Kenny

HRG,

Well, the assumption here, of course, is that our language actually means something most of the time – that when we refer to someone like Smith, where “Smith” is a tag that we have attached to that individual’s personhood, we really are referring to what we think we are. If we don’t make such an assumption, it’s difficult to see the point in attempting meaningful discourse.

Now, I realize that my particular views of personhood involve metaphysical assertions which I cannot prove. I can argue for them on the basis of more basic beliefs that I hold which I believe to be justified, but someone else may not accept those beliefs. Fine; that really doesn’t matter in terms of making a defense against bd-from-kg’s argument. Bd’s argument is an attempt to show that the concept of just divine punishment is logically incoherent. If I can produce an at least plausible account of how the concept of “just divine punishment” is logically consistent and no inherent contradictions can be spotted in that account, that is sufficient to defeat the argument.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ March 16, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Wizardry

Kenny,

The “actualization of natures” debate is entertaining, but I think it really avoids the salient issue here.

If Smith cannot exist without rejecting God, then wouldn’t it be better for God to not actualize Smith’s nature? I mean, who really cares whether or not there’s a guy named Smith running around, if he is just going to reject God and be subject to eternal torment, it’s better just not to actualize that nature and move on to another nature. Who’s going to miss him? If God had just skipped over the Hitler nature, wouldn’t that have been better?

By actualizing a nature which is doomed to eternal torment, God is doing that nature a grave injustice. It is better to never have existed than to have an existence of misery. If God had any compassion at all, he would never create a being that would end up in hell.

In any event, actualizing a nature which is known to be hell-bound still makes God ultimately responsible for the fate of that being. bd-from-kg’s second alternative holds and his argument stands.

Peace out.

Kenny

Wizardry,

As I have pointed out, God may not have been able to “skip over” Smith’s nature and still accomplish other goods. For instance, there may be many other beings who will experience eternal bliss who will exist if and only if Smith’s nature is actualized. It may be that the accomplishment of such goods outweighs any evil that results from the actualization of Smith’s nature. And, as long as Smith is being treated justly, he has nothing to complain about. He is culpable for his own actions and he can’t whine to God about the simple fact that he exists. It’s still Smith’s choices that get him where he winds up.

God cannot perform an “injustice” upon an abstraction, such as a nature. Injustices can only be performed against sentient beings. No injustice is committed against Smith, once created, if He is being punished for actions which he is morally culpable. Furthermore, Hell itself is a tragic fate, one that I would not wish on anyone. But, if it is the execution of justice, then it is a moral positive, not a moral evil. The moral evil involved is in the actions on the part of the agent which warranted such a fate.

God Bless,
Kenny

bd-from-kg

Kenny et al:

Family duties make it impossible to respond right now to the many interesting points being made here. I should be able to respond to the points raised in Kenny's recent posts by late Sunday or early Monday. In the meantime, I'd be interested in any further comments on my argument that anyone with full knowledge and understanding would have to be insane to reject God, and would therefore not be culpable for this choice. (Of course this assumes that an omnimax God exists.)

Terminator

[QUOTE]Originally posted by bd-from-kg:
[QB]In this thread I want to consider how it can be just for an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God to punish anyone.

You are missing one other item or (possible) detail. There is a strong idea now active in Christian churches that you are given the opportunity to believe in God (not god) up to the moment of judgement. Basically, it's along the lines of this -

No matter what your life was like, no matter what sins you may have committed, no matter your circumstances here on earth. When you die you are (I guess) presented with God (and His glory??). It is your last and final chance to accept God. The bottom line is that if this was/is true, then it makes your three scenarios meaningless because regardless of whatever happened the person would have one last chance.

Of course we won't know if ANY of this is true until after we die.

jpbrooks

Ok bd, I'll bite.
It is difficult (if not impossible) to come up with analogies from the natural world that precisely reflect the moral relationship between God and humans because God, unlike us, is an "Omnimax" Creator.
God intentionally designed humans to be capable of understanding concepts like "good", "evil", "bad", "wrong", etc., and to make choices based on their desires. "Predestination" (specifically, the idea that humans were each created to fulfill certain ultimate purposes) has no bearing on the issue of human culpability for their actions because God is not the immediate cause of our choices. We are.
So, it would actually be unjust (i.e., less than fair) for God not to punish any human for any choice that he or she makes that he or she knows is contrary to God's prescriptions.

As far the "insanity" argument is concerned, the choice to reject God in favor of self interests is not necessarily insane. It may, in some cases, be the result of insanity, and in those cases, it is not clear, from religious texts, how God would render his judgment. But this issue is complicated by the fact that rational reasons can, in fact, be provided for rejecting God, even on the assumption that any rejection of Him is (ultimately) irrational (as the very existence of websites such as this one demonstrates). So, it is not clear, even on the assumption that your insanity claim is true, that the person who chooses to reject God is not morally responsible for that choice.

[ March 17, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Terminator:
On the contrary, it doesn't affect my scenarios one way or another. The point at which the "moment of truth" arrives is irrelevant to my argument.

The point of this idea is to meet the objection that it's unfair to punish someone for not accepting God if he did not have sufficient grounds to justify rational belief in God in the first place. While I think this is a valid point, it plays no role in my argument.

HelenM

The churches I have been to teach that a person can repent and believe up until the moment they die but after that it's too late. However I'm not disputing what you say - I wouldn't know.

What you say seems rather the opposite of the sheep and goats judgement in Matthew 25 where people are judged - so it seems - on how they lived their lives. The sense of that passage is that the decision has already been made by the time the people have got to being judged, not that they have any opportunity for it to be changed.

love
Helen

Samhain

The whole point of bd's argument is that how can God hold us responsible for any action which we would already take if we were determined (BY GOD) to take that that action. If we have no free will or choice in the matter, then it is all based off of how God created us, and therefore would it be just for God to punish us for the way that he made us?

The point is not even the question of whether or not we have choice in our actions. With an omnimax God, we don't, since we are determined: (1) by the omniscience of God (or rather, that God knows every action which we will take before we even take it, from the most trivial to the most outstanding, proving that we have some kind of pre-chosen destiny because of the fact that God already KNOWS. Unless of course you chose to say that God does not know, making God fallible) and (2) The Omnipotence of God (or that every action that we take is dependent on the fact that God could of done something to change that action. If God is all powerful he could change any action which we would take, and therefore render our actions dependent on what God does to change those actions or what he doesn't do).
If all this said is true then we truly never have any choice in any action that we take, because we are already molded to be a certain way by God, and God is ultimately the being responsible for ANY action that we take, because, in essence, God is our creator, and to be a creator such as God is, there would be no part of us not touched by God in some way. With an omnimax god, he would not be able to just randomly throw together some basic emotions/desires/etc. and create a human. This kind of omnimax God already knows, before the human is created, how that person will live throughout their whole lives, and this god could also chose to change that, therefore, why would it be at all just or right for God to punish us for any action that we take, if God has already determined (and allowed) every action that we take?

Photocrat

Jesus? ;]

The consent of *how many* of the governed? What if, say, the Nazis had won WWII and were now the majority. Would that have legitimized the 'Final Solution'? Part of the problem is that there isn't always a consensus on what the governed will consent to (e.g. some may have no problems in giving up parts of their 1st Ammendment rights for 'additional security'; others would roll over in their graves before they'd give up an iota thereof). As such, what part of it is our standard? Simple majority? Super majority/near consensus?

Why should 'ad populum' morality be the standard?

BTW, as for the logic of the original argument; it's begging the question. They refute free will by supposing we don't have it, but are only deterministic automatons. For all the talk about 'causality' being synthetic in origin debates, I find that it dissappears rather rapidly when it's not useful... Then again, how would one measure the probability amplitudes of a person's moral choice function? :]