Normal

I'm not very "well-versed" in this argument, but I think the KCA doesn't rely on space-time, as in the time that started at the beginning of the universe, it relies on logical time sequences, as in: not what temporally preceded time, but what logically preceded time.

Wiploc

So you think the KCA says this?

- 1. Whatever begins to exist has a
- cause that didn't necessarily come
- before it chronologically.
- 2. The universe began to exist, but
- only in the chronological sense.
- 3. Therefore, since the premises are
- about totally different stuff, no conclusion
- can be drawn.

crc

Normal

Most like:

1. Whatever beings to exist has a logical precedent (cause).
2. The universe began to exist.
3. The universe has a logical precedent (cause).

Wiploc

I thought you were trying to get to this ...

... but there's no reason that a logical precedent has to be extra-universal.

crc

mattdamore

Sorry for the wait. Thomas Metcalf and I are discussing the Evidential Argument from Evil in exquisite detail, so I was unable to add to this thread at a sooner date.

TiredJim,

I think this may be more of an objection to premise 2, since it denies your contention that nothing has occured to the existence of the contents of the universe except for rearrangment. Premise 2 states that this matter and energy couldn't have existed forever, and, therefore, had a beginning. If it had a beginning, then Premise one is applicable here.

Further, your contention of Premise 1's truth depending on it being witnessed confuses the epistemological way in which one comes to know the truth of it. We don't come to know it's truth through experience, but some pre-experiential intellectual structures which assist in our defining the actual world.1 Philosopher Shandon L. Guthrie explains further, This will incline us to opt for a synthesis of both idealism and empiricism. Think how we could devise something like a one thousand sided figure or a mathematical infinity if only empiricism were exclusively true. We would, according to Aristotelian empiricism, be obliged to sense a variety of particular infinities and one thousand sided figures in order to universalize them. But this is clearly absurd. It is absolutely necessary that we have at least some sort of pre-noetic structure that possesses a way of defining particulars in their absence

So the truth of premise 1 isn't based on experience, but a systematic expression which surpasses all experiences. Stuart Hackett says: Either the categories are thus a priori or they are derived from experiences. But an experiential derivation of the categories is impossible because only by their means can an object be thought in the first place. Since the categories are preconditions of all possible knowledge, they cannot have been derived from an ex-perience of particular objects: the very first experience would be unintelligible without a structure of the mind to analyze it.

But even if you deny a priori category of the causal principle, David Hume agreed with it on other grounds: But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neither

So, I think premise 1 has some strong support.

mattdamore

ComestibleVenom,

Since I'm not an expert in this, I'll quote someone with reasonable knowledge in the field and you can let me know if you agree with or no.

Shandon L Guthrie states at http://sguthrie.net/theism_and_conte....htm#chapter4, that:

Without neglecting the intellectual benefit quantum mechanics has had in our thinking culture, we need to consider one final objection that only a person living in or beyond the 20th century could propose. Modern day cosmological speculations about the utilization of quantum theory in the universe's origin are attempts to dismiss the notion that all things that begin to exist require a cause. In quantum physics, some critics suppose that a high level theoretical entity called a virtual particle may be exempt from the causation principle arguing that such theoretical entities are non-Newtonian in nature. This fancy scientific footwork used to elevate an exception to our premise that everything that begins to exist has a cause is only an imaginary distraction, much like David Copperfield's dancing assistants. But there really is a man behind the curtain! Upon closer inspection, the educated scientist is somewhat enlightened about the virtual particle. First, causal critics have to make the universe a virtual particle in order to make it an exception to the causal principle. (31) But if we are to press the issue, I find no correlation between a virtual particle and the universe's original singularity. All speculations about the universe's singularity entail a point of infinite mass at t=0. There is no similarity in definition or folk knowledge about it. Besides, why do we not observe additional universes "popping" into existence uncaused if virtual particles are the culprits? (32) If the critic supplies reasons to suggest that such a particle is unique then it is difficult to see how it can be identical to the general understanding of virtual particles today. The conclusion that the universe is not a virtual particle is, to me, a proper analysis. So, what if the universe were only analogous to a virtual particle? (33) This would also seem to fail since the universe's origin does not appear to have behaved like a virtual particle. But perhaps there are specific similarities with respect to initial conditions prior to Planck time (10-43 of a second after the initial singularity). Quantum physicists speculate that there existed a superforce and a superparticle prior to the hot Big Bang state of the universe. The superforce is the force from which the gravitational, strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces are derived. Similarly, the superparticle is divided into bosons and fermions following the Planck era. This superparticle could conceivably be broadly construed as a virtual particle. Granting the superparticle analogy, virtual particles derive their existence from quantum vacuums, which is not the same thing as saying "nothing at all." That is, a classical Newtonian vacuum is understood to be the absence of any energy or matter. But a quantum vacuum is the state of a particle that has not yet been provided the necessary qualities to be observed. Lastly, there is one final destination for the virtual particle argument: It relies on a metaphysical view of quantum mechanics not yet adhered to by the majority of physicists. Quantum physics is a theoretical science that remains in its underdeveloped infancy. The fact that quantum events are just comprehensible manifestations of unobservable entities demands that such a system be interpreted with caution. This is why most physicists opt for the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum events associated with Niels Bohr. (34) Quantum particles serve to provide answers to scientific problems but have no real bearing on reality. Such a view sees quantum physics as a science similar to astronomical theories about WIMPs and Dark Matter. Although they may be constructive and functional, there are no firm conclusions drawn about the unseen.

31. Edward Tryon, "Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?" Nature, 246 (1973), pp. 396-7.

32. The notion of Quantum Gravity Fluctuations will be considered in another chapter below.

33. D. Atkatz and H. Pagels, "Origin of the Universe as a Quantum Tunneling Event", Physical Review, D25 (1982), pp. 2065-6.

34. Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (New York: Doubleday, 1985), pp. 158-64.

mattdamore

Shadowy Man,


The support for this premise splits between both philosophical and scientific support. If you want one or the other let me know which you prefer.

mattdamore

ex-xian,


I would agree with Craig on the definition of causation when he said, A cause is, loosely speaking, something which produces something else and in terms of which the thing that is produced can be explained. So if one ponders the nature of causation at the beginning of the universe to be logical instead of temporal then I conclude with Craig, that In general, arguments to the effect that some intuitively intelligible notion can't be analyzed in terms of certain philosophical theories should make us suspect the adequacy of those theories rather than reject the common sense notion. So, If God's causing the universe cannot be analyzed in terms of current philosophical definitions of causality, then so much the worse for those theories!

What is Craig's solution? This only shows that the definitions need to be revised. Indeed, the standard procedure in terms of which proposed definitions of causality are assessed is typically to propose some counter–examples in terms of intuitively plausible cases of causation and then show how the definition fails to accommodate these new cases. In the same way, if God's causing the universe cannot be accommodated by current philosophical definitions of causality, then that plausibly constitutes a counter–example to the definition, which shows that it's inadequate as a general metaphysical analysis of the causal relation, however adequate it might be for scientific purposes.

mattdamore

wiploc,

When I say universe, I mean the collection of all time, space, matter, and energy.

This ignores the necessay conclusion reached in the deductive KCA. If KCA is valid and sound (you now agree with validity, and soundness I can provide if you want) then the logical implications of the conclusion would rule out the truth of your premise 2. Those logical implication were made above when I said: If it's the case that the universe is finite, and that because whatever begins to exist has a cause, then the conceptual analysis enables us to recover a number of striking properties that must be possessed by such an ultramundane being. For as the cause of space and time, this entity must transcend space and time and therefore exist atemporally and nonspatually, at least without the universe. This transcendent cause must therefore be changless and immaterial, since timelessness entails changelessness and changelessness implies immateriality. Such a cause must be beginningless and uncaused, at least in the sense of lacking any antecedent causal conditions. This entity must be uminaginably powerful, since it created the universe without any material cause. Other reasons can be offered for this cause to be personal, but I find this superfluous.

Plus, I don't think there is any evidence for the truth of your Premise 2.

I don't really follow what you mean here.

mattdamore

fishbulb,

Could you explain this a little more.

Well, the conclusion is monumental in that it gives the universe a beginning which would require a cause which possess attributes akin to the God of the apologists; something which naturalism couldn't account for.

Which one would you like to discuss, 1 or 2?