The AntiChris

What intinsic value do you think the mother is appealing to when she says "Don't do that, it is wrong!" and how do you justify your conclusion without making at least some assumptions about her reasoning?
Really? This assertion is a recurrent theme in your attacks on individual subjectivism but I have yet to see anything that clearly supports this from you. Of course people will use common, shared, language when talking about moral issues but I'm not sure you can safely make any assumptions about the intent behind the words.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

I will answer this later, but I fear that it may be a distraction. We both agree that there are no intrinsic values -- that this assumption is a mistake.

What evidence there is that people are making this mistake may be an interesting question, but is it relevant to this debate given that we both agree it is a mistake?


I am suspicious of your use of the word "intent" here. Intent generally has to do with the cause of action, rather than meaning. Indeed, the theory of action that I use (BDI theory) stands specifically for "belief - desire - intent" theory. Illustrating the role of intent as a cause of action.

Are you again asking me about the causes of a speech act (as distinguished from the meaning of the proposition).

When you say, "This assertion is a recurrent theme in your attacks on individual subjectivism but I have yet to see anything that clearly supports this from you." it is because you quite correctly see that my assertion supports no conclusions about the causes of a speech act. Yet, that is because I am not talking about the causes of a speech act but the meaning of the spoken proposition.

The AntiChris

Well, maybe. The only reason I've not let this go is because you seemed to be using the "intrinsic value" interpretation as a necessary stepping stone to your "all things considered" theory.

In any event I'm still unclear how your analysis of the mother's "it is wrong" leads you to your "all things considered" conclusion.
Apologies. I'm not an academic and my use of language is probably sloppy by your standards.

By "intent", I simply meant "intended meaning".

Chris

Norge

Alonzo,

I have read your posts on what could be described as "Desires-Theory Morality" and remain singularly unimpressed. Not because I don't think you haven't thought a lot about your beliefs, but because when it comes down to it, a solution is staring you in the face and because you're an atheist, you refuse it and then reach for a solution that simply doesn't make sense. That's why you're struggling to convince the other people posting here.

This following section is really rather remarkable. You even reach the point where you admit that the real question is: What has intrinsic value. You admit this. Your logic has driven you to this point and then because of your presupposed atheism, you refuse to admit to this, so you take an alternative route. It is sad to see this so clearly outlined.

Let's see what you do. First you go through a series of questions to do with discovering why it is wrong to harm a cat:

You got this far and forced to face the unthinkable (for an atheist) you simply refuse the invitation and take a turn to try and explain it without resort to the existence of God, which would have afforded you a much better alternative, so you write:

So, you're forced to try and provide another alternative to explain what you're actually seeing, namely that there is right and wrong and these concepts actually are rooted in the intrinsic value of things. You have seen this and it's as though you close your eyes, cover your ears and say, "no, that can't be, because I'm an atheist."

So, you write:

Now, quite apart from the fact that morality has little to do with desires, something which you haven't satisfactorily answered, Alonzo, your most serious problem here is that you're trying to explain "what" morality is, not "why" we should be moral. I'd like you to affirm that there really are no reasons why we "should" be moral at all. This idea of "best in relation to all desires" neither describes morality (clearly self-sacrifice cannot be accounted for on this view), nor does it provide any grounding at all for the imperatives inherent in moral statements. Moral statements, such as "you shouldn't torture" are not descriptive, they are prescriptive. There's a HUGE difference.

Since you don't believe in the inherent value of anything, there really is no reason why we should act in one way rather than another. You provide no reason why I should act so that I act "best in relation to all desires." Why should I do this? You provide no answer. Again, you're simply describing - imperfectly as it happens. As long as you continue to keep describing - incorrectly - what you see, you fail to account for morality as commonly understood, something containing an imperative, an "oughtness."

On a more transcendental note, atheists have long realized that without God, this is a world without inherent value. It is simply matter in motion. Values are so very obviously, on the atheist view, creations of ourselves. One follows from the other. And that is why while atheists might believe in atheism, they cannot live as atheists. Atheists try and sneak in value all the time. As well as moral imperatives. They leap from "is" to "ought" all the time. And that's what you're doing. You recognize morality - imperfectly try to describe it - and think that makes the jump from your description to an "oughtness" we "should" abide by. But the attempt is futile. "is" doesn't become "ought." Not even within a description, I'm afraid.

Morality contains moral laws - "you shouldn't torture children" - which implies a law-giver. And that law-giver ain't us.

It's time to give that idea some consideration.

Alonzo Fyfe

The reason that I include the mention of "intrinsic value" in this analysis of meaning is because there are a couple of places where the "all things considered" analysis falls short.

Recall, the analysis says to look for the "best fit" meaning that makes sense in the context of the types of evidence considered relevant, the types of inferences concerned valid, and the way that speakers relate moral propositions to other propositions.

There are a couple of relationships that universal subjectivism do not handle. If you should discover what they are, you can come back to me and say, "Ha, your theory does not handle this, and this!"

It is because "this and this!" are the reasons for believing that the true best fit makes reference to intrinsic values, and are legitimate complaints against universal subjectivism. I just wanted these problems "on the table" so they do not come back to haunt me later.

As for my defense of universal subjectivism, since it has nothing to do with speech acts the legitimate way to challenge this theory would be to identify relationships that native speakers draw between moral propositions and other propositions (used as evidence or inferences in moral discussion) and see if another meaning has a better fit. (A meaning other than intrinsic value theory -- I have already admitted that it has a better fit, but has the disadvantage of referring to properties that are not real.)

Alonzo Fyfe

I find your arrogance and condescention mildly amusing. Do you expect me to bow before you and grovelling now? Or can I wait until after lunch?

As for me, proper decorum would be to stick to identifying false propositions and invalid inferences.

And something that I would like to throw out just for the fun of it. I have referenced, a couple of times, an article in the Journal of Philosophy, 1976, called "Motive Utilitarianism" by Robert M. Adams. Adams is a Christian philosopher at Yale University. So, if I have been forced into these ideas because of my atheism, what argument do you make against R.M. Adams?

Anyway, all of this is a distraction. In truth, philosophers do not give credit to the traits of the person making an argument. What matters are the elements of the argument itself. Switching the argument from traits about the argument to traits about the person is referred to as the fallacy "argumentum ad hominem." Which are best avoided.


See. You start out fine. But when it comes to phrasing an answer, you slip into an ad hominem fallacy. There is nothing to respond to here. Ad hominem fallacies are not arguments.

[Note: Do not make the mistake of interpreting 'ad hominem' as 'against the person' and argue because your claims are not 'against' me that they do not qualify. 'Ad hominem' means 'to the person.' And since you are shifting the focus from the argument to the person, yes you are guilty of an ad hominem fallacy.]



Any evidence that I am actually "seeing" such things would be welcome.

I am no more "actually seeing" this then a person who looks at a stick half out of a lake sees is "actually seeing" that the stick is bent rather than straight. Or that a person is "actually seeing" that the earth is flat, or "actually seeing" that the Earth is the center of the universe and everything revolves around it.

"You see that the earth is flat, but it is like you close your eyes, cover your ears and say, 'No, this can't be, because I am an atheist."

When, actually, it has nothing to do with being an atheist. It has to do with the fact that the evidence against a flat earth is so overwhelming that it gives me a reason to doubt appearance.

Now, if you want to discuss the exitence of God, there is another forum set up for that purpose. I would recommend going there and discussing that issue with them if it is the issue that you truly want to debate.


Effectively, if there is an argument contained within your writing, it is, "If people act as if X is true, then X is true" (for X = "intrinsic value"). But there is no credibility behind such a statement. It does not work for X = "The earth is the center of the universe." It does not work for X = "Santa Clause exists." It does not work for X = "This apricot pit will cure my cancer". It does not work for anything.

And if, in order to impress you, I have to accept ad hominem fallacies and this type of inference from belief as valid argument forms, I sincerely hope that I do not acquire the traits that seem necessary to impress you.

Norge

Alonzo,

I'm sorry you mistook my comments. They were not intended to be personal. When I write that I am unimpressed with what I have read, that is a comment about your arguments, not about you personally. The same is the case in reference to your point about ad hominem fallacies. My comments have nothing to do with your personally, but they have to do with your arguments, which, this being a discussion forum, I am taking issue with.

You wrote:

[Note: Do not make the mistake of interpreting 'ad hominem' as 'against the person' and argue because your claims are not 'against' me that they do not qualify. 'Ad hominem' means 'to the person.' And since you are shifting the focus from the argument to the person, yes you are guilty of an ad hominem fallacy.]


Which is false, of course, because if you read what I wrote, you will note that my objection is that based on the reasoning you use, you make a false turn, turning away from "inherent value" and going in the direction of "desires etc", the theory you propose. The point obviously is that that is a mistake. The fact that you are making the mistake is what I'm pointing out. That isn't ad hominem at all, for I'm attacking the argument.

As for the argument and your response, I'm not sure you have given a response at all. The most I can work out here is this section:

Effectively, if there is an argument contained within your writing, it is, "If people act as if X is true, then X is true" (for X = "intrinsic value"). But there is no credibility behind such a statement. It does not work for X = "The earth is the center of the universe." It does not work for X = "Santa Clause exists." It does not work for X = "This apricot pit will cure my cancer". It does not work for anything.

That's a mischaracterization of the argument. You're still just describing, and failing to account for the prescription basis for morality. The statement "You shouldn't torture children" has a truth value and it's based upon the inherent value of children and the wrongness of torturing them. You write "if people act as if X is true to represent the PRESCRIPTION aspect of morality. Your theory - which by the way, is false (but that's a separate issue) - doesn't deal with prescription, it deals with description.

So, why don't we make this very very simple. Just answer this question:

"Why shouldn't I torture children?" That's not a difficult question to answer.

Just to ensure you don't write something about desires, why don't we add the caution that simply writing that I wouldn't be taking into account the desires of the child is obviously insufficient to answer the question. I want to know why that has any force to persuade me why I shouldn't go ahead and act any way I please. In other words, even if we grant that acting morally fulfills "the most desires" (which is loosely your argument - which I deny by the way), you must still provide a reason why we SHOULD act morally. You must account for the leap from "is" to "ought."

Determinists deny any kind of imperative at all. They simply state that there are no "shoulds" at all. I wonder why you don't affirm this position in the absence of the ability to justify the "should" for your position. Nevertheless, I'd like to hear your answer to the challenge above.

Alonzo Fyfe

Error. Hit the wrong button

DRFseven

Hi, Richard, remember me?

Norge

Hello, Dee, how are you?

I hope you've had a good day. I haven't managed to answer your post yet in detail, in which I believe you spoke about morals being on a par with preferences. You're going to have to make that clearer, I'm afraid.

I think what I'm looking for here is how you argue for morality being a preference, so that it doesn't become counterintuitive. Ie. preference for icecream and torture are clearly different intuitively, but your response seemed to indicate that the difference is simply in the response of the person indicating the preference. Ie. it has a different effect in me. That doesn't seem to me to be sufficient to show that they are materially different. They are still, after all, preferences. Surely better to bite the bullet as most determinists do and admit that your theory leads to that conclusion. It's a brutal world for the atheist, but there you go. Then I'll answer that position!

In addition, I can't quite remember, did you say that the "imperatives" in morality are a myth? In other words, there is no "should?" I can't remember. In addition, do you argue that there is no such thing as right and wrong? I think you did say that, but in that case, do you argue for objectivity or subjectivity in terms of what you present as moral statements. In other words, "torturing is wrong" is a subjective statement, regardless of the re-interpretation of the word "wrong" to mean "bad for society" or some such meaning that you would substitute for objective wrongness. Or do you agree with Alonzo that moral statements are objective? You don't have to agree with him how that is the case - he argues for some kind of Desires-Theory - but do you agree with the argument for objectivity or not?

If you do, how do you account for it on the atheistic view, since most professional atheists agree that there is no objective morality at all, and certainly not the "Desires Theory" that Alonzo has come up with.

I'm going home soon and will check back here on Monday to see if you've had time to answer. Have an enjoyable weekend.

Richard

P.S. Still don't know if I'm talking to a man or a woman. No necessity to disclose such information but it would be nice to know!