phaedrus

Ok, now thats out of the way, could you clarify the following -

Schopenhauer liberally borrows from eastern philosophy was that the world of appearance was a chimera, though necessary, that reality hid behind the “veil of Maya.” In this metaphysical position Schopenhauer claimed the world was a transcendental illusion; that reality was located within us as the “impersonal, irrational will.”

but does not deny the empirical reality of the external world.

So he says that reality is "empirically real" but still is a transcendental illusion? What sort of idealism would you classify Schopenhauer's? Thats the reason i asked whether you would call him a strict idealist.

And getting back to the starting point of our discussion, you think the zen approach is equivalent to western idealism?

Ender

In order to answer that question we have to look at Schopenhauer's idol, Immanuel Kant. "Empirically real" is the substance of phenomena or vorstellung or idea or representation the mind experiences, much like the kantian sensation the mind organizes with the understanding. Kant is often misunderstood as a subjectivist, conceptualist or psychologist theorist, while in realith his phenomenalism is a theory of empirical realism that we are directly acquainted with real external objects in space and time. This is only a part of the ground of all being- the blind, compulsive, irresistible striving- the will. Schopenhauer appropriates the noumena, "ding-an-sich" from Kant that transcends the phenomenal categories of space, time, causality, in which are the concepts our empirical experience is dependent upon. It is not that Schopie denies the reality of the experienced world, but instead he affirms the primacy & opacity of the ground that generates empirical experience and provides its monistic nature/unity/fundamental essence.

Looking up the dictionaries, there seem to be more than just two idealism- absolute idealism, objective idealism, (world is mental but independent of the perceiver) voluntaristic idealism, (they listed Schopenhauer's name <a href="http://theology.freeyellow.com/tdicv.htm" target="_blank">here</a>) subjective idealism, (berkeleyanism) christian idealism, classical idealism, kantianism (transcendental or critical idealism), & Epistemological idealism. It's possible to be a strict idealism on purely empiricst grounds (berkeley) or with transcendental arguments (kant, fichte). I'm going with what seems reasonable, Voluntaristic idealism as opposed to pure epistemological idealism (Bradley).

not exactly- schopenhauer's reinterpretation of Kantian's transcendental idealism parallels buddhism neatly- but as for zen approach, is it a serious approach to the buddhist ideal of enlightenment? Is is also true that western thinking has corrupted Zen as something "mystical contradictory cult" than an approach with discipline and integrity?

This seems to be a moral indictment rather than a phenomenological exposition of being.

~WiGGiN~

phaedrus

Ender

"Empirically real" is the substance of phenomena or vorstellung or idea or representation the mind experiences, much like the kantian sensation the mind organizes with the understanding

This boils down to everything being a representation and the source being transcendental =&gt; idealism? Or does he say there are material objects which we percieve and interact with?

Kant is often misunderstood as a subjectivist, conceptualist or psychologist theorist, while in realith his phenomenalism is a theory of empirical realism that we are directly acquainted with real external objects in space and time.

Then he is not an idealist? Realism goes against that right?

Schopenhauer appropriates the noumena, "ding-an-sich" from Kant that transcends the phenomenal categories of space, time, causality, in which are the concepts our empirical experience is dependent upon. It is not that Schopie denies the reality of the experienced world, but instead he affirms the primacy & opacity of the ground that generates empirical experience and provides its monistic nature/unity/fundamental essence.

So the world is "real" and our "experience" of it while being empirically real is still an illusion due to the noumenal nature of the source/essence? Eastern philosophies keep on harping about the illusionary nature of our reality (maya) and how we have to overcome the mundane to experience the one (be it the brahman or satori or zen)

but as for zen approach, is it a serious approach to the buddhist ideal of enlightenment? Is is also true that western thinking has corrupted Zen as something "mystical contradictory cult" than an approach with discipline and integrity?

While i havent tried it, talking to people who have indulged in it does indicate that its a very very serious approach with its own discipline...dont know what you meant by integrity over here. Well given the material success of the west, they would obviously look at such abstract or spiritual approaches as some sort of heathen practices (earlier) or new age approaches (now) Zen has its beginings in the ancient hindu philosophy to the extent that buddhism is considered an offshoot of hinduism and its philosophy.

Ender

I don’t think your demarcation between “representation” and “material objects” is justified because coming after the empiricists; the idealists (i.e. Kant) evaded the dead end of empirical epistemology (skepticism) by assigning powers of perception in the mind, (instead of a Lockean passive model of a blank slate) making it active in its sanction of what is intelligible. With that great “turn” the German idealists sought to “complete” Kant’s apparent schism in his critiques. Philosophy became extremely “cosmic” with a radicalized subjective ego as everything or the Geist as everything.

In Schopenhauer, the transcendental source was the Will, but he did not deny that there are material objects we do perceive and interact with- just that these “objects” were “representations” or “ideas” pending whichever translator- not fundamentally an inert matter. The idealists paved the way by saying that the empirical world is a system of appearances (Kant) that our concepts (spacetime, causality) are applied to this realm of pure appearance and organize it into the familiar material world. Where a materialist would say there’s nothing beyond the apparent empirical data, Schopie would’ve said “but of course! It is the thing that I know immediately, without concepts, not as a representation, but as the “I” itself, i.e. the Will. IOW, the Will is really real behind appearances, escapes the categories of space, time and causality. Schopenhauer would differ from a materialist that there was something “transcendent” beyond matter, where he placed Will in a sovereign place in his ontology.

No, Kant is a transcendental idealist of the highest order, since he did invent that field! A realist limits his explanations of everything according to the external world and opposes the empirical position of the phenomenalists (Kant) who thinks all empirical statements are strictly only about mental appearances. All phenomenalists deny the possibility of a reality independent of the mind that conceives of it, while realists assure themselves that reality does not depend on their ability to conceive of it. (anathema to Bekeleyan empiricism)

Yup! And schopenhauer’s prescription of overcoming such irrational blind striving of the will is to simply deny those passions, or reflect upon the meaninglessness of existence with the aesthetic phenomenon.

I would readily assume that by integrity I meant strict adherence to fundamental principles, no capricious whims that violates whatever guiding code of beliefs one adopts.


"Zen points out that our precious "self" is just an idea...When we are no longer identified with the idea of ourselves, the entire relationship between subject and object, knower and known undergoes a sudden and revolutionary change. It becomes a real relationship, a mutuality in which the subject creates the object just as much as the object creates the subject. The knower no longer feels himself to be independent of the known: the experincer no longer feels himself to stand apart from the experience. Alan Watts - The Way of Zen"

IOW, become attuned to the environment by dissolving the subject-object dichotomy that is a result of language!

If I understand this man correctly, this what I have been trying to say in all my writings - Heidegger on reading the work of Zen scholar DT Suzuki

I am taking a class on Heidegger and am doing poorly. I won’t even remark about Suzuki if I can’t get over that Heideggerian hump.

~WiGGiN~

((sacrificed to the God of UBB)))

[ March 18, 2002: Message edited by: Ender the Theothanatologist ]</p>

phaedrus

don’t think your demarcation between “representation” and “material objects” is justified ....snip... Philosophy became extremely “cosmic” with a radicalized subjective ego as everything or the Geist as everything.

Well the demarcation does exist coz there is a difference between saying that everything is a representation (making reality illusionary and the raison d'etre transcendental) and accepting that there are material in-itself-objects which exist inspite of our representation

In Schopenhauer, the transcendental source was the Will, but he did not deny that there are material objects we do perceive and interact with- just that these “objects” were “representations” or “ideas” pending whichever translator- not fundamentally an inert matter.

So the bottomline is that these "objects" are indeed transcendental inspited of being "empirically real"?

No, Kant is a transcendental idealist of the highest order, since he did invent that field!

What about empirical realism then? Going by strict defintions those terms are not contradictory? [You are not planning to throw the friesian thoughts at me right? ]

Yup! And schopenhauer’s prescription of overcoming such irrational blind striving of the will is to simply deny those passions, or reflect upon the meaninglessness of existence with the aesthetic phenomenon.

Do you think his concession of empirical reality make his version of the world any less illusionary or transcendental?

I would readily assume that by integrity I meant strict adherence to fundamental principles, no capricious whims that violates whatever guiding code of beliefs one adopts.

Well any system has its corruptions and mutations and given the commercialisation of eastern thought in the west, i am sure the integrity part will come under the shadow of doubt. Nevertheless I am sure there are enough practioners of the philosophy with integrity

IOW, become attuned to the environment by dissolving the subject-object dichotomy that is a result of language!

Bottomline of most eastern philosophies, but they did have their share of dialectics .....

I am taking a class on Heidegger and am doing poorly. I won’t even remark about Suzuki if I can’t get over that Heideggerian hump.

You shall overcome


JP

Ender

Yes that is a better, more concise, and fair demarcation than the previous one between “representation/transcendental source” and “materials object we perceive and interact with” since they fulfill the same role. The only difference is whether objects are “things-in-themselves” that exists independent (or in spite) of our perception.

No, these objects are not transcendental because only the Will is “independent of space, time, and causality.” Anything transcendent is consigned as noumena, that which exists outside space, time and causality. The objects are mere representations contingent upon our means of perception- and do not exist independent of our perception- but they are “empirically real” insofar they do interact with Man in every sense of the word.

I don’t know how you define empirical realism, but it’s not analogous to basic realism, which position is to assert reality does exist independently of the mind that perceives it. Kant defines empirical realism as a form of realism at the empirical level, which is grounded in transcendental idealism. IOW, transcendental idealism renders empirical realism intelligible, or possible for man.

I understand very little about Fries, other than the consensus that he was a terrific critic of Kant’s epistemology, while Schopenhauer’s the critic of Kantian metaphysics.

Nah his concession of empirical reality as illusory is a product of his pessimistic nature. While his metaphysics is beautiful, an aesthetic cross-dressing of Kant, it is his pessimism I have a problem with. I do not agree with his all-too-christian morals of denying the natural passions of the will in order to “transcend” it. I mean, come on, he elevates the ascetic saint on par with the genius as much as the musician/artist.

Could you name them and give me a signpost on who’s who? Who’s the best thinker of the eastern tradition today?

speaking of dialectics, what do you think of Hegel? Has he in turn corrupted eastern thinkers with his progressive dialectics that smacks of purpose?

~Speaker 4 the Death of God~

[ March 18, 2002: Message edited by: Ender the Theothanatologist ]</p>

phaedrus

Yes that is a better, more concise, and fair demarcation than the previous one between “representation/transcendental source” and “materials object we perceive and interact with” since they fulfill the same role. The only difference is whether objects are “things-in-themselves” that exists independent (or in spite) of our perception.

Well thats what material objects were to be i thought (especially in the context of idealism) *innocent look*

No, these objects are not transcendental because only the Will is “independent of space, time, and causality.” Anything transcendent is consigned as noumena, that which exists outside space, time and causality. The objects are mere representations contingent upon our means of perception- and do not exist independent of our perception- but they are “empirically real” insofar they do interact with Man in every sense of the word.

Do you agree to this?

Objects = representations (which dont exist independent of our perception)

Self = part of the will

representations = products of the mind of the self

Will = transcendental

I don’t know how you define empirical realism, but it’s not analogous to basic realism, which position is to assert reality does exist independently of the mind that perceives it. Kant defines empirical realism as a form of realism at the empirical level, which is grounded in transcendental idealism. IOW, transcendental idealism renders empirical realism intelligible, or possible for man.

From the friesian....

Could you name them and give me a signpost on who’s who? Who’s the best thinker of the eastern tradition today?

Nope no idea what-so-ever

speaking of dialectics, what do you think of Hegel? Has he in turn corrupted eastern thinkers with his progressive dialectics that smacks of purpose?

Didnt understand...how could he have corrupted...werent most of these eastern thinkers/philosophies much before his time?

JP

Ender

In idealism the same objects retain their properties and their fundamental relation to the mind- but the lone difference is when the perceiver is not around to observe the object in question… the properties (hardness, shapes, texture, smell, etc) remain the same in both materialism and idealism.

If I understood Schopenhauer right, then that lists sounds good to me. Phenomena, for Schopie, existed as an “object only for a subject.” In addition the self was a figment of the Will that had a private access to it, the most personal, essential aspect of ourselves. Thus the body is objectified will as well as phenomenal/empirical. But in order to maintain his idealism, Schopehanuer says the showcase of his metaphysics Will is the only real thing, while everything else is merely a Polaroid of the original.

Only through an intellectual insight could a person have access to ideas, not experience, and only through art- not science, which was a belief that the world was a causal mechanism, and was limited to the phenomenal world (representations or manifestations of the Will) A “vicious and self-deceptive ways to conceal meaninglessness and irrationality”. Knowledge of the phenomenal world was at best illusory and false. Modern science is rather a reinforcing agent of the very same illusions that endow us a bogus understanding of a phony reality. This is where Schopenhauer surpasses both Kant and Plato and calls this world a chimera, albeit necessary, and conceals reality behind a ‘Veil of Maya.’

That’s a linguistic analysis of Kant completely removed from the epistemological tradition. Fries’ methodology reflects that fact with questioning the logical consistence of Kantian epistemology by adopting a certain austere & fixed definitions of transcendental and idealism. One may ask whether Kant held the same principle Fries seems to employ.

The true reason why Kant endeavored to conjoin transcendental idealism with empirical realism was to combat the utter skepticism of Hume’s “gutter empiricism” where the self, reason in morals, and science or induction was reduced to psychological beliefs/habits/passions. The little trouble is whether Kant truly understood Hume’s epistemological project, since he read only the Enquiry (the dumbed-down version of the Treatise). By introducing the possibility of experience as the fundamental question, he avoided Hume’s deadspots with a nifty “synthetic a priori judgment” that marked the great turn in philosophy. The elucidation of the “synthetic judgment” of the empirical data we receive is what makes Kant the greatest thinker of the enlightenment (ad populum via scholarly oxen).

P. F. Strawson made a similar criticism that Kant violated his own “principle of significance” he formulated in the negative metaphysics part in the first Critique. From my essay: Well it doesn’t have to be a native eastern guy, if that’s any help? One of the reasons I got excited about Schopenhauer is cuz of his position in western thought as the only truly first rate thinker who was well-versed in eastern thought, that coming after he formulated his magnus opus in his mid twenties. He wrote that “in 1814 by the age of my 27th year all the dogmas of my system even the subordinate ones were established”

Well yes, I was thinking dialectics in Hegel’s context of historical progress. Didn’t care much for Socrates’ version of it. Would either one be too western style, cuz it imports a certain rational purpose for the eastern thinkers? a little crossover never hurts! I keep seeing the eastern guys, as a whole, people who are capable of worshipping a hole while the western guys need a center. Pardon these generalizations, but the topic is as broad as it gets

~WiGGiN~

Ender

<a href="http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Asia/AsiaKhan.htm" target="_blank">an essay on the status of Indian philosophy and the hurdles it needs to clear before it coalesces to the author's desire to subvert it under the western ideals of rationalism.</a>

initial thoughts: I've expressed an epistemological anarchistic views before and though i respect the three major ways of proposed changes: destroy thousand year old demagogues, religion & authority.

But in preference for western philosophy?
this smacks nothing more than an ideological massacre, a subversion. Perhaps a marginalization is in effect! Why even try and establish one single ideology as the be-all end-all and consequently elevate it to dogmatism? Sure beats watching the Lake Show stumble about like drunken bums in a two-game losing streak tho'.

~WiGGiN~

((edited on second thought)))

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Ender ]</p>

Ender

FWIW, i will be spending my Spring Break in a state of constant drunken stupor, so any forthcoming replies will go unanswered. That said, i will (hopefully) make my return in 10 day's hence.

~WiGGiN~