are actions that do not produce a contradiction when they are performed."

Quote:

Instance #3 (10/18/02 10:03pm):

You said: "Not everything that is logically possible is actually possible. Can you count to infinity? Can God?" (Emphasis original.)

I said: "'To count to infinity' is not a logically possible action. This is the third time we've gone over this point."

Quote:

Instance #4 (10/20/02 9:36pm):

You said: "I ask this because you explicitly stated 'I assert everything that is logically possible is actually possible.' Are you saying that everything termed 'logical' must be actually possible?"

I said: "No. This is, I believe, the fourth time we've been over this point. A logically possible action is any action that does not produce a contradiction when it's performed."

Quote:

Instance #5 (10/26/02 4:54pm):

You said: "While neither of these are actually possible, they are logically possible."

I said: "But 'to count to infinity' is a logically impossible action."

"I am not speaking of fabrication or craftsmanship."

Then "to fabricate something too heavy for its fabricator to lift" is a logically possible action that God can't perform.

Thomas Metcalf · 10-27-2002, 03:58 PM

I'm going to use "lpsoa" to abbreviate the much longer "logically possible state of affairs." "lisoa" is similar.

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"So, God can bring about the SOA in which Sam dies against Sam's will. Sam cannot do this; nor can he bring about the SOA in which God dies against His will... In the case of God causing Sam not to exist against Sam's will, there is no corollary state of affairs which Sam can bring about."

So only God can bring about the lpsoa "Sam dies against Sam's will," and only Sam can bring about the lpsoa "Sam dies in accordance with Sam's will." Now, Sam can't bring about "God dies against His will," but not because of a limitation in Sam's power per se, but rather, because of a logical limitation. It's true that there's a parallel action a' to Sam's action a, but one of them is logically impossible.

Another angle: What of the lpsoa "Sam kills himself," independent of will? Sam can't bring about the soa "God kills Himself," but that's not a lpsoa. If God can't bring about the lpsoa "Sam kills himself" (because it would really be God killing Sam) I think we've found a lpsoa that Sam can bring about that God can't. Is there a corrolary lpsoa that Sam can't bring about?

"My position does not require this; it only requires that if God lost the power to do some action, then it would still be true that there would be no beings more powerful than Him."

Now, even if God is able to perform an infinite number of actions, this still seems to suggest that if God "lost an ability" an infinite number of times, there would still be no beings more powerful than He.

"God always determines the correct course of action, and always takes it."

It seems to me that "to continue being morally perfect" is always a correct course of action. If this is so, then we can say that God will never perform an evil action in the actual world. Isn't this equivalent to saying that if God is ever morally perfect in the actual world, then at that point, He's morally perfect in all possible worlds?

Vanderzyden · 10-27-2002, 04:14 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
This is at least the sixth time in this thread you've made this mistake, not accurately representing what "logically possible action" means. There is a difference between an action that is "illogical" and a logically impossible action.

"When philosophers say 'logically possible,' they mean something very specific. If an action a is logically possible, that means it does not express a contradictiont to perform it."

Then why don't you use a definition that includes the terms "actually possible"? I have asked you this before and you did not answer. Please consider the following very carefully. The conditions described by these statements are logically possible:

"Unicorns can jump fences."

"Unicorns have horns."

There is nothing illogical about either of these statements. They are both coherent and conform to the rules of modern logic. Hypothetically, they are possible. Therefore, they are logically possible. However, neither of these are ACTUALLY POSSIBLE, since unicorns do not exist.

Another example: There are many mathematical concepts that are logical, but can never be actualized. We cannot empirically detect numbers. No one can count to infinity.

You see, Thomas, I am quite familiar with philosophy. But I am unaware of your equivocation of the terms "logical" and "actual". Please tell me from whom you have learned that it is proper to equate these terms with one another.

Now, if you prefer we can redefine your WO definition to be the following:

Weak omnipotence = the ability to perform anything that is actually possible

Please inform me if you don't find this acceptable, and why. You should realize that this does not affect my arguments at all, while you are forced to modify your position substantially.

John

[ October 27, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]

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10-26-2002, 04:13 PM	#213
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by Philip Osborne: "So even if there are states of affairs which Sam can bring about and God cannot, there will necessarily be corollary states of affairs which Sam cannot bring about and God can (i.e. If God can't cause Sam to freely do S, it is also true that Sam can't cause God to freely do S)." But there is a further soa, "Sam freely does S," which does not seem to have a counterpart in God's repertoire for a few values of S. Sam can't ever cause God freely to do S, but sometimes "God freely does S" is a logically impossible soa and therefore will not present a problem for Sam's omnipotence. Less often, "Sam freely does S" is a logically impossible soa. I think we can look at this in a different direction. Suppose God somehow lost the power to perform some action. Your position seems to me to require that God would still be just as powerful as He was before. Is that accurate? And if God somehow gained the ability to perform some action, again, He would be just as powerful but not more? "Moral perfection may simply be a matter of making moral judgements w/out error." What if the world were unfortunated enough to contain a being, Jerry, who made a correct moral judgment every time, but always decided to be immoral? That is, given any moral choice between p and q, Jerry would say correctly, "Well, the morally correct thing to do would be p," but would follow that with "So I will do q!" I do not think this being is morally perfect, but I have a feeling I may be reading your definition uncharitably. By "without error" do you mean God can always figure out what the morally correct course of action would be, or that He can figure it out and further, always takes it?

10-27-2002, 10:03 AM	#215
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	But there is a further soa, "Sam freely does S," which does not seem to have a counterpart in God's repertoire for a few values of S. Sam can't ever cause God freely to do S, but sometimes "God freely does S" is a logically impossible soa and therefore will not present a problem for Sam's omnipotence. Less often, "Sam freely does S" is a logically impossible SOA. The strongest line of argument this seems to suggest is that Sam can freely intend to do evil, whereas God cannot. For Sam freely intending to do evil, there is no corollary state of affairs which God can bring about, because God cannot freely intend to do evil (evil in the sense of not bringing about greater evil, but evil for the sake of evil). In this sense, you are correct. However, there is a similar counter-example in favor of God which may be just as damning. Sam is able to do any logically possible action; hence, Sam can commit suicide. That means that Sam can freely bring about the SOA in which Sam ceases to exist. This necessarily implies that the SOA "Sam ceases to exist" is possible. If it is possible, then it can be brought about by God. But if God brings it about, then obviously it is not in virtue of Sam's free will that it happens. So, God can bring about the SOA in which Sam dies against Sam's will. Sam cannot do this; nor can he bring about the SOA in which God dies against His will, since God, according to strong theistic tradition, has necessary existence (note that if we say that Sam exists necessarily, then Sam cannot commit suicide, and he is no longer a being that can do any logically possible action). In the case of God causing Sam not to exist against Sam's will, there is no corollary state of affairs which Sam can bring about. I think we can look at this in a different direction. Suppose God somehow lost the power to perform some action. Your position seems to me to require that God would still be just as powerful as He was before. Is that accurate? And if God somehow gained the ability to perform some action, again, He would be just as powerful but not more? My position does not require this; it only requires that if God lost the power to do some action, then it would still be true that there would be no beings more powerful than Him. This is not logically equivalent to saying that God would be just as powerful as before. What if the world were unfortunated enough to contain a being, Jerry, who made a correct moral judgment every time, but always decided to be immoral? That is, given any moral choice between p and q, Jerry would say correctly, "Well, the morally correct thing to do would be p," but would follow that with "So I will do q!" I do not think this being is morally perfect, but I have a feeling I may be reading your definition uncharitably. By "without error" do you mean God can always figure out what the morally correct course of action would be, or that He can figure it out and further, always takes it? God always determines the correct course of action, and always takes it. I take "judgement" to include both the judgement about some moral situation and the action taken on that situation. Sincerely, Philip

10-27-2002, 02:59 PM	#217
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by Vanderzyden: "1. No being can count to infinity." But "to count to infinity" is a logically impossible action. "2. No being can create something too heavy for it to lift." By your definition of creation, to create something to heavy for its creator to lift is a logically impossible action, because the creator of an object can always lift that object. "If a being cannot act on a particular ability, then it does not have power with respect to this ability." Right. God cannot act on the ability to learn, because God does not have the ability to learn. Therefore, He does not have that power. "If, somehow, new abilities are acquired by the hypothetical omnipotent being (which, I notice you provide no explanation of how this might be possible), there will be no corresponding increase in power if they do not collectively supersede the Great Power." I don't think that follows. They need not supersede the Great Power to produce an increase in power. If I have the power to destroy any of eight planets in the solar system, and I gain the power to destroy the ninth, I think I have gained in power, but the power to destroy Pluto in no way "supersedes" the power to destroy the first eight. "Abilities such as 'surprise' and 'delusion' are weaknesses." You used nouns in place of verbs. "To surprise oneself" and "to delude oneself" are indeed actions, but actions cannot be weaknesses. And I don't see how the ability to perform some action would be a weakness, ever, just the potential to make oneself weaker. "Tell me, what prevents you from abandoning this definition?" No one has yet shown it to be faulty.

10-27-2002, 03:58 PM	#219
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	I'm going to use "lpsoa" to abbreviate the much longer "logically possible state of affairs." "lisoa" is similar. Originally posted by Philip Osborne: "So, God can bring about the SOA in which Sam dies against Sam's will. Sam cannot do this; nor can he bring about the SOA in which God dies against His will... In the case of God causing Sam not to exist against Sam's will, there is no corollary state of affairs which Sam can bring about." So only God can bring about the lpsoa "Sam dies against Sam's will," and only Sam can bring about the lpsoa "Sam dies in accordance with Sam's will." Now, Sam can't bring about "God dies against His will," but not because of a limitation in Sam's power per se, but rather, because of a logical limitation. It's true that there's a parallel action a' to Sam's action a, but one of them is logically impossible. Another angle: What of the lpsoa "Sam kills himself," independent of will? Sam can't bring about the soa "God kills Himself," but that's not a lpsoa. If God can't bring about the lpsoa "Sam kills himself" (because it would really be God killing Sam) I think we've found a lpsoa that Sam can bring about that God can't. Is there a corrolary lpsoa that Sam can't bring about? "My position does not require this; it only requires that if God lost the power to do some action, then it would still be true that there would be no beings more powerful than Him." Now, even if God is able to perform an infinite number of actions, this still seems to suggest that if God "lost an ability" an infinite number of times, there would still be no beings more powerful than He. "God always determines the correct course of action, and always takes it." It seems to me that "to continue being morally perfect" is always a correct course of action. If this is so, then we can say that God will never perform an evil action in the actual world. Isn't this equivalent to saying that if God is ever morally perfect in the actual world, then at that point, He's morally perfect in all possible worlds?

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