long winded fool

No. Sperm and unfertilized eggs are not members of the species homo sapiens sapiens. They are cells which are produced by members of the species homo sapiens sapiens. The sperm and egg are not examples of the species independent from the species which produces them. While a zygote is also a group of cells produced by a human being, it is an independent example of the species from the species which produces it. Cloning a sperm cell will produce a replica of the man who produced the sperm. Cloning an egg cell will produce a replica of the women who produced the egg. Cloning a zygote will produce neither a replica of the man who provided the sperm, nor the woman who provided the egg. It will produce a replica of the human being that is the zygote. You are correct if you're saying that sperm and eggs have the potential to develop into a human being, which then has the potential to develop into a person. You are incorrect that the line of potential personhood must be extended to a thing which is not a human being and therefore cannot develop personhood. The sperm or egg cells can NEVER become a person. Humanity must exist before personhood can develop, and human beings are more than just sperm or eggs. There are no sperm or egg cells which are people. There are human beings which have developed from the combination of sperm and eggs cells which are people. Sperm and egg cells do not have human rights. Things which are humans have human rights.

Sperm and egg cells cannot be extended rights by applying rights only to members of the human species, since they are not members of the human species, though they are a part of members of the human species. This is a fallacy of categorical division.

yguy

Taken at face value that is obvoiusly false, since consent can be withdrawn at any time, without regard to whether such withdrawal produces unwanted consequences for the grantor of consent. IOW, if you and I enter into a contract and I decide I don't like the deal, you are obviously not the least bit culpable solely on the basis of my change of heart.

long winded fool

This is not logical. What is personhood? You refer to #'s 3 and 4. If I'm reading you right, a person is something that has been in the past capable of things you consider to be criteria for persons and will be capable of things in the future you consider to be criteria for persons. There cannot be a time of first becoming a person because a history of personhood is required for the definition of person to apply. There cannot be a time of ceasing to become a person, since a future of personhood is required for the definition of person to apply. Your definition of person therefore cannot be based on history or potential. The present state of a thing is the only relevant identification for what it is.

If this is the basis for your argument you've shot yourself in the foot. A human blood sample in the lab is not a human. If you can understand the logic of this sentence, you can understand why the above appeal is not logical. Your appeal is a textbook fallacy of eqivocation. The adjective "human" has a different definition than the noun "human." Rights apply to all things which are humans. Not all things which are of human origin. If all humans are also of human origin, then human rights apply to things of human origin if and only if such things are also humans. The state of being the a member of the set of all things which are the noun "human" is what grants a thing the right to life, regardless of its adjective description.

The reason ET is brought up is that any reasonable definition of personhood must include him. That shoots down definitions based on genetics. The first non-human person we encounter might very well not *HAVE* genetics--it might be a computer program.

I agree. This means that all persons ought to have rights. It does not mean that, if a species has the right to life because it contains persons, that nonpersons of said species can be excluded from this right to life, if rights are equal and inalienable.

No. All persons have the right to life. The mere fact that something might become a person in the future does not grant a right to life.

Then depending on your definition of "person," coma patients cannot have the right to life, and neither can infants or slaves. Unless you pin down exactly what is a person with a non-subjective definition, you open yourself to discrimination against humans by appeal to a nebulous definition. Because we're sure that adult humans are people doesn't mean that we can safely destroy any humans who may or may not be people. If we apply human rights to ALL HUMAN BEINGS, we can avoid discrimination. Incidentally, the only reason not to apply the right to life to all human beings is for the purpose of expressly discriminating against humans we find inconvenient. No appeals to women's rights can change this. That is the fundamental motive behind all pro-choice philosophy, whether one realizes it or not. No one can come to this conclusion without first desiring to discriminate against fetuses for the convenience of the majority. (Therefore, it is building a case around a conclusion which has already been decided to be true without examination.) It is rationalizing a selfish desire, however masked it is in pseudo-compassionate appeals to women's rights. Changing human rights to person rights is always solely about discrimination.

Note that the definition being discussed excludes thoses in irreversible comas. Note that the law tends to see it the same way.

It excludes all people logically, since no one can know for sure whether I have a past history of being a person or the future capability of being a person. By not thinking critically, I can logically exclude any human being I wish from personhood. "At this point in time, there is no absolutely concrete evidence for a past history of personhood, nor is there absolutely concrete evidence for future ability of personhood, therefore Joe is not a person and not subject to inalienable rights."

Alonzo Fyfe

Could you explain any link you might see between these statements and the discussion leading up to it?

I see no relevant connection at all -- it is as if you ended our last dialogue and started talking about something only vaguely related (because it includes the same word 'consent').

Your previous argument seems to be saying that the mother consented because nobody has culpability. Yet, the existence of culpability does not imply nonconsent, it assumes nonconsent. There is nothing to be culpable of unless one assumes nonconsent. So your argument is circular.

Besides, the point raised in my earlier post still stands (you never addressed it -- you simply ignored it and begged the question against it). Facts about B or C or any other person are totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not A consents. The question of A's consent is a question about A, not about B, or C, or anybody else. And changing the facts about B or C (e.g., giving them a "choice" or understanding them as "culpable") still has no relevance to whether A consented or not.


Edited to add:

I think I am figuring out where you are coming from.

(1) Nonconsent implies culpability.
(2) No culpability (in the case of abortion)
(3) Therefore, no nonconsent (or, in other words, the mother consented).

If this is your argument, it fails at the first premise.

(1) In fact, nonconsent implies (culpability and choice)
(2) No culpability (in the case of abortion)
(3) Therefore either no nonconsent (consent) or no choice.

"choice" here refers to the choice of the person using the mother's body, not the mother's choice. The issue is whether the mother consented to the use of her body by another. The absence of culpability on the part of the person using the mother's body does not, in itself, prove that the mother consented. The same result follows from the fact that the person using her body does not have the capacity of choice.

You have already granted the no choice option. Therefore, nothing in your argument compells me to accept the no nonconsent (or the mother's consent) option.

yguy

You took exception to my reasoning on what appears to be a flawed basis, and I pointed it out.

No, the mother has culpability because she consented. The only entity lacking culpability is the fetus, having had no power to excercise a choice in the matter by virtue of the actions of the parents.

If you refer to the connection between personhood and consciousness, I most certainly have. Those who claim a zygote lacks consciousness because it lacks a brain have no way to validate the claim, not even knowing what consciousness is, or when it exists or ceases existing.

Sorry, questions about a consensual (or not) relationship between A and B cannot be addressed independently of either party, unless we are talking about theoretical entities which have never drawn a breath.

Maybe not, but obviously there is more at issue than the mother's consent.

Dominus Paradoxum

Are you saying she consented in the case of a rape? Because if not, I think you should re-read Alonzo's post.

yguy

Nope.

I have, several times. What am I missing?

Alonzo Fyfe

So, you are now denying the original proposition that "no person may have use of another person's body without consent" in situations where "there is more at issue."

Which means that you would favor legislation allowing a person who needs a kidney, bone marrow, blood, or some other material from another person to go to court and compel that other person to provide it -- against their will -- whenever "there is more at issue."

Furthermore, the limit to the extent of the burden and even physical risk to the life and health of others -- in terms of the use of their bodies to keep me alive, and against their will -- is comparable to the most imposing and risky of "to-be-prohibited" pregnancies. Whereas the only limits that anti-abortion advocates argue for is that the life of the mother is at risk, I may have the courts pose any burden on another person -- against their will -- short of asking the court to actually kill the person to save my life.

Because whatever is included in the fetus's rights as a person -- in terms of imposing costs on the mother against her will -- should also be included in my rights, as a person, in terms of imposing costs on another -- against their will -- to save my life.

And you support this.

dk

Alonzo Fyfe: So, you are now denying the original proposition that "no person may have use of another person's body without consent" in situations where "there is more at issue."
dk: I would appeal to a more fundamental proposition, people can only assent or dissent on a matters they control. A pregnant women’s claim to choice (abortion) asserts a degree of control she can’t possibly exercise without omnipotence. If the human life in her belly poses no threat then she has no right to destroy it.

Alonzo Fyfe: Which means that you would favor legislation allowing a person who needs a kidney, bone marrow, blood, or some other material from another person to go to court and compel that other person to provide it -- against their will -- whenever "there is more at issue."
dk: Forcefully taking a kidney from an unwitting bystander through due process (legislature) presumes upon providence. If I deny my donor’s choice under the pretense of justice, then the law presents an eminent threat to my benefactors freewill. We can not sell a kidney to the highest bidder without impugning human freewill and subsequent goodwill. Citizen A’s two healthy kidney’s poses no threat, injustice or ill will towards Citizen B, who suffers from two diseased kidneys. If Citizen A can use a healthy kidneys to extort from Citizen B’s some monetary gain then human life becomes an economic commodity. On the other hand, if Citizen B can deprive Citizen A of freewill with due process then the law becomes a weapon. Jurisprudence lacks the omnipotence to manage a fair exchange of freewill for goodwill. To deprive any person of either threatens to deprive everyone of both. Justice deprived of free will and good will serves up ill will.

Alonzo Fyfe: Furthermore, the limit to the extent of the burden and even physical risk to the life and health of others -- in terms of the use of their bodies to keep me alive, and against their will -- is comparable to the most imposing and risky of "to-be-prohibited" pregnancies. Whereas the only limits that anti-abortion advocates argue for is that the life of the mother is at risk, I may have the courts pose any burden on another person -- against their will -- short of asking the court to actually kill the person to save my life.
dk: You presume life to be a burden that empowers women with a right to choose death as a solution to the problem of pregnancy. Life is not the burden you purport, therefore you’ve presented a false dichotomy. A pregnant women has no power to know the future, a right to exercise blind power over life and death. Like Oedipus’s Mother, Jocasta, she became destined to sorrow when she chose to abandon her own son to fate, rather than nurture her son with love. She sealed her own sorrow, her sons tragedy and her husbands death by wanton participation in the Oracles vision. She made life a burden for her own family by presuming upon providence with an act of betrayal.

Alonzo Fyfe: Because whatever is included in the fetus's rights as a person -- in terms of imposing costs on the mother against her will -- should also be included in my rights, as a person, in terms of imposing costs on another -- against their will -- to save my life.
dk: A mother that participates in the wanton abortion of her own Child exercises power without foreknowledge. If life is good then we can not secure a good life by blindly choosing death, for ourselves or anyone else. This is what is meant by, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Salmon of Doubt

No threat to what? Her physical safety? Her physical health? Her mental health? Her financial health? Her familial situation? Her happiness? Where do you draw the line at acceptable damage to the mother?