rainbow walking

Phillip: The fact that we must use observation to come to an understanding of something does not mean that thing is subject to empirical falsification. What I meant by saying observation is required to come to an understanding of concepts is that, for instance, a person who has never seen the color red will not understand what red is. However, this does not mean "Red is a color" is subject to empirical falsification.

Rw: Comparing apples to oranges is how I would define this. One does not observe properties independent of some existent thing to which they derive. All properties are defined in the sense by which they are perceived: color, sound, texture, taste, odor. These are legitimately conceptualized by attaching their significance to a universally agreed upon term. Falsification doesn’t normally apply at this level nor need be. But properties don’t exist independently. They must be identified from something that must exist to be derived from. You cannot show someone the color red without showing them something with this property, a crayon or stop sign. You also cannot make a TRUE statement about a property of any single existent thing that cannot be verified by observation. For instance, if I suggested a proposition that “all stop signs are green” this could easily be falsified by observation. But I see no reason why anyone would enter a proposition that red is not a color. Since we are discussing an entity “god” whose existence is in question, meaning unverifiable, any conclusion contingent upon the existence of this entity for its propositional truth value cannot be conceptually true.

Phillip: Suppose it is analytically true that all dogs have four legs. Suppose you have found this creature, x, which is similar in all respects to a dog, except it has three legs. What you have actually refuted is not that "All dogs have four legs," you have shown that x is not a dog. You might use a different term to describe x, such as dog*. Or perhaps, you might decide to use a new term, dogs**, that encompasses both x and all dogs.

Rw: No, what you have shown is that x is not a normal dog AND that your claim “ALL dogs have four legs” is not analytically true. If you desire precision in your analysis you would conclude that “all physiologically NORMAL dogs have four legs” after analyzing your three legged species. We wouldn’t say that a man who lost his legs in a war is not a man, would we?

Phillip: Existential propositions are never conceptual truths. Conceptual truths involve what Kant called "conceptual containment." For instance, "All bachelors are unmarried men" is a conceptual truth, because that is the way the concepts "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are related.

Rw: Are not all existent things made conceptual by identification and classification? For instance, “unmarried men” have been identified and classified as bachelors. Just because the existence of unmarried men is implied, rather than specified, in the term “bachelor” doesn’t mean this isn’t an existential statement. If bachelors didn’t exist would it then be conceptually true that all men are married, or that unmarried men do not exist? Of course it would. Why? Because all conceptual truths imply existential truths in their construction, and existential truths, to be true, must be verifiable. Any proposition incorporating conceptual truth implies existential truth. If the existential truth cannot be verified the conceptual truth becomes questionable and the proposition fails to meet the criteria of a true statement.

"Rw: “Necessary” existence doesn’t negate non-existence when Necessary is based on past events. The OA does not argue that present and future events are contingent on the CONTINUED existence of the one Necessary...."

Phillip: Also, according to my usage of the term, there is only one sense of "necessary"; truth in all possible worlds. If a is necessitated by b, a can still be contingent if b is contingent. Neither one is necessary, although one necessarily follows from the other. According to this sense of necessity, necessary existence, if true of some being x, is such as to entail that the non-existence of x is impossible under any circumstances.

Rw: I don’t think your argument establishes the conceptual truth of being X.

Phillip: At any rate, I think you might have made your argument needlessly complicated. My impression is that you are arguing that the non-existence of any given thing is always and everywhere a logical possibility. I don't think your arguments are strong enough to substantiate that conclusion.

Rw: It is not my burden to establish the non-existence of an unverifiable god, although I think I’ve whittled away at the possibility of such a being’s Necessity or non-contingency. If you can substantiate the existence of any given thing that is not subject to the possibility of non-existence I should be quite happy to hear of it.

Phillip: Are you suggesting that it is analytically true that nothing whatsover exists?

Rw: No, what makes you say that?

Phillip: Not only is this false, it is a synthetic proposition. If you are suggesting that the possibility of non-existence can be substantiated logically, then it would seem to follow that there is some logical argument to demonstrate this conclusion. I know of no such argument, and I'm not convinced you have provided it.

Rw: Are you saying it is impossible to substantiate the logical possibility of non-existence as contradistinctive from existence?

Phillip: No, the conclusions of an inductive and deductive argument will be different. A deductive argument with true premisses will take as its conclusion, "x is true." An inductive argument's conclusion will be "Probably, x is true." So the conclusion of your argument is not that necessary existence is an impossibility, but that probably, nothing with necessary existence obtains. Perhaps this latter conclusion is acceptable to you, but the difference ought to be noted anyway.

Rw: The difference is minimal in this case due to the lack of any verifiable evidence to reduce the probability of it being true.

Philip Osborne

"Rw: No, what you have shown is that x is not a normal dog AND that your claim “ALL dogs have four legs” is not analytically true. If you...."

The term "dog" is not inextricably tied to the concept it denotes. It could just as easily have meant "to eat" or "ostrich." It is a matter of linguistic convention that we use the term "dog" to define a specific concept. If I say that "all dogs have four legs," what I am saying is that I want the term "dog" to mean "creature with four legs." So if I see any creatures without four legs, they are not dogs, according to the usage I have defined. If I define dogs as ostriches, then it is not analytically true that all dogs have four legs. It's all a matter of linguistic convention. The fact that this is not consistent with the generally accepted usage of "dog" is irrelevant. The point is that I can define a sense of "dog" according to which "all dogs have four legs" is analytically true, and no empirical observation will falsify it.

"We wouldn’t say that a man who lost his legs in a war is not a man, would we?"

No, because we haven't defined "man" in such a way as to make having two legs an essential requirement for being a human. I could create the definition "man*," according to which any man without two legs is not a man*. This would make it analytically true that all men* have two legs, because that is how I have defined man*, and that is how the concepts are related.

"Just because the existence of unmarried men is implied, rather than specified, in the term “bachelor” doesn’t mean this isn’t an existential statement."

Universal quantification has no existential import. If I say, "all y's are z's," this does not imply that any y's or z's exist. What it means is that for any x, if x is a y, then x is a z. This does not in any way, shape or form imply the existence of either x, y or z.

"Rw: I don’t think your argument establishes the conceptual truth of being X."

The ontological argument is not intended to establish "God exists" as a conceptual truth, for this would be vacuously true. The OA seeks to establish the existence of God as a synthetic necessary truth.

"Rw: The difference is minimal in this case due to the lack of any verifiable evidence to reduce the probability of it being true."

The point I am making is that your argument is useless as an objection to the ontological argument. For instance, if someone presents an attempted proof of some mathematical conjecture, it is not adequate to reply "no one has ever observed an instance of this conjecture being proved; therefore probably, this proof is incorrect also." This objection is useless without engaging the premisses of the proof and looking for errors.

Sincerely,

Philip

doubtingt

Put simply, theism exists to satisfy emotional needs, and is not motivated by an attempt
to "answer" questions. Human beings seem highly motivated to reduce anxiety, fear, uncertainty, and to find subjective purpose. Much of science
is motivated by these things, but science acknowledges a distinction between what is objectively true and what we would like to be true. Thus, science will not blindly accept claims
simply becasue they satisfy emotional needs.
Theism is the conclusion people reach when their
psychological desire to satisfy emotional goals
overrides any kind of commitment to understanding
the actual world.

Synaesthesia

Philp,
The claim can be formulated modally but it is, in essence, a claim about the properties of a system, namely geometry.

I’m claiming that modal logic is not the sort of epistemic system by which determine whether or not God exists.

The main point is that the evidential support has nothing to do with modal logic.

Of course we can’t assume that it’s impossible or certain. I’m just pointing out that the same remains true of mammals, fish, intelligence or any other biological phenomenon.

You have again merely presupposed that these sorts of properties cannot be formulated to be necessary in a way analogous to the way you define a certain intelligence to be necessary. The only relevant consideration is what you have presupposed to be (modally) possibly necessary.

My main point remains the same: no such claim has been in any way justified. The epistemic status the ontological claim enjoys, therefore, is nothing more than being a clever logic game in which to dress presuppositions.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

Philip Osborne

"The claim can be formulated modally but it is, in essence, a claim about the properties of a system, namely geometry."

The point is that it can be made a modal claim, and if formulated in this way, I can properly point to the properties of geometry to support my claim.

"The main point is that the evidential support has nothing to do with modal logic."

This is straying away from the original argument from this portion of the thread. HRG claimed that all modal statements express merely beliefs of philosophers; I have argued here that this is not the case. So far, you are not disagreeing witht this claim.

"You have again merely presupposed that these sorts of properties cannot be formulated to be necessary in a way analogous to the way you define a certain...."

I have not merely presupposed it; I have argued for it on the basis of what are, in my opinion, plausible modal intuitions. I do think that my claim enjoys a certain prima facie plausibility that its negation does not. If you were not seeking to create parodies of the ontological argument, I don't see what grounds you could use to reject my claim.

"My main point remains the same: no such claim has been in any way justified. The epistemic status the ontological claim enjoys, therefore, is nothing more than being a clever logic game in which to dress presuppositions."

I did not claim that the ontological argument, as it stands, provides a sufficient epistemic justification for believing God to exist. If this is all that you are claiming, then I agree with you. What I am arguing is that there are rationally acceptable reasons for thinking that the ostensible parodies to the OA are unsuccessful, and that the objection "We have never seen any necessary beings" is not a useful one against the OA or any argument for the necessary existence of God.

Sincerely,

Philip

PS: This will probably be my last post in a while, as the school year is beginning again and I have a pretty heavy courseload. In the meantime, have fun and stay out of trouble!

rainbow walking

Phillip: The term "dog" is not inextricably tied to the concept it denotes. It could just as easily have meant "to eat" or "ostrich." It is a matter of linguistic convention that we use the term "dog" to define a specific concept. If I say that "all dogs have four legs," what I am saying is that I want the term "dog" to mean "creature with four legs." So if I see any creatures without four legs, they are not dogs, according to the usage I have defined. If I define dogs as ostriches, then it is not analytically true that all dogs have four legs. It's all a matter of linguistic convention. The fact that this is not consistent with the generally accepted usage of "dog" is irrelevant. The point is that I can define a sense of "dog" according to which "all dogs have four legs" is analytically true, and no empirical observation will falsify it.

Rw: Incorporating semantics will only destabilize conceptuality and disintegrate meaningful communication. This is not conducive to logical classification. Classification depends upon the identification of common properties. This does not negate the un-common properties found within a particular classification. If you saw an animal with all the common properties of a dog with the exception of one missing leg you would not tell your friends over the phone that you saw an ostrich. In order to effectively communicate your experience you would likely tell them you saw a three legged “dog”. Four legged dogs IS analytically true until you incorporate the “ALL” into the proposition. Once you introduce a mathematical operative you open up the proposition to empirical falsification.

Semantically distorting the commonly understood concept of dog is not the most logical method of addressing the falsification of your proposition. Logic would dictate you qualify your math with a proprietary “state” such as the concept of “normal”. Altering your proposition to read, “ALL normal dogs have four legs” would rescue its truth value from empirical falsification. No one would argue that a three legged dog is a normal state of such creatures, and this iss based on observation and numbers of four legged dogs as opposed to three legged ones.

Phillip: No, because we haven't defined "man" in such a way as to make having two legs an essential requirement for being a human. I could create the definition "man*," according to which any man without two legs is not a man*. This would make it analytically true that all men* have two legs, because that is how I have defined man*, and that is how the concepts are related.

Rw: Well, we haven’t really defined “man” in this discussion. I was using “man” analogously to the “all dogs have four legs” proposition that we were discussing. The number of appendages is not a primary property of classifying most mammals anyway. When you get into classifying things like squid, octopi, and insects the number of appendages become more crucial to the classification.

Phillip: Universal quantification has no existential import. If I say, "all y's are z's," this does not imply that any y's or z's exist.

Rw: Sure it does Phillip, even if they only exist in your mind, they imply that something classified as an English letter Y and Z exists as a meaningful concept to anyone with the common knowledge of the English alphabet.

Phillip: What it means is that for any x, if x is a y, then x is a z.

Rw: That is what it means if that is what you want it to mean. If you want it to be meaningful to others then you must also communicate your meaning. At every juncture of communication both you and your audience are assumed to understand that these letters exist as part of the alphabet. If you made some squiggly line that conveyed no meaningful conceptualization, that squiggly line would still exist even if it conveyed no meaningful communicative value. Anything that is observable, hence verifiable, implies existence. It may not be important to argue existence in this case but it remains a viable property of your x’s, y’ and z’s. When you introduce a term like “god”, that has no verifiable, observable qualities, then existential claims become primary points of contention. If you ascribe properties that are equally contentious, like Necessary and non-contingent, you imply existence in every proposition formulated with these concepts.

Phillip: This does not in any way, shape or form imply the existence of either x, y or z.

Rw: Not only does it imply existence, it necessitates it. Are you saying that x,y, and z do not exist in the English alphabet?

Phillip: The ontological argument is not intended to establish "God exists" as a conceptual truth, for this would be vacuously true. The OA seeks to establish the existence of God as a synthetic necessary truth.

Rw: It fails to actualize the necessity of the synthesis. It is not conceptually true that “god exists”. It is true that a term “god” exists as a concept that is loosely defined in many various ways that, for the most part, fail to communicate any meaningful understanding. It is in the attempted establishment of synthetic Necessity that causal agency arises which renders the argument susceptible to inductive rebuttal.

Phillip: The point I am making is that your argument is useless as an objection to the ontological argument. For instance, if someone presents an attempted proof of some mathematical conjecture, it is not adequate to reply "no one has ever observed an instance of this conjecture being proved; therefore probably, this proof is incorrect also,

Rw: Yabut, I haven’t engaged the value of the OA on the basis of what has “not” been observed, but on what “has” been observed. It has been observed that all things can, have, and/or will cease to exist at some point in time. Synthetic existence does not circumvent this factor thus Necessity has not been established.

Phillip: " This objection is useless without engaging the premisses of the proof and looking for errors.

Rw: Isn’t Necessity one of the premises I’ve been engaging? Good luck in your scholastics Phillip, I've enjoyed our discussion and look forward to more of the same.