phaedrus

Vork,

Umm, the tone continues i see. Maybe instead of jumping around .....you should have noticed Part I.

Will wait till then......

jp

Vorkosigan

Phaedrus, you haven't read anything on this topic, but you're convinced you must be right while attempting to assume the moral high ground. Then you regurgitate propaganda claims at me that have been refuted again and again. How do you expect me to react?

Here was your opening post:

• Umm...the old nuking-japan-was-good argument ...propaganda does seem to work........check this old thread ....whch veered towards the hiroshima in the middle...

You accused me and others of falling for propaganda. The tone was set by you. Yet throughout this thread you have done nothing but ask questions and show basic ignorance of the events under discussion.

But you can cut this whole conversation short simply by supplying us with the genuine peace feeler -- an offer to end the war, withdraw from China, and occupied areas elsewhere, and submit to occupation -- that originated from the Japanese government and was rejected by the US. That would make your case and destroy mine.

Vorkosigan

phaedrus

vork,

Ahh that line.....well guilty as charged. But didnt you make a reference to BTW, the tone of my post was based on your posting Chomsky as though I were the dupe in this case. And i showed you how the chomsky line was a part of the old thread and you did make an appearance in the old thread and then vanished for whatever reason.

why dont you respond to part I and we will take it from there. And regarding ignorance, talk about yourself. Questions? What else does one do ? Make statements? Moral highground?

The point is.... was nuking japan morally justified or from a military POV too. Dont keep landing up at genuine peace feeler et al......there are enough things truman & co could have done, that would have averted the nuking. End of the day, one could also ask questions like, if the same number of people died due to conventional bombing, would there have been so much hoopla about the whole thing?

jp

ps: btw, "us" refers to who all?

Vorkosigan

[QUOTE
why dont you respond to part I and we will take it from there. And regarding ignorance, talk about yourself. Questions? What else does one do ? Make statements? Moral highground? [/b]

No problem. The tone will henceforth vanish.

The point is.... was nuking japan morally justified or from a military POV too. Dont keep landing up at genuine peace feeler et al......

There were no genuine peace feelers.

The question was also posed at the time in another form, Phaedrus: would the US be justified in not using a potentially war winning weapon?

Nuking Japan was I think, justifiable with the information Truman had in his possession. However, history, I think, has overwhelmingly shown that it was the correct action to take at the time. It ended the killing instantly and saved thousands, if not millions of lives.

there are enough things truman & co could have done, that would have averted the nuking.

They did them. Japan was finished. It was getting it to end the war that was the problem.

End of the day, one could also ask questions like, if the same number of people died due to conventional bombing, would there have been so much hoopla about the whole thing?

Obviously not, since far more people died in the conventional bombings!

Vorkosigan

phaedrus

vork

Nice to get back to civility. Thanks. Could you deal with the first part of my response. We can take it from there

jp

azazel

This discussion is too long and I don't have the time/. But here's my two cents anyway.

Dresden was declared an open city by the reich to protect it's cultural value. There were no significant military forces garrisoning the city (Panzer divisions or the like). The city didn't manufacture much in terms of arms. I'm not asking you to research this all, so you'll just have to settle for Vonnegut's Schlachtoff Funf.

Manila was an open city as well. And guess what? It was american territory, yet it took the most pounding of all urban centers in the pacific theatre. Though it was obvious beyond doubt that the populace and yanks would root out the japs eventually (after all, you cant properly defend a territory where the populace is on the side of the invaders). but no, the yanks decided american lives mattered more. the bombs had to drop. up to now, Manila's buildings have yet to regain their pre-war nobility.

Blixy Sticks

But wait a second, this article supports the same contention. In the "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" thread you completely discounted the article from The New American, because that organization is an affiliate of the John Birch Society. Your claim is that the John Birch Society is "nuts," so, therefore, this article must have no validity. That's rather narrow-minded, wouldn't you say? The author's points are well supported, whereas, a great many of your points are not. At least I am not spouting off regurgitated facts without supplying the source of each and everyone of those facts like you and harrije appear to do on a consistent basis. Start revealing a source for every fact you throw forth so everyone here can attack the source, like you are apparently accustomed to doing.

I would ask that everyone read the article and base your opinion of it on its own merits as opposed to discounting it because it was put forth by The New American.

Actually, I find the article highly ironic in relation to your position, Vorkosigan. You claim that the issue of peace-feelers is propaganda created by the Japanese Right-Wing Facists. How interesting to place The John Birch Society in bed with the Japanese Right-Wing Facists. Oh my, Vorkosigan has his jockstrap in a tangle around his ankles.

The evidence is there and proves that the war with Japan was extended needlessly. Truman wanted to submit explicit terms of surrender to the Japanese well in advance of dropping the A-Bombs, yet Marshall resolutely disaffirmed the notion, calling it premature. Marshall wanted to make the Japanese pay with as much blood as possible and he saw to it that FDR and Truman acted, accordingly. It's a shame the other members of the USA War Council did not have the balls to stand up to Marshall. If they did, then we would not be having this discussion. That is the lesson that should be taken from this tragic event.

Vorkosigan

But wait a second, this article supports the same contention.
In the "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" thread you completely discounted the article from The New American, because that organization is an affiliate of the John Birch Society. Your claim is that the John Birch Society is "nuts," so, therefore, this article must have no validity.That's rather narrow-minded, wouldn't you say?[/b]

Yes, and if you go over to the Institute for Historical Research, you can read tightly and beautifully written articles that the Holocaust never happened and Hitler took loving care of the Russian people who had the good fortune to be occupied by the Germans. I suppose it is narrow minded of me to reject those brilliant works.....I confess it. I am narrow-minded, to the point that I require solid evidence and argument. A personality fault, I suppose. <sigh>

The author's points are well supported, whereas, a great many of your points are not. At least I am not spouting off regurgitated facts without supplying the source of each and everyone of those facts like you and harrije appear to do on a consistent basis.

Blixy: you want to know why? Because the kind of stuff Harrije and I are putting forth is basic historical knowledge. Citing a source for that would be like citing a source for the claim that four Japanese carriers were lost at the Battle of Midway or that the Incas built a large city on the plain at Cuzco.

Start revealing a source for every fact you throw forth so everyone here can attack the source, like you are apparently accustomed to doing.

Read through the articles...the sources are all there, son. I extensively used The Last Great Victory and Toland's The Rising Sun Vol 2 as well as Skate's The Invasion of Japan and touchedn on Craig's The Fall of Japan and Lee's Marching Orders. My copy of Frank's Downfall is out on loan, sadly, or my threads would be smokin' even more. These are all basic works that you should be familiar with if you want to participate in a discussion with Harrije or myself.

I would ask that everyone read the article and base your opinion of it on its own merits as opposed to discounting it because it was put forth by The New American.

Indulge me. Find me the same facts in a more reliable publication.

Actually, I find the article highly ironic in relation to your position, Vorkosigan. You claim that the issue of peace-feelers is propaganda created by the Japanese Right-Wing Facists. How interesting to place The John Birch Society in bed with the Japanese Right-Wing Facists. Oh my, Vorkosigan has his jockstrap in a tangle around his ankles.

I am sorry....Japanese anti-American facists in bed with American anti-establishment facists? The ironic contradiction there would be....????

The evidence is there and proves that the war with Japan was extended needlessly. Truman wanted to submit explicit terms of surrender to the Japanese well in advance of dropping the A-Bombs, yet Marshall resolutely disaffirmed the notion, calling it premature.

See the text of the Potsdam resolution. It clearly asked only for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese army, as the Japanese themselves knew, and preserved the Emperor, as the Japanese themselves knew. Concrete terms would only be seized upon by the military and made into excuses to continue the war -- as the Potsdam terms actually were.

Marshall wanted to make the Japanese pay with as much blood as possible and he saw to it that FDR and Truman acted, accordingly.

LOL. Blixy, I'm not going to debate nonsense with you. Please find me a mainstream text with these claims. Do you know anything about the political beliefs of the Birchers, BTW? Do you know how many times they have been busted for making bogus claims about WWII?

Marshall worked to ameliorate the unconditional surrender policy and called for dozens of studies to undermine it. See Skates The Invasion of Japan p 54-5 for a thumbnail of his views. In fact, Marshall forced the Joint Chiefs of Staff to cook their conclusions so that they would support softening the unconditional surrender demand. The original studies, done in the spring of 1945, concluded that there was no way to force Japan to accept unconditional surrender prior to the middle of 1946, although they might accept some kind of surrender before the end of 1945. In other words, your source doesn't know what it is talking about.

It's a shame the other members of the USA War Council did not have the balls to stand up to Marshall. If they did, then we would not be having this discussion. That is the lesson that should be taken from this tragic event.

Blixy, do you honestly believe that the "lesson" of the A-Bomb decision is that if George Marshall tells me to do something, I should have the guts to stand up to him?

Look, Blixy, you don't really seem too familiar with the situation in 1944 and 1945. I am trying to avoid being nasty and sarcastic, so just for you, I'll go over the article in detail. The cited article is here

I'll skip the background and start with the meat:

• [i]. But in fact the Japanese had sent peace feelers to the West as early as 1942, only six months after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. More would come in a flood long before the fateful use of the atomic bombs.[i]

Here is a vague claim with no details. No peace feelers were sent in 1942, needless to say, none were ever sent, right up to the end, in fact. All you have to do, Blixy, to prove this statement wrong is bring me the peace feeler originating from the government itself.

• In her book, Brown supplied abundant evidence about the immense perfidy that kept the Japanese from surrendering until such time as the Soviets were ready to enter the war against Japan and the American forces had dropped the atomic bombs on civilian populations.

Again, a vague claim with no details. The reason this cannot be refuted is that there is no argument here to refute.

• Even before Japan started the war, its leadership was divided into two sharply opposing factions. Those who never wanted any hostilities between Japan and the United States were known as "the peace party." They counted among their number Emperor Hirohito and several high officers in the navy.

Completely incorrect on every count:
Even before Japan started the war, its leadership was divided into two sharply opposing factions.

First, the military alone was divided into more than 100 factions, which fell roughly into several major groups, the most important being the Control Faction and its opponent, a loose group of expansionists grouped around a number of hothead officers. See the first volume of Toland's The Rising Sun or Ienaga Saburo's brilliant The Pacific War for the story of these. David Bergamini's Japan's Imperial Conspiracy also goes into almost mad detail on the personalities and roles of each and every Japanese officer of any importance.

Such an accounting of factions does not even begin to describe the swirling whirlwhind of noble, military, diplomatic, political, and corporate factions in pre-WWII Japan. The idea that there were two broad factions is a laughable miswriting of history. You'd have to review one of the major histories, like E.H. Norman's collected writings in The Origins of the Modern Japanese State to get some feel for the complexity of Japanese politics in the prewar era.

Those who never wanted any hostilities between Japan and the United States were known as "the peace party."

This is also laughable. All Japanese officials of any authority were expansionists; that was the prevailing political attitude. The major split was between the Army, which wanted war against Russia, and the Navy, which wanted expansion into SE Asia and the Pacific. There was never any "peace party." Hostilities with the US were viewed as a regrettable outcome that had to be embraced if Japan was to expand (extensive wargamining and analysis had convinced the Japanese that the US would enter any war against Britain and the Dutch). For example Yamamoto, writing in 1940 to Shimada, stated "The probability is great that the launching of our operation against Netherlands Indies will lead to na early commencement of war with America, Britain and Holland before those operations are half over. Consequently, we should not launch out on the southern operation unless we are at least prepared to face such an eventuality and are, moreover, adequately equipped..." (cited in Prange At Dawn We Sleptp11). Pearl Harbor was Yamamoto's answer to this strategic problem. Although he is often portrayed as some kind of peaceful man tragically dragged into war, the truth is that he was an expansionist who favored southern expansion and was against war with the US as unwinnable. No ranking Japanese were in favor of peace in 1941.

They counted among their number Emperor Hirohito and several high officers in the navy.

Hirohito supported the war from the start. In later writing his role was whitewashed and softened, but scholarship has shown how vital a part he played. See Bergamini's Japan's Imperial Conspiracy or Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan for two views of this.

• The other faction, the militarists led by Army leader Tojo, was known as "the war party." It was this group's belief that Japan should rule the Pacific and most of the lands touching it. These individuals were responsible for launching the vicious attack on our naval base at Pearl Harbor, Japan's only victory of any consequence during the entire war.

Another farrago of errors. Looking more closely at it.

The other faction, the militarists led by Army leader Tojo, was known as "the war party."

Actually, Tojo was head of the Control faction, whose goal was expansion under the overall control of the Emperor. The hotheads wanted to go it regardless of the Imperial Will (in Bergamini this split is merely political theatre orchestrated by the Throne). Tojo was put into place in order to control the hotheads. Again, see any of the major works referenced above -- Toland, Bergamini, Ienaga. There was never any "War" party as such; almost all Japanese politicos of whatever faction were Pro-War.

These individuals were responsible for launching the vicious attack on our naval base at Pearl Harbor, Japan's only victory of any consequence during the entire war.

Actually, Tojo had nothing to do with it. The idea of a strike on Pearl Harbor was conceived by the US originally as a wargame in 1932 and copied and elaborated brilliantly by the Japanese over the years. It was a staple of Japanese military fiction during the interwar period. As for Pearl Harbor being "Japan's only victory of any consequence during the entire war," the author is smoking dope. The falls of Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Indochina were much greater. This of course ignores the spectacular Japanese successes in China.

Midway was actually a dramatic turning point in the war, a realization shared by many in Japan's leadership.

Another historical error. The dramatic turning point was Guadalcanal, which many bright Japanese realized signaled that the war had turned against them. Midway was too early, and there was another problem: the extent of the destruction at Midway was unknown in broad government circles until 1944. Even Tojo, the Prime Minister, was not told for months. The debacle was hidden from everyone by the Navy. One reason that the government would not surrender is that the military had hidden the realities of the war from the other parts of the government, including other parts of the military. Again, see Vol 1 of Toland's Rising Sun or Prange's Miracle at Midway for the complete story. On page 931 of Vol 2 Toland describes the conspiracy to circumvent military secrecy and feed information on the true course of the war to top officials.

• After Midway and prior to the U.S. assault on Guadalcanal in August 1942, as reported in his 1950 book Journey to the Missouri, Toshikasu Kase, an official of the Japanese Foreign Office, delivered a highly confidential message to the interned British ambassador, Sir Robert Craigi. It contained a "discreet hint regarding the eventual restoration of peace." Emanating from Japanese Foreign Minister Togo, this message stated, "Should it happen that the British Government became desirous of discussing or negotiating peace they would find the Japanese Government ready to be helpful."

What is left out, of course, is that the Japanese intended that "peace" would enable them to keep everything they had taken in China, the Pacific and SE Asia. That is not a "peace" offer but a cease-fire. Certainly, the US government could have made peace at any time, if it had been willing to sell out China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and its own people.

• Admiral Ernest J. King reported President Roosevelt's 1942 understanding that "by the application of sea power, Japan could be forced to surrender without an invasion of her home islands"

Quite true. And by 1944, war had made everyone realize what a hopeless idea that was.

• Toshikasu Kase wrote that on June 26, 1944, Baron Kido, a close adviser to the Emperor, "sent for Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and asked him if he would work out some plan looking toward an eventual diplomatic settlement of the war." The only unwavering stipulation sought by anyone in the Japanese "peace party" was the retention of the Emperor and the continuance of the monarchy.

Another set of nonsense. Let's do it line by line:

Toshikasu Kase wrote that on June 26, 1944, Baron Kido, a close adviser to the Emperor, "sent for Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and asked him if he would work out some plan looking toward an eventual diplomatic settlement of the war."

Quite true. Kase and the others wanted the war ended with the troops in place so that Japan could exploit her gains.....in fact, Tojo himself had wanted the war ended in 1942....but with the proviso that Japan keep everything it had taken. Do you think that would have been acceptable to the US? Tojo's proposal was dismissed as naive by the Japanese ambassador to the US: "It is easier to start a war than end one," he told the prime minister bluntly. See Toland Rising Sun Vol 2 for discussions of the plot and counterplot, assassination and secret meeting, that revolved around a small group of conspirators

BTW, who was Toshikasu Kase? Do you know? He was a secretary to Togo, the Foreign Minister. In other words, a nobody.

• But America's leaders began trumpeting the need for "unconditional surrender" without ever spelling out exactly what that would mean. Many Japanese feared that the Americans intended to force the termination of their culture, even the denigration of their deeply revered Emperor. They had good reason for such concerns. By July 3, 1945, the Washington Post alluded to such a concern: "Senator White of Maine, minority leader, declared ... that the Pacific war might end quickly if President Truman would state specifically just what unconditional surrender means for the Japanese."

Let's deconstruct more nonsense:
But America's leaders began trumpeting the need for "unconditional surrender" without ever spelling out exactly what that would mean.

Actually, America's leaders spelled it out plainly. See, for example the Zacharias broadcasts outlined in Craig The Fall of Japan. By the end of July all influential Japanese knew exactly what it meant; one need only read the entries for July 26 and July 27 in The Last Great Victory. Tojo himself, in his first act as a jushin, placed the unconditional surrender/continue the war dichotomy in perspective during the discussions held on April 5, 1945, when Suzuki became prime minister. After Tojo raised the issue, all present hastened to assure him that the war would be prosecuted to the bitter end and that there would be no surrender. See Toland's account of this meeting on p 851-4 of Vol 2 of The Rising Sun.

"Unconditional surrender" was used by the military as a catch-phrase to enable them to continue the war. I will repeat my discussion of this point from above. We're talking about the "peace negotiations" with Russia:

****"Additionally, not everyone in the government was convinced that Russia was a dead end. Who was going to send Konoye to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire with Russian backing? Hirohito. And the military wanted to continue the war. Remember, Sato is in Moscow and has only the vaguest idea of what is going on in Tokyo. He has no idea if anyone is listening to him or not, which accounts for the increasing desperation in his cables as he requests clarifications for surrender plans that do not exist. As he himself said in a decrypted message: "My first responsibility is to prevent the harboring of illusions which are at variance with the reality." He knew that the war was futile -- "How much reserve strength does Japan have for continuing the war?" he asked in another cable. But because he was in Moscow, not Tokyo, he had no clue as to the actual control by the military.
[list]As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender[list]

No. The problem was the attitude of the Japanese, who were using unconditional surrender as an excuse. You will note that the cable above was sent on July 25. The context is completely missing, as it usually is in such propaganda presentations. This was an instruction from Togo to Sato, who is not discussing realities but instead is telling Sato what attitude he is to take with the Russians. Togo added at the end of this cable specifically that this was not a 'peace feeler' (exact words) but "obedience to Imperial command." In other words -- and I can't emphasize this enough -- this is an out-of-context quote that actually demonstrates that Japan's stance on unconditional surrender was a negotiating tactic designed to give the military cover to continue the war."*****

The military knew full well that surrender was negotiable (they continually generated lists of terms, tediously laid out in Ienaga, Franks, Bergamini and other works. In any case, if Japan had serious questions, the two nations maintained contact in Switzerland where there was a 24-7 channel for discussion of POW issues and suchlike. In other words, this claim is obnoxious nonsense.

that the Pacific war might end quickly if President Truman would state specifically just what unconditional surrender means for the Japanese.

Potsdam cleared up all confusion on that issue, if any had existed beforehand (which none did). Review the entries above that I presented in the previous posts, or read the extensive discussions in Toland, Vol 2, and Weintraub's The Last Great Victory. All ranking Japanese leaders were aware of the actual situation, and all understood it by July 28, 1945. Yet the war did not end, and no plans were formulated on the Japanese side to end the war.

• In his 1954 book The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur, Frazier Hunt reported that Owen Lattimore, the deputy director in charge of Pacific Affairs of the Office of War Information, "called on President Truman and remonstrated against the government taking any position which would enable the monarchy to remain in Japan." According to Hunt, Lattimore had violated policy by using his office to attack the Emperor, even recommending that the Japanese monarch be exiled to China. Attacking Japan's monarchy could only lead to prolonging the war and opening the door to Soviet presence in Asia. As would subsequently be revealed, Lattimore had reason to act as he did: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee would conclude a few years later that Lattimore "was from some time in the middle 1930s a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy."

The McCarthy Era demolition of Owen Lattimore was one of the nation's great shames. Lattimore was a brilliant scholar and a great man. That the Birch Society agrees with this nonsense simply shows what complete facists they are. No evidence that Lattimore was a spy was ever adduced by anyone, needless to say, and no one today believes he was, except a few right-wing facist nuts. I don't want to waste much time on this shit, so a few links will establish how Lattimore was eventually cleared.
Interview with one of Lattimore's co-experts

Timeline and lecture notes for whole mess.

• Once Saipan was in American hands, President Roosevelt journeyed to Hawaii to meet with our nation's top Pacific commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. Both emphasized that Japan could now be forced to surrender without an invasion of her homeland. In his 1950 book I Was There, Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's aide who was present at the meeting, confirmed that there was never any consideration given during the meeting to an invasion of the Japanese mainland.

No kidding there was no mention of an invasion at this meeting. It took place in July of 1944, or a year before the A-bomb was dropped! The question of invasion was not decided until the meetings on 1 April 1945, and reflected the conflict between the US Army and the Navy, which respectively supported invasion and bombardment and blockade. See Skates The Invasion of Japan. Planning for the invasion commenced on April 3, 1945. So I can't imagine why Nimitz, Truman and MacArthur would be discussing an invasion which did not yet exist. Those men were intelligent, but they were hardly psychic.

• In the fall of 1944, Emperor Hirohito attempted to make peace with China, but his efforts failed because Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek felt compelled to follow the lead of his wartime allies, Great Britain and the United States, neither of which was planning for an early Japanese surrender. The Emperor then made contact with a group of Siamese and had them send peace proposals to Washington. By now, the Japanese were aware of the alarming possibility that the USSR might be invited into the war.

Wow, this is plain lying. No other word for it:

In the fall of 1944, Emperor Hirohito attempted to make peace with China,

Ahem. Hardly. Hirohito blocked all peace proposals. The peace initiative came at the behest of Prime Minister Koiso, who thought it would be prudent to make peace with China prior to seeking peace with the allies. He chose as his go-between the corrupt Nationalist Chinese intriguer Miao Pin, who was simply using the Japanese to promote his own position. Shigemitsu, his foreign minister and a Chinese expert, severely chastised Koiso for his naive policies. In any case, after the fall of Leyte, the Koiso government was in no position to do anything, would fall within a few months. See Toland's discussion of the Emperor's rejection of peace initiatives and the Koiso government on pages 842-44 of The Rising Sun.

but his efforts failed because Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek felt compelled to follow the lead of his wartime allies, Great Britain and the United States, neither of which was planning for an early Japanese surrender.

Now that's comedy. Everybody knows that Chiang used the UK and the US to get what he wanted by threatening to leave the war at any moment. That's basic knowledge of the war.

• More peace overtures were being sent by Japan through various channels. In No Wonder We Are Losing, Robert Morris stated that "the Japanese had explored the possibility of a negotiated peace through the Vatican as early as November 1944." Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn noted in his 1990 book Leftism Revisited that the Japanese had tried to arrange peace "in April 1945 through the Vatican."

Ahh, the mysterious Vatican peace initiative. Which Japanese tried this route? No details are given, of course. In April 1945 the Japanese government fell and no peace initiatives were possible. In fact on May 12 (see Toland Vol 2 p 922) the Big Six discussed ending the war and rejected the Vatican route: "In this conspiratorial atmosphere they candidly discussed possible mediation by Switzerland, Sweden, or the Vatican and concluded that these channels would undoubtedly end in the Allies' demand for unconditional surrender."(p922). Togo ended that meeting by pointedly asking everyone to give up their fantasies about Russia and demanding that the Japanese negotiate a cease-fire with the US. It is hard to see how the Japanese were rejecting a channel in May that they had allegedly been using just a couple of weeks previously. Perhaps the Birchers have their facts wrong.

• Arnold referred to Admiral Leahy as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but to Marshall as the spokesman. I therefore came to the inescapable conclusion that, when I read that "the Army" or "the Joint Chiefs" had decided upon such-and-such a strategy, the decision was invariably that of General Marshall.*

This passage is wrong. You will note that it relies on testimony from far right sources and dismisses one of Roosevelt's advisors as a pro-Communist. The Birchers see Communists under every bed. I won't deal with this whole paragraph here because I did so above, at the beginning of the thread. Those interested in the real story may consult any one of millions of books on Marshall.

• On June 14, 1951, Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered to the Senate a review of the career of George Marshall. His speech, the product of journalist Forest Davis' research, detailed Marshall's incompetence as a military official, his rise to prominence within the military through political connections, and his diplomatic disloyalty to the United States and its true allies. The speech was later published in book form as America's Retreat From Victory.

We are now deep in la-la land. A speech by McCarthy is cited as historical evidence that Marshall was "disloyal" to the United States. McCarthy is clearly clinically insane. I see no reason to even bother with this nonsense.

• One of the most compelling was transmitted by General MacArthur to President Roosevelt in January 1945, prior to the Yalta conference. MacArthur's communiqué stated that the Japanese were willing to surrender under terms which included:
  
  • Full surrender of Japanese forces on sea, in the air, at home, on island possessions, and in occupied countries.
  
  • Surrender of all arms and munitions. · Occupation of the Japanese homeland and island possessions by allied troops under American direction.
  
  • Japanese relinquishment of Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa, as well as all territory seized during the war.
  
  • Regulation of Japanese industry to halt present and future production of implements of war.
  
  • Turning over of Japanese which the United States might designate war criminals.
  
  • Release of all prisoners of war and internees in Japan and in areas under Japanese control.

I do not know where this nonsense comes from. Obviously this is not the case. The Koiso government never drew up terms for surrender; it was completely overshadowed by the military and could never have done such a thing. See Ienaga, Toland, Bergamini, or any similar work. These terms were never at any time acceptable to the Japanese. Even as late as August the military was still holding out for only a token occupation.

• In his 1963 book How the Far East Was Lost, Professor Anthony Kubek told of a July 6, 1945 message sent to the State Department by American diplomats in Sweden which claimed "that Prince Carl Bernodotte, nephew of King Gustov, had been told by the Japanese military attaché in Sweden that Japan had lost the war and wanted to enter surrender negotiations through the King of Sweden."

Upside down and backward. The move was initiated by Bernadotte, not the military attache Onodera. See Toland (p915). Unfortunately, it leaves out the fact that Japanese government shut down this negotiation in a cable cited in Toland (p.916):

"JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END, BUT WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT SOMONE IS CONDUCTING A PEACE MOVE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. YOU ARE TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER AND REPORT YOUR FINDINGS."

This was triggered by the Swedish Foreign Minister's complaint that the diplomatic plan bypassed regular channels. The putz protested to the Japanese Ambassador in Stockholm, which resulted in the cable killing the move. The Japanese routinely killed all peace moves. You can see how the Birch society stands things on its head.

I've really had it with refuting this Bircher nonsense. I've wasted too much time on it. Blixy, you need to do some reading. I'll leave third party readers who have it this far with the last part of this Bircher tract:

• In our times the portentous event is the atomic bomb which creates general insecurity and is credited with effecting a total change in mankind's destiny since it can no longer be called a "single event" but a permanent state with which we shall have to live from now on. Accordingly, voices are already heard that, living as we do "in the shadow of the bomb," our traditional moral assumptions will have to be reconsidered. Religious leaders declare that the existence of "the bomb" has so activated our awareness of science that, as Paul Tillich says, "we must forget everything traditional we have learned about God, perhaps even that word itself." Political leaders, fearful of the final cataclysm of nuclear annihilation, say that men must huddle together under a world government .... (Emphasis added by Birchers.)

In other words, these Bircher nuts believe that the a-bomb was dropped to make everyone believe that they should form a world government. This is emphasized by their conclusion:

• Without doubt, war is hell. But World War II in the Pacific was hell for at least six months more than was needed. And when it was finally over, the real winners were the conspirators who had done their very best for Josef Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and world government.

I think I'll let the laughter of the spectators refute that.

Vorkosigan

phaedrus

Vork

part I ?

Vorkosigan

I have no idea what part I is. Sorry.

Vorkosigan