Longbow

You cannot claim that the a priori is part of the natural world. That contradicts what the term means, unless perhaps you are an Idealist. And if you are, then why would you reject realism at all? You have to be an empiricist if you think that everything is predicated on facts about the natural world (unless you think we directly experience these facts in some Platonic way). How else do you know things if not through observation. You were saying talking about everything we know as being based in some fashion or another on data. That is known as empiricism.

Dr. Retard

This might help focus the discussion. Look at these claims:

The earth is larger than John.
John is larger than his son.
John ate a sandwich.
John killed a dog.
John behaved wrongly.
John is immoral.

These sentences are similar in some ways and different in others. They all have the same surface grammar (indicative mood). But they do make different claims from each other. That much should be uncontroversial.

The big question: is there a fundamental difference between some of these sentences and the rest?

The defender of the is-ought thesis has to answer Yes, and he (I presume) owes us undecided folks an account of this fundamental difference (what it is and why it divides these statements).

[edit - indicative MOOD, not indicative case! Jesus, I'm disappointed in myself]

[ October 16, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

Longbow

I am a defender of the is/ought thesis. I do not hold that "John is immoral," for instance, is not a declarative sentence expressing a proposition that is either true or false. There is in fact no substantial difference in these sentences. Such is my contention. However, I do think that the "is/ought" dichotomy is legitimate both in the trivial sense that saying that "John is immoral" is different from saying that "John is" and in the more profound sense that the former sentence cannot be evaluated using empirical methods.

So, while there is no relevant difference in the sentences, there is a difference in the propositions they represent. Specifically, the last two (moral) propositions are a priori while the former propositions are a posteriori (aka empirical). And, that is why you will never get "ought" from (Hume's) "is" -- because the "is" refers to some empirical fact from which no knowledge of morality can come.

Now, one could contest a lot of things I am saying here, but what one cannot contest is that morals do not directly refer to a state of affaris in the physical world in any obvious way. If one does contest what I am saying, then they must dispute it with a physical interpretation of morality that they must defend. In other words, unless and until you have a specific physical object or state of affairs in the physical world that morals literally are in mind, you have to concede that morality is a priori.

Primal

LongBow: By 'a priori" I simply mean not a matter of what we tend to traditionally call sense experience via the five senses, mainly observation in this case. How would we then acquire such conceptual skills? In the same way a computer has tools to process information i.e. mental hardware. I do not think sensations, in the traditional sense, are ones only means to knowledge. I believe that concepts likewise lead to knowledge and are planted via inductive means. I see this as perfectly natural and the dictionary agrees with me:

<a href="http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=a%20priori" target="_blank">http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=a%20priori</a>

There is nothing about metaphysical implications here.

But if there is no fundamental difference between an is and an ought, then ought claims can be seen as claims about the natural world among a myriad of other claims about the natural world. Also why can't morals be established via sensation or a combination of sensations. Pleasure and pain certainly are. And if one believes morals reflect intrinsic character or evaluations, then one can establish the existence or nature of morals in the same way one establishes the existence of pleasure and pain via experience.

BTW I liked Cr.R's post. Well said.

[ October 03, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Longbow

I am saying that there is no difference between the sentences. For instance, as I have been discussing in another thread, there are some that think that moral statements actually have no propositional content. That is, even though the sentence "X is wrong," sounds just like "X exists," they are very profoundly different types of sentences. One contains an assertion and the other one (on the view I am thinking of) contains no such assertion but is really just has the same content as an imperative sentence with some added emotive meaning.

So, I am definitely not a so called Emotivist. In general, I view moral sentences as containing assertions, or in other words, what such a sentence means is something that could be either true or false (and that their author, in general, claims to be true). What such an interpretation of these sentences should not be construed as is that moral statements contain an empirical proposition. I think you are an empiricist even though you won't admit it. You act as if any proposition must be an empirical one -- it must be about the external physical world. On my view, there is this whole body of knowledge that is not about the external physical world. And, this epistemological view of mine should not be construed as the metaphysical view (that I do not hold) that something exists besides the physical world.

John Galt, Jr.

Primal,

I am unable to sort out the various different lines of discussion that have emerged in the course of this thread. SO, if you don't mind, I would like to pose my own question for the purposed of self-orientation.

My understanding of the 'is/ought' issue is encapsulated in the claim that one cannot derive an 'ought' (moral ought)statment from an 'is' statment (statement of non-moral fact). In other words, no mere description of the non-moral aspects of the world entails any moral prescription. Among the considerations that were urged to support this claim (if it isn't obviouis) were, I think, G. E. Moore's 'Open Question' argument.

DO you dispute the claim that a (moral) 'ought' cannot be derived from nothing but a (non-moral) 'is'? or is your quarrel with something else?

John Galt, Jr.

doubtingt

The issue is all about the specific question you are answering. All your examples are questions about "what do people prefer?" Thess question have objective answers. But knowing what people prefer tells us nothing about whether what they prefer is "objectively better?" In fact the very concept of "objectively better" is absurd and lacks meaning.
We can reduce many many questions about morality to naturalistic explanations. We simply cannot reduce the one question "What is objectively moral?" to nature b/c it is actually a meaningless question b/c moral are by definition the preferences of a subjective mind.

Dr. Retard

For what it's worth, the is-ought distinction comes from Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, which far antedates G. E. Moore's "open question argument" against ethical naturalism. The two are somewhat similar, of course. But the paragraph in Hume that is the source of the is-ought distinction doesn't even seem to argue a position, but rather identify a possible problem.

"I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason."

The open question argument is pretty controversial these days. The primary criticism, I believe, is that just because we cannot see how statements in one field entail another those in another field doesn't mean that they are not identical. The classic example is statements about mental properties and statements about physical properties (brain states and such). It's hard to see how the first can entail the second or vice-versa. But that observation doesn't refute identity materialism.

Dr. Retard

I think this is exactly what needs to be shown. It's certainly not obvious that objective value is absurd and meaningless. And it's quite obvious that "morality" does not by definition concern subjective preferences; maybe it does by your definition, but certainly not the one most other people use. I don't think the issue can be settled by definitional fiat. Arguments are needed.

Dr. Retard

Just by way of clarification, Longbow is a cognitivist, then. That is, he believes that moral claims can bear truth-value. Emotivists, prescriptivists, and the like (Hare, Gibbard, Blackburn) are non-cognitivists because they hold that moral claims cannot bear truth-value -- they're like boos, cheers, commands, emotional outbursts, etc.

But he contends that moral claims are non-empirical. That is, they can't be known by empirical investigation, experience, observation, and all the ways of knowing that filter in through our senses. He also contends that moral claims are a priori, and so can be known non-empirically. This is just a consequence of the view that moral claims can indeed be known, combined with the view that they are non-empirical. If all this is true, this would make moral claims different from positive/factual/descriptive claims; so it would uphold the is-ought distinction.

But I think this needs to be shown, for it's not obvious that moral claims are non-empirical and a priori. For all I know, all moral claims are representational claims about the physical world, claims that we can learn empirically. Some moral realists defend this position (I think Peter Railton does). It's not obviously false.

A similar issue is whether moral facts are explanatorily useful -- whether we need to invoke them to fully explain certain observations. The negative view would be that moral facts explain nothing, and that when it looks like they do explain things, it's actually the underlying physical facts that do the explaining. This is important and relevant because, if moral facts don't explain anything, then that's a good reason to cut them out of our ontology. Why believe they exist if they can't explain anything? This might be what Longbow is getting at when he says moral claims are non-empirical. But this debate is pretty controversial and difficult (Gilbert Harman against moral explanation and Nicholas Sturgeon for it).

My conclusion: if the is-ought thesis stands or falls on controversial, difficult matters like these, then it's not obviously true. Then it shouldn't be assumed true.