hedonologist

d'Naturalist this question is also for you and any other 'materialists' I haven't read yet.
That seems to be true, on the one hand, but let me ask you this. What if you wanted to get rid of cancer, so you had a whole exact duplicate body (with brain) made with the agreement that after you met the new body and checked to make sure it was working properly, you would take something to die. Would "you" "wake up" as the new body?

Would you use this method to get rid of cancer?

hedonologist

I think that that would make you a "mind-body dualist", but like I say, it is difficult to define "materialism" (which is a mind-body monism) in a meaningful way, without saying how the philosophy affects behavior, and the supposed authorities, ie dictionary and encyclopedia definitions of materialism, don't seem to define it. Under the mind-body dualist category there is substance dualism, and property dualism. Maybe you want to distinguish yourself from a "substance dualist", not that I am very clear on what that is. I really would rather talk about the hypothetical situations, than try and figure out what "materialism" means to the majority of people, but I think the words need to be defined in terms of behavior, so maybe I am redefining them in terms that make sense and are thus useful to me.

tronvillain

hedonologist:
No, "I" would not wake up as the new body - as I said in my original reply, the "I" that existed when the duplicate was made would.

I would, at a certain point in the progression of cancer. However, I'd prefer to be anesthetized, copied, and then killed without being revived - I'd choose that option long before I'd choose the option you mentioned.

[ January 09, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

excreationist

Well the "you" who had experiences after the duplication wouldn't be in the body, but the one immediately before the duplication (who decided to be duplicated, etc) would be in the body.

I guess... mainly so that I could meet myself.

hedonologist

Why?

Wouldn't you want to meet "yourself"? (hed giggles)
(This question is, again, for any 'materialist'.)

How physically different could this new organism be, for you to die for it (as I would say), or in other words, how many modifications might you make to this new body/brain if you could?
-- new DNA?
-- new face?
-- maybe erase some painful or useless memories?
-- maybe rewire those synapses to operate in a more efficient way, like defragmenting a hard drive?
-- new desires?
-- new associations of what you enjoy?

What would you keep about "yourself" and what would you discard? This gets into the question of your ultimate purpose/intention in how you live. What "data" or "hardware" in your brain is most "valuable" to you (if any), such that you would consider the brain transplant "successful", if this "data"/"hardware" was identically replicated?

tronvillain

hedonologist:
I would choose the second option because I consider eliminating divergence preferable to meeting myself.

Questions about about physical and mental differences apply as much to the original as they do to any copy:

Will "you" still be "you" if your DNA, features, or brain were altered?

Anyway, you asked:
It's a ridiculous question, since to me my brain is essentially a black box.

Jamie_L

Again, as far as the outside world is concerned, "I" still exist. However, I believe my consciousness is tied to my physical brain. Ignoring all the hypotheticals, if my brain is destroyed, I stop experiencing things. I am dead. Now, in these scenarios, at some point, two identical brains exist side by side, but they are two distinct physical entities made of separate matter. If activated, they would be two separate consciousnesses, even if identical. Destroy one brain, and that consciousness dies. Destroy the one that is the first me, and I would be dead. The other one might live on, preserving "me" for itself and the rest of the world, but I wouldn't experience any of it.

I guess that means I think "I" am more than a "brain state", I am a brain state of a particular brain. Another brain with the same state is a different consciousness.

Well, it might be nice for my family and friends if I was copied and then killed, but otherwise it makes no difference to me. Either way I stop experiencing life forever. There might be no loss to the world, but my brain would be destroyed, and I'd be experiencing the nothingness of death. No thanks. Kill the copy instead, please.

Jamie

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: Jamie_L ]

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: Jamie_L ]</p>

hedonologist

Is there any reasoning behind that preference? I don't get it.
If you define "me" as what you can sense physically, you would know the answer better than I would.

I would define myself as the experiencer, so whether or not I would exist depends on what is the neural (or physical) correlate of me as an experiencing being. I would think I could replace anything outside of this correlate, while still "experiencing my brain".

These have been suggested as the "neural correlate of consciousness" (NCC), which I equate to a "neural correlate of myself", when they are happening in my brain, though these are very simple, and it may be much more complex. <a href="http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/ncc.html" target="_blank">http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/ncc.html</a>
So I might replace brain functions or DNA, so long as they were not part of the physical correlate of myself, for example, by removing unessential parts of my brain and replacing them with stem cells, which is already a treatment for stroke and Alzheimer's.
I don't know what you mean. I'll try a similar question.

Might you consider getting an "upgrade" to your current brain, not because you were close to death, but just to make any improvements you would like? Would you trade in your current brain, just like you might with a used car?

If so, how different could the new brain be, such that you would still go through with the operation?

I don't see how these could be nonsensical questions because I'm asking about your behavior.

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: hedonologist ]</p>

hedonologist

That is only true, if the outside world is "materialist" (for lack of a better term). I would not think the copy of you was you. You are the experiencer of the original brain. And you are not "the consciousness", you are who experiences the consciousness.

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: hedonologist ]</p>

tronvillain

Jamie_L: I am afraid that I still don't understand your attachment to matter. If someone gradually over a period of years replaced every neuron in your brain with a machine that performed the same function, what would happen? Would "you" still exist after it was complete? If yes, then it would seem that matter doesn't matter, since nothing has been preserved of the original brain. If no, then it would seem that a brain can continuously operate while "you" cease to exist - a very odd state of affairs.

hedonologist: The reasoning behind that preference is that essentially everything that is "me" will be preserved in my copy - nothing will be lost. I will go to sleep dying, and then I will wake up healthy.

When I say that to me, my brain is a black box, I mean that I really have no idea what specifically it is about my brain that defines "me." I am my brain, and cannot discern anything about it by introspection. Would I define myself as "the experiencer"? I don't know. Perhaps "the experiencer" could be preserved while totally altering memory and personality, and I don't know that "I" would still exist after such a change.

As a result, I can only answer your questions with "maybe."

[ January 10, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]

[ January 11, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>