Alonzo Fyfe

It depends, is this the only substitution that is taking place? You are not also asking me to substitute one definition of "good" with a different definition as well?

If you are holding the meaning of "really good" constant, you are only making the substitution explicitly stated above, AND you are drawing the same inferences I discussed in my previous answer, then . . .

Yes, you can't reach those inferences without either (1) working on the false assumption that intrinsic values exist, or (2) using invalid reasoning.

[It's either a false unspoken premise, or invalid arguments. Either way, you can't get to the conclusions you want to get to from using this type of premise.]

What I would do instead is change the definition of "really good". The first definition, the one used when talking about Guinness, is agent-subjective. The only desires that you are talking about in this case are your own, and you are merely saying that you like it.

In the second case, I would use a new definition where "really good" does not mean "I really like it". Instead it means something like "given everybody's preferences, not just mine this time but everybody's, the desire to rape generally brings about more of what is disliked than of what is liked," then you can get to all of the inferences you would want to get to without referring to any type of intrinsic goodness.

But this is the difference between switching from an individual-subjectivist definition of "really good", to a universal-subjectivist definition of "really good."

But if I do this, it is not only true that "not being raped" is being substituted for "Gunness," but a universal-subjectivist concept of "really good" is being substituted for the original individual-subjectivist definition of "really good." And THAT is why you can now draw all sorts of new conclusions.

Alonzo Fyfe

Error, double post.

DRFseven

Then you don't know me! (This is a joke, Alonzo)

1. You keep bringing up the "pizza topping" issue, which ignores the emotional (main and distinguishing) component of morality. Why?

2. You ignore the evolutionary aspect of morality; the fact that it evolved the way it did, and that people are powerless to go back and change that. It is a system of behavioral restraint whereby the dynamic social environment provides the cues for behavior, that has enabled survival. The moral system MUST be emotionally based, and it must constantly adapt to changing circumstances or we will die and there will be no moral system.

3. We all acquire (or don't acquire) morals the same way - through socialization. It doesn't matter what kind of subjectivist or otherwise label people apply to themselves, or even if they apply a label at all. The way people talk about morality is a physiological phenomenon; if they feel something is wrong and say so, it makes no sense to accuse them of being mistaken or insincere; it is not as if they have a choice in the way they feel.

4. You say the term "intrinisic values" is not incoherent, it is false in the way "my car is red" is false. But it IS incoherent because values always reside in the valuer; not in that which is being valued. A value, by definition, cannot be intrinsic because it is, in fact, a value, a judgement.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe
Yes. All I'd be saying is that I, personally, really like not being raped.
Well, I'm clearly not appealing to intrinsic values, so I must be using invalid reasoning.

This seems to suggest that individual-subjectivists can never be justified in coercing others in order to defend themselves from being raped - or for that matter, anything else.

Perhaps you could explain, without recourse to "pizza toppings", how defending oneself from harm would be construed as "invalid reasoning" for an individual-subjectivist?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

I do not see this component as being present. All human action can be explained in terms of beliefs and desires. Different desires exist in that desires can take different OBJECTS. However, I see no justification for saying that there are different TYPES of desires.

Instead, what distinguishes moral value from "pizza topping" value is that moral value is concerned with the desires that we OUGHT TO have, given everybody else's desires. Pizza topping value has to do with the values that we DO HAVE simpliciter. Pizza-topping desires are simpler than moral desires, both in terms of what they aim at, and in terms of whose interests are at stake (the evaluator's alone, or everybody's).


Actually, no, I just moved them a little. Our desires evolved, of course. To different degrees, our different desires are subject to outside influences. Some desires we acquire virtually independent of experience (e.g., an aversion to pain), other desires are heavily influenced by experience (our desire for a particular type of music).

But the fact that a particular preference has an evolutionary history does not make it a moral preference. If it did, then every preference would be a moral preference because every preference has the relevant type of history.

What makes a preference a moral preference is how well it fits in with other preferences (with the desires of others in the community).

We have, indeed, evolved a capacity to acquire moral preferences. But evolution is not what makes them moral. It is the way that they fit in with the (evolved) desires of others that make them moral.


We acquire our scientific beliefs the same way. This does not imply that scienctific truth is merely the set of whatever beliefs that people happen to have acquired.

Socialization is responsible for the beliefs that we acquire in fact. It is also responsible for the desires that we acquire. Parents are as involved in shaping their children's likes and dislikes as they are in shaping their children's beliefs.

But what makes a particular belief justified is not that it has a particular sociological history. What justifies the belief is the way that it fits in with other beliefs.

Similarly, what makes a particular desire moral is not the fact that it has a particular history. What makes a particular desire moral is the way that it fits in with other desires.

Socialization plays a role in both instances, but its role is that of explanation, not justification.


In order to make this objection stick, you have to say more than "values always reside in the valuer." You have to say that "reside in the valuer" is a part of the very DEFINITION of value.

Though I agree with you that values always reside in the valuer, I disagree with you if you say that this is a part of the DEFINITION of value. That is to say, if you want to argue that "values reside in the valuer" is a part of what every person means when they use value-terms, even in their pre-theorietic conceptions of value, we will part company on this reqard.

The only principles contained within our pre-theoretic conception of value is that certain states of affairs seem to merit effort to bring about. The question of whether the property of "merit effort to bring about" is intrinsic to that which is being evaluated, or whether it is assigned on the basis of the brain states of the evaluator is left open to debate.

Intrinsic-value and extrinsic value are, then, competing theories of value. Neither is true by definition. Whichever theory wins out is the theory that best explains and predicts observable behavior. Through observation, we have learned (I think) that extrinsic value theory proves to be the superior theory, but this cannot be determined merely by examining a priori the meaning of the word "value."

Or, to put it another way, intrinsic-value claims are not incoherent, they are false.

Alonzo Fyfe

All I am interested in is consistency.

Perhaps the problem does not have to do with the subjectivist saying that a person is justified in using violence to prevent from being raped.

Perhaps the problem has to do with the subjectivist saying that the person is NOT justified in using violence to obtain a beer.

Wiploc

Suppose an agent subjectivist doesn't want to be raped. She might appeal to her would-be rapist by saying, "Rape is wrong because god hates rape." If she did that, you'd agree, I hope, that she had used language contradictory to her agent subjectivism.

Likewise, if her appeal is, "Don't rape me! Rape is wrong because I hate it," we see that she has switched to ego-subjectivism rather than agent subjectivism, thus, once again, contradicting her agent-subjectivist principles. (Contradicting them, but not violating them.)

If she is an agent subjectivist, true to her principles, she must believe that the would-be rapist is morally obligated to rape her
if that's what he wants to do. That is the only test of morality to the agent subjectivist.

None of this means that she shouldn't say anything that she thinks will save her. The only test of what she, as an agent-subjectivist, should say is her own desire.

And as for your "defending oneself from harm," an agent subjectivist will see nothing wrong with that. If someone can defend herself from harm by using a gun or by using words that logically contradict her philosophy of agent-subjectivism, that will be a morally good thing to do in the eyes of an agent subjectivist who wants to protect herself.
crc

dk

Perhaps, in a sense the rapist and drunk may both desire satisfaction, but have different needs. The refusal of the victim to gratify their needs justifies the violence. Its even true that many drunks and rapists get violent even when they get all the booze and sex they want. Psychology has determined the exercise of violence by a rapist or drunk to be compulsive. So is this a moral issue, or a phsyical illness that needs proper treatment?


To all subjectivists on this thread, I think I've justified violence on behalf of many rapists and drunks, please correct me.

dk

posted by dk: The explanation for morality rests on the object rationally chosen by a deliberate act of will; hence may have nothing to do with the motion of particles. The object of a moral act may be independent of any external physical order, or even the ability of the actor to affect the objective state of affairs. The morality of an act rests upon the perception, will and knowledge of the actor. Suppose I pick up a gun and aim it point blank at a person I want to kill in cold blood then pull the trigger. The gun misfires. I’ve committed an immoral act. So morality may or may not be a part of the explanation, and morality certainly doesn’t explain a misfire.

Alonzo, could you please correct me, and explain my error.

The AntiChris

Perhaps.

I have to say I don't see any inconsistency but if you really don't know, I guess we'll have to leave it there.

Chris