tronvillain

free12thinker:
Yes, if one accepts that definition, the hypothetical action is immoral. Now, why should someone accept that definition if they don't already?

Sojourner553

What threw me off track was

(1) from debating Haran on a similar topic (who does believe it requires religion to be moral) and switching over here.

(2) your complete silence -(you do not even acknowledge the posts on it to rebut them) why there is one absolute moral rule necessary for well-functioning societies:

and that is to treat others as you would like yourself to be treated.

Every other moral rule IS "relative"!

Sojourner

DRFseven

And so is that one.

tronvillain

Yes, that one is too. It may be a reasonably good rule for creating a functioning human society though.

[ April 10, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

Hans

Sojourner553


Isn't the "Golden Rule" subjective as well? Isn't it possible for someone to place greater value in something other than the the welfare of others? Isn't it also possible for someone to simply treat the welfare of others with complete indifference?

I'm not sure if when you said "every other moral rule is relative" that you meant to imply that the golden rule is an objective moral rule.

Sojourner553

You mean the Silver Rule not the Golden Rule --a minor matter.

If interested in the difference:
<a href="http://mac-2001.com/philo/crit/ETHICS2.TXT" target="_blank">http://mac-2001.com/philo/crit/ETHICS2.TXT</a>

More important: You are at the individual level. -- notice I said for a well functioning "society"

Here's some historical info on the subject -- why invent the wheel?

During the 1800s, the philosophy of "Utilitarianism" was put forth
by Jeremy Benthan and James Mill, and later developed by Mill's son, John
Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and others. According to the Utilitarians,
moral law was based on utility--meaning, whereby one acts according to what
they perceive to be its consequences. These consequences are judged in terms
of human happiness (similar in definition to happiness as defined by the
ancient Greek philosophy, Epicureanism).

Religious apologists argued that the skeptic
must be prepared to explain "how" GENERAL shared feelings of morality developed
"naturally" within human society at all! After all, there could STILL be a God
or other divinely directed force that is the basis for an absolute system of
GENERAL morality. The diversity that exists at the DETAILED level, may still
be according to His "Will". Thus, the skeptic must be prepared to "explain"
how ANY mechanism of morality developed "naturally" among foreign, distant
cultures.

Skeptics have responded with various explanations. (These may or may not
have some basis, depending on the reader's perspective.) One secular
explanation relies heavily on Darwin's theory of evolution to explain that
natural selection may have favored the development of moral feelings within
society over millions of years. Proponents of this theory, often see
similarities in morality between humans and the animal kingdom.

For example, one proponent of this view (Westermark), argued that society
is "the birthplace of the moral consciousness", and that this moral
consciousness may also be seen in animals: "All mammals seem to possess an
instinct, whereby they react sympathetically towards others of their kind.
Such as where the mother defends her baby, or the male his mate, or even with
the dog and his human master." (GA Wells, Ibid)

Gilbert Murray (1939), suggested that there is an instinct to naturally
empathize with our neighbor--which arises out of the human brain's capacity
to project our self onto new, hypothetical situations.

"In the late war, how many thousands of men--not particularly selected
or high-minded men--risked their lives eagerly to save a companion wounded
in No Man's Land? They did not ask or know why they did it. Some may have
alleged motives of religion, or motives of ambition in the form of medals
or promotions. But the basic motive was probably more or less the same
all through; that instinctively they could not see a mate lying there
wounded and not try to help him." (Gilbert Murray, "What is Permanent
in Positivism", in STOIC, CHRISTIAN AND HUMANIST, 2nd edition, London:
Watts/Allen and Unwin, 1950, pp 184-5.)

The agnostic G.A. Wells, in his book RELIGIOUS POSTURES, argued that
the natural tendency towards kindness and self-sacrifice that are found in
most cultures--were "established during the course of social evolution":

"If there is an instinctive basis to social behaviour, one does not need
a theist's creed in order to sympathize with one's neighbor. Because a
few sound maxims are to be found in sacred books it is not reasonable
to credit religion with their dissemination; they were recognized in the
most primitive societies because they were based both on instinct and on
social necessity. There are certain precepts held in common by religious
and irreligious persons, and these almost universal moral principles are,
as it were, generic characters, established in the course of social
evolution. We can all observe in ourselves natural promptings to kindness,
generosity and self-sacrifice which have no relation to any religious or
metaphysical beliefs. Nor does theistic creed at all ensure sympathy with
one's neighbour. The state of mind we call faith has often been correlated
with hatred for the large majority of mankind, and it is very doubtful
whether devoutly religious people are in any way better citizens, friends,
or parents than people who have deliberately rejected religion."
(G.A. Wells, RELIGIOUS POSTURES, Open Court: La Salle, Illinois, P 184)

<a href="http://mac-2001.com/philo/crit/ETHICS3.TXT" target="_blank">http://mac-2001.com/philo/crit/ETHICS3.TXT</a>

Sojourner

[ April 10, 2002: Message edited by: Sojourner553 ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Hans:

As promised earlier, here’s a short outline of an objective, nontheistic interpretation of moral statements in terms of which convincing reasons can be given for saying that the actions described in your OP are wrong.

The interpretation I’m going to offer here is explained much more fully in the thread <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=14&t=000458" target="_blank">How can Morality be Objective?</a>, particularly the OP and my posts of June 10 (3:55 PM) and June 21 (12:28 PM). Anyone who wants to understand it better, or has questions about it, is encouraged to look there first.

First, the kind of “moral statements” I have in mind, at least initially, are not statements of general moral principles, but statements about specific acts – for example, “John should not have punched Mary in the eye outside Potter’s drugstore at 5:32 P.M. on July 18, 1996”.

Second, what I mean by an “objective” interpretation is an interpretation in which moral statements express propositions whose truth or falsity (once relative terms like “I”, “here”, and “today” are translated out) are independent of who makes them, or where or when they are made. It does not mean that the truth of such statements must necessarily be independent of the contents of any possible mind or minds.

But a second requirement must also be met before an interpretation of moral statements can be truly considered “objective”: the truth or falsity of such propositions must depend only on the properties of the people involved and the situation, not on the identities. In other words, if it is true that X should do Y, and if X' is faced with exactly corresponding choices, with exactly similar consequences, then it must also be true that X' should do the corresponding action Y'.

This first step in my interpretation is:

(1) We want (in a very real sense) to do what we would choose to do if we had enough knowledge and understanding (K&U).

Thus, if I am trying to decide whether to ask Carol on a date, I would normally like very much to know whether she would accept. But even if I don’t know, I’d like to make the decision that I would make if I knew the answer to this question. The same is true in almost all situations.

It’s true that there are a few exceptions. for example, if I’m deciding whether to read a book, in a sense I’d like to know its contents. But if I really knew its contents, I might well choose for that reason not to read it. But these kinds of cases can be resolved by a more precise statement of the principle. (See the thread cited earlier for details.) For most purposes the simple statement of the principle given in (1) above is good enough.

The second step is more controversial. It is:

(2) What we would choose to do if we had sufficient knowledge and understanding is to act altruistically.

There are two reasons for this. The first is empathy. Empathy (in the sense I’m using here) is a particularly intimate, thorough understanding of someone else. It’s “getting into the other person’s mind”, understanding what it’s like to “be in his shoes”, “feeling his pain”, sharing his joys, etc. I contend that sufficiently strong empathy with someone will naturally and inevitably cause us to take his or her interests into account in our decisions. In the limit (which of course is not even close to being humanly attainable), if we had perfect empathy with another person we would take his interests into account equally with our own. Moreover, although this is not essential to the theory, I contend that this is not a result of some strange quirk of the way the human brain is constructed, or the result of an instinct produced by natural selection because it enhances our survival, but is an inherent property of a rational mind.

The second reason is philosophical. I contend that a fully rational mind apprehends the Principle of Equality (that everyone’s interests should be taken equally into account) as a valid principle of action. The fact that we humans often do not apprehend this as a valid principle is that we are very far from being fully rational.

[It’s interesting that several people posting here have asserted that this principle – stated in the form of the Golden Rule, for example – is self-evidently valid, even though they are unable to give any justification for this claim. In the thread I cited earlier I do try to give a justification for it.]

At this point we still haven’t actually given an interpretation of “X should do Y” when “should” is used in the moral sense. And if we just say that it means “X would do Y if he had enough K&U”, we don’t have an objective interpretation. The problem is that it is possible that another actor X', faced with an exactly corresponding choices with exactly similar consequences, might choose to do Z' rather than Y' even if he had perfect K&U. Both Y and Z (and thus Y' and Z') might be perfectly altruistic choices, and so either might be preferred even by a perfectly rational person with perfect K&U. So instead we offer the following definition:

(3) “X should do Y” (or “It would be right for X to do Y”) means that any sufficiently rational person with sufficient K&U would of X doing Y. And “X should not do Y” (or “It would be wrong for X to do Y”) means that no sufficiently rational person would approve of X doing Y.

Now certainly with these definitions there will be many cases in which, under this interpretation, it is neither true that X should do Y nor that X should not do Y – i.e., doing Y would neither be right nor wrong. But because of (2) it is clear that there will also be a great many cases in which it is true that X should do Y. More to the point, there will be a great many cases in which Y is so far from being altruistic that it is obvious that X should not do Y, or that it would be wrong for X to do Y. That is to say, it is obvious that no rational person with sufficient K&U would approve of it.

The example in your OP is a pretty clear-cut case of this. I would contend that, based on (2), it is self-evident that no fully rational person with sufficient K&U (which would include sufficient empathy for the victim) would approve of your doing the things you describe, and therefore, under this interpretation, it would be objectively wrong to do it.

As a fringe benefit, we can also easily show that, if you did do these things, you should feel guilty about it. For if you were fully rational and had enough K&U, including enough empathy for the victim, you would feel guilty about it, and any other fully rational being with enough K&U would approve of your feeling guilty about it.

As I said earlier, you are free to reject this interpretation of moral statements. And I also admit that it is not possible (at this time) to demonstrate conclusively that (2) is true. But it seems to me that (2) is far more likely to be true than not. In any case, (3) is clearly an objective, nontheistic interpretation of moral statements under which it can be demonstrated from very plausible, defensible premises that it is objectively true that the actions you describe would be wrong and you should feel guilty about doing them.

Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the “logic of moral discourse”. Practically any moral statement that would command widespread assent can be given a reasonable interpretation within the framework laid out here under which it is true. It makes sense, in terms of this interpretation, to say that you once thought that something was right but now think it wrong. It makes sense to say that two people disagree about a moral question. In short, it has none of the shortcomings of subjective theories discussed earlier.

Also, (1) answers the question of “why do the right thing?” The answer is that, in the “very real sense” mentioned there, we want to do the right thing: it’s what we would do if we were sufficiently rational and had enough K&U. We may need an explanation of why it’s the right thing, and quite often we need a reminder that it’s the right thing. But it is an interesting feature of this theory that, if anyone is rational enough and understands that something is the “right thing to do”, and understands just what that means, he will want to do it.

Sojourner553

______________________________________________
Per bd-from-kg


Also, (1) answers the question of “why do the right thing?” The answer is that, in the “very real sense” mentioned there, we want to do the right thing: it’s what we would do if we were sufficiently rational and had enough K&U. We may need an explanation of why it’s the right thing, and quite often we need a reminder that it’s the right thing. But it is an interesting feature of this theory that, if anyone is rational enough and understands that something is the “right thing to do”, and understands just what that means, he will want to do it.
_______________________________________________

Bd -- I see you are a serious contender with me for longest poster...

There are a number of psychological behavior models that have been proposed to maximize WIN-WIN scenarios. These all rationally entail some form of give and take - ie the recognition that one's individual needs are maximized, if one also allows the needs of others to be met.

Hans original post posits why an individual acting in isolation should have any morals. And for an individual acting ALONE -- there is no incentive for him or her to act "humane" or moral to others.

But within a societal framework, where one understands the rule: "I will be treated well, only if I treat others well" this "moral" action becomes not only virtuous, but selfish.


Sojourner

Hans

bd-from-kg


I have intentionally alterted your quotes above to replace 'altruistic' and 'empathy' with 'hatred' and 'disregard' in an attempt to argue that they fail to demonstrate how empathy is the natural course of a perfectly reasoning mind with sufficient K&U. I don't believe you or I have the means to show, of the two (empathy or hatred), which is the correct one.


What is this rational mind that exists outside of our human brains and how have you come to know what it is? Is this just a personal ideal?

I realize that you said up front that premise 2 is controversial and I can see why it is.

bd-from-kg

Hans:

But as I explained above, empathy in the sense that I’m using it is a form of understanding, not an emotion. So it makes not sense to substitute an emotion for it. “Sufficient understanding” logically entails sufficient empathy.; it doesn’t logically entail hatred.

Of course, you’re free to deny that sufficient empathy with another person in this sense leads to taking the interests of that person into account. But the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of this claim. And almost anyone who has had the experience of having even a very rough empathetic understanding of another person will tell you that it’s true.

As for your supposed “Principle of Inequality” the thread that I cited (especially the June 10 post) gives an extended argument as to why it is reasonable to believe that a rational mind will find the Principle of Equality compelling. Again, this argument is not logically rigorous; you are free to deny the conclusion. But it does seem reasonably persuasive (at least to me), especially as it applies to rational human minds.

The comments about “inherent properties of a rational mind” are admittedly speculative and are essentially based on my own personal intuitions. Fortunately they are peripheral to the argument. They go only to the question of whether the conclusions are applicable to all rational beings or only to rational human beings (and perhaps to other rational beings whose minds work like ours in ways that cannot be defined at this point). Until we have some experience of non-human rational beings there’s really no way to tell.

At any rate, as promised I’ve offered an objective, nontheistic interpretation of moral statements under which it can be demonstrated that it is objectively true that the actions you describe would be wrong and you should feel guilty about doing them. I think the premises involved are very plausible. Of course, you are free to deny this. Anyone is free to do that whenever any (nontautological) premises are used to “prove” anything. Even if I could prove them, you could just say that you did not find some of the premises in that proof plausible. As I said before, if you’re asking for a proof involving no premises at all, you’re asking for something inherently impossible.

If nothing else, I’ve shown that it is possible in principle that moral statements can be interpreted in an objective, nontheistic way. So objective moral theories cannot just be ruled out of court a priori.