sodium

First, I agree with Metaxy that if consciousness can't be reduced to the physical, then materialism is false. It seems to me pretty clear that qualia (non-physical sensations), if they are anything, are not material, or meant to be so. And if you believe in this kind of immaterial entity, you are not a materialist. And after you die, you will be cast into hell, where there will be great weeping, and gnashing of teeth. OK, that last part isn't true (as far as I know).

The view being offered in constrast to materialism (at least as I define it), is, I think epiphenomenalism. This is the idea that sensations have some kind of immaterial reality, that is, are qualia. Qualia are caused by physical things. In fact, you can have different mental states (qualia) if and only if you have different physical states. This is roughly what is meant by saying that the mental supervenes on the physical.

I'm going to offer two objections to this idea, and one explanation for why I think people are misled into it.

Objection 1:

The epiphenomenalist will generally say that he knows the theory to be true, because of the experience of qualia. However, since qualia are ephiphenomenal (they don't enter into the chain of causation) his belief isn't really caused by the qualia at all. The epiphenomenalist theory says that the epiphenomenalist will assert belief in qualia, independent of their existence.

But it isn't only the assertion, it is the belief. Since the belief is caused by a physical state, and the physical state is caused only by other physical states, and never by qualia, it follows that even the belief in qualia is not caused by the qualia. So, if the epiphenominalist believes his experience of qualia results in his belief in qualia, he is mistaken.

However, in the materialist view, sensations can be reduced to physical states, which do enter in the chain of causation. So the epiphenomenalist's belief in epiphenominalism is caused by his sensations, even though it is an incorrect conclusion. So, if he really believes that his sensations cause his belief, he ought to be a materialist.

Objection 2:

The epiphenomenalist believes that under certain physical stimuli, her body will undergo an aversion response, and she will experience the qualia of pain. But this combination seems rather convenient. After all, there is no reason she couldn't just as easily experience the qualia of pumpkin pie. What would that be like? Would she even know she had this problem? The argument from objection 1 shows that she would not, in fact, she would act no differently as a result. What then is responsible for the perfect matching of qualia with biological experiences? How could it evolve? Does such a perfect matching exist? How would we even know?

Explanation:

So, why are people attracted to the idea that our sensations can't be reduced to the physical? I think there may be many emotional explanations, but I think the primary intellectual one is as follows. When you imagine a physical brain undergoing chemical changes, you look in vain for the actual experience. Where is the experience? It must be somewhere else. But what would it be like to see an experience in third person? I think what people really want is for the third person account to provide a little of the first person experience. When we see a mind experiencing pumpkin pie, we want to be able to experience a little of the pumpkin pie ourselves, otherwise we feel something is left out.

Consider I have you describe to me the eating of a sandwich. You explain it as best you can, but at the end, I complain that I am no fuller than when you started. So, something is clearly missing from my third person experience of sandwich eating that was included in the first person experience.

Well, something is clearly missing, but it isn't information. A third person explanation does not have the same biological effects as does a first person experience. It won't make you full. It won't leave you with a black eye. And if the sensation of seeing orange is a biological reaction, a third person explanation will be quite different than the first person experience, for exactly the same reason.

A third person explanation can be perfectly complete, and still not have the same effect as a first person experience. Sensations are not alone in this regard. And there is no reason to assume anything like qualia based on this observation.

markfiend

1. Consciousness, defined very loosely as the hard to describe, somewhat abstract difference that presumably distinguishes a human from a machine made to emulate one, is an existent and distinct phenomenon.

I would disagree with this premise. IMO an artificial intelligence of sufficient complexity to perfectly emulate a human's consciousness would be conscious.

Metaxy

Not necessarily. We don't know that for a fact. Being an unobservable phenomenon, there's no way to tell whether I'm right or you are.

I was just using the machine example to try evoke the concept to a layman, even if the example is questionable.

contracycle

All right. I would go further and say, we have reasons to think that this will be the case.

Dominus Paradoxum

Remember, sodium, there's two possible responses. One is to accept materialism, the other is to accept interactionism.

Metaxy

But surely you admit the very fact of experience is at least somewhat mysterious - I mean, why can't we just be highly interactive objects with no observer at all? Do you admit there's a difference (premise 1)?

I've already asserted my intellectual reason why I'm attracted to this idea. You didn't challenge my reasoning (though I don't doubt that you have an as-yet unspecified objection to it) you just gave me an alternate route to my conclusion, and countered that.

I've thought of and considered objection #1 of Epiphenomenalism without even knowing the name of the viewpoint until now - and that's something I'm still chewing on, and I'm leaning toward interactionism as a reasonable alternative. But my main argument is for consciousness as an extraphysical phenomenon in general, variants of that premise aside. I can't even grasp how a materialist universe would work. It just doesn't logic out for me at least, and I've shown my (probably seriously flawed) work.

ComestibleVenom

Let's suppose for a moment, with Wittgenstein, that nobody can in fact know that you are conscious. The information provided in your physical manifestation, in other words, cannot usefully inform us about the contents of your mind.

Thus, the words you emit are not causally related to consciousness, and they do not actually speak of consciousness.

Thus, 'true' consciousness, if it is indeed nonphysical, cannot be spoken of. If it cannot be spoken of, it cannot be argued for. Your argument is therefore illegitimate because it asserts that a non-physical phenomenon produces physical consequences where we know that those same physical consequences have merely physical antecedents.

Thus, the words you speak are unrelated to (nonphysical)consciousness, since the words are merely physical with merely physical causes.

Consciousness is constitutes an observable language, hence aminable to scientific invetigation, hence physical in every relevant sense.

ComestibleVenom

If there is a regular, scientifically determinable interaction between consciousness and the rest of the world, consciousness is physical in every relevant sense we need. Any argument purporting that consciousness is non-physical isn't compatible with interactionaism.

The way the science stands does not indicate that interactionism is a serious possibility so it doesn't matter at any rate. Since interactionism stands or falls on purely scientific grounds, it's not a reasonable option at this time.

Metaxy

Who says an interacting consciousness would be physical? The operation of it interacting could be considered part of the physical universe, but the "hard problem" still remains.

ComestibleVenom

Interaction with the rest of the world is all we have to go on for matter too. If systematic, scientifically acessible phenomenon become evident, there is no problem for today's paradigmatic materialist, the methodological naturalist.

The hard problem of consciousness is a lot like the hard problem of cosmology. It's a question that requires dissolution, not an answer on it's own terms. The hard problem as typically construed involves asking how a private language can be scientifically examined. The answer is clear: nobody has pointed out a language that is private in the relevant sense. In fact, by the language game, nobody could.