WJ

Hi John!

I believe it would require the uses of, say, as you said, 'synthetic apriori assumptions' which I take it to mean you are no longer interested... . So I am wondering what is your point in asking the questions? Did I misinterprete your intentions here(?)

(As Nailscorva indicated, metaphysics seems nonsensical and meaningless.)

I realize you're wanting explainations to your thread concern, but am confused on what method to use to go about responding.

Walrus <img src="confused.gif" border="0">

John Page

I have objection whatsoever to working assumptions, I guess its the synthetic a priori cause that results in infinite regress that I'm wary of. Anyway, I'm not sure if it would or not.

I think one could make this conclusion for metaphysics on its own, devoid of reality, is meaningless. But you might say that of art, music, math....

Cheers, John

owleye

John...

"Maybe there is a disconnect in our trains of thought. I believe (define) all abstract entities as representations of other things - much the way that excreationist talks about information coding in the post above."

If your philosophy begins with this as a definition, then, in my opinion, you will probably wind up builing a house of cards. An abstract entity does not represent something else in so far as it is an entity. For example, the number 2 is an abstract entity (if you believe in such things anyway). I have no idea what excreationist is talking about as I have not been following his discussion. With respect to information, however, if this is what you have in mind for your theory, I think it would be better to use this concept directly, rather than have to use it to define what abstract means in your theory. Appropriating words for your special theory when in ordinary use they mean something quite different is likely to cause a great deal of confusion. So far I'm not sure what value it gives you to do so.

In particular the following would be a complete misuse of the term:

"This representation is rendered on physical matter thus all abstract entities are also subject to the causal laws of physics."

"I agree that my "touch" example is not a foolproof test of physicality. The knowledge that we are touching something is a conscious awareness that involves the mind. We can "triangulate" our senses, though, to observe that our body is touching something."

I don't doubt that the brain is physical. This is not the issue. The problem is in determining what being physical means with respect to observations. Mere "triangulation", whatever that means, doesn't seem to meet any ordinary definition of being physical. Of course, here too, you could have your own private notion of what being physical means. If so, I suspect it will only add to what I believe you are building (i.e., the "house of cards").

"IMO, the best proof that physical reality does not emanate from the mind is the fact that we cannot control physical effects through the mind."

This again begs the question of what being physical means.

"Whether a pedestrian has observed a car bearing down on him or not as he crosses the road, he still gets run over."

You are not being very philosphical here. You remind me of the Ben Johnson's rejection of Berkeley's Idealism: where he "refutes it thus" (by kicking a bucket).

"You use the expression "concrete". I think this is useful for illustration but IMO ends up as a subset of the category of physical entities. If two concrete objects cannot pass through each other (*foot kicks stone*) where does this leave the physical neutrino particle that can pass right through our body without us noticing - concrete, abstract..?"

It sounds like you don't understand the distinction between being concrete and being abstract. The foot kicking the stone (or a stone) is an example of a concrete event involving concrete objects. With respect to the abstract category 'stone', however, kicking would not apply. Alternatively, the abstract concept 'kicking' would not apply to a concrete stone.

"I agree we cannot consciously know physical entities directly, only through our senses and all the other manipulations that our mind/brain performs."

I'm not sure why you suggest we are in agreement here. Indeed, if you do believe this, I would say we are in complete disagreement. I'm rather an empirical realist. I gather you aren't. But it really doesn't matter what I believe. It is your theory that is being tested here.

owleye

John Page

Owleye;

The number 2 represents a quantity of two - a countable set of two whatevers. The number 2 on its own is a meaningless symbol.

Agreed, I started this thread in search of a clearer concept/definiton. The term Information, however, has particular connotations in the heirarchy of data, knowledge etc. and I wanted a more encompassing term for everything in the realm of the mind.

Again, agreed, I'm seeking a better definition in the context of the mind/body border issue.

Should I use Johnson's example? Surely a physical example is appropriate to demonstrate existential meaning.

No, its the difference between concrete and physical I was struggling with, to understand why you introduced it.

Sorry, but how is it we can know physical entities directly?

Many thanks for your observations, cheers, John

excreationist

owleye, just some comments and questions:

you wrote: Finally, following Brentano and Husserl, it has been forcefully argued that intentionality is the key property that minds have which physical things do not have.

Well it looks like Husserl died in 1938 and Brentano died in 1917!!

Back then not much was known about the brain and even less was known about <a href="http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/ai/" target="_blank">artificial intelligence</a>.

I believe you would benefit from learning something about phenomenology, which goes into this at great length.
But people would probably benefit more from learning about more recent things, such as <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF8&oe=UTF8&q=neurophenomenol ogy&spell=1" target="_blank">neurophenomenology</a>, which takes into account the latest brain research rather than relying on the intuitions of old-fashioned philosophers.

John Page wrote: I believe (define) all abstract entities as representations of other things [they're physical symbols that refer to other things, such as patterns of physical behaviours, other physical symbols or patterns of physical objects]

you replied: An abstract entity does not represent something else in so far as it is an entity. For example, the number 2 is an abstract entity (if you believe in such things anyway).

John Page replied: The number 2 represents a quantity of two - a countable set of two whatevers. The number 2 on its own is a meaningless symbol.

i.e. if it doesn't represent *something else* then it is meaningless. e.g. let's say there was this word - "djiwosa" - if it doesn't refer to anything at all, the word is meaningless.

For more stuff I've written about abstraction, see <a href="http://iidb.org/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic&f=56&t=000212&p=2" target="_blank">Mind/Body Border - page 2</a>

you wrote (to John Page): You are not being very philosphical here. You remind me of the Ben Johnson's rejection of Berkeley's Idealism: where he "refutes it thus" (by kicking a bucket).
I thought seeking the answers would be the most important thing, not being properly "philosophical" about it.

John Page wrote: I agree we cannot consciously know physical entities directly, only through our senses and all the other manipulations that our mind/brain performs.

you replied: I'm not sure why you suggest we are in agreement here. Indeed, if you do believe this, I would say we are in complete disagreement. I'm rather an empirical realist. I gather you aren't. But it really doesn't matter what I believe. It is your theory that is being tested here.

I think we only see an approximation of the physical world, and this approximation can be corrupted... (and be totally wrong) would you agree?

excreationist

That should be in a different thread I think. You're basically asking how to be content for a long time - that's a pretty tricky question...

I think there are over a hundred types of chemical messengers in the brain. It would probably mean an absence of the signals like fear.

Ultimately it mightn't achieve much but since we can comprehend it, it has meaning.

Mr. Sammi

John, sometimes you drive right by my points. You said you do not think the mind is conscious of itself. That is not what I am arguing, I am arguing the idea that the mind knows itself. You did not examine the reasons I outlined (as you asked) why the mind knows itself, neither did you refute them, you just merely stated what you thought. I hardly agree that this is a proper technique of refutation.

Perhaps you can look at the ideas and try again...
OR mabye you did not think my reasons strong enough to support the mind knowing itself, if this was the case perhaps it is best said rather than left unsaid.

The point I make, is the mind through the brain offers its services, selectively not randomly, it seems to choose which function should be used to obtain which result. WHO tells it to do this? The will? IF SO where is this will? in space?

By the mind, through the mind, for the mind...

Sammi Na Boodie ()

[ June 14, 2002: Message edited by: Sammi ]</p>

excreationist

Well I think we have a lot of problem-solving strategies stored in our brain. We would have been born with a couple instinctual ones like sucking, etc.
Then this fuzzy set of problem solving strategies would be shaped by our life experiences. Some part(s) of our brain works out whether things are going good or not. If they're going good, our current strategy is reinforced. If they're going bad, our strategy is discouraged.
e.g.
Say we see a big bear.
This might trigger these ideas:
1. cuddle the bear (60%)
2. watch the bear (50%)

We'd choose the most desirable option (1) and this might result in us getting mauled.

We naturally have a problem solving strategy where we avoid bodily pain signals. This has a very high priority.

Then we might see the bear again.
The options might be
1. do anything to avoid being mauled (100%)
2. cuddle the bear (-100%)

So I think that we just have lots of problem solving stragies in our brain.

And maybe memory recall is also a kind of problem solving strategy. So that's why we can recall events in our lives, etc and convert them into language. We'd do that to seek our goals. (socializing, etc)

Mr. Sammi

Good to have contact. The problem-solving capabilities within the head has been exposed like an object waiting to be explored.

The provider of the problem-solving capabilities, which is the natural brain, has provided services to the head, which allows problem-solving.

An entity A offers part of itself, Ai, in order to facilitate some event Xi. The entity A uses part of itself Ai, not Aj and not Ak, to further a request which is present. Simply put there are only a few ways to reasonably process this request. Try all possiblities, try a few selected possibilities, try the most appropriate possibility, or try no possibility, seems the only choices available to initiate Ai from A.

Two of those possibilities suggest the brain/mind knowing what to try. It does not seem as if the mind tries everything all at once seeing I am not always on the point of being confused.

Does this not suggest the mind knows itself and is not blind to itself. As opposed to a silicon mind which is blind to itself.

The reporting of self-conditions seems to be an indication of not being blind to oneself. Headaches, pains and disease seem to be reporting techniques on information about itself.

Does this make sense? or more explorations are needed?

Sammi Na Boodie ()

John Page

Sorry, I don't mean to be a drive-by philosopher. Let me go back and think harder.

Cheers, John