madmax2976

<strong> I'm a little confused about what is being argued here.

That our sense perceptions are generally reliable is an axiom that most people hold to. As an axiom, we do not justify it. We hold it as self-evident. We hold that our senses allow us to obtain knowledge about the world. This is not to say this is an "absolute" truth since we could just be brains in vats being fed electrical stimuli.

If someone doesn't hold to the axiom that our senses give us knowledge about the world, thats fine. I suspect such individuals live as though they do anyhow.

I don't know how presuppers would ever show that knowledge without a deity is impossible to obtain. That seems impossible itself.
Certainly they can claim it, but thats hardly impressive.

D. Lundberg

We have a nice self-referential statement here - "If God does not exist, then no knowledge exists".

How can a person know the truth of that statement?

1. If the truth of that statement can be known without God, then the statement is paradoxal (by contradiction).

2. If the truth of the statement requires the existence of God to be known, then it is circular.

But by arguing for the truth of that assertion the presupper assumes that it is false, and thus contradicts himself.

There is only one way the presupper can hold that assertion to be true and remain consistent, and that is by adopting it as an ontological axiom. And if he does that there is really no point in arguing about it. At least not with people who don't share his metaphysical system.

[Daniel]

[ June 11, 2002: Message edited by: D. Lundberg ]</p>

Vorkosigan

I ask "When we observe the world we see that causes have no resemblance to the effects. The difference between say a THUD and the basketball bouncing off a wall is striking. Now if our sense perceptions are caused by the world around us what *reason* do we have for thinking they bere any resemblance to that which is?"

This is a massive "so what?" You already give the answer below....

2) You respond Evolution.

3) I ask "If we use our sense perception to learn of evolution and we see that causes are nothing like their effects (our perceptions) what reason do you have for thinking that our perception about Evolution bere's any resemblanceto the actual data?"

"causes are nothing like effects" -- why would you expect causes to resemble effects!

What reasons? Many.....

1) Our perceptions are reliable. Things recur in ways we expect them to. Things are where we expect them to be.

2) They are predictable. Using our senses, we can make predictions which are verified by later experience.

3) We can use data from our senses to manipulate the world. The world respnds in ways that are predictable and understandable. Manipulation is the crown jewel in the “effectiveness” claim.

In short, our experience of the world is robust and four dimensional.

1) Reliablity and repeatablility.

Reliablity. A) Reliable how? If reliable does not mean *corresponds to that which is* then we have *not* got knowledge of the world. If you claim it does correspond to that which is you're going to have to come across the word accurate at some stage and you're going to have to answer the question below.

Nope. I don't live in your perfect platonic reality. You've never answered the question of what accuracy means. Accuracy is always relative to a standard. What standard are you proposing? None that I can see.

My senses are accurate for what they are evolved to do. "Reliable" can correspond to *that which is* easily -- because *that which is* is experienced differently by every animal. I experience a boat differently than a shark, which detects its magnetic field. The shark and I both have effective and accurate (relative to our senses) experiences of the boat. These experiences enable us to conduct ourselves in the ways we need to conduct ourselves; the shark to find prey and me to catch fish. Whose experience is more "accurate?" This is what -- the fourth time I've asked this?

This is the point in question. Simply saying they are reliable does not answer the question above.

Well, if they are not "reliable" you must explain why my experience of the world is consistent both with my memories and the experiences of others as they report them to me. Further, how is it that my unreliable senses enable me to effectively manipulate the world?

Repeatability doesn't help us. To use an analogy, if the ball is 'that which is' and the THUD is the effect and I bounce a ball of the wall the THUD will continue THUDing, time after time. Therefore that is no reason for thinking your perceptions about evolution bere any resemblance to the actual data or that "which is" because you continue to have the same perceptions.

The ball is an excellent example. Anybody but a presuppositionist concludes that the sense is reliable. First, the THUD happens every time our eyes percieve the ball striking the wall (our senses back each other up; my hand on the wall feels the vibration of the ball; other people report the ball hitting the wall and the THUD, my dog’s ears perk up at the noise, he comes to investigate and chases the ball). Not only does the THUD occur predictably, I can stop the THUD by stopping the ball. I can start the THUD by throwing the ball. If our senses are not effectively reporting what is going on, why is the experience consistent? How is it I can manipulate the world to stop and start the THUD if my senses are not accurate and reliable relative to that activity?

There is no *that which is* out there. There is a collection of atoms that is experienced differently by all percievers, people, dogs, amoebas, cockroaches. Whose experience of the ball is the right one? How is it that the ball has color, if atoms have no color?


2) Intersubjectivity. Because other's have the same perceptions as us is no reason for thinking that our sense perceptions are an exception to the rule of cause and effect which we observe.[/b]

What "rule of cause and effect?" That effects are not like causes? No kidding. Why would we expect them to be?

Actually i wrote more then that. I said we are also interested in what we can know. And just for the record if one cannot justify their beliefs wether it be in God or the reliablity of their senses then what have they got? Knowledge? An irrational belief? Justify *does* mean a lot in confirming the rationality of one's position. And the numerous books on this subject confirm the incorrectness of this. Why write a book on why Evolution shows us why we know stuff if we don't need to justify knowledge?

Yes, Plump, I know this. But you are the one arguing that in fact the perceptions of others are worthless. Here's what you wrote above:

• Because other's have the same perceptions as us is no reason for thinking that our sense perceptions are an exception to the rule of cause and effect which we observe

So you’re the one in the quandary here. I must justify to others if I wish to change their minds. But you don’t have to – you don’t even need others, because your ability to perceive comes directly from god. That is why I am wondering why you keep talking about justification. You don’t need it.

Well if we're going to start arguing in gnereralities i'd argue a large amount of theists reject it because they don't even understand it. From your assertion here i'm guessing most atheists probably don't really understand what's being argued either. And all this talk about evidence and trickster God's *completely* misses the point of this argument.

Nonsense. The trickster god is a major problem for theists. How do know your deity isn’t playing tricks on you? Your deity is omnimax. There’s no way to ever discover whether it is playing tricks or not.

Now, i'm not claiming to be a "presupper guru" but i think i do know what the presupper argument is actually trying to show. As i write below, think of it as a logic disjunct. It's actually very simple. The presupper argues that If God does not exist then no knowledge exists therefore if knowledge then God.

The presupper doesn’t argue this. The presupper asserts this. In my time here I have never seen a presupper actually make an argument that reason depends on god; mostly think if they show reason cannot be explained naturalistically, then they’ve made their case. Not hardly. For reason could depend on Krishna, the cosmic consciousness, etc……

That's it. Now if the presupper can show that knowledge without God is impossible there's only 1 option left Vork. So all this talk about trickster God's and so forth misses the point. If God is a trickster, then there is no knowledge. If you want evidence, you need knowledge first. But if the argument works then whenever you say you know sometihng you require God first. That's what the presupper is trying to show. By proving the impossiblity of the contrary you're left with only 1 option.

Um, no. As I said, there are many non-naturalistic arguments that could suffice. Your argument depends on a fallacy of the excluded middle.

So if the argument is succesful you're left with. 1) God and Knowledge or 2) Not God/Trickster God's/whatever else you want to put in here and *no* knowledge.

How about the truth: Knowledge. No god.

And this whole point misses the presupper argument (again) which i have already stated. Think of it like a logic disjunct. The argument tries to show the impossiblity of the contrary. If you can scratch the leg of the disjunct that says knowledge cant exist without God your left with God. It's as simple as that. To say there is no argument invovled is just plain old false.

No argument is involved. It is a false dichotomy.

I never said they WERE "accurate?" There isn't any such thing as "accurate." I can't sense electromagnetic fields, a shark can. Whose senses are more "accurate?" Your notion of accuracy is absurd and meaningless. There is no "accurate" world out there.

Plump: What does that even mean? Are you suggesting there is no objective reality?

What I am saying is “accuracy” is a value. All life forms experience “objective reality” differently. Whose experience is the most accurate?

If you're not denying the existence of an objective reality then if you or i claim we know something about "that which is" we're going to have to justify that our senses are actually telling us about that which is.

Already done. See reasons given above. You seem to think that “causes don’t resemble effects” is an argument. It is only a description of reality. What evidence do you have that our senses are not built to take that into account?

That means we're going to have to come across the word accurate at some stage in our justification. If our senses and reason are not accurate in describing 'that which is' then what have we got? We certainly have *not* got knowledge about this objective reality, whatever that is.

We have knowledge about reality. Suitable for us. We have effective knowledge. Sharks have other kinds of knowledge. Whose is the most accurate?

So? If a Dog claims he know's something about the world we can hear his justification for that. It doesn't matter wether they have different pictures of reality, the question is "Do our senses and reason give us a reliable picture of reality?" If you say they do then you're going to have to come across the word accurate at some stage. If you say our senses are not accurate and that such word's are meaningless we have *not* got knowledge about the way things are.

Before we can move this discussion forward, I need to know which set of senses provides the most “accurate” picture of reality.

If logic is a convention, it is no more binding then any other convention. You don't like it, well hey, just reject it. You don't like people who wear their hats backwards, well don't wear it? You don't like this silly either/or logic of the westerners, hey just embrace some of that 'contradictions' can co-exist nicely logic of the Hindu's. If you claim that a theist is irrational for his or her belief in God, hey.. so what. They just use a different kind of logic to you. If i claim you're being illogical or you're contradicting yourself, so what. You don't accept my particular brand of logic any more then you embrace the Muslim notion of a male dominated society. So claiming someone is illogical doesn't actually mean very much if logic is a convention.

That’s right. Welcome to the world, Plump. Tools are only effective for the purposes they are constructed for. No one tool solves all problems. In human society we use agreed-upon conventions to convey ideas. Sometimes people abuse them, as in “People’s Republic of China” or “rational deistic belief.” Nothing we can do except show that the word usage won’t fit the conventional accepted meaning.

*So what?* Look... it seems to me from this response that you don't really know what Hume's skepticism was. It has not been answered. Evolution doesn't answer it either. Just because someone is born with a particular *whatever* does not confirm or deny the ontological status of causality.

Who cares whether it is confirmed or denied in the platonic sense you demand? The question is whether reality behaves in a way that makes it useful for an organism to have a sense of causality. The answer to that is “yes.” My understanding is that physicists have other senses of causality. The world reveals itself in different ways to different viewpoints. Which one is the most accurate?

…am i? I exist yet i don't even know what the I in "I" means. In otherwords i cannot justify a meaningful belief in myself... because i don't even know what i am.

I simply meant that I do not know how the mind goes about constructing the self-evident sense of self we all have.

All i see is someone who can't give an adequete answer to a very simple question. How do you know about Evolution? You can have all the feedback loops you like however if you decide at any stage you're going to use your sense percetion to claim you *know* something about Evolution and use that as a justification for your belief in the reliability of your senses about *that which is* you're going to have to answer that question.

All I see is someone who can’t accept a very adequate answer for a meaningless question whose terms he himself cannot define.

Sense perceptions only occur in networks of other sense perceptions, built-in theories of the way the world works, other people’s sense perceptions, other organism’s sense perceptions, learned behaviors and knowledge, and other cognitive devices and experiences. These together form a robust system for interacting with and understanding the world. In your view, and in Hume’s, you see to think sense perceptions can be ripped out of that network and tossed in the air for explanation. How? The senses are not foundational to the rest; they are merely one aspect of it. The foundational aspects are the hardware and software, the sense organs and mind devices that enable processing of sense perception to go on. Hume’s theory of the mind (and yours) was false. Therefore his discussion, while foundational and still interesting, is based on false premises.

Your question has been answered, more than adequately. We suspend the question of our senses. We then find that our senses work when we go out to discover how that can be. Armed with the new knowledge, we can exit your false circle. Not only can we note that our senses give us knowledge that enables us to rely on, predict and manipulate the world, we can also say why. We have a complete, robust naturalistic explanation for the effectiveness of human sense perceptions. It because they exist in internal and external networks of perception that allow us to incorporate knowledge from different types of senses, as well as the senses of other organism, into innate processing mechanisms evolved to produce certain outcomes effective for our further survival and reproduction, like all other organisms.

In your next post, I want you to show me how the Canaanite sky god Ya of the Christians, and only the Canaanite sky god Ya, and not some other god, chi, cosmic consciousness, psychic power or naturalistic reason can account for the reliability of human sense perception. In other words, I want you to make a [I]positive argument[I] that does not rely on bashing naturalism with false understandings of how the mind works.
I strongly suspect, however, that you, like every other presupper, are incapable of making a positive argument that (1) pins the deed on your god (2) rules out all non-naturalistic systems (3) rules out naturalistic views. So far I see presuppers focusing only on (3), and doing very poorly there, to boot.

Vorkosigan

Jack the Bodiless

Plump:
I'm surprised that you have not yet spotted the double standard here. Just try substituting "the reliability of perception and reason" for "God" (I think we've heard enough thudding basketballs, thank you: "perception and reason" are quite capable of deducing the cause of the thud).
For the umpteenth time: we do not NEED to "justify" an axiom. The fact that we CAN justify it is an added bonus to the integrity of our worldview, but is NOT essential. People were using their senses and reason long before evolution was discovered or God was invented!

demrald

Though this thread has piqued my interest, I must admit I did not read every single post before making this post, and I will pre-emptively apologize if I say something that has already been said by someone else here.

While most, if not all, of what I've seen here is a philosophical approach from the analytic tradition, which I certainly consider myself to be an inheritor of, my knowledge of some particular aspects of other religions has led me to the discovery of other presuppositional schools of thought within some of these other religions.

My familiarity with presuppositionalism is primarly via Reformed epistemology, and I find that a reductio ad absurdum from another presuppositional religious viewpoints (Buddhism works especially well, though Hinduism and Islam can be fun, too) is incontravertible without the presuppositionalist denying the epistemic validity of presuppositionalism or admitting that they are as justified in their beliefs as adherents of other religions.

That is, assuming presuppositionalism isn't presupposed to be true by matter of meta-presuppositionalism.

[ August 29, 2002: Message edited by: demrald ]</p>

Entropical Paradise

I may be equivocating the term God here, but if we presume that the Christian God represents "thinking properly" or the convictions of one's beliefs (or whatever provides us to believe whatever it is we believe in the moment), which both theists and atheists have, then many of the problems relating to the existence of God and the inconsistencies of the bible seem to fade into irrelevance. All that we are left with is the problem of whether to hold firm to one's beliefs or not. Isn't this something we must all do? Do theists never change their beliefs about anything? Do atheists never cling to false beliefs?

This seems to me to be the main fence over which theists and atheists hurl arguments at each other.

I would presume tolerance of each others' beliefs would be an ideal both parties advocate.

NialScorva

Welcome to the forums. Always nice to have another person who's into philosophy.

We had a presuppositionalist here about a year ago by the name of Jim Mitchell. You might find some of the threads in the Existence of God archives by searching for his name, and there was a formal debate between him and Bill in the formal debates forum. Might be worth a read if you want to see the history of us figuring out exactly what you said (after much grief) and the many ways we tried to explain it to him.

wade-w

Hmmmm... I just read the first few posts, and then skimmed some of the middle, and now the last few. I am unfamiliar with presuppositionalism, but it seems to me that the very name gives the game away. Unless I have completely misunderstood what everyone is saying here, it should be called Beggingthequestionism.

"Reason is the greatest enemy that faith has..."
--Martin Luther

demrald

wadew
I think you may be correct: the presuppositionalist, to me, appears to be assuming the existence of God in a convoluted modal argument for God's existence. My reason for thinking this is that they claim God is necessary for reason to work, but this, of course, only follows if God is "logically possible" (the terminology of the argument). Certainly, if God exists, as defined by most Chrisitans, God is also necessary. But why should we believe God exists?

Until the presuppositionalist can demonstrate that God is logically possible (requiring a deductive proof), however, their claim that God is necessary for anything is unsubstantiated.