Jobar

My original idea didn't work out as I had hoped it would, but I am fascinated by the discussion it started anyway.

I have always devalued solipsism because of the fact that the world 'outside' could surprise or hurt me.

Yet, I realize that the world certainly appears to center around me! I cannot actually experience a single thing totally objectively, with no subject- you know, I'll bet there are various works of Hindu philosophy on this.

Primal

Well the idea of nonsubject objective experience represents a sort of straw man by subjectivists. Of course one is always a subject when one experiences something, and of course the experience can be said to be subjective in that sense, i.e. the experience does not exist without the subject. The issue is not whether the experience or belief requires a subject but whether the experience or belief can be said to reflect what exists outside our imaginations or beliefs i.e. the issue is over whether or not we can know anything about the outside world or if the outside world exists.

When I say X claim is objective, I am not saying that the claim exists exists without a subject making it. What I am saying is that the claim is certainly backed up by certain standards of evidence to the extent that it warrants my belief that the claim says something about reality instead of what is merely imagined.

JP2

Some may, perhaps, but most are smart enough to know the difference.

Presuming a dualistic universe (which I am not necessarily agreeing with here), the subjective represents the internal world (the mind), the objective represents the external world (the rest of the totality of "what-is"). Absolutism, on the other hand, marks a position of completeness of certainty, to the point where it is impossible for this "certainty" to be refuted. Therefore, one who advocates some form of "absolutism" is of the mindset that their belief is "complete in its certainty", and "true" beyond any level of doubt.

However, in everyday speech, "subjective" is a rather dirty word (usually used to denote a ambiguity or prejudice) whereas "objective" usually has a connetation involving the transcendence of one's subjective stance. Thus, in being objective, in everyday speak, we usually mean that we are thinking beyond our own inevitably prejediced position, and attempting to view a problem or a stance from a position beyond our own. We could then quite easily link this "transcendence of our own subjectivity" to a position of, and our conception of, "the absolute". Thus, the absolute in this sense, is to approach any problem or stance from a position above ourselves, and attempt to view the situation as an impartial observer so as to see the "truth" as clearly and as seperately from our own subjective prejudices as possible.

This, in my opinion anyway, is how we conceive of the "absolute" in everyday speak. This conception of the absolute, I might add, seems quite similar to our conception of "God" - but I'll ignore that tangent for now.

However, philosophically speaking, it is impossible to transcend the subjective. Regardless of how hard you cogitate, it is impossible to "go beyond" our humanity, and, much more, it is impossible to "go beyond" ourselves. That is, the totality of what we experience - and experience is, unless someone can suggest otherwise, the basis for all knowledge - must first be filtered through the subjective before it can be "realised". Thus, from this perspective, the subjective is all we can know, and, from this stance, the subjective becomes absolute. It is absolute, quite simply, because we can know with completeness of certainty that that which we experience on the subjective level does, in fact, exist. Existence, or the modality of existence (essence), beyond the subjective is impossible to imagine, bound as we are to our own subjectivity. Thus, my conception of the ball being "hard" and "yellow" is absolute, where as the independant existence of the ball, as a thing-in-itself, is a question of objectivity, which, as it turns out, means - that as we can never conceive of anything from an "objective" stance - that we can throw doubt on its objective existence, making its existence on this level anything but absolute. Thus, actually, if anything, the problem with the solopsist position is that it refuses to associate the absolute and the objective, instead offering the stance that subjectivism is the only means of acheiving the absolute.

JP2

Beyond that which we "know" (depedning on what you mean by the word "know") subjectively, no, if can deny the "absoluteness" of any one thing that exists as a thing-in-itself, then - assuming existence is uniform (i.e. there's only one possible mode of "existence") - then we can use this doubt to deny the "absoluteness" of any other thing-in-itself that exists in the same respect, and is perceived or experienced in the same respect.

Am I succeeding in confusing you all yet?

With the first sentence you wish to dispel an unnessecary dichotemy, but with the second you advocate it.

In saying that "some things can be known with absolute certainty and some thing cannot" you are still setting up the concept of absolutism or relativism. That is, by default, and as we understand the terms, absoluteness depends on a certain "thing" being certain and complete in-and-of itself, without needing to be related to any other "thing" to ascertain it veracity. If something is "relatively" true, then it can be true only if some other "thing" is assumed to be true as well. For instance, the theory of evolution can be correct - and can only be correct - if we assume natural selection to be true. If we could demonstrate - or, even, if it is possible to demonstrate - that natural selection is false, then evolution is falsifiable, dependant on the truth of another concept for its own realistion of "truth", and is thus not "true" in-and-of itself. We can show virtually all knowledge - in this respect - to be "relative", as it is all dependant on the truth of another concept to be considered true itself. It's all relational, or, as Einstein said "everything is relative".

Of course there are differing degrees of "relative truth" - that is, we could say hypothetically, the strength of a relative truth is inversely proportional to the sum of all things that could make it false. Thus, we could say that the existence of the "hard, yellow ball" I mentioned before is of a higher standard of "relative truth" (as the only thing, really, which could disprove the existence of the ball is if I were to assume that me senses were misleading me) than the theory of evolution (as there are an incredibly high number of things that could render this theory falsifiable).

And no, that doesn't make me a creationist.

Once again, "subjectivism" (or the type of subjectivism I'm talking about here) makes no attempt to claim that an "external world" does not exist, rather only that we can never know - with absolute certainty - the modality or essence of this external world.

It is possible to reject the external world as a consequence of this stance, I suppose, but in doing so you would be required to explain where these experiences do indeed come from.

Given my previous definitions, yes, he would be wrong.

We may "experience" the external world, but it's still entirely on a subjective level. Have you ever experienced anything from a position that transcends your own existence?

But it amounts to the same thing.

I'm not denying that an external world exists, or claiming that we can never "know" anything about it, just that we can never "know" these things with absolute certainty as a result of our subjectivist stance.

I do not believe that "absolute certainty" is necessary, mind, in terms of considering the things that we know to be "true", just simply that there must be doubt cast upon all that we claim to know before we can arrive at any form of certainty whatsoever.

Am I making any sense? <img src="confused.gif" border="0">

Keith Russell

Immanuel Kant said:
"Keith, i would dare say that is a traditional mischaracterization. Subjectivism is not a creation of what is in me, as opposed to “external”, because that is predicated on a notion of objectivity.

In addition, I claim that objectivity is simply the correspondence to what is "external," and is impossible to ascertain."

Keith:
The main problem I've had with subjectivists isn't that they're subjectivists--it's that they want to have their cake, and eat it, too.

Subjectivism claims that knowledge (which I believe can only be 'objective') is impossible, while simultaneously claiming that they know that knowledge is impossible.

Your statement above still possesses this contradiction. You say that objectivity is impossible to prove (ascertain), and yet you claim to know this.

(Hint: if you've ever been 'sure' of something, and yet you turned out to be wrong, you've experienced the 'external' asserting its primacy over your consciousness.)

Keith.

Primal

JP:
That may be, but sadly it hasn't been my experience.

Yes, this though would advocate some knowledge of the external world, namely that the world exists. This knowledge would be objective.

Yes I'd agree.



See, that's where I see the straw man as lying. In the equation of objectivism with some idea that we can transcend, almost physically exit our own bodies and/or preconceptions. That to me sounds impossible as being as subject, having a mind with filters is the only way to examine or learn anything about the objective world. Can you imagine a creature that truly jettissoned all his or her preconceptions or mind? That person could not think, because minds are needed to do so. That person could not store data because there would be no place to do it. That person could not make sense out of any data he or she recieved because such data can only be organized according to principle i.e. preconceptions.

Hence such thing in my viewpoint are required for knowledge, not barriers to knowledge yet I am an objectivist. So how is this puzzle solved?

I think a main crux in the issue lies in transcedence=objectivism. I do not think this represents the case. Objectivie knowledge is knowledge to me based on evidence and is apart from prejudice. I do not mean this in the sense that the evidence erases all prejudice, or transcends it. Only in the sense that the evidence counters the prejudice, limits it. The issue is not whether or not a person has prejudices but whether the person's ideas and beliefs are wholly determined by the prejudice. An objectivist position is one which says that a person's ideas and beliefs can likewise be determined by reason and evidence in such a way as to displace prejudice or correct ideas once based wholly on prejudice.

In this case it is not the idea of transcedance at issue but the idea of evidence and self-correction.

I suppose we could if there was one absolute, there may be many. Also subjectivity would itself represent an absolute, something known with certainty, namely that we are limited to the subjective.

That's changing the definitions now, in one sense the absolute just meant certainty, now it implies transcedance.

I disagree because one can be prejudiced and at the same time quite certain.

I'm not sure what is meant by the absolute, if it means certainty it is far more wide in its use then how you are positing it, as a sort of religious concenpt almost. If it means something "above ourselves" though, then I'd agree, there is no absolute. But I do not then share your definition of aboslute.

Yes but then you are using the term subjectivity in two different senses, in one sense to refer to our mind and identity in general, in another sense to refer to our prejudices and mistaken beliefs.

That's contradictory though if the absolute means "above ourselves" because then the subjective would be above the subjective.

And by means of know do you mean experience or knowledge? If you mean all our experiences are subjective, within the mind; I'd agree. If you mean that all we can know about is our mind, then I'd disagree. The two are not the same though.


Again though, by absolute do you mean merely certainty or being above ourselves?

Do you mean its impossible to imagine something existing outside ourselves? Or that we cannot imagine such a thing without invoking our minds or imagination? Again here the two are not the same thing. There is a difference between imaging something outside ourselves and imagining something with an imagination outside ourselves.


Yes, I'd agree with you. Depending on your standards that is.


I think they both to an extent can be a question of objectivity.

It seems that you are confusing the idea of an objective stance- implying on the one hand that it means the mind physically gets beyond itself, or the person sees without experiencing,believing etc.

On the other hand you mean to see via objective standards i.e. knowledge invoked from the outside world.

Now by objective knowledge it should be noted that the objectivist is not reffering to knowledge physically outside one's head, but knowledge based on evidence and certain fundamental concepts said to reveal something about the outside world. You seem to confuse the two and critique one as if it refutes the other. No objectivist would say that knowledge is floating around outside the head, and that's not the issue.

Well by existence I'll assume you mean existence outside one's mind. But this doesn't follow, because the knowledge is based in a subject, that the thing's existence outside of the mind has come into question. That's a non sequitur, because it does not mean that just because the knowledge of something external is based in the mind that the knowledge cannot accurately reflect the external. Though I'd agree that the given claim "this rock exists" is less then absolutely proven, but for different reasons.


That may be in some cases but not all.

Yes but who's to say existence is uniform? It is only uniform qua existence not necessarily as a type of existence.


No because I said absolutism vs relativism, whole scale "existence or knowledge is absolute or relative". My own piecemail "this some knowledge is absolute and some knowledge is relative" is neither absolutism or relativism.

Basically, there is a difference between absolutism and relativism; and absolutes and relative. One ecompasses an evalution of a given claim, the other a stance regarding all claims.



I would agree with the certainty part but not with the "complete-in-itself" as I, not to be offensive, see such a statement as meaningless. What does it mean to be "complete-in-itself"?

Yes, I agree. Though relativists usually say that it means the claims truth is dependent on personal perference and/or culture.


Or Darwinism at least, sorry to be nit picky.



Again I don't understand the term "in-itself".


Einstein thought the speed of light was absolute, so I'm somewhat warry of that quote. But no matter, if all truth was relative then what would that truth itself be based on one wonders?

I do not see all truth as relative because there are certain axioms I see as self-evident and absolute. This is the only way to avoid either circular reasoning or infinite regress. Verifying one concept you adhere tois circular, verifying one concept with a new concept continues on forever. Starting with concepts self-verified leads to productive reasoning.

I'd agree with the statement that there are degrees of relative truth. And I think this is one of the things that makes the absolutist vs relativist position a false dichotomy. As relativists tend to posit that the truth-values of given claims are equal.

I believe that the further one reasons from self-evident axioms, the more relative a truth-claim become. Hence my idea of relative vs absolute nature of a claim is sometimes a matter of degree instead of all or none.



I'd question that conclusion. As Imay be wrong about seeing a yellow ball via hallucination but evolution has a massive amount of evidence for it that denies the likelihood of it being based on hallucination as this would entail mass hallucination of an unprecendented kind.


As for the yellow ball existing, I would come to this conclusion via these two premises :1) I have sensation. Absolute. 2) There is an external world, absolute. 3) My sensations do a good job of telling me what is in the external world. Tentative. 4) These sensations more often then not report correct information. Tenative, based in part on premise 3. 5) It is best to go by the least superfluous belief or explanation. Relative.(Based on reasoning and sensation i.e. the fact that otherwise people can easily make stuff up) 6) That since these sensations are reporting the existence of a yellow ball, and to conclude that this is a hallucination or fake etc is superfluous, the yellow ball exists. Tentative.


I would agree here, the full nature of the external world cannot be known with absolute certainty. However objectivists positions are compatible with this position, so there must be more to subjectivism then this. Namely, that we cannot know that the external world exists at all.

Yes I agree, see some of my posts above.


Again though, this would be at odds with subjectivism as I know it. On what basis can one say the subjective belief is wrong? A subjective basis? But then, if subjectivity determined right and wrong, then the objectivists subjectivity has determined that objectivism is right and subjectivism is wrong. If you disagree then you are saying that subjectivity does not determine right and wrong, but then what does?

Again I do not see the concept of transcedants as the hall mark of objectivism. So I would answer "no" but that answer would not negate my objectivist position.


Me JP: No it doesn't. One has to be a subject to know in general, but what one can know as a subject is an entirely different issue. Saying that I can only know as a subject is not the same as saying I can only know about the subjective. Knowing something via a mind is not the same as only knowing something about a mind. To say otherwisewould be question begging.

Here I and most objectivists would agree, which is why the idea of absolute-universal certainty is not the issue.


I agree, we cannot be certain of everything, should question and doubt often times and most knowledge is tentative.

However it must be realized that when you throw doubt on EVERYTHING there is no coming back. Despite what Descartes says. In throwing doubt on everything Descartes threw doubt on logic and the law of noncontradiction, in which case his famous statement "I think therefore I am" does not stand. First how do we know we think? I can doubt that. But you might say, "but doubting is thinking"? To which I can doubt that, and so on forever.

Secondly why can't a nonthinking thing doubt or a nonexistent thing think? The only answer that can be given is that such things are contradictory. But so what? We already jettisoned the law of noncontradiction, so there is no reason to suppose that just cause the idea of a nonexistent thing thinking is contradictory that it is not possible.

Descartes problem in his method of doubting everything was he failed to doubt everything; absolutely, everything without excetion. His famous statement, "I think therefore I am" was made in haste as it could be doubted as illustrated by my points above.

In which case it must be realized then when one truely doubts everything, there is no escape. One has opened a void which cannot be filled.

This is why doubt in moderation, with context is helpful, but extreme doubt gets nowhere.

Even though I disagree with you I must say, yes you are. That while you may be hard to keep up with you do a good job of defending your position and I look forward to your response.

Kantian

Only according to a fictional characterization of subjectivists, which you've outlined below. Incidentally, do you think that by regurgitating famous catchaphrases of Ayn Rand (where she usually misses the mark on her various criticism of philosophical enterprises) you are actually making a valid point? No offense intended, but I used to be an Ayn Rand acolyte in my 'wet-behind-the-ears' days, so I'm familiar with the literature and argumentative tactics...
Strawman. A couple of things- a subjectivist will never consider his or her knowledge is objective. Second, they do not claim that knowledge is impossible. You confuse skepticism with subjectivism. In this case, why don't you make a real argument against subjectivism without importing your assumptions about the nature of knowledge?
That would be true if I characterized the knowledge of the subjectivist as something objective. That is not the case.
Here's a hint: I would attack subjectivism from the inside, show how the enterprise deconstructs itself, instead of adopting a privileged vantage point in epistemology that imports foreign concepts. I will outline such in the next post.

~Transcendentalist~

Keith Russell

Immanuel Kant said:
Only according to a fictional characterization of subjectivists, which you've outlined below.

Keith: OK, help me out. How have I misinterpreted 'subjectivism'?

Kant: Incidentally, do you think that by regurgitating famous catchaphrases of Ayn Rand (where she usually misses the mark on her various criticism of philosophical enterprises) you are actually making a valid point?

Keith: Rand isn't the only person I've heard make this point--and you haven't refuted it with the above comment.

Kant: No offense intended, but I used to be an Ayn Rand acolyte in my 'wet-behind-the-ears' days, so I'm familiar with the literature and argumentative tactics...

[b]Keith: I'll ignore the patronization, and ask ask a sincere question. I've heard a great deal of criticism of Rand and her ideas, but that's all I hear--criticism and insults. If you are aware of an error in Rand's ideas that I've missed, I would love to learn about it. Rather than telling me that I'm still 'wet-behind-the-ears', and that you've evolved beyond Rand, why not help me to evolve, too?

Keith: (Earlier) Subjectivism claims that knowledge (which I believe can only be 'objective') is impossible, while simultaneously claiming that they know that knowledge is impossible.

Kant: Strawman. A couple of things- a subjectivist will never consider his or her knowledge is objective.

Keith: If they don't consider their views to be 'objective', then why do they consider it 'knowledge', at all?

Kant: Second, they do not claim that knowledge is impossible. You confuse skepticism with subjectivism.

Keith: Actually, I was about to accuse you of doing the same, LOL.

Kant: In this case, why don't you make a real argument against subjectivism without importing your assumptions about the nature of knowledge?

Keith: Kant, I thought I was doing exactly that. (By the way, the dictionary definition of subjectivism includesthis: "...characteristic of or belonging to reality as perceived rather than as independent of mind."

Keith: (earlier) Your statement above still possesses this contradiction. You say that objectivity is impossible to prove (ascertain), and yet you claim to know this.

Kant: That would be true if I characterized the knowledge of the subjectivist as something objective. That is not the case.

Keith: Then how do you characterize knowledge of the subjective? I'm willing to admit the possibility that I've used the term 'subjectivist' incorrectly, but all you are telling me is that I'm wrong. If I'm wrong, why not tell me why I'm wrong, and help me to understand what is right?

Keith: (earlier) (Hint: if you've ever been 'sure' of something, and yet you turned out to be wrong, you've experienced the 'external' asserting its primacy over your consciousness.)

Kant: Here's a hint: I would attack subjectivism from the inside, show how the enterprise deconstructs itself, instead of adopting a privileged vantage point in epistemology that imports foreign concepts. I will outline such in the next post.

Keith: I can't wait.

Hugo Holbling

Keith Russell asked:

I realize you didn't ask me, Keith, but <a href="http://world.std.com/~mhuben/critobj.html" target="_blank">here's</a> a link you might find useful. Let me know if the criticism there is of the standard you require.

Kantian

Hopefully, what follows should demonstrate the case beyond dispute. But then again...
Not that I am claiming that Ayn Rand is the only person to employ that phrase; but in philosophical matters it is usually a Randite who bandies that <a href="http://www.students.uiuc.edu/~johnku/ooCake.html" target="_blank">"seemingly intuitive"</a> phrase around in a criticism of competing worldviews.
I apologize if what I wrote smacks of patronization, but I only wanted to share with you my own personal experiences. About errors in objectivism… there are quite a lot, and I don't know where to begin, but Hugo Holbling was kind enough to include a link on possible critiques. You may want to start there. As for the 'wet behind the ears' remark, I was referring to me alone.
Generally, subjectivists consider their "knowledge" knowledge of their perceptions of the world, not the world in itself. This dates back to Locke, when he began the movement to subjectivism by claiming that we "perceive" secondary qualities, and that they are not inherent with the objects of perception in themselves. A subjectivist who claims that his knowledge is objective is either a confused first year philosophy student or a character in a pseudo-philosophical fiction.
I'm all ears. how may I be confusing skepticism with subjectivism? Skepticism is basically the claim that knowledge is impossible, while a subjectivist will claim that their knowledge is entirely of their own creation. Two completely different things.
Yes, the dictionary captures the gist of the subjective knowledge- that it is contingent upon the subject's perception, not as some entity independent of the mind.
Unlike Primal, you're not using the term subjectivist incorrectly, but that you think he must characterize knowledge as something independent of his mind.

~Kant~

[ September 27, 2002: Message edited by: Immanuel Kant ]</p>