Kharakov

The objective realities that language refers to can be completely different while language still conforms to logical patterns. Even if we both agree to call the color of the sky 'blue', how does either of us know that your 'blue' is my 'red' (qualia), or my 'blue' is the equivalent qualia of your 'smell of hot chocolate'?

My point is that we cannot communicate the fundamental objective qualities that we experience with symbols. I can describe sight to a blind man, but does he really know what I am talking about?

I think language has to refer to some kind of sensation, feeling, or perception outside of language itself in order for language to have a foundation other than authority (by authority I mean that we agree wrong fits into the english language according to certain rules, etc.).

Is this some moral 'sense' that you are refering too?

I try not to take anything for granted. You are defining morality as objective, so I would like to hear your definition of morality. If you give me a clear picture of what you think morality is (not the topic of discussion definition...) I will hopefully be able to understand your argument for objectivity.

Actually, they have the burden of proof to establish that what they claim is moral is not just a personal preference. Just because someone claims that an action is moral does not mean the action is moral. People have different opinions as to what is moral (and what morality is). That is why people say that morality is subjective. You call one thing morality, christians call another thing morality (1.2 billion people), over a billion islamic people define morality in yet another way. When you have been taught that morality is a certain thing since childhood, you tend to think that is what morality is. This ties back into the subjectivity of language- how every person interprets language based upon what they have been exposed too.

Kharakov

Cool, can you let me know how you decide whether or not something is moral? I might like your morality better than mine.

bd-from-kg

Helmling:

You say:

Now this idea is pretty common as you say, but it is logically incoherent. Let’s see what happens if we take it seriously.

According to this notion, John’s morality consists of his belief(s) about morality. the simplest interpretation of this is that John’s morality consists of his beliefs about the validity of various things thought by some to be moral principles. (Note: The argument here doesn’t apply only to this interpretation. It doesn’t really matter exactly what you mean by “beliefs about morality”; all versions of this idea have the same problem.) Thus John’s morality consists of beliefs of the sort:

P1 is a valid moral principle.
P2 is not a valid moral principle.
P3 is a valid moral principle.
etc.

But what sort of belief exactly are we are talking about when we say that John believes that P1 is a valid moral principle? Surely we aren’t referring to a belief that John has about his own moral beliefs! This would be transparently circular and thus meaningless. So the only possible interpretation is that it is a belief about whether P1 is really a valid moral principle. But this only makes sense if there is a fact of the matter – i.e., if it is objectively true that P1 is a valid moral principle (in which case John’s belief would be correct) or else objectively false that it is a valid moral principle (in which case his belief would be mistaken). And of course, to say that there is an objective fact of the matter regarding such things as whether something is or is not a valid moral principle is to say that there is an objective morality. But if there is an objective morality it is absurd to talk about “John’s morality”, just as it would be absurd to talk about “John’s arithmetic”, (consisting, say, of his beliefs about the correct sums of various finite sets of numbers). One would simply speak of morality, meaning the objectively correct answers to questions like whether P1 is a valid moral principle.

Please don’t misunderstand. I’m not saying that this shows that there is an objective morality. I’m saying that the position that a person’s morality consists of his beliefs about morality logically entails that there must be an objective morality. Now people who say that a person’s morality consists of his moral beliefs almost always mean to deny that there is such a thing as an objective morality, so it is rather ironic that this position actually logically entails that there is.

One more point. The fact that you didn’t notice this problem shows that in spite of your protestations to the contrary you still conceive of morality as something that it is possible to have meaningful opinions about. But from any standpoint other than moral objectivism, morality is not something that one can have meaningful opinions about. And you might want to ponder the fact that this entails that it is impossible for any two people to disagree about moral questions, since to disagree about a question means to have different opinions about it.

Vorkosigan

I’m saying that the position that a person’s morality consists of his beliefs about morality logically entails that there must be an objective morality. Now people who say that a person’s morality consists of his moral beliefs almost always mean to deny that there is such a thing as an objective morality, so it is rather ironic that this position actually logically entails that there is.

The contradiction here is not in the views of non-objective moralists, but in the way you've conflated two different uses of the term "objective morality." One is "extant in the real world in some way," the other is "absolutely binding on humans." It is the second definition, not the first, that non-objective moralists deny.

Vorkosigan

bd-from-kg

Vorkosigan:

I don't understand either of the things you call "different uses".

1. What does it mean to say that something is "extant in the world in some way"? I understand, of course, that the White House (for example) is extant in the world. But what about these things:

(a) The fact that there are more than two hundred million people living in the USA
(b) The fact that some people are color-blind
(c) The fact that this rectangular piece of paper I'm holding is "worth" twenty dollars
(d) The fact that I prefer strawberries to spinach

2. What does it mean to say that something is "absolutely binding"? For example, which of the following are absolutely binding:

(1)The fact that 2 + 2 = 4
(2)The fact that I'll die
(3)The fact that if I jump off a cliff I'll fall
(4)The legal prohibition on smoking marijuana
(5)The rule that I must follow suit if possible in bridge

Now let's consider the sort of thing that most people mean by "moral principles". For example, "You should keep your promises". What it means to say that this is objectively true is not that is it absolutely always wrong to break a promise, nor that it is absolutley certain that you will be severely punished for doing so (so that you have no "real" choice), but simply that it is an objective fact that it is generally wrong to break a promise regardless of whether you think so or not, and regardless of whether it would be to your advantage to break it. It's not clear whether this is what you mean by saying that moral principles are "absolutely binding".

In any case, I don't understand what you think I'm "conflating". You can only talk about having a "belief" about a question if you think that there is a fact of the matter; otherwise there is nothing to have a belief about. That is to say, if you say "I believe that X" you are saying that you believe that X expresses a proposition, and that this proposition is true. This is a simple matter of logic; of what it means to believe something. You wouldn't say, for example, "I believe that 'Close the door'", or "I believe that 'Strawberry milkshakes - hooray!'". (These examples, of course, correspond to imperative and noncognitive moral theories.)

Now suppose that someone were to say, "When I say that strawberries taste better than spinach, I mean that I believe that strawberries taste better than spinach". Now if he had simply said "Strawberries taste better than spinach", we would have understood him to be simply expressing a preference for strawberries over spinach. But the only reasonable interpretation of his saying that he means that he believes that strawberries taste better than spinach is that he believes that there is a fact of the matter - that it is either objectively true regardless of what anyone thinks that strawberries taste better than spinach, or that it is objectively false - and that he personally believes that that it is objectively true. I simply do not see any other reasonable way to construe statements about what someone believes.

Finally, I am not claiming that there is a contradiction in the positions of "non-objective moralists" in general, but only that the position that morality is a matter of personal belief is self-contradictory. For a non-objectivist it just doesn't makes sense to talk about moral beliefs. He can talk about moral feelings, or moral attitudes, or a moral stance, but he cannot talk about moral beliefs. You cannot say that there is nothing that a moral belief could be about and still talk meaningfully about moral beliefs.

[ October 28, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

Primal

False analogy. This is because morals are an evaluative response, an emotional one often acted on and not merely a descriptive. In understanding emotions and behaviors like, why do people get angry about X? or why do people take pleasure in X? Evolutionary explanations become much more relevant then they are for discussions of what is truth. And such emotional explanations for morality go along better with raw feel and are the only basis for any real justification.

There is clearly more to it then reasoning and conceptions, it is more then an epistemic problem. Backstabbing, something many see as immoral is not a stance taken on ignorance or being illogical, there is no argument to refute like there is in a case of helio vs geo-centrism. This is a case of behaviors and different emotional mechanisms.

You seem to be confusing ultimate with proximate explanations. Ultimately for example truth telling-honesty, has been seen as moral because of the benefits it yielded to our ancestors. But why should individual X follow it? Well for me, I'd say that because my emotional mechanisms have been wired that way. I find it emotionally fullfilling to be honest in most cases. Why do I find it fullfilling? Because my mechanisms have been set that way by genes and conditioning, which in turn were set by evolution. Now, even if that's true, might there be exceptions? Of course, i.e. sociopaths. Just as there are ppl born who are color blind. Now how do you get sociopaths to develope a moral sense like you or I? You can't, anymore then you can make a person who is color blind see colors. To ask then, why should I be moral if I lack the mechanisms? Is like asking....why should I see colors if I lack the mechanisms?

Maybe you could show that other things a sociopath values like self-preservation and happiness are better achieved in a moral society by moral means because immoral activity is punished. But you can't instill a moral sense in them.

Hence evolution may not tell me the proximate/personal reasons why I should tell the truth, they probably will not convince you that truth-telling is "good" but if you already have personal/emotional reasons for telling the truth, evolution can elaborate on that and tell you of its origins.


To make an analogy, lets use sex. People have fun during sex, it seems hardly appropriate to ask, why should I have sex? But lets say someone does not enjoy sex for whatever reason. Now an evolutionary explanation will not tell that person why he or she will have sex but why others do. In fact evolution will have a lot to say about it as an ultimate explanation. But ask me why I have sex personally and I wouldn't say "cause evolution did X" but "because it's fun". Now why is sex fun? That's where evolution comes in. And it says a lot. It says that sex is not liked because it is a fiction, that it's not something totally learned due to biological precusors and that hence trying to live a life of chastity will likely just cause suffering. Evolution also justifies the act by telling us about ourselves, that we normally find sex to our liking and hence laws against consentual sex to our disliking. And that this situation is very strong and unlikely to change.

Same with morality, at a proximate/personal level evolution says very little. At an ultimate level, it says a lot.



Why can't a priori knowledge be seen as physical or descriptions of a physical world?

Also it seems you are making a straw man by equating physical morality to a "moral particle", scientists don't search for a "life" or "evolution" particle either, does that mean such things are not physical?

It seems to me, and correct me if I'm mistaken, that you consider 'a priori' knowledge to be nonphysical but empirical knowledge to be physical, I see no basis for this though.

Even if you see morals as a priori, they would still thus be physical.


The distinction between "universal" and "universalizable" was actually pretty weak and meaningless. Please provide a better one.

Basically universalizable so far means a rule is applied consistently with itself. OK, so what? Still results oriented.

Basically yeah. All of them at some level apeal to teleological mechanisms.

Ok this is the deal, Kant beleived that lying under any circumstance was immoral. For example, if an axe wielding maniac asked Kant where his mother was, Kant says "two wrong don't make a right" and hence lying in retaliation to save one's mom would be wrong. Kant made no exceptions for his morals but arbitrarily puts in government "retaliation".

I agree though, that retaliation is the basis for justice, but for very different reasons then Kant.


Actually I see no distinction. In any case, Kant is saying the end result is irrelevant, as are the characteristics of the actors. It is in no way dependent on material factors and hence is immaterial.



That's funny because I actually quoted Kant on that. You have yet to back up the assertion that Kant was not theistic with anything solid.

<a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/k/kantmeta.htm#Kant's%20Copernican%20Revolution:%20M ind%20Making%20Nature" target="_blank">http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/k/kantmeta.htm#Kant's%20Copernican%20Revolution:%20M ind%20Making%20Nature</a>

False dillema and non sequitur. For one Kant brings up God a lot but not all the time. To suppose that for Kant to be a theist, he has to bring up God all over his book is ridiculous. Kant does bring up God though and condemns atheism.

Also Kant may be a deist, in which case he wouldn't bring up the Bible. Or he may see Biblical references as inapropriate, remember that Kant thought God justified reason, not that reason justified God. Biblical proof would be reason establishing theism.

Actually God is mentioned in the book about 50 times. <a href="http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/" target="_blank">http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/</a>

So yes Kant does mention God and even condemns atheism in the preface. Thus your idea that I "if Kant is a theist he must be a bible thumping fundy" is wrong.



Yes.


Actually I did present his views fairly. And the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy will agree.

<a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/k/kantmeta.htm#The%20Good%20Will" target="_blank">http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/k/kantmeta.htm#The%20Good%20Will</a>

Primal

Also Longbow you seem to be saying morals are objective and exist, but not physical. But then deny that immaterial entities exist. That makes absolutely zero sense. Either morals exist as immaterial things then, exist as material things or do not exist at all.

Primal

Well according to you they must be.

Abstractions of what? Math can be reduced to quantitative relationships, morals to behavior which are both physical. I'm starting to think you are a cryptodualist.

Fred Flintstonensis

To longbow

For the third time you have misunderstood and/or misrepresented what I have said and gratutitously insulted me based on your misunderstanding of my position. Talk about being a belligerent idiot. If I thought the things you say I think, you would be justified in calling me an idiot, but since I don't...

Don't presume to tell me what I will 'come to learn in life', I am probably older than you and absolutely more mature.

I hate to post this, knowing it will result in another insulting comment from you (I presume you will have a need to get the last word in, like a recalcitrant child), but that is fine. I will not respond to it--might not even read it.

[ October 30, 2002: Message edited by: Fred Flintstonensis ]</p>

Helmling

to bd-from-kg:


[But what sort of belief exactly are we are talking about when we say that John believes that P1 is a valid moral principle? Surely we aren’t referring to a belief that John has about his own moral beliefs!]

And why not? I see absolutely no problem with John having a belief that references his own beliefs. That’s certainly the case for myself or other moral relativists/subjectivists. However, many people think that their beliefs do correlate with some objective morality. I’ve already indicated that I believe the origin of John’s beliefs is external—a combination of culture and instinct. If I was claiming these beliefs were the product of a rational process and were somehow objectively true, then I can see how your criticism would be valid. But since I am saying the opposite, your remarks do nothing to subtract from my position.

All this assumes that John himself believes in an objective basis for morality. Obviously, for me to speak of a moral principle as being "valid" after having claimed that there can be no objective basis for morality would be absurd.

[One would simply speak of morality, meaning the objectively correct answers to questions like whether P1 is a valid moral principle.]

And the question I ask is where could such “objectively correct” answers come from? What in the nature of reality could dictate ONE correct morality?

[Now people who say that a person’s morality consists of his moral beliefs almost always mean to deny that there is such a thing as an objective morality, so it is rather ironic that this position actually logically entails that there is.]

I’m afraid I don’t agree. It is only people who believe in an objective morality, or an objective truth in a broader sense who cannot grasp the lack of contradiction for those of us who do not. You say that the statement entails the existence of an objective morality, I say it is only your assumption of such that leads you to believe that it entails such a thing. You accuse me of “not noticing” the problem. I find that amusing, since from my point of view, it is you who cannot perceive the problem in your own thinking. It’s all a matter of perspective. That’s a given to someone with my philosophical slant, but it drives objectivists nuts.

Is it possible to have meaningful opinions about morality? Of course it is. But that meaning is entirely subjective. It cannot be proven or justified through reason or evidence. It can only be disseminated through persuasion, force or sheer will--as cultural beliefs have always spread. Humans are meaning factories. We stitch it together from the fabric of our lives. Rarely do we assemble it systematically through logic and reason. The business of making meaning is art, not science.