The AntiChris

Koyaanisqatsi

Your last three posts comprise 30 pages of text when imported to a Word document. Painful, yes....

If I've misrepresented your argument, then I apologise. The essential point at issue here is not the validity or soundness of your argument but one of definition.

Quite clearly, your understanding of "objective morality" is not shared by people like bd and Alonzo Fyfe. If there's going to be any sensible debate on this issue it seems to me that at the outset we need to establish precisely what it is we're talking about and that must entail defining what all parties understand by the term "non-theistic objective morality".

This is why I started this thread.

Chris

Koyaanisqatsi

And why I responded by arguing that no such inherently contradictory phrase can be established, either for atheists or theists, due to the inescapable fact that it is impossible to marry the terms "objective" and "morality."

It is identical to saying a black white horse.

Morality, by its very definition, is contingent upon subjective perspective and therefore cannot--in any possible universe, including one in which a god is proved to exist--ever be considered to "objectively exist"; i.e., independent of subjective perspective.

It is a judgment call, which necessarily means someone must make that judgment for it to have any meaning.

Let's rehash bd's invalid analogy and try to make it fit.

Steve "believes" that the actual age of the Earth is "X," when the actual age of the Earth has already been demonstrated to be "Y."

Steve is therefore incorrect in his belief.

Now let's properly plug in my example accordingly; i.e., so that the terminology used is properly adjusted to fit the analogy of the fixed age of the Earth.

Steve "believes" that masturbation is a physical action that will result in the immediate, significant and catastrophic physical reaction of space-time. It has been established that masturbation is a physical action that will not result in the immediate, significant and catastrophic physical reaction of space-time.

Steve is therefore incorrect in his belief.

Removing the abstract qualities of "wrongness" and "rightness" from the analogy immediately demonstrates why it is not applicable. "Wrongness" and "rightness" are abstractions and therefore contingent upon subjective judgment for meaning. Thus, they cannot simply be randomly imposed onto the scenario in the manner that bd's analogy would have done.

Apples and oranges.

Alonzo Fyfe

In making this claim, there are two options with respect to how you define the terms "objective" and "morality."

I will focus on the term "morality".


Option 1, you are offering a stipulative definition. A stipulative acts like an assumption in an argument. For example, if I began an argument with "let me use the word 'lykarta' to mean 'any all-white equite'.

In this case, it is a contradiction to hold that there are no black lykarta. Indeed, the conclusion that there are no black lykarta is inescapable -- it is impossible for a black lykarta to exist.

However, this does not say anything meaningful about the world. This type of argument assumes the truth of that which it claims to prove, and then derives the conclusion from that assumption.

So, if your subjective definition of morality is a stipulative definition, then your argument is question-begging. It is circular -- assuming as true that which it seeks to prove.


Option 2: The definition is a descriptive definition -- it is meant as a theory about how native speakers of the language use the term in normal speech. Like any theory, it is proved or falsified by its ability to explain and predict relevant observable phenomena.

The relevant observable phenomena in this case is how people use moral terms. Among the phenomena to be explained is the observation that people seem to act as if there is a right answer, and debate the matter as they do any other matter about which a factual conclusion can be reached. They argue evidence for their conclusions and at least expect the evidence to be convincing to others who view the evidence. You do not hear people debating the relative merits of chocolate ice cream vs. vanilla ice cream this way -- or anything else that is merely a matter of taste.

Look at the debates that are going on around you in this forum for evidence that native speakers of the language often do not hold 'objective morality' to be the type of contradiction you assert it to be.

Therefore, as a descriptive definition, evidence suggests that you have a false premise.

In fact, I think a full theory of the meaning of the word 'morality' among english speakers will show that it has a range of different meanings -- some of them subjective, others objective.


This is not to be taken as proof that morality is objective. Circular arguments and arguments with false premises can both have a true conclusion. But neither type of argument demonstrates that the conclusion is true.

99Percent

Steve "believes" that masturbation is a physical action that will result in the immediate, significant and catastrophic physical reaction of space-time. It has been established that masturbation is a physical action that will not result in the immediate, significant and catastrophic physical reaction of space-time.

The fallacy you are making is assuming that in objective morality there must exist and absolute wrongness/rightness that affects the whole universe even beyond humanity.

Rightness and wrongness exists withing the boundaries of human understanding. Objective morality rests in maximizing the probabilities of success by making life good over death, consciousness good over unconsciousness and volition good over force.

You cannot of course know the full consequences of your actions and that is why you must rely on your ethics. Maybe killing person X will prevent X from procreating a future Adolph Hitler, but you do not know that. But at the same time maybe you should not kill person X because he might invent the cure of cancer in the future, but you do not know that either. But that is not the point of objective morality (as you seem to imply with absolute wrong/right).

Murder is objectively wrong you will always enter into a state of violence if you initiate it yourself and a state of violence restricts volition and undermines your future life.

This is not the same as masturbation, since masturbation is a act that doesn't affect your life, consciousness or volition.

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

1. On “objectively true” moral theories.

In my last post to you I said that you appeared to be claiming that

You now say that this is “close, but not precisely accurate”. But from the rest of the post it would seem to be more accurate to say that it is completely wrong.

Unfortunately you didn’t explain how I had misinterpreted the statements that had led me to the conclusion above. And frankly, I’m at a loss as to where I went wrong. Let’s look at them again.

First: “I look for evidence that any of the propositions within the theory are false ...”. The hypothesis that you meant only that you look for evidence that a given moral proposition can be shown to be false from the premises of the given theory (plus facts about the real world) doesn’t quite work because this statement was supposed to be a description of how you “test the soundness of your theory”. Determining that any number of moral propositions can be shown to be true or false from the premises of theory can tell us nothing about the “soundness” of the theory itself, except in the special case that the very same proposition can be shown to be both true and false. But in that case the theory is logically inconsistent, and “evidence” doesn’t come into the matter.

Second: “The answer that I defend is that moral values are based on all of the desires that exist, regardless of who has them,” It’s possible that you meant only that you prefer your theory to others, not that other theories are “incorrect”. In fact, you seem to be saying this in your last post:

But of course, if “moral” is defined in a some-things-considered sense, “moral values” will necessarily be based on only some of the desires that exist. If there is nothing “incorrect” about this, there is nothing to “defend”. You personally prefer to use an all-things-considered sense rather than a some-things-considered one, just as you might prefer strawberry milkshakes to chocolate ones, but it is absurd to speak of “defending” such subjective preferences.

My bafflement is deepened when I recall that on the “Morality is Evil” thread you said:

The significant point here is not the claim about a false assumption, but the statement that this false assumption leads to “moral mistakes”. It only makes sense to say that something is a “mistake” if there is a correct answer. But you seem to be denying that there is a correct answer. So what do you mean by a “moral mistake”? (I asked this question on that thread, but never got an answer.)

2. On “objectively true” moral claims.

Although you (apparently) don’t believe that any moral theory is “objectively true”, you do say that some moral claims are:

Unfortunately your example involves statements that do not contradict one another. But from the analogy with the word “atoms” it is clear that you are willing to say that, just as the statements “atoms are divisible” and “atoms are indivisible” are in a sense both objectively true, two moral theories can yield seemingly contradictory moral claims, both of which are “objectively true” – for example “Jones should kill Smith” and “Jones should not kill Smith”. Of course, the “atoms are divisible/indivisible” example works because the word “atom” has different meanings in the two statements. In the case of moral claims it is terms like “right” and “ought” that have different meanings in different theories.

The problem with this is that once again you are ignoring the purpose and function of moral discourse. Thus, for example, you say:

But to say that a moral statement such as “Jones should not kill Smith for his money” is “true” is not merely to say that a certain relationship holds between his act and some set of desires. It is also to say that killing Smith is not the thing to do. If I say to Jones that it is “objectively true” that he should not kill Smith, I am telling him not to kill Smith. This is built into the logic of moral language. If I say to Jones that he should not kill Smith but deny that I am thereby telling him not to kill Smith, I am not using “should” in a moral sense at all.

Now suppose that I tell Smith that it is “objectively true” that he should kill Smith, and that it is also “objectively true” that he should not kill Smith. Then I am telling him to kill Smith, and also not to kill Smith. This is not a logical contradiction, to be sure, but it is certainly a practical contradiction.

The fact that these “objectively true moral claims” issue from different theories doesn’t help. Unlike descriptive propositions, moral statements have immediate, direct practical implications in terms of actions. This is an integral part of their purpose and function.

So the only tenable options are:

(1) It may be objectively true that Jones should kill Smith, or that he should not kill Smith, or perhaps neither, but certainly not both.

(2) Moral statements do not express propositions, and so cannot meaningfully be said to be “true” or “false” at all.

Moral philosophers who choose the second option (which seems to be the only one open to you, since you clearly reject the first) are generally called “noncognitivists”. It is pretty much universally agreed that noncognitivists are not moral objectivists. That’s fine, except that in that case you have nothing constructive to say about a non-theistic objective morality beyond saying that no such thing exists.

3. All-things-considered vs. some-things-considered.

Although you don’t claim that an “all-things-considered” moral theory is “correct”, you do offer some reasons for adopting such a theory.

The first reason is that some-things-considered theories are, well, evil:

Now there are lots of moral subjectivists on these boards who will give you a stiff argument on this. They will say, for example, that enlightened self-interest will lead rational people to form a “social contract” and that it will almost always be in everyone’s interest to adhere to it. But suppose for the sake of argument that you’re right. So what? What’s your objection to an ethic of selfishness, cruelty, violence, abuse, and exploitation?

There are three possible answers. The first is that you find such an ethic repulsive. While I share this sensibility, it appears on your showing to be nothing but a subjective preference. You might as well criticize asparagus on the grounds that it tastes yucky.

The second answer is that if everyone were to subscribe to such an ethic you would find the resulting state of affairs unpleasant. But at best this is a reason for preferring that everyone else subscribe to an all-things-considered ethic; it doesn’t offer a reason for you (or anyone else) to do so.

The third answer is that such an ethic will lead to the thwarting of a great many desires (counting everyone’s, not just yours). But this is merely to say that widespread adoption of an all-things-considered morality will probably lead to “better”” results from the point of view of an all-things-considered morality than adoption of some other morality. The circularity here is obvious.

So it appears that this argument for preferring an all-things-considered moral theory cannot withstand critical scrutiny. This is not to say that such reasons are not perfectly good ones for you to adopt this kind of morality. It just means that anyone who is not naturally inclined to “consider all things” will not find such reasons persuasive. In essence this is just a psychological explanation of why you are attracted to this type of moral theory. Some people may find it attractive for the same reasons; others may not.

But you have a second reason – namely, that the logic of moral discourse demands that reasons must be “all-things-considered” reasons in order to be considered “moral” reasons at all:

This, IMO, is a completely valid argument. “Some-things-considered” reasons do not qualify as moral reasons; in fact, this restriction arises naturally from the purpose and function of moral discourse. And since “some-things-considered” reasons don’t qualify as moral reasons, “some-things-considered” theories do not qualify as moral theories. To call such things “moral theories” is an abuse of language.

Oddly enough, this is one of the arguments I presented in the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000138" target="_blank">Fyfe and Acting with Impunity</a> thread. It is the main reason that I gave for rejecting Pompous Bastard’s “moral theory”. But at the time, you rejected my reasoning rather emphatically. It’s nice to see that you’re finally coming around to my way of thinking on this point at least.

Of course, none of this shows that there are objective moral truths; it only shows that there are restrictions on what can be called a “moral truth”, or “moral principle”, or “moral theory” if the term “moral” is to retain any semblance of its normal meaning.

Note: I want to get back to the question of whether (A) is true, and then move on to the central question of what might be meant by “objective moral truths” and whether there are any such things. So I probably won’t have time to make a detailed response to any reply to this post.

[ May 31, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

0n0w1c

is this true? or is it simply against the law? if it is not against the law, do enter a state of violence? no cover up, no one to pursue me... murder is subjective not objective. we even have subjective levels of murder: 1st degree, 2nd degree, and manslaughter.

[ May 30, 2002: Message edited by: 0n0w1c ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

bd-from-kg:

You now say that this is "close, but not precisely accurate". But from the rest of the post it would seem to be more accurate to say that it is completely wrong.

Not completely, no.


Unfortunately you didn’t explain how I had misinterpreted the statements that had led me to the conclusion above. And frankly, I’m at a loss as to where I went wrong.

Well, it seems first that I recognize a distinction between what something is and what something is called. There is a best all-things-considered that is objectively knowable and the same for all people.

Then the question comes up: "What are we to call this thing?"

I cannot look at nature and say that the word 'morality' must necessarily be used in this way. Which leads to:


You personally prefer to use an all-things-considered sense rather than a some-things-considered one, just as you might prefer strawberry milkshakes to chocolate ones, but it is absurd to speak of "defending" such subjective
preferences.

This applies to the question "What are we to call this thing?"

As I have stated several times, this problem exists in all areas of study. It applies to chemistry. The question of whether these smallest pieces of gold, lead, iron, etc. have parts is one thing. The question of what to call these
smallest pieces of gold, lead, iron, etc. another.

So, rewrite your observation with respect to the word 'atom'


You personally prefer to use a smallest-piece-of-an-element sense rather than a having-no-parts one, just as you might prefer strawberry milkshakes to chocolate ones, but it is absurd to speak of "defending" such subjective preferences.

It may be absurd, but it is not the type of absurdity that allows one to argue that chemistry is subjective.

Imagine that you visited a board somewhere and you found somebody making the claim that there are no objective truths in the field of chemistry because whether these smallest pieces of an element are called 'atom' or something else is merely a preference. How would you answer such a person?

[b]My bafflement is deepened when I recall that on the "Morality is Evil" thread you said: We have built a false assumption into the very meaning of our moral terms... And this error leads to all sorts of moral mistakes. Mistakes that cost lives. Mistakes that cause undue suffering.

The significant point here is not the claim about a false assumption, but the statement that this false assumption leads to "moral mistakes."[b]

The meaning of moral terms is theory leaden. What moral terms mean is determined by the role it plays in a theory. Folk morality is a theory that
assumes that there are desires-independent values. This is a mistake -- it is incorrect -- any claim that something has desire-independent value is false. It is false in the same way that 'the smallest pieces of an element has no
parts' is false.

That this assumption is a part of folk-morality can be deduced by the way people make moral arguments. Many arguments that native speakers of the language offer and accept make no sense in the absence of an assumption of desire-independent values.

In addition it is an important mistake because it costs lives, leads to undue suffering, etc.


Although you (apparently) don’t believe that any moral theory is "objectively true,"...

Again, this confuses the question of what something is and what something is called. To deduce this from my statements is like saying to the chemist that he does not believe any theory of chemistry is "objectively true" because he
admits that what these smallest pieces of an element are called is merely a matter of taste.

The problem with this is that once again you are ignoring the purpose and function of moral discourse.

I knew you would get to this.


But to say that a moral statement such as" Jones should not kill Smith for his money" is "true" is not merely to say that a certain relationship holds between his act and some set of desires. It is also to say that killing Smith
is not the thing to do. If I say to Jones that it is "objectively true" that he should not kill Smith, I am telling him not to kill Smith. This is built into the logic of moral language.

I agree with this. But this is because folk-morality presumes the existence of desire-independent values. But this presumption is false. The logic of discourse may require that killing Smith has some sort of desire-independent
value, but nothing in fact has this type of value. Never has.

Let me illustrate with the following hypothetical discussion.


SOPHIA: I have been going over this data on these uranium atoms, and I think that the data suggests that atoms are made up of different parts.

PROF: Don't be absurd. The word 'atom' literally means 'without parts'. To hold that something without parts is made up of parts violates the very logic of chemical terms.

SOPHIA: Okay, then, these smallest pieces of matter are not atoms. I think they are made up of parts.

PROF: What do we call them, then?

SOPHIA: I don't care. Let's call them bitsies. Bitsies have parts.

PROF: We could continue to call them atoms.

SOPHIA: Sure. Whatever you want.

PHIL: Wait a minute. I've been listening to this. You need to give me an argument as to whether these smallest pieces of element are to be called
atoms or not.

SOPHIA: There is no argument.

PHIL: It's just a matter of preference, like the preference of chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream.

SOPHIA: Well, yes. It is useful if we all agree on the same terms, but the process for doing so is no different than the process for deciding which ingredients go on a pizza that we are all going to share.

PHIL: And you can call these smallest pieces of an element 'atoms' or -- something else.

SOPHIA: That's what I said.

PHIL: And if these smallest pieces of an element is called atoms, then atoms have parts. And if we call the smallest indivisible particle atoms, then atoms do not have parts.

SOPHIA: That's true.

PHIL: So, what you're telling me is that whether or not atoms have parts is merely a matter of personal preference. For you, atoms have parts, but the Professor here is perfectly free to say that atoms don't have parts.

SOPHIA: Sure, as long as the Professor here does not use the word 'atom' to refer to these smallest pieces of an element.

PROF: Come, now. We have always called these things atoms. I am not going to stop now.

SOPHIA: Then atoms have parts.

PROF: Nonsense. It violates the very meaning of the term.

SOPHIA: Prof, what you are saying is false, and you cannot defend it by saying it is required by the very logic of chemical terms. You decide -- are these smallest pieces of an element to be called atoms or not. I don't care. If you call them atoms, then they have parts. If you insist that atoms do not have parts, then these are not atoms. But they still have parts. Phil, no this
does imply that truths in chemistry are simply a matter of personal preference, only that the words used to express those truths are a matter of personal preference. Whether or not these smallest pieces of an element are made up of
parts is an objective fact. It's what we call them that's subjective.

What neither of you seem to realize is that while I am talking about chemistry, you are talking about language. You just think are talking about chemistry because the examples of language that you are using for your examples are drawn from the field of chemistry. Call these smallest pieces of an element what you want. I vote to call them atoms, but that's just my preference. But whatever you call them, they have parts. The data supports this conclusion, and no amount of linguistic analysis that "this is not the proper use of the word 'atom'" or that a person with different preferences can say that atoms do not
have parts changes the fact that these smallest pieces of an element has parts.

Translation. The only value that exists are desire-based values. Every proposition containing a value element that does not reference a set of desires is false. If you use moral-ought in a way that refers only to the desires of an agent (or in any type of some-desires-considered sense), then you have a morality of selfishness, cruelty, violence, abuse, and exploitation, because the desires of others are considered at best contingently or at worst not at all. The only way to avoid this is to use moral-ought in an all-desires-considered sense. I vote for the latter, but that, I admit, is a matter of preference. Whatever you decide to call it, it does not change the objective fact that a some-things-considered morality is a morality of selfishness, cruelty, violence, abuse, and exploitation. Nor does the fact that what we call things is a matter of preference proof that morality is any less subjective than, say, chemistry.

Regarding my use of "the logic of moral discourse" to defend an all-desires-considered moral theory.

This, IMO, is a completely valid argument . . . . Oddly enough, this is one of the
arguments I presented in the Fyfe and Acting with Impunity thread....But at the time, you rejected my reasoning rather emphatically.

What I objected to was a use of "the logic of moral discourse" that was comparable to the example above in which the professor used the meaning of the word "atom" to argue that the smallest bits of an element cannot be split. In your case, the argument professed that the purpose of morality was to find the bridge across the chasm from the agent's desires to the welfare of others that the logic of morality dictated must exist.

It does not exist, and if the logic of morality dictates that it does (and, I believe, the logic of morality does dictate its existence because it builds a presumption of the existence of desire-independent value in the very meaning of moral terms) then the problem rests with the logic of moral discourse.

Referring to the example above, Sophia may argue that we should call these smallest pieces of an element "atoms" because the term has been used to refer to these smallest pieces of an element for so long and people are used to it. But the professor cannot use the same type of argument to "prove" that these smallest pieces of an element have no parts.

Now, I can't use it to defend a bridge across this gap either. So I must still accept your criticism that "good all desires considered" may well be something that is quite different from "good Jones' desires only considered." This is simply one of those facts that we all have to live with.

[ May 31, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Koyaanisqatsi

All right...

All definitions are in some manner stipulative, yes?

Except for the fact that I did not state, "Let me define morality as 'all things subjective.'"

I deconstructed the term. There's a significant difference.

No, it does not. It points out that there are inherent qualities of definition that cannot simply be bulldozed over.

If a phrase is inherently contradictory--such as a "black, white horse"--then it is simply and irrefutably contradictory, whether it is agreed upon or not (i.e., an objective fact).

Consider it a wall that cannot be tunneled under, scaled over, blown up, or gone around. One can only bang against it or leave it stand.

"Objective morality" is one such phrase, since, as I have pointed out repeatedly and no one yet has risen to the challenge, there can exist no possible world (even with a god proven to exist) in which an action such as masturbation can be established as "objectively immoral," meaning that the immorality of masturbation is independent of human interpretation (aka, judgment).

This is what objectivity means, unless you simply wish to gray the meaning and ultimately transpose the meaning of subjectivity onto the word "objectivity," in which case, what's the point?

As I had stated in my third post:

Doesn't anyone read my posts?

Well, then, I'm certainly glad it is not, other than the fact, of course, that ultimately every definition is in some manner stipulative.

Close, but it is actually a deconstruction of the terms and a demonstration as to why they are inherently oxymoronic, but you win anything off the third shelf.

Closer still, since it is not possible to "prove" or "falsify" the objective "rightness" or "wrongness" of an action.

How could you? That is, again, identical to stating, "I can prove the blackness of this white horse."

Subjectively .

Hence my third post, where I argue that there is no actual "objective morality," merely a perceived "objective morality."

Nice attempt at trivializing, but not allowed.

It is not my fault that "native speakers of the language" do not properly apply the correct terminology, nor does this observation on your part have any relevance to what I have been arguing, other than to indirectly affirm it, of course.

Clearly not your "evidence," so what evidence that you have yet to present would you be referring to?

Once again, more evidence for the inherently subjective nature of the term, demonstrating precisely what I have been arguing.

No, just support for the fact that it is inherently subjective.

Good point, but entirely irrelevant.

Koyaanisqatsi

For morality to be "objective" it must be independent of humanity or it ipso facto ceases to be "objective," yes?

Or are we simply playing pointless word games and transposing the meaning of subjectiviy onto the word "objectivity?"

But must exist independtly of that understanding for it to be considered at all objective. That is the purpose of using the qualifying term "objective," yes?

This is a meaningless statement. Objective morality is not a being that can "rest" in such a state, so the comparison is lost.

For the "wrongness of masturbation" to be "objective," it must therefore be "wrong" independant of human existence entirely or it ceases to be objectively wrong, aka, contingent upon human existence.

If it is contingent upon human existence, how could it therefore be "objective?"

It could only be considered "true for all humans" but it could not be considered "objectively true" as a maxim unto itself, which is the only relevant definition of the term "objective."

Otherwise, again, all we are here doing is graying the definition for the sake of pointless word games.

Rely on your ethics for what? To prevent you from doing certain actions considered by yourself and others as morally wrong?

What about killing Hitler as Adolph Hitler? Was does your "objective morality" then conclude about such an action?

I do not imply this.

Except in times of war, self-defense and any other form of "justifiable homicide" on the books.

Says you

It did for many years of my life. So, now where are we?

[ May 31, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

99Percent

Koyaanisqatsi: For morality to be "objective" it must be independent of humanity or it ipso facto ceases to be "objective," yes?

No, because morality applies only to human actions. There is no morality on the existence of the moon, or that the earth is round, or whether it is wrong for the universe if the dog pees on trees. But there is morality on human actions because humans have volition. There was no morality before humans existed. So your insistence on objective morality to exist independently of humanity is not valid.

But must exist independtly of that understanding for it to be considered at all objective. That is the purpose of using the qualifying term "objective," yes?

No, again because morality applies only to humans. That is why I say objective morality lies within the real of human understanding, that is, it is objectively true for all humans.

For the "wrongness of masturbation" to be "objective," it must therefore be "wrong" independant of human existence entirely or it ceases to be objectively wrong, aka, contingent upon human existence.

No, because only humans choose to masturbate.

If it is contingent upon human existence, how could it therefore be "objective?"

Because it is true for all humans.

I do not imply this [that objective morality must reside on absolute wrong/right]

Yes you did in your example of Steve masturbating causing "immediate, significant and catastrophic physical reaction of space-time". Because if objective morality is going to exist independent of any human mind it must rest on absolute good/bad, which is absurd, because there is no such thing. "Good" and "Bad" only exist with the interpretation and understanding of the human mind. But that doesn't mean it ceases to be objective. It is still "good" and "bad" withing the understanding of all human minds.

Except in times of war, self-defense and any other form of "justifiable homicide" on the books.

Yes that is why I am careful to distinguish between "initiating" violence and resorting to violence as self defense.

It did for many years of my life. So, now where are we?

No, because you are you not dead, unconscious or without volition.

[ May 31, 2002: Message edited by: 99Percent ]</p>