jlowder

What do you mean by "ontologically binding"? Perhaps you are saying something like this: "Okay, I grant that metaphysical naturalism has ontological room for moral properties. But I don't understand how such moral properties are 'binding' in the sense that they create obligations?" Is THAT your question? I don't know how else to interpret your statement.

I think more clarification is needed. What do you mean by "ontologically dutiful"?

Manion is begging the question. In particular, Manion is begging the question when he writes, "In the natural world we find no properties to which moral concepts correspond." I see nothing in Manion's statement that even addresses the arguments of Post, Brink, Q. Smith, T. Smith, Bloomfield, or Martin. Indeed, Manion's statement is akin to an atheist who says, "There is no evidence of God's existence," without even so much as addressing the various arguments for God's existence. That is NOT how one makes a prima facie case for a position!

Jeffery Jay Lowder

jlowder

To be correct, I accused Michael Ruse of committing the genetic fallacy.

I refer you to the works of the Tara Smith, Quentin Smith, John Post, Michael Martin, Paul Bloomfield, et al.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Dr. Retard

Plump-DJ wants to know how ethical naturalism could ground "ontologically binding" or "dutiful" ethical truths. I want to know two things:

(1) What is it for an ethical truth to be "ontologically binding" or "dutiful"? (What distinguishes ontologically binding ethical truths from other ethical truths, the ones that do not or cannot bind ontologically?)

(2) What, if true, could ground such truths and how would this grounding occur? (Ethical naturalism faces some test, and I want to know how the test works, and what meta-ethical theories would pass the test)

I might agree with you that it makes no sense for ethical naturalism to house such truths. But that might be because it makes no sense for anything at all to house such truths. Perhaps the very idea of such truths is itself nonsensical or unintelligible. Right now it's too soon to say.

Kingjames1 says that (metaphysical) naturalism can provide no clear basis for moral properties. I want to know two things.

(1) What are the characteristics of moral properties? (If we know this, then we can see whether naturalism and other metaphysical theories can provide a basis for them)

(2) What metaphysical theory (like naturalism) would provide a clear basis for moral properties, if it were true, and what is it for a metaphysical theory to provide a clear basis for properties? (Again, I want to know the test that naturalism is failing, how it works, and what could pass the test. Then I can decide if it's a good test)

I might agree with you that naturalism can provide no clear basis for moral properties. But that might be because no metaphysical theory at all provides any clear basis for moral properties. Perhaps the very idea of moral properties involved is unintelligible. Right now it's too soon to say.

[ November 02, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

kingjames1

Jeff,

again we seem to be missing each other. you say that you have answered the question of how fact gives rise to moral obligation, but as I said in my previous reply, you have not. You merely articulated Post's claim that (if there were) moral properties (they) could be determined or 'supervened' by natural facts without being themselves natural facts. This, as you can plainly see, is hardly an answer to the question of how facts constitute moral properties - it is merely an assertion that they do.

Moreoever, your continued insistence that I am "merely asserting" things fails to recognize your own guilt in the matter. I am asserting that metaphysical naturalism is incapable of sustaining moral properties (without presupposing them a priori), and you assert that moral properties are real and can be reduced to or at least determined by natural facts. You have certainly not made a case for this, however. In order to make such a case, you must show what a moral property is, that such exist (given metaphysical naturalism -- Post's arguments about the language of ethics could just as well demonstrate the inadequacy of metaphysical naturalism given in its inability to support an ethical realism [which is my take, as you know], which seems presupposed in our language), and then demonstrate how facts can determine oughts -- this implicitly demands that you answer Hume and Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy.' You simply eschew this challenge. However, it is a real problem recognized by ethicists, and indeed deserves some sort of an answer.

I will read Morriston's paper though in response to your request. I will give my response to the paper shortly, and perhaps then, having answered one set of challenges from your side, you might be kind enough to reciprocate.

Thanks,

J.

[ November 04, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

kingjames1

Yes it would. Fortunately, this is not my theology nor is in accord with a biblical understanding of God or goodness. It could no more be "good" to torture children (in any possible universe) than could God fail to be God.
This hypothetical suggestion is no different then supposing that in some possible universe killing children is desirable, and hurting people is for the greater 'good' (I suppose this would be bizzaro world) -- its just silly.

<strong>
quote:
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I don't know that I would agree to your labels in summarizing the biblical texts you listed (e.g. "cruelty to women"), but the answer is yes.
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Chopping the hand off a woman simply because she touched the genitalia of a man while trying to stop a fight (along with "showing her no pity") is indeed barbaric and cruel. I'm sorry you don't see that. And it would still be barbaric and cruel if a judge, king, president,.. or deity commanded it.
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It is interesting to note that your standard for cruelty historically developed in the Christian West. Christians have in the past viewed such laws as strange and even barbaric. The easy Christian response is to write them off as 'old covenant' - and indeed they are. However, given the law in its eniterty, it becomes apparent that these laws were necessary and good given the historico-cultural setting of the Israelites. You object to 'barbaric' law, but this was indeed a barbaric world the Israelites lived in. It is clear from subsequent revelation that these laws were in part accomodating to Ancient Near Eastern culture, in order to be applicable to their situation (consider Jesus' response to the Pharisees regarding the divorce procedures of Deuteronomy 24). The Law is both absolute and particular (i.e. the law as written in Exodus through Deuteronomy is a particular articulation of civil, moral, and ceremonial law for a theonomy - while being simultaneously the divine revelation of a transcendent God, and hence of abiding significance if not wooden application).

The question of the mutilation of the woman in repsonse to her attempting to 'favor' the fight for her husband by grabbing his assailants genitals is indeed difficult. Perhaps the law arose from the desire to protect the reproductive organs and thus obviate anything that might prevent a man leaving descendents -- a crucial issue in the ANE. This is in fact the only law in the Torah prescribing mutiliation (cf. the general principle of lex talionis in Deut.19:12, and see the other prescriptions regarding 'fighting' in Exodus 21). That mutilation is not a normal prescription is in itself remarkable, comparing Israelite law with their surrounding culture - e.g. the Code of Hammarabi or the Assyrian Code.



Again, good can be nothing other than what it is -- just as God could not be Satan in some other universe, or whatever. And again, you object to genocide from what is historically a Christian cultivated understanding of good and evil, cruelty and injustice, etc. You indeed correct in suggesting that the Israelites too were evil and depraved (as the OT testifies) - though probably not nearly to the extent as the Canaanites before them. When the Israelites behave in such destestable ways, the Lord threatened them through His prophets and promised blessing conditioned upon repentance and turning to justice for the oppressed, care for the poor and the alien, and to deal fairly in commerce. Failing to respond, as you know, God did to the Israelites what He did to the Canaanites through them -- "vomited them out of the land" in exile and destroying the nation of Northern Israel and later Judah.



Indeed, it is. And it is ironic that you should quote Pascal here - a Jansenist Catholic of conservative, Augustinian convictions. Of course you know that I do not believe that cruelty to women or genocide or 'extreme religious intolerance' good - I assume you're being rhetorical. Rather, I believe that loving God with all of one's heart, mind, soul and strength is good, and loving one's neighbor as one's self -- both commands from the Pentateuch. This is my basis - God the Maker and Redeemer has revealed Himself, and commanded that we love each other and Him in adoration and worship of His goodness and grace.

I wonder, then, what your basis is for believing that it is 'good' to treat people well? You seem to want to live like a Christian in this regard without the foundations. You argue that you base 'goodness' on what is beneficial and harmful to human beings. But why?

J.

jlowder

You seem to have confused which answer was intended to correspond with which question. In response to the question, "Why believe there are moral properties?", I provided the following answer:

This argument--not the argument about natural facts determining moral properties--is the answer to your question.

You haven't recognized the case I have provided.

To say that "Post's arguments about the language of ethics could just as well demonstrate the inadequacy of metaphysical naturalism" reveals a complete ignorance of Post and his writings. Post's book, The Faces of Existence, is a texbook on metaphysics written from a physicalist perspective. The chapter on facts and values opens up with the observation that the compatibility of moral properties with physicalism is not new; Post goes on to provide an argument for moral realism that is compatible with physicalism. You really ought to get a copy of Post's book via ILL and read the chapter for yourself; I can't recommend it highly enough.

Again, Post answers this in his book (and I believe I have summarized his answer on this board). I certainly do NOT "simply eschew this challenge." On the contrary, I provided an answer, which you have yet to reply to:

You have my replies to your challenges. I look forward to reading your reply to Morriston.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 04, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

kingjames1

Reply to Morriston's paper:

Interestingly Morriston speaks of "moral properties" as real but God as a useful (but apparently unnecessary in his estimation) fiction (though he does affirm some kind of mini-god), whereas I see God as the truly real and "moral properties" as useful intellectual constructs -- abstractions (like "meter") .

Morriston writes concerning the positions of Craig and Alston,

"There is one significant difference between Alston's formulation of this solution and Craig's. In Craig's formulation,God's moral nature is said to be the ultimate standard of moral goodness. In Alton's, it is God himself who is so identified."

This statement indicates that Morriston fails to appreciate the significance and meaning of the doctrine of divine simplicity. He indeed mentions the doctrine later, and even concedes that it bypasses the so-called Euthyphro dilemma he poses, but eschews it without argument: stating simply, "those of us who cannot see how God could be his nature and how his nature could be simple -- things are not so easy." This is perhaps a legitimate question, but hardly a thoughtful 'dealing' with the classical doctrine. The doctrine of simplicity states that God is simple, that is, he is not composed of parts, as though his "nature" was constituted by a multiplicity of separate properties or divisible into divine components. To use the classical language, God is a singular substance (“deity&#8221), which in turn is coextensive with his attributes: eternal, good, holy, just, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, sovereign, etc., and vice versa. These multiple properties or attributes are not separate realities but multiple perspectives on a single reality: God.
This doctrine shouldn't be dismissed so quickly, as Morriston has done. It is not unthinkable or incomprehensible that God’s various attributes are merely facets, perspectives, or ‘angles’ on the entire being of God. This does not mean that such perspectives are fictions or any less real; on the contrary, they are realities of deity from particular perspectives or dimensions. E.g. God's goodness is manifested as justice from one perspective, mercy from another, and love from yet another. Who would deny that all these things are good? And on the other side of the coin, who would deny that goodness is just, and loving, and merciful? Similar ‘perspectival’ approaches are employed in quantum physics - e.g. the specific mass, spin, and charge of an electron are not understood as isolated or separate entities, but facets of a singular wave-function. That we don’t understand exactly how spin is related to measured mass or charge, and so on, in no way diminishes their intreconnectedness.
Philosophically speaking, since God according to the Christian religion is the ultimate reality, it is not surprising that we should find both unity and multiplicity within the Godhead (cf. the ancient problem of the one and the many). The essential unity of God coheres with man’s cosmological and religious intuitions: “All the instincts and cultivated habits of reason lead us to refer the multiplicity of the phenomenal world backward and upward to a ground of absolute unity, which being infinite and absolute, necessarily excludes division and rivalry,” A.A. Hodge. God is one in substance, and He alone is absolute. The multiplicity of attributes in the one Godhead in turn accounts for how such wonderful diversity and multiplicity as seen in the world could come from one Ultimate Cause. It also prevents us from reducing God to a single, absolute principle or super-attribute, or to something akin to the catatonic god of Aristotle.
The unity of the divine being and attributes answers the problems that arise when considering the question of priority of attributes and properties, e.g. God’s love cannot be understood apart from his justice, nor his justice apart from his love (i.e. God never acts as righteous Judge without simultaneously acting as loving Creator). So which is primary? If, however, God’s attributes (including the eternality of his being) are simultaneous as to ‘logical priority’, then they are all equally essential to his deity, and hence identical with his deity/being. To see this, take Morriston’s definition of a person’s “nature” as those properties that exist in every possible world in which that person lives, and, “in the special case of God,” he writes, this “is generally thought to be every possible world.” In other words, God’s being ‘exists’ in every possible world, and so is itself a necessary ‘attribute’ or ‘property’. Hence, it would seem that his nature includes his existence! This of course is the heart of the so-called ontological proof. Some reject existence as an attribute (though why “necessary existence” should be put in a different category than the other necessary attributes is not clear to me in this case), and so neatly dismiss the argument. But however we understand “existence,” I think the biblical attribute of eternality (e.g. “The Ancient of Days,” “I AM that I AM,” “the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and End,&#8221) in itself demonstrates this point well enough: God’s nature includes his being.
Similarly, his being includes his nature. God’s eternal being cannot be understood as an empty absolute (e.g. "pure being"). It must always be the being of God – the good, loving, compassionate, just, and holy deity. God always exists as God, according to the attribute of immutability. In other words, God’s attributes are coextensive with his being. This is also apparent in the above statement that none of Gods’ necessary attributes are logically prior to the other. E.g. God’s eternal being is one of eternal goodness, and his goodness one with his being (i.e. eternal, infinite, personal, and absolute).
Thus his existence cannot be abstracted or understood apart from his nature, nor his nature apart from his being. To paraphrase Aquinas, because God is a necessary being (unlike any of us), his nature is his being, and his being, his nature. Hence, there is no significant distinction between God himself and God’s attributes (as though God can be so divided). This also means that goodness, justice, love, etc. (i.e. the attributes of God) are absolutes that necessarily exist only because God necessarily exists. And given the doctrine of unity, there are no absolutes apart from the one true God – hence my position.
Thus you can see how the horns of Morriston’s hackneyed dilemma are avoided in the doctrine of simplicity: God is good and good is God, simultaneously and absolutely (as Augustine argued over 1,500 years ago). Morriston’s rejection of this line of argumentation is essentially the rejection of the doctrine of the absolute unity of the Godhead. He may very well do that, but Morriston must recognize that in so doing, he will no longer be dealing with a Christian theology proper. Hence, it becomes necessary that he demonstrate (at least the possibility of) the existence of absolutes (e.g. moral properties) independent of God’s being if he is to argue his case against traditional Christianity – which he does not do here.

Because I thus reject Morriston’s dichotomizing of the divine being and nature, his arguments against Alston’s position are for the most part inapplicable to my position. However, I do disagree with the implications of Alston’s theory that goodness is merely a measure of conformity to God, or that God is the moral standard simply because moral properties occur ‘maximally’ in his person. It involves these things, yes, but it must be more than that, as some of Morriston’s arguments indicate.
But the question of the nature of moral properties is very interesting. Morriston looks at the analogy of the “meter,” which Alston uses. As is pointed out, a “meter” measures a fixed physical distance (measured by the speed of light in a vacuum). However, a “meter” is an abstract idea, a convention. One meter stick does not represent THE meter anymore than does an algorithm that prints out a meters length of text on command. Morriston rightly points out that the argument that God is the absolute standard of good simply because he is the exemplar of the good is inadequate.
Now, a meter stick is a convention that represents or indicates a certain fixed reality (i.e. a definite amount of space). The question then is, if God is a measuring stick, what is the reality he so supremely measures? A meter stick measures off a distance of space – we got that: a distance of space is well-defined, it is physical, and physically measured. But what in the world is ‘goodness’? In order to understand this, we must ask ourselves what is the ‘nature’ of “good”, what is our understanding of our own moral intuitions? If we think about ethics, we soon find that it deals with the personal, whether interpersonal relationships (e.g. lovers, friends, or even enemies) or personal ‘responsibilities’ w/regard to impersonal entities (e.g. stewardship of natural resources, money, time, etc.). Even the concept of responsibility presupposes someone to whom we are responsible. One philosopher said, “oughtness” takes place within the dynamic ‘field’ of personal relationships (another paraphrase). Morality then seems to be entirely concerned with the personal. How should we persons live, both individually and with others? To put it another way, the rules of ethics seem to be ‘laws’ pertaining to persons (for they obviously cannot pertain to the impersonal).
If we agree that moral properties pertain to personal and social behavior, an important question arises for atheists: suppose that persons never evolved (surely there is one such possible universe for an atheist, unless you can argue that consciousness is logically necessary – and good luck with that). Would there be moral properties? If so, what in the world could their meaning be? It is obvious that moral properties have no bearing or significance in an impersonal universe. This is a bit like asking whether the laws of geometry apply in a universe without spatial extension. The answer would seem to be “no”.
Does the existence of moral properties then somehow depend upon the existence of persons? If so, how? Are they dependent upon the evolution of self-consciousness (ala Posts outlines for moral dependency on natural fact)? If so, then since evolution is by all accounts an arbitrary process, ‘evolved moral properties’ are necessarily arbitrary as well, and hence non-binding, and so cannot be understood as truly obligatory.

It seems to me that the existence of absolute moral properties presupposes the existence of an absolute personality. How else to explain the irreducibly personal nature of morality and ethics? This, by the way, is part of the reason why abstract (impersonal) moral properties would seem to have no authority to bind the conscience or be obligatory to us person-folk.

BTW, I agree with those theologians that Morriston mentions who argue that the laws of mathematics, or rather the laws of logic (as well as the ‘laws’ of justice and mercy, etc.) depend on God in “some other sense.” I do not hold that God arbitrarily chooses what good is, or that 2 plus 2 equals 4 anymore than his nature is arbitrary, or subject to change. As St. Paul said, “God cannot deny himself,” and hence ‘must’ be consistent with own holy, good, just, merciful, and loving (and logically consistent) nature – but of course given divine simplicity, God never wills to the contrary of his nature/being, nor can he will otherwise, as an expression of his own inherent goodness, etc. Nevertheless, I hold that God’s being is the sole ground for all such absolutes, including the laws of logic (e.g. some theologians have speculated that the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction are rooted in the eternal triunity of the Godhead à the problem of the one and the many!)

Thanks,

J.

[ November 05, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

kingjames1

In response to jlowder

Moore's point in asking the question is why or on what basis do naturalists decide such and such a natural property is good. For example, if we suppose with some of the utlitarians that, that which benefits the greatest number of people is "the good" that we ought to pursue, the crucial question Moore asks is "how do we demonstrate that the greatest benefit is the greatest good?" Is this dogmatic? intuitive (as Moore argued)? revelational, etc.? For there seem to be cases where the greatest benefit for the greatest number is not good (e.g. the oppression of a small minority group who competes with the majority in a world of limited resources). This then is not merely a tautological or trivial question.

If natural property N is idenitified as good, then of course it is good -- that indeed is trivial. But the question is how do we recognize or acknowledge that N is good? That is why Moore asks whether we know N is good. But without a basis for determining the goodness of N, how will we ever make such an identification? BTW, the examples above are all social constructs (42nd president, naming the planet Venus or Morning Star), naming things with different labels (and hence is arbitrary) -- but to identify a natural property as "good" is more than mere labeling, it is an evaluation! How do we make such evaluations?

J.

KnightWhoSaysNi

I think there's a contradiction here. See below.

It may interest you to know that there are Christians today who don't regard the Israelite law as "old covenant." Perhaps you may have heard of the <a href="http://www.religioustolerance.org/reconstr.htm" target="_blank">Christian Reconstructionists</a> who seek to impose a totalitarian theocracy based on OT laws.

In addition, are you saying that cruelty and barbarism are okay if one lives in a cruel and barbaric world?

Yes, that's true. The OT prescribes a far more severe penalty than mutilation for 'crimes' such as picking up sticks on the sabbath. And no matter what 'historico-cultural' context you use, chopping a woman's hand off for grabbing a man's genitals in a fight is still a cruel and vicious thing to do. Let me ask you this. If you were an ancient Israelite in charge of law enforcement, would you really take an axe, place the poor woman's hand on the chopping block, and sever her hand at the wrist while "taking no pity on her"? If there was a problem of women grabbing men's genitalia in fights, don't you think there are far more benevolent and constructive solutions?


So in effect, the OT laws are evil based on a "Christian cultivated understanding of good and evil, cruelty and injustice."

Okay, I see a contradiction here. My view on morality is that actions with consequences that cause harm to humanity are bad, and what is beneficial to humanity is good. You claim this is "living like a Christian." So are you admitting that one need not appeal to the supernatural to understand the difference between right and wrong? In a few posts before, you equated "good" with "whatever God wills". Which is it? Are actions good because God commands them, or does God command actions because they are good? Does 'might make right' or 'sight make right'? Why wouldn't God command the torture of children? Could it be that he has to adhere to standards external to him?

As for why I have my view on morality? I suppose it comes down to one's self interest. If everyone was raping, killing, and stealing from each other, it would not be in my best interests if I wanted to live in safety and security and raising a family. Emotions come into play too. I dislike feeling guilt or shame when I have wronged someone. I feel good when I have helped someone (these emotions are likely rooted in an evolutionary/biological instinct likely comes into play here).

Though you may deny it, I think you are following your self interest in your worldview as well. You believe that an omnipotent deity exists and you think it's in your best interest to please it.

I think an example is an order if we wish to compare the merits of biblical vs. humanistic morality. Let's take 2 different societies: one that bases its laws on the <a href="http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html" target="_blank">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> and another on the laws of the OT. One is a very human document and the other is one many insist was inspired by an omnibenevolent deity. Which society would you prefer to live in?

[ November 08, 2002: Message edited by: Nightshade ]</p>

SRB

KJ
Moore's point in asking the question is why or on what basis do naturalists decide such and such a natural property is good.

SRB
Moore's open question argument is not restricted to highlighting problems with analysing goodness in terms of natural properties. Any attempt to analyse goodness in terms of any properties (including God's properties) has to deal with the same problems.

KJ
For example, if we suppose with some of the utlitarians that, that which benefits the greatest number of people is "the good" that we ought to pursue, the crucial question Moore asks is "how do we demonstrate that the greatest benefit is the greatest good?" Is this dogmatic? intuitive (as Moore argued)? revelational, etc.?

SRB
Two possibilities:

Option #1
It is an analytic truth that to be good is to have property N. Moore thought that all such definitional truths are self-evident to clear-thinking speakers of English. However, he was mistaken. We use terms like " "consciousness," "knowledge" and "good" every day, and seem to have a good understanding of them. However, it is not obvious how any of them is best analysed. It took a great deal of study of our concept of knowledge to arrive at the modern view that knowledge is best defined as "justified and true belief." Despite this, one can still sensibly ask, "B is a justified and true belief, but is B knowledge?" Similarly, the fact that it is an open question as to what counts as good does not show that goodness cannot be best defined in terms of natural properties.

Option #2
Being good is synthetically identical to having property N. Jeff mentions this possibility. Moore wrote at a time before philosophers understood the distinction between analytic and synthetic identity, so failed to realise this flaw. To demonstrate that the greatest benefit is the greatest good one would conduct an empirical investigation to establish that people generally use those two terms in a way such that they are co-referring, even if "good" does not have the same meaning as "has property N."

SRB