John Page

You are assuming that "you" for the purposes of the discussion is equivalent to the "you" over a period of time. That you can count that there is one of you doesn't mean to say you are the same person - that's an assumption (the belief) on your part.

Not all sheep are the same, but similar enough that we can count the flock. It seems we are able to track instances of sheepishness over time so that we don't count an instance more than once per tally.

Cheers, John

mnkbdky

Again, here is my original assumption:

Assumption 1 (A1): All rational people believe that they remain the same person from the time they start reading this sentence to the time they finish. That is, the "you" that started this e-mail is the same "you" that finished it. "You" do not become Sue, Greg, Kat or Chuck. "You" are the same person throughout. Though "you" have obtained new info and may be in an altered state of emotion when "you" finish than when "you" began, "you" are still the same person as when "you" started.

Perhaps the qualifier "all" is too much. I could fix that by re-stating it as "some," which would look like this:

(A1') Some rational people believe that they remain the same person from the time they start reading this sentence to the time they finish.

Then what this argument would amount to is showing that if they believe this then they must also believe in the soul. But someone could just as easily argue

(A1steaksauce) Some rational people believe that they do not remain the same person from the time they start reading this to the time they finish.

Though, normally, we do think those who think they are different people to be a bit looney.

As to the false dichotomy. Their is no such thing as strinct identity. Identity is reflexive and transitive. Any change in something's essential qualities is radical change, it annihiliates the former thing.

X=Dave (a name given by social practice) at T1
Y=Dave (a name given by social practice) at T2
Z=Tom (a name given by social practice) at T1

If X exists at time T1 and goes out of existence and is replaced by Y at time T2 then Y is numerically different than X. If Z exists at time T1 and is not numerically identitical to X at time T1 then Z is numerically different than X.

It is a matter of logic, Y and Z are equally different to X.

tribalbeeyatch

Excuse me if it has already been pointed out, but that is not, in fact, true. Up until the most recent decade, it was thought that neurogenesis didn't occur in adult humans at all. That turned out not to be the case, but neither is it true that neurogenesis occurs at anything approaching the rate that would be necessary in order to effect a 7-year turnover. In fact, the majority of the central nervous system is likely unreplaced during a person's lifetime.

mnkbdky

I have always been confused on this point. I remembering being told that brains cells do not reproduce and also being told we are entirely different cells in 7 years. Obviously the two claims conflict. Then last year I was watching the new and was informed that brains cells, in fact, do reproduce, albeit very slowly. Thankfully, though, it is not necessary to the argument at hand.

Clutch

Good. You've basically capitulated, withdrawing under the cover of some weak and question-begging noises about how it would be "looney" to hold that selves change over time.

You are driven, finally, to a sophomoric equivocation between difference as a discrete notion, opposed to identity, and difference as a measure of similarity. Only a view that asserted the radical and short-term difference of selves in the latter sense would be implausible. In the former sense, difference is perfectly consistent with every first-person observation about selves over time: in particular, the intimate relation that later selves typically have to earlier selves (and especially to very recent ones). You lamely attempt to gloss this equivocation, but the result is genuine lunacy indeed:Now there's a dictionary-defying stunt.

ex-xian

-throwing in my two cents-

I have adamantly disagree with you first assumption. Not all rational people believe that they remain the same person from moment to moment. In fact, I would maintain that it is irrational to maintain that a person can exist in an isolated moment.

First, to draw from Hume, I have no conception of what "I" am. I have perceptions, of myself-hearing, seeing (but seeing is extra problematic, since I can never really see myself, only a reflection or replication), etc. If I attempt to isolate a particular moment and define who I am, I find myself at a loss to do so. If I attempt define another person in an isolated moment, I am equally impotent. Considering others, I have only the sum of my experinces with that person to draw upon. To comment that someone is not acting "like themself" implies that their current actions are out of character with the previous experiences of that person.

You quoted Heraclitus earlier "One can never step in the same river twice." I tend to hold with a disciple of Heraclitus', whose name escapes me, who said "One can never step in the same river once."

It seems to me that personhood can only be defined as the sum of the experiences of the person. And even that is circular. To maintain my conception of myself (whatever that may mean) has nothing to do with a soul. It has to do, instead, with a continuous, though non-uninteruppted, flow of experiences.

mnkbdky

If you look at my argument, it was to point out that those who believe they retain identity over time and are materialist are irrational. Furthermore, I bet you if you talked to someone on the street who kept denying that you had been talking with them but with someone else that looked like them, you would think he was a bit strange. The implication are large.


Sophmoric, hmmm. I guess many a great philosopher both western and eastern are sophmoric then. At least, though, they gave arguments for their positions. You, on the other hand, merely assert things with no argument what so ever. But maybe you don't know how to disagree without resorting to name calling. Well, have fun and maybe you should read your intro to metaphysics book again. A great one to start with is Michael Loux. Keith Yandell in his philosophy of religion also has a great discussion on identity. Alvin Plantinga's nature of necessity is excellent. Have fun doing your philosophy according to Webster's dictionary.

P.S., I will no longer respond to you until you give valid arguments for you points and clearly define your terms. Then, and only then, will I respond. I may not be satisified with them, but that is when the conversation starts.

mnkbdky

I find it interesting that you say you have no concept of "I" yet you continually use it to refer to something. Now, I have some questions for you; who has perceptions? who hears themself? who sees their reflection? I find it very easy to define who I am. I am that substance that endures through time having the experiences described above, among others. I am that substance who began to exist on 2/2/74--at least outside of the womb, I don't even want to think about my conception day. I am that substance that thinks. I am indentical to myself. I am the only substance that has ever replied to you at this particular time at my particular location. Your experiences can never be taken apart from you. What does it mean to say "pain" apart from something that experiences "pain?" Nothing. That is,

1) If there are experiences then there is by necessity something that has experiences

2) There are experiences

3) Therefore, there is by necessity something that has experiences


How is it that a continuous, and I guess interrupted, flow of experiences retains identity? You must supply arguments. You cannot merely assert things.

Michaelson

Go the arrogance! Someone have a bit of a superiority complex, do they?

Clearly materialists believe we have a mind, yes? And that this mind comes about as a result of the brain's mechanations? Correct me if I'm wrong. Now, I don't know where materialists would stand on this point, but clearly our thoughts (it would seem to me) are intangible... So we have a mind, with (capabilities, memories, ambitions...) that is produced as a result of our brain's functioning.

Can't identity still be located within the mind, which would still be held to be an intangible substance, even if it is entirely dependent on the body for continuity? And if that is the case, then where would your objection stand? I don't know of anyone who pretends that their personal identity is reliant on remaining physically identical to their previous self. But where you talk of the soul, they talk of the mind.

Help me out if I'm wrong here, I am actually doing an intro to metaphysics course (of sorts). I have no problem with being contradicted. Just go easy on the righteousness, yeah?

mnkbdky

I don't think I have a superiority complex, just read some of the things Clutch has said. I have fully admitted that I am not able to make sense out of it. If anything that makes me a moron, that is if he has actually said anything. If someone needs to go back to the basics then that is what they need to do. It says nothing about who is better than whom.

I will try to answer your other questions later, that is, if someone else has not already done it. But if you have the time you should check out Scott Sturgeon's Matters of Mind: Consciousness, reason and nature. Also J.P. Morland and Scott Rea give a great discussion as well in their book Body & Soul. However, they are Cartesian dualists couched in Aristotelian language. Don't let them fool you. You might want to look at Ric Machuga's book In Defense of the Soul. He gives very good arguments for an Aristotelian account of the soul. Ultimately, though, I find it unconvincing. You should also get Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a physical World and the book Physicalism and its Discontents ed. by Gillett and Loewer. One last book you might want to get is Kevin Corcoran's Soul, Body and Survival. This is an execellent compilation of essays by both dualists and materialists. Last one, I swear, you should also take a look at Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti's Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyaya Dualist Tradition. There are great arguments in this book against identity being retained in a continuous conscious stream, which is basically Buddhist.

Anyway, I hope to respond with something substantive soon.