Sojourner553

Hi Hugo. Yes I am still on...


Perhaps, but the matter is not so clear cut as you would have it. Brahé reviewed the evidence that Galileo provided which did not and could not include the telescopic data until the latter could provide a reasonable theory of optics.

What evidence was there before 1601 when Brahe died??????

Here are my details.


*1604: a spectacular nova had exploded in the constellation of Serpentarius. Galileo had argued privately to friends that this event refuted the doctrine of the incorruptibility of the heavens.
* 1609, Galileo heard about the recent invention of the telescope, and promptly built one himself that had a magnification of 32 times.
*1610: Galileo published the SIDEREUS NUNCIUS in Venice. In it, he described how he saw that the surface of the moon appeared rugged and uneven--instead of being perfectly smooth as contemplated by the philosophers. Another discovery that Jupiter had four moons, proved that there were SOME bodies that did NOT revolve around the earth.

ie all of Galileo's major efforts and proofs were AFTER Brahe had died in 1601.



As it turned out, by the time he had done so the Copernican theory had already won the day on both philosophical and scientific grounds; i.e. the telescope only contributed after the fact. Hence, your point is moot.

Are you now saying contemporaries of Galileo were for the heliocentric theory?? Does this not goes against your original premise that the Orthodox opinion was for geocentrism?

If the Copernican theory had already "won the day" why was Cardinal Bellarmine against it??

Sojourner

Sojourner553

per Bede:
Sojourner,

On a historical note, the victims were handed over to secular authorites for capital punishment so this wasn't on the cost ledger of the inquisition. Also, as excummunication was condsidered more severe in would have been unjust to give out this punishment more often simply on the grounds of procedual convenience

But this was still a "cost" --whether born by a secular or religious body is not so significant. Afterall, during these times both often worked hand in hand according to sources I have read. There were also some priests present during the torture sessions and resulting "confessions", I have read.

The real issue is this: You seem to imply the Inquisition purposely chose torture/imprisonment/execution over excommunication as it was the more "humane punishment" of the two.

Then why is it that excommunication WAS employed to punish strong secular kings and noblemen during the 11th century who might step out of line with Church doctrines and pronouncements?

If the Church could use it for powerful noblemen/kings-- why not common people??

Perhaps excommunication really was not that powerful a deterrent is the other possibility....


Got some sources for your position (if I stated it correctly of course)? I find this most fascinating.



). Luckily, I move universities next term and know that I can expect world class seminars on these very questions

Where you moving to, if you don't mind me asking? Good luck as always...

Sojourner

Bede

Hi Sojourner,

Well the church excommunicated kings and interdicted countries because that was all it could do. As they couldn't get their hands on Elizabeth I to imprison her, excommunication was the only deal in down. A good book on this would be Edward Peter's Inquisition which is quite cheap. BTW, did you read Levack's book on witches? What did you think?

BTW, torture per se was never used as a punishment by the church. Imprisonment was quite common and certainly considered more humane than damning someone's soul for eternity.

Yours

Bede

Bede's Library - faith and reason

Sojourner553

To Bede,

per Bede:
If you are interested, i could explain why the truth is probably not out there (assuming that the statement itself is not simply meaningless) and how correspondence with such was dropped from the philosophy of science (and hence the context of justification and demarcation difficulties - very much the issues here) a long time ago


Well, you are partly right about my position. I think the truth “can” be knowable (if not now then in the future). The KEY difference is that I do not think the truth ON EVERY POSITION will always be “knowable” by the majority of Orthodox opinion. (This may be due to human bias AND/OR limitations in our scientific capabilities to observe/measure/analyze)!!!

To put this another way, on a number of scientific topics, I would predict the “minority” opinion would have the correct position on a number of issues.

If I thought the truth was easily discernable by the majority, I WOULD be far more sympathetic to Hugo’s position – ie for less freedom viz-a-viz the Orthodox position(s).


To Hugo:

Getting down to the bare essence, I see the following as the two issues to be resolved:

(1) How to keep new absurd ideas from detracting from mainstream science?
(2) How to allow for the discussion of new ideas which may eventually modify, illuminate, or even overturn mainstream science?

One extreme position is to focus on item (1) to the exclusion of item (2) and permit only Orthodox opinions to even be discussed and taught.

Both the Galileo Trial and Lysenkoism are often heralded as examples of what can happen when Authorities have the power to try and stifle all opposing views. (ie the Extreme View of (1) )


The other extreme position is just its reverse –ie, focusing only on item (2) to the exclusion of item (1) and permitting a “circus” styled forum where anything goes for science.

Especially because there are so many lunatic ideas out there (science AND religious AND political): Bede is correct to state that it will only be a minority of times that a new idea is better than the orthodox position (no matter how wrong the orthodox position is to begin with.)

The Middle Road to Resolve #1 and #2


One main reason why Albert Einstein is so popular is he, likewise, is seen as an example of an individual who bucked conventional scientific thinking. There were clearly no religious bodies involved here though! On the other hand there was also no Authority to try and silence his views.

Still it was important for Einstein's MINORITY opinion to be expressed and taught.

Einstein and Galileo's examples (there are many others) demonstrate why the best approach to RECONCILE, or resolve the two opposing options of scientific debate is thus:

to allow an Orthodox body (be it religious, scientific, political) to brand an opinion as the “official” position, while still allowing the minority position the freedom to express their views and teach it. The minority view is not allowed to brand itself as the “official scientific” theory or position, yet is free to express their “minority” opinion and try to gather evidence to eventually sway the majority opinion to their side.

Let me apply this to a case-- one we all agree is extreme – to Creationism:

Creationism may not be labeled as “scientific” as it has (of this date) failed to pass the Orthodox scientific bodies rules for this.

Still, Creationists are allowed to express their views. They are free to gather what they consider to be “scientific” evidence for their views, and as such be published in scientific publications when they pass its criteria. (As one example: I saw an article in DISCOVER a number of years ago, how a Creationist was trying to prove there was enough water in the fissures of the earth to account for the “missing” volume of the Flood waters.)

Still, it is Scientific Orthodox bodies that can determine whether or not Creationism is properly labeled as a “scientific” theory and as such taught in the SCIENCE class rooms. I have heard of no objections (at least in the US) to teaching Creationism in a RELIGIOUS course setting.

To repeat, the relevence of the Trial of Galileo is in regards to freedom, not religion. The only attack that can be made against the Catholic Church – is that during THIS period of time, the Catholic Church did oppose individual freedom to freely express his/her intellectual idea(s), WHERE THIS conflicted with Orthodoxy. The majority of these conflicts with individuals were purely religious/political in nature. But early scientific ideas could also clash with religious ideas on the nature of the world/universe, and therefore be deemed heretical.

Of course --The Catholic Church had every right to brand Galileo’s heliocentric views as unorthodox, and against Catholic Church dogma. I would also argue they had the right to excommunicate Galileo.

The issue most people (including most Catholics) today have with the Trial of Galileo is the MEANS the Church took to silence Galileo. What means? the threat to Galileo with the ordeals meaning torture of the Inquisition if he did not recant publicly. [Note: The mild punishment you highlighted that Galileo received of house arrest is precisely because he DID recant (and this time he did obey as well.)]

The Trial of Galileo is of historical interest in demonstrating the issues involved in resolving free scientific debate. It is unfortunate and unfair it is often used/abused to attack the Catholic Church (often by Protestants as well, – really unfair considering the trial of Michael Servetus, yes?)

Despite this, Galileo’s Trial deserves to be taught as one (of many) milestones for freedom of intellectual thought.

Sojourner

On a personal note to Bede: So cool!!! My husband and I love historical sites. We go crazy just over early 18th century buildings along the East coast (I know, I know—smile-- we Americans really have no first rate experience with REAL history.)

Sojourner553

Per Bede:

BTW, torture per se was never used as a punishment by the church

Hi Bede,

I’ll probably get you mad at me again: To me, the Church defined the moral guidelines/framework for what was acceptable or not. It was the Catholic Church that first established the institution of the Inquisition and its proper means of punishment. That secular bodies IMPLEMENTED the punishments, is really just a technicality, no – if religious bodies were not opposed to it.

Indeed, as far as I am aware, Church authorities/scholars who spoke out against the MEANS of punishment, including torture (such as Erasmus) were reformers of the Church and definitely in the minority.


. Imprisonment was quite common and certainly considered more humane than damning someone's soul for eternity.

On one hand I agree this would make sense. On the other hand, I notice that excommunication was used not infrequently against recalcitrant nobles and kings – so maybe this was not seen as so effective after all. I’m still stuck on the fact the Church probably would have utilized the THREAT of excommunication more, if it really were effective. You see, the THREAT should have been enough to stop offenders – yes if people were really afraid of it.

Perhaps what happened is that offenders (especially religious or political) often saw themselves as having pure motives, and therefore the threat of excommunication was not effective as a deterrent. Once torture was instituted, it was easily meted out for everything.

Again I have not come across any writings to indicate Church authorities set forth any moral guidelines that would ask secular authorities to refrain from harsh torture. (I agree though, they probably frowned on a King/nobleman using torture for purely political motives. The point is the Church agreed torture was “necessary” for religious heretics. It is a technicality they let secular bodies do "the dirty work".)

Hugo Holbling

I'm also interested, btw. In any case, this is why i like this forum: the mutual respect in spite of disagreements in sometimes vociferous debate.

On to the posts...

You misread me, i presume. The additional proof you refer to was connected with telescopic data which only affected the debate after the fact: that is, the Copernican theory eventually won out but before the theory of optics was sufficiently understood to make sense of what Galileo had seen. Here is how Kuhn described this remarkable situation, having discussed Galileo's telescopic observations:

What Galileo was able to do was set in motion a process of redescription that eventually resulted in the triumph of Copernicanism before the telescopic observations were understood. Bellarmine represented a very reasonable position and one that would - i think it is fair to say - have been shared by most philosophers of science in rejecting Galileo's ideas at that time because of their poor empirical and theoretical support. I therefore read this entire episode as indictative of the folly of placing methodological constraints upon scientific praxis (and you can call me a Feyerabendian if you will).

Thanks for your interesting discussion of what is essentially the demarcation problem. To the best of my knowledge it remains unsolved, which somewhat throws a spanner in the works. Thus far all methodological solutions to the difficulty you identify have proven to be too restrictive and to disallow moves in the history of ideas that have led to theories we should like to keep. Nevertheless, some form of reconciliation seems like a reasonable option.

I don't follow you here (but then you were addressing Bede...): am i for less freedom? I'm afraid this appears to be a misunderstanding.

Okay. I'll indulge you, but not too much. I'd hate to see this turn into a philosophical discussion (although philosophy of science is okay - i hope) and i wouldn't want you to think that what i say is agreed by all.

The problem with realism is that it requires a metaphysical leap of faith akin to that regularly berated at these fora. All attempts to find demarcation criteria to distinguish between true and false hypothesese have collapsed into identifying good and bad ideas, and even there not much safe ground is available. As a result, instrumentalism became more widespread and talk of truth was dropped, replaced by predictive power and more coherentist approaches. Goodman's arguments were particularly devastating, while verificationism and falsificationism took a battering from Popper (in the first instance), Lakatos and Feyerabend.

Notice that none of the above discounts the possibility that the truth may be "out there"; the difficulty lies in knowing or saying anything about it in its presupposed ahistorical form. This is what led Bohr to declare that physics doesn't tell us about nature in itself; it tells us what we can say about nature. This is not to say that an anti-ontology is any less metaphysical or that we should give up any methodology that leaves us less than absolutely certain; rather, it enjoins upon us a cautionary approach and leaves us less willing to declare the truth to be any more than a best and most useful guess so far.

The realist position entails two primary assumptions: firstly, that there is a true representation of reality independent of us and independent of the particular culture and circumstances that could bring it about (as Feyerabend noted); and secondly, that our enquiry moves asymptotically towards it. Both are decidely metaphysical. Here is a comment made by Feyerabend in his discussion of relativism that may interest you (and Sojourner) and which is likely to prove controversial. I don't propose to debate it in this thread, but see what you think:



This leads me to:

Where specifically does your disagreement begin? I very much doubt that your physics degree hinders you in this fashion, particularly when most of the important physicists of recent times were also philosophers of science and the debate amongst them between realist and instrumentalists was detailed, interesting and pertinent to the discussion here.

At the moment, personal, but hopefully professional some day soon. My degree is in mathematics but i'm working towards another in philosophy in my spare time. If i take it further it will likely be related to the philosophy of science in some way.

Bede

Sojourner,

You badly need to read Peters as I have been unable to get through to you on this. You say "To you..." but what we really need is an informed opinion.

Anyway, torture was never used as a punishment by the church but only as a method of interrogation - and then rarely. Imprisonment was a punishment. Excommunication was a more serious punishment, the threat of which caused most heretics to recant. If Galileo had refused to recant he would have been excommunicated and in all likelihood executed. In other words, the threat worked in his case and he suffered only the lesser punishment of house arrest for disobedience. This was the usual pattern - excommunication was used only for those who refused to recant (which is why it was a weapon used against kings who defied the pope politically and would not back down). Excommunication would never be used if you recanted unless you were a repeat offender who they thought was lying. Hope this clears things up but I still think you should read Peters.

Yours

Bede

Bede's Library - faith and reason

Sojourner553

Hi Hugo,

I think what we may be termsed a "philosophical difference" in how we are approaching truth!

That is, you are espousing Feyerabend’s relativism, while I am even further from Feyerabend’s philosophy than Bede, who possibly strikes more of a middle ground between us.

Therefore to me Galileo’s heliocentric views was the CORRECT view, period no matter what environment or time period he “relatively” found himself in.

While you can argue that the environment in which Galileo formulated his views makes a RELATIVE difference-- I would argue his views were either right or wrong in ABSOLUTE (not relative) terms in how they are objectively measured being CLOSER to the ultimate truth. {For true, although the sun is also not the center of the universe, it is a better approximation of reality than to say the earth is the center of the universe.}


You misread me, i presume. The additional proof you refer to was connected with telescopic data which only affected the debate after the fact: that is, the Copernican theory eventually won out but before the theory of optics was sufficiently understood to make sense of what Galileo had seen.

To me, this is what I was describing when I stated that it was important for a person like Galileo to have freedom to express his views, because they could form part of a chain of events/connections that led to better theories, even ones that later become the majority view.


Here is how Kuhn described this remarkable situation, having discussed Galileo’s telescopic observations:
“Therefore, the telescope did not prove the validity of Copernicus’ conceptual scheme. But it did provide an immensely effective weapon for the battle. It was not proof, but it was propaganda. (The Copernican Revolution, p224.) “

But isn’t this just a more embellished description of what I was describing above-- ie a chain of scientific findings/connections that leads to new findings/views. By the way, how could it be for propoganda if there was imposed silence on teaching it.


What Galileo was able to do was set in motion a process of redescription that eventually resulted in the triumph of Copernicanism before the telescopic observations were understood. Bellarmine represented a very reasonable position and one that would - i think it is fair to say - have been shared by most philosophers of science in rejecting Galileo's ideas at that time because of their poor empirical and theoretical support. I therefore read this entire episode as indictative of the folly of placing methodological constraints upon scientific praxis (and you can call me a Feyerabendian if you will).

"Redescription" has nothing to do with it. Either Galileo’s view was superior, the same, or inferior to the views that were already in place. It took more scientific data to VALIDATE it. But the TRUTH was always there –absolute, not relative.



Thanks for your interesting discussion of what is essentially the demarcation problem. To the best of my knowledge it remains unsolved, which somewhat throws a spanner in the works.

Does that mean you disagree with the “Middle Road”/Reconciliation I provided?


Thus far all methodological solutions to the difficulty you identify have proven to be too restrictive and to disallow moves in the history of ideas that have led to theories we should like to keep. Nevertheless, some form of reconciliation seems like a reasonable option.

How is my reconciliation “more” restrictive than the Catholic Church forcing Galileo to recant his minority viewpoint?

[color = blue]
quote:

If I thought the truth was easily discernable by the majority, I WOULD be far more sympathetic to Hugo’s position – ie for less freedom viz-a-viz the Orthodox position(s).
I don't follow you here (but then you were addressing Bede...): am i for less freedom? I'm afraid this appears to be a misunderstanding. [/color]

If you are supporting the Church’s silencing of Galileo’s minority opinion, is this not the epitome of loosing one’s freedom of intellectual expression?

[color = blue]

The realist position entails two primary assumptions: firstly, that there is a true representation of reality independent of us and independent of the particular culture and circumstances that could bring it about (as Feyerabend noted); and secondly, that our enquiry moves asymptotically towards it. Both are decidely metaphysical. [/color]

How can the first position be metaphysical, if it is based on a physical reality. The second position –agreed- IS physical. {Am I breaking the rules here – this really is addressed to Bede I think}
[color=blue]

Here is a comment made by Feyerabend in his discussion of relativism that may interest you (and Sojourner) and which is likely to prove controversial. I don't propose to debate it in this thread, but see what you think:

quote:

For the ancient Greeks, the Greek gods existed and acted independently of the wishes of humans. They simply 'were there'. This is now regarded as a mistake. In the view of modern rationalists the Greek gods are inseperable parts of Greek culture, they were imagined, they did not really exist. Why the disclaimer? Because the Homeric gods cannot exist in a scientific world. Why is this clash used to eliminate the gods and not the scientific world? Both are objective in intention and both arose in a culture-dependent way. The only answer i have heard to this question is that scientific objects behave more lawfully than gods and can be examined and checked in greater detail. The answer assumes what is to be shown, namely that scientific laws are real while gods are not. It also makes accessibility and lawfulness a criterion of reality. This would make shy birds and anarchists very unreal indeed. There is no other way out: we either call gods and quarks equally real, but tied to different circumstances, or we altogether cease talking about the 'reality' of things and use more complex ordering schemes instead. (Notes on Relativism, pp88-89 in Farewell To Reason.) [color]


Yes, I think Feyerabend is speaking metaphysical concepts (which means it's like a good candidate for the garbage heap!)

Here is the Positivist response to Feyerabend’s comparison of quarks and Homeric gods. Quarks should be treated no differently than the Homeric gods. Here is where the study of quarks so far has differed from belief in the homeric gods: Quarks are open to falsification, have led to predictions that so far have not been falsified, and are also open to future scientific predictions which can eventually lead to falsification.

(You do not have to debate this. But I did want to respond.)

Tell me, since you are into metaphysics, what is your classic response to:

if a tree fell in a forest and there was no one around to hear it, would it still make a noise?

[or the more modern version: If a man spoke and there was no woman around – would he STILL be wrong. Smile. Woman’s joke.]

By the way, I was also a math major once, but then I switched to business – and am now in Finance.

I appreciate how you are like me in this one respect– we can engage in open honest debate with each other, EVEN THOUGH WE MAY DISAGREE MOST STRONGLY WITH WHAT THE OTHER IS SAYING.

Not everyone is as good-hearted as you in this respect.

Have a good day, Hugo!

Sojourner553

Bede,

Maybe it is the analyst in me:

In business we summarize our position, and then give quotes and citations to prove it.

To say, "Go read a book" is too general to prove anything. {Not to mention I feel I have followed this goose chase before only not to find what you promised, at least not in clear black vs white terms.}

If there is an error in my logic, you should be able to pinpoint it (with or without another author's help)

That is: the ideas stand on there own. It only matters "who" says something when you want to prove a fact, or to give credit to someone else for the ideas you are espousing.

The first step is to validate our facts.
The next is to review and discuss the objections of the other individual.

Take as an example:

You insist the Church did not torture (except rarely and for interrogaton). But you agreed elsewhere that secular bodies did torture.

Still, you did not bother to refute whether the Church established a moral culture that "allowed" torture to be an acceptable practice during medieval time by secular authorities.

You should have been able to do answer this, without a "go read a book" response.


[Now, Hugo gives good citations , so I can see exactly where he is coming from]


Sojourner

NOGO

Is there any "proof" out there that would convince a person like Bellarmine that the Bible was wrong?

Here Bede commits the very error he warns others of. That is, he is being anachronistic. People were simply not that open minded back then. The quote Bede gives above to suggest that Bellarmine was open to the idea that the Church's interpretation of the Bible may have to be changed if a proof was ever found, is being misued and anachronistic.
Bellarmine is saying nothing more than many fundamentalists say today, that, for example, the bible does not teach a flat earth. they reinterpret the verse to change their meaning. So Bellarmine was saying that is what he would do if ever Galileo provided "proof". In other words Bellarmine is saying that the Bible cannot be wrong but the Chruch may have made a mistake, however a "proof" is required.

Galileo got into trouble because one day someone suggested that his theories were contrary to the Bible. Galileo's answer through one of his pupils was that perhaps the Bible should not be interpreted so literally. Perhaps when Joshua order the sun to stand still, it was the earth rather than the sun that stopped moving. This kind of talk was just toooooo much for the church.

Now we all know who was the authority in the interpretation of the Bible.

Yes they were. Kepler, for example, understood and believed that the earth moved. One must understand here that not everone at the time was that deep into astronomy to examine all the evidence and draw the appropriate conclusion. Bellarmine himself did at some point in time look into the matter but turned away from it. He was either too afraid of what he would find or he had no interest in such matters.
To suggest that if Galileo had a better arguement, he would have rallied the Church is just wishful thinking.

Simply put. If the idea of heliocentricity did not die it is because there were already enough evidence to convince enough people in the field of astronomy to carry on against the mojority.

The point here is that the Church was outside its field of expertise but did not have the wisdom to stay out of it.

If not contradicting scriptures then interpreting them.