Philip Osborne

Morriston points out that God cannot bring about the state of affairs "someone or other freely commits an evil action." We can expand on this; God cannot bring about "someone or other learns under his or her own power" while many people (including Sam) can bring....

Your objection is interesting, but ultimately rests upon making the same mistake I mentioned earlier. The reason is that your objection depends upon assuming that the free will defense, and any variation of it, is unsuccessful. This is highly controversial, so it will simply not do to assume a certain position true. As I pointed out before, it would not do for me to say "In order for the argument from evil to work, it must be at least possible for God not to exist. But the ontological and cosmological arguments prove God's existence to be necessary, so the argument from evil fails."

Secondly, I think theists can reasonably hold that God may not have necessary moral perfection. God may have a nature that inclines him not to do evil, to a degree such that the likelihood of God doing evil is 1/infinity, or zero. While this may seem incorrect to some theists, I think others will find the idea of a God who can but chooses not to do evil appealing.

Theists may find that performing actions is more appealing than bringing about states of affairs, but I don't think they are necessarily correct. As I've argued before, performing an action is nothing more than bringing about the state of affairs in which you perform that action. So performing actions would be subsumed under the category of bringing about states of affairs.

This will be my last post in a while. Enjoy!

Sincerely,

Philip

Vanderzyden

Wait a minute K. Did you read the definitions I posted?

It would seem that you should acknowledge at least one thing before we go on to an elaboration of what creative power entails (which I already covered before in this thread).

What do you have to say about the Webster's definitions? How do they compare with mine?

Vanderzyden

[ October 21, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

Apparently, a clarification is in order before we proceed. What did you mean by this statement?

'I assert everything that is logically possible is actually possible.'

Vanderzyden

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"Apparently, a clarification is in order before we proceed."

I mean that my definition of "actually possible" is identical to my definition of "logically possible."

Thomas Metcalf

Thanks for your comments; they've been very helpful in drawing out objections to my thesis.

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"Your objection is interesting, but ultimately rests upon making the same mistake I mentioned earlier. The reason is that your objection depends upon assuming that the free will defense, and any variation of it, is unsuccessful. This is highly controversial, so it will simply not do to assume a certain position true."

I'm afraid I'm having a hard time seeing the connection between this and the free will defense. The following are states of affairs:
s1: someone or other learns independently of anyone else's influence
s2: someone or other freely chooses to do evil

These are both logically possible and possible for an agent to bring about. Yet, God cannot bring them about. I think we face a real problem when we define "omnipotent" such that (almost) no essential properties could conflict with it. For if God happened not to be able to tie His shoes, neither Sam nor God could bring about the state of affairs "God ties His shoes." It would be logically impossible.

As for necessary moral perfection, I agree that theists may choose not to believe God's moral perfection is not one of His essential properties. But even if God is only morally perfect in the actual world, this seems to be interderivable with, "Every time actual-world-God is faced with a moral choice where the options are not equally good, God chooses the better option." While this says nothing about anything prohibiting God from doing anything, it still seems to imply that we can predict ahead of time what God will do in any situation, with 100% certainty. To choose to stop being morally perfect is, itself, a morally imperfect choice.

Vanderzyden

I thought that we agreed previously that this is actually impossible. You appear to take the concept of creation too lightly. Let me reiterate: A being who has creative power over rock matter would be unable to create (your "make") anything that he did not have complete control over. That would include the following:

-- bringing the rock into existence
-- removing the rock from existence
-- disassembling the rock and reassembling at will, irrespective of location
-- moving a particular rock an indetectable small distance, or over long distances, without actually "touching" it!

On this view, then, the notion of making a rock too heavy too lift is absurd. Mapping this analogy to God, we see that nothing that could be created would be immovable by the Creator.

It would appear that this is your definition. That was my point. Your insistence on the equivalence of "logically possible" and "actually possible" makes this very clear:

Now, when I responded that your hypothetical beings were equally powerful, you wrote:

Am I? Perhaps you did not read my reply to K:

It would seem that you are unwilling to even consider that a measure of potency requires identification of the strongest powers and comparing them to other beings:

You are correct, but not fully. We must know what a being can do in relation to other beings. The greatest powers will determine who has the most power.

Vanderzyden

[ October 21, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]

<a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=47&t=001228" target="_blank">Evidence, Vanderzyden.</a>

[ October 21, 2002: Message edited by: Jobar ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"A being who has creative power over rock matter would be unable to create (your 'make') anything that he did not have complete control over."

Non sequitur. I didn't say this being had "creative power over rock matter." I said this being could create rocks. This being can do something (create a rock it can't lift) that God can't do.

Why do you think your definition of "omnipotent" is better than mine?

"It would seem that you are unwilling to even consider that a measure of potency requires identification of the strongest powers and comparing them to other beings:"

But remember, it is possible to imagine a more potent being than God, if beings with more abilities are more potent. Are they?

K

Vanderzyden:

All of these definitions except #2 and #3 definitions of almighty imply unlimited power. They don't even limit the power to the logically possible - let alone to creative power.

Great in magnitude or seriousness doesn't seem to apply since there are many things that are great in magnitude or seriousness.

I would accept that God be defined as relatively unlimited in power if that is the version of almighty that you are using. It would make sense to say that God is powerful relative to us.

That would also leave Satan with the title of almighty as I pointed out earlier. These uses of the words omnipotent and almighty are perfectly fine as far as I'm concerned, but I don't think most Christians would find it acceptable to call Satan omnipotent.

Vanderzyden

Those weren't my definitions. They came directly from the dictionary. The "logically possible" definition leads immediately to problems. If your equate "logically possible" with "actually possible", then you must consider the other traits of the being in question.

Again, no. I can't imagine a being more powerful than a creator. You have not shown a being that is stronger than one who has creative power.

You are attempting to show that all definitions of omnipotence describe a god that cannot possibly exist. The "creator" definition is robust, and is consistent with the God of the Bible. Creative power is adequate for omnipotence; no additional powers are necessary.


Vanderzyden

Vanderzyden

If you read about Satan in the Bible, you will find that his power is great, but limited. He is limited in his influence over human affairs, other angels. He has no creative power. In the end, he will be destroyed. So, no, he is not almighty.

The dictionary definitions do not include "anything" or what's "logically possible". There is no indication of this whatsoever. All the definitions are relative. Authority is the "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior ". "Absolute power over all" means that everyone else has significantly less power than the one with absolute power. #2 and #3 are explicity relative.

Again, my definition, omnipotence = unique supernatural creative power, is sufficient and is consistent with these "popular" definitions.


Vanderzyden