Theli

What is greatest, continuity or finitude? And why?
What color would GPB have if it indeed had a color? Would a red GPB be greater than a blue one?
Both could not be equally great and at the same time be called GBP. And if one is greater than the other, then what does color have to do with greatness?

How big would this GPB be?

I think the whole idea of "greatest possible being" is horseshit, no personal offense to anyone who have used the term in their claims.

And how the hell would we know that this being really is the "greatest" it could possibly be?

xian

not at all. That is a non-sequitur. I have a nose because I am human. That does not mean I am human because I have a nose.

The GPB would be all-knowing, and it would know if it could conceive of a greater being than itself.

Mageth

not at all. That is a non-sequitur. I have a nose because I am human. That does not mean I am human because I have a nose.

When you stated "if the GPB is ignorant of its own position as the GPB, then it is not truly the greatest possible being", it sounded like you were implying that "to be the GPB, it would have to know it was the GPB", or even perhaps "a necessary property of the GPB is that it knows it's the GPB". A bit circular, is it not?

The GPB would be all-knowing,

That's nice as a definition, but how would the GPB know, and demonstrate, that it was all-knowing? "I am the GPB because I am all-knowing. Along with everything else, I know that I'm all-knowing. Otherwise, I wouldn't be the GPB". Another being logically could exist that was otherwise identical to the GPB, and thus knew everything else that the GPB knew except that it was all-knowing, but would not be the GPB because it did not likewise know that it was all-knowing. Things are getting kinda circular, and a bit absurd, around here.

This also implies that, as I stated before, the GPB would know that it was the GPB, and thus is the GPB because it knows it's the GPB, as a logically possible, otherwise identical being that didn't know it was the GPB would not be the GPB because it didn't know it was the GPB, even though it knew everything else that the GPB knew. Again, circular and absurd.

and it would know if it could conceive of a greater being than itself.

If it was all-knowing, it wouldn't have to "conceive of" anything, would it? There would be nothing left for it to conceive of. If there is something left for it to conceive of, then it's not all-knowing, and it's also not the GPB, both because it's not all-knowing and because it would be greater than itself when it conceived of something else!

And if it couldn't conceive of a greater being, or of anything else, would that be a limit on its omnipotence?

And if you're implying that the GPB would know it was the GPB because it couldn't conceive of another being greater than itself, this implies that there could logically be another being that was otherwise identical to the GPB but could conceive of another being greater than itself, but, absurdly, would not be the GPB!

So bottom line, you're left with the logical puzzle of it merely knowing that it was the GPB, but not being able to demonstrate to itself that it was the GPB. And the circular definition that it is the GPB because it knows it's the GPB, and knowing it's the GPB because it is the GPB.

What it can or cannot conceive of makes no difference, really. The GPB could not demonstrate, to itself or to us, that it was indeed the GPB.

The whole GPB concept reduces itself to an absurdity when you get right down to it.

xian

Perhaps it is circular, but not logically invalid. Its no different than saying "If the greatest possible being is not the greatest possible being, then its not truly the greatest possible being".


how would I know this? I am not all knowing so its hardly likely I am going to "know" how the GPB would know everything, all I am saying is that the concept of a GPB is not inherhently flawed. The only thing flawed is a human being able to know it. But like the uncertainty principle....lack of a human being able to know does not equate to logical fallacy.


listen to the being you just proposed:

"it did not likewise know that it was all-knowing"

....and you say this can logically exist?

I don't think so.

i see no absurdity at all.

however the claim that there could be an all-knowing being that doesn't know something does seem like an absurdity.

Mageth

how would I know this? I am not all knowing so its hardly likely I am going to "know" how the GPB would know everything, all I am saying is that the concept of a GPB is not inherhently flawed. The only thing flawed is being able to know it. But like the uncertainty principle....lack of being able to know does not equate to logical fallacy.

I claim the concept of the GPB is logically flawed because the GPB could not determine if it was the GPB, and thus could not know it was the GPB, and thus could not be the GPB. The only out you've provided for this is "well, it would know it was the GPB." That leads to the circular absurdity that it was only the GPB because it knew it was the GPB, and would know it was the GPB because it was the GPB.

listen to the being you just proposed:

"it did not likewise know that it was all-knowing"

....and you say this can logically exist?

I don't think so.

Why not? The wording's a bit clumsy, I admit, but it's identical to your definition of the GPB, it knows everything your definition of the GPB knows, except it does not know it's "all-knowing." Why cannot such a being logically exist, if the GPB can logically exist? Indeed, I think it's more logical that such a being can exist than the GPB, because I don't think you can logically demonstrate that a being could know it was the GPB.

To sound a little better, perhaps the above sentence could be reworded "it does not know that it knows everything there is to know outside of the fact that it knows everything there is to know." Or, better yet, "it knows everything except that it knows everything."

Let me put it this way. Suppose that everything there is to know is [a, b, c, d], where d is the knolwedge that [a, b, c] is the sum total of everything there is to know outside d. Then my being would know [a, b, c] but would not know [d]. How is that logically inconsistent?

i see no absurdity at all.

It's there.

however the claim that there could be an all-knowing being that doesn't know something does seem like an absurdity.

Fine, but I did not make that claim. I didn't define my theoretical being as "all-knowing". Indeed, I excluded a certain element of knowledge (that it knows it's all-knowing) from its knowledge base. Thus, it is not all-knowing, and does not match your definition of the GPB. It knows everything except that it knows everything.

Perhaps you were confused by the statement "but would not be the GPB because it did not likewise know that it was all-knowing." A bit confusing, I admit, and a problem with dealiing with absurdities such as this. But note I'm not claiming here that it is all-knowing, but that it doesn't know it's all-knowing, and thus is not all-knowing, even though, it knows everything there is to know except that it knows everything. And thus is excluded from being the GPB.

And you're still left with this absurdity:

And if you're implying that the GPB would know it was the GPB because it couldn't conceive of another being greater than itself, this implies that there could logically be another being that was otherwise identical to the GPB but could conceive of another being greater than itself, but, absurdly, would not be the GPB!

Grumpy

If the Greatest Possible Being could conceive of a being greater than itself...

...would it let anyone know about it?

Mageth

If the Greatest Possible Being could conceive of a being greater than itself...

...would it let anyone know about it?

Good question!

xian

but that is not my defnition. I am saying that I agree with you that a human being could not know it, but the GPB must certainly know it.

Lets assume your proposed being exists. He knows everything except whether or not he is all-knowing.

Your being will wonder, "is there something out there I do not know?"

Thus live in an eternal state of confusion. I propose that there is no logical problem with knowing that you know everything.

I can illustrate this in a limited fashion:

tic-tac-toe.

A human can learn all there is to know about this game to the point where he can certainly declare "I know everything about this game. There is nothing left for me to learn". And he can know this.

All existence for the GPB is so comprehendable, that it is even more simplistic than tic-tac-toe. It is simply a round peg and a round hole. The being is so comprehensive of all possible things to know, he just knows there is nothing left to learn.

Although I respect your arguments, I just fail to see why uncertainty is a logical necessity for knowing all there is to know about something. The uncertainty principle need to apply to the GPB.

because if the universe contained 3 particles....a b c....the being would know not only those 3 particles, but also know that there are no other particles to learn about.

HRG

The question has been answered: Yes - because of invariance under translations, aka conservation of momentum.

Which has exactly zero to do with your positive claim that all events are caused.

Regards,
HRG.

HRG

Not if they had agreed not to use their unlimited power against the other one.
Easy - if given any being, we can always conceive a greater one (and Cantor's Power Set Theorem suggests it), no GPB exists. Your statement sound like "I do not see how one GCNN (greatest conceivable natural number) could not exist.

What has this to do with the actual existence of a GPB ? The existence of leprechauns cannot be logically refuted either.

But as I said, several results in set theory speak against the existence of a GPB (IMHO, Set Theory 101 should be required for all philosophers, theologians etc.).

BTW, we still await your unambigous definition of "greater than", including a demonstration that it is a linear order (i.e. that for any A != B, either A>B or B>A).



Regards,
HRG.