Vorkosigan

Let’s see what this statement really means. It means that, if you can safely kill Smith to get his wallet and have no particular reason not to (such as empathy for Smith or his family), you should kill him. That is, it would be wrong not to kill him for his money.

BD, I don't buy this for several reasons. First, it contains an unproven ought statement. It declares that whenever possible, I should act in my short-term interests, those being defined in the narrowest way possible. You've replaced ought not to with ought and with even less justification. If I forego killing Smith, I haven't done anything; I've failed to take an action. It costs me nothing not to do anything. But if I kill Smith, I am taking a positive action. There's nothing in subjective moral thinking that demands I take a particular positive action like this. You're going to have to demonstrate this ought before I can accept it.

The second problem with "moral" conundrums of this nature is that they appear to assume that everyone should have the same reason for not killing Smith. But everyone has different reasons for not killing Smith, and they are all valid. Some avoid the risk, others value human life, others fear retaliation by Smith's family. Are you saying that one reason for killing Smith is more valid than others? On what grounds?

A third problem is that it assumes, irrespective of other issues, that killing Smith has no effect on me. I can perform an act of that heinous nature and feel unmoved by it. People who are unmoved by the consequences of evil actions and indifferent to others are usually removed from society as rapidly as possible, as they are widely regarded as sick. In order to function as social agents, people need to have a positive view of themselves and their own actions.

Fourth, the whole view of "interests" is incomplete. It is not in any interest of mine that Smith be killed for his money. It might be in some interest of yours. "Interests" are values, but in your statement above, you declared that your definition of (short-term) "interests" ought to be universalized to all human beings. On what grounds?

Michael

bd-from-kg

tronvillain:

If you mean that you’re using terms like “right” and “ought” in a sense closer to standard usage than I am, that’s ridiculous. If you mean something else, you missed my point.

Not so. I can think of several rational motivations for not killing someone for his money (other than the ones I ruled out). First, I might have a deep sense that everyone’s interests should be taken equally into account in deciding what to do. Second, I might be aware that if I knew Smith and his family well enough I probably wouldn’t want to kill him and choose not to kill him for that reason.

Your statement assumes without proof that the only principle on which it is rational to act is the principle of “look out for number one”. Many traditional moralists have thought otherwise. Can you offer any arguments to show that you’re right and they’re wrong? If not, why should your principle “win” by default?

It’s not clear to me what you’re saying here, but at any rate, it is simple to demonstrate that your usage differs radically from standard usage of terms like “right” and “ought” in a number of ways. For one thing, those who use words like “right” and “ought” in a more or less standard way (i.e., the overwhelming majority of people) would certainly not agree that a demonstration that an action is in the agent’s self-interest is a demonstration that it’s right, or that he ought to do it. On the contrary, almost everyone finds the statement “Doing X was in A’s best interests, but it was wrong” to be perfectly intelligible. According to your usage it is incoherent; it means “Doing X was in A’s best interests, but it wasn’t in his best interests.” Similarly, if someone who uses these terms in the standard way were the victim of a car hijacker, he would never dream of saying anything like “well, that was unfortunate for me, but he did the right thing; he acted exactly as he ought”. But according to your usage, if hijacking the car was more advantageous to the thief than any alternative, that’s what the victim should say.

Again, I’m not sure what you mean here, but in any case neither of these interpretations comes anywhere near agreeing with standard usage. Besides, there’s at least one more way to interpret this statement: you can say that it doesn’t mean anything; that it doesn’t express a proposition at all.

Once again, I’m mystified as to what you mean by “more accurate”.

bd-from-kg

Pompous Bastard:

[quote][failing to kill Smith is] Not "wrong," as such. It would certainly be irrational ...

OK, maybe the way you use moral terms is even weirder than I thought. On the Moral Subjectivism: One View thread you say:

Now the way these words are normally used, if one “ought” to do X, it is “wrong” not to do it. Apparently you don’t use these words this way. Frankly, I’m getting tired of trying to figure out how you do use them. Your personal, private definitions of words that are in widespread use with other meanings is of little interest to me.

OK, so while you think that one “should” (under ordinary circumstances) repay a loan, you wouldn’t say that one has a “moral obligation” to do so. Again, I’ve pretty much lost interest in your personal, private language.

Where did I suggest that it was? The point is that if you say that someone “ought” to do something, and the kind of justification you consider appropriate for saying so is strong enough, the logic of moral discourse more or less dictates that you say that he has a “moral obligation” to do it. But it has long since become clear that you have no interest in the way such terms are normally used, which is why I have little interest in how you use them.

My post was a response to turtonm’s puzzlement about what Alonzo’s “problem” was. I’m well aware that you see no problem with saying that it was “right” for the people who stole stuff from Alonzo to do so, but then (as your post makes clear) you have no problem with using moral language in ways that bear no resemblance to standard usage.

That’s true. But it doesn’t justify your hijacking of moral language to mislead people. Suppose that you decide that the common concept of God is logically incoherent; does that mean that it’s perfectly OK to define God (in your own mind) as meaning “the person who currently disposes of the most power” and to use it with this meaning without bothering to tell people what your doing? And if you do tell them, what have you accomplished?

But you haven’t “salvaged some meaning” from moral language; you’ve just arbitrarily replaced standard usage with a highly idiosyncratic usage. Nor do you seem to be much interested in exploring the reasons that people actually use moral language, or how this relates to the logic of moral discourse. (If you are, I suggest reading Stephen Toulmin and R. M. Hare.) Moreover, self-interest” is not “demonstrably true”; it isn’t “true” at all. Only propositions can be true or false. The only thing that’s “demonstrably true” is that what’s in your self-interest is in your self-interest.

bd-from-kg

turtonm:

Where did I suggest that by “self-interest” I meant short-term interests defined narrowly? Actually, as I indicated in that post, I had in mind enlightened self-interest. But if Smith has enough money in his wallet, and there is virtually no chance of getting caught, it will be very hard to convince me that killing him for his money is not in my enlightened self-interest. And even if you could convince me, this example was obviously meant to stand for those cases (which clearly exist) where harming others is in one’s enlightened self-interest.

I was analyzing tronvillain’s statement that “...people should advance their own interests at the expense of others whenever they encounter a situation where they may do so with impunity...”. Perhaps my reading comprehension skills are declining, but I took this to mean that people should advance their interests at the expense of others when they can do so with impunity. PB’s statement (cited in my reply to him) seems equally clear.

If you’re going to say that “A should do X” means that it is in A’s self-interest (in some sense) to do X, this is the kind of thing that you get. There’s really no way around it. Sometimes it’s in your self-interest to harm other people, no matter how broadly or cleverly you define “self-interest”. And if “should” means that it’s in your self-interest, then you “should” harm other people under these conditions. He who says A must say B: if your position logically implies a certain conclusion, you’re stuck with that conclusion.

But that’s my point. why is self-interest self-evidently a more valid reason for doing something than other reasons? And if it isn’t, what sense does it make to erect a “moral system” on the assumption that it is?

As for “valuing human life” as a reason for not killing Smith, this is exactly the sort of thing that tron and PB seem to be ruling out. “Valuing human life” in general does not seem to be demonstrably in my self-interest, or if it is, it’s only very weakly so. But even if you don’t agree, the tron/PB type of philosophy seems to require that we allow the agent himself to define what’s in his self-interest; otherwise it’s meaningless. (If I get to define what’s in PB’s interest, for example, I’ll define it as “the greatest good of the greatest number”, but I don’t think that’s what he had in mind.)

Not so. All that’s needed is that the effect on me of that particular act does not outweigh the advantages of doing it. And what in the world do you mean by “an act of that heinous nature”, and why should I feel “moved” by it? These would seem to be holdovers from the old, primitive, superstitious, completely mistaken idea of “objective morality” that people like tron and PB are trying to supplant with their new, “enlightened” philosophy. If they succeed, why should someone in that brave new world feel “moved” by such an act? Or, if you want to say that we have an instinctive revulsion against taking a human life, let’s say that the act in question is swindling thousands of people out of their life savings. Are you going to seriously argue that we have an instinctive revulsion to that? In the absence of “traditional” moral notions, there would seem to be no reason at all to expect such an act to have any “effect” on me other than to enrich me (assuming that I got away with it, of course). If I’ve believed all my life that this would be the “right” thing to do, and then do it when the opportunity arises, why should that make me a “different” person?

Really? Do you have any evidence for this? I recommend that you read Robert Hare’s fascinating study of psychopaths, Without Conscience.

I’m not sure what you mean here. Perhaps you’re referring to the statement that “it would be wrong not to kill [Smith] for his money”? If so, this seems to be a misunderstanding. I don’t think it would be wrong not to kill Smith for his money (or for that matter that I “should” do so). This was an interpretation of tron’s statement.

Pomp

bd-from-kg,

OK, maybe the way you use moral terms is even weirder than I thought...Now the way these words are normally used, if one “ought” to do X, it is “wrong” not to do it. Apparently you don’t use these words this way.

I try to avoid the terms "right" and "wrong" whenever possible, as they tend to carry so much baggage with them and I don't want to, as you say, abuse the language. When I do say that an act is "wrong" I mean that it violates some normative ethical principle. This is roughly equivalent to how most people use the term. Where I depart from most people, however, is that I do not hold that we always ought to obey normative ethical principles. Hence, as I have explained in the past, there are situations in which I am forced to say that one "ought to" do the "wrong" thing.

Refraining from killing Smith is not "wrong," then, as it is in accord with the normative ethical principle "do not kill except in self-defense," but it is nevertheless true to say that you ought not refrain from killing him.

I'm not sure how I can be any clearer. Ordinary moral language assumes that one always "ought to" do the "right" thing. I deny that assumption and, as a result, I have to make a decision to either adopt a specialized definition of "right" or a specialized definition of "ought to." I have chosen the latter and typed up an extensive post detailing the manner in which I use "ought to." I suppose to completely avoid abusing the language I could throw out moral language altogether and invent new terms out of whole cloth to describe my thoughts, but I'm sure that would cause an even greater degree of confusion.

OK, so while you think that one “should” (under ordinary circumstances) repay a loan, you wouldn’t say that one has a “moral obligation” to do so. Again, I’ve pretty much lost interest in your personal, private language.

I'm not sure how denying that a moral theory creates any obligations that must be met constitutes inventing my own "personal, private language." You hold a presupposition about morality: morality creates obligations that we are bound to live up to. I do not hold that presupposition. Simple as that. I am no more inventing a new language than I would be if I denied some presupposition you held regarding any other topic. You say that A has properties B, C, and D. I say that A does not have property D at all. You accuse me of inventing a new language.

Where did I suggest that it was? The point is that if you say that someone “ought” to do something, and the kind of justification you consider appropriate for saying so is strong enough, the logic of moral discourse more or less dictates that you say that he has a “moral obligation” to do it. But it has long since become clear that you have no interest in the way such terms are normally used, which is why I have little interest in how you use them.

As regards the topic of moral obligations, I think I have made it clear why I do not use the term. In short, because I hold that there are situations in which one ought not behave morally, I hesitate to use the term "moral obligation." An "obligation," to my mind, is something that one must meet. If you would like to continue to use the term to describe the non-obligations created by my theory, then that is your prerogative, but I find such usage confusing, unnecessary, and, dare I say it, an abuse of language.

If anything, the manner in which I use "ought to" might lead one to the conclusion that one has a rational obligation to kill Smith, but I'm not even sure I'd go that far, as I'm not entirely convinced that there are no situations in which an agent would not be better off to temporarily abandon rationality.

That’s true. But it doesn’t justify your hijacking of moral language to mislead people.

I have to admit that I'm angry at the suggestion that I am intentionally trying to mislead anyone. My purpose is to provide some rational grounds for the everyday notion that there are certain actions that we ought do and certain actions that we ought not do. If you view this as hijacking language with intent to mislead, then I don't know what to say.

Suppose that you decide that the common concept of God is logically incoherent; does that mean that it’s perfectly OK to define God (in your own mind) as meaning “the person who currently disposes of the most power” and to use it with this meaning without bothering to tell people what your doing? And if you do tell them, what have you accomplished?

I was under the impression that the long post in which I explained how I use terms such as "ought to" in detail, not to mention the dozens of times I have explained myself to various people on this forum, constituted "bothering to tell people what (I am) doing." It's not as though I'm keeping my views secret.

Moreover, self-interest” is not “demonstrably true”; it isn’t “true” at all. Only propositions can be true or false. The only thing that’s “demonstrably true” is that what’s in your self-interest is in your self-interest.

Pardon my sloppy writing. What I meant is that the existence of self-interest is demonstrably true. It is a demonstrable fact that each of us has interests.

99Percent

Pompous Bastard: Before all, I want to say that I really value your courteous discussion with me. I have recently encountered quite irritating intellectual one-up-man-ships from several people here (won't mention names) in the intent of making me look like an idiot, instead of arguing reasonably with me. I find it highly ironic that a person whose handle is Pompous Bastard is anything but.

In implying that it would be irrational to kill Smith for this reason, you are making the unfounded assumption that a) Smith has now, or will have in the future, some knowledge that I value at least as much as his money and b) Smith is, or will be, willing to share that knowledge with me. The possibility that both of these assumptions are true certainly counts as a factor to be considered when determining whether or not to kill Smith, but it is not decisive in and of itself. As the hypothetical stipulated that there would be no negative consequences entailed in killing Smith, we can assume that either a or b is false in this case, and proceed to kill Smith.

The question is not whether there is any consideration for proper values in the supposedly rational decision here, but rather if the decision is irrational or not to begin with. What I am arguing is that by purposefully denying the possible information input from the moral agent itself that is being killed you are being irrational in the first place because you are denying an undeniable source of unfathonable knowledge that can help you in your rational decision to begin with.

Your other objection: Presumably, you do not mean this to apply in all cases. Do you hold that it is rational to kill in self-defense? If so, you admit that there are values, one's own life in this case, that can take precedence over potential sources of information.

I think I have gone over this a number of times, but in case I haven't: a situation where violence has been initiated (violence meaning an immediate threat to your own life or the life of someone you hold dearly) there can be no rational and therefore no moral decision. Whatever you decide when someone is threatening to kill you is by reason itself an amoral decision. However by observing the act of initiating violence you can then objectively state that this act is in effect immoral since it is causing an irrational state of affairs by the simple act of denying the free will of others (for example by pointing a gun at my forehead and demanding to be your slave).

I'm digressing a bit here, but you, like bd-from-kg in other threads, seem to operate under the assumption that a rational agent always wants as much information as possible. I maintain that this is simply not true. One of the key problems in AI research is developing algorithms to filter out useless information. One of the defining characteristics of intelligence seems to be the selective destruction of extraneous information, as an agent with a limitless amount of information to consider never reaches a decision. Ideally, an agent will have just enough information to reach an informed decision, no more and no less.

Your introduction of IA into this discussion is bizarre to say the least but I have to admit it is a valid proposition if we want to figure out rational decisions (being a computer programmer myself I have thought deeply about the problem of imitating human intelligence). That said I think the problem resides in your definition of "limitless amount of information". This basically equates to "noise". As human beings we seem to have an innate ability, since we are born, to filter out meaningful information from noise. We rarely purposely seek to amplify noise in order to achieve additional knowledge, rather we wish to refine our filtering process ever so minutely of what is received by the senses in order to more easily discern information.

Anyway I am getting heavily sidetracked. The point is that we cannot be honest and therefore truthful to our rational decision (false rationality) if we purposefully shut off a source of huge potential information that can be contained from the victim of an intentional murder. An undeniable source of already filtered and processed and therefore meaningful information. Information that can be very concrete in our human understanding, say an invention of cold fussion, or a cure to Parkinsons of which your grandmother is suffering.

In fact a child as young as two years old can already have quite a wealth of empirically useful and communicatable knowledge. This can explain why killing any understandable or potentially understandable being (say a person in a comma that has a reasonable chance to come to consciousness) to be irrational and therefore objectively immoral.

pug846

99percent, I’m selectively responding to two of your points from different posts. I’ve read through the surrounding text and don’t think I am being unfair to your position by doing so. Please correct me if I have misunderstood your position.

Do you really think it is irrational to kill someone merely because you are shutting them off as a source of knowledge?

What about cases where the person is mentally handicapped? If there IQ is sufficiently low-enough, it seems to reason that it would be highly probably to assume that you will never gain any bit of knowledge from them.

Your argument boils down to a cost-benefit analysis; You would have to assign a value to the potential knowledge you might gain from someone who you would kill. But if we are operating under such a model, how can you not take into consideration other factors? Are you going to claim that the value assigned to that potential will always necessarily be higher than the sum total of value for the killing of the person? Is that really a rational assumption? No matter how outlandish the individual situation and what we might gain from a persons death would have to be outweighed by potential knowledge we might gain?

Would you say that it is always wrong to shut off potential sources of information, whether they be moral agents, books or any object in the world?

Lets say you and I walk into a bar and have a drink. You unintentionally insult me. I get angry and push you down. I’ve initiated violence. Under what you described, whatever your reaction might be, it can’t be rational. If you were to walk away from the event or take a gun and blow my head off, both would be equally irrational? In the fact of violence, aren’t there some responses that are in fact rational? In this situation, assuming that you value my friendship and enjoy talking with me, from these premises it would be a better strategy to try and comfort me, calm me down, etc.

Vorkosigan

Where did I suggest that by “self-interest” I meant short-term interests defined narrowly? Actually, as I indicated in that post, I had in mind enlightened self-interest. But if Smith has enough money in his wallet, and there is virtually no chance of getting caught, it will be very hard to convince me that killing him for his money is not in my enlightened self-interest. And even if you could convince me, this example was obviously meant to stand for those cases (which clearly exist) where harming others is in one’s enlightened self-interest.

Well, it in your previous posts it seems you've decided that there is some "objective" or "default" position of "self-interest" which qualifies as a moral ought. Except that you have subtly shifted the goalposts here. Now it is no longer a moral ought to screw people when you get the chance, but simply a blunt declaration on your part that it is nearly impossible to convince you not to screw people with impunity. So I don't see what other choice a rational person has, other than to lock you up, since you are clearly a sociopath.

I do not even see what this discussion is about; even if I put forth irrefutable evidence for an objective morality existing outside of our conversation, how would it stop you from killing Smith for the three dollars in his pocket? Do you think that if I made a brilliant argument, you are compelled to obey mere words? You can simply ignore any appeal I make, leaving me only the sad alternative of locking you up as a danger to others.

If you’re going to say that “A should do X” means that it is in A’s self-interest (in some sense) to do X, this is the kind of thing that you get.

No, I mean "It is in MY judgement of A's self-interest." I have no idea how A perceives her own self-interest; I only speak for myself.

There’s really no way around it.

Only if you convert opportunities to inflict harm with impunity into moral oughts. So far you have not offered a single argument that says I should obey your construction of my self-interest. Further, you have offered no argument that says I am compelled to screw people whenever the opportunity presents itself. You seem to be operating under that assumption, but I haven't seen a strong argument on your part. Don't appeal to your presumption of my self-interest; I won't accept that. If you want to universalize your definition of "self-interest," you'lll have to come up with strong arguments.

You are correct. What I am saying goes both ways. But the implications of that haven't yet dawned on you. Just as you have averred that there is no way I can convince you not to take advantage of Smith -- back at you -- there is no way you can convince me that it is in my interests to kill Smith for the money in his pocket. You have no more basis for your moral claims than I do for mine. Only one of us recognizes that, however...

Sometimes it’s in your self-interest to harm other people, no matter how broadly or cleverly you define “self-interest”.

No, it is never in my self-interest to knowingly harm others. That is my particular definition of my self-interest. Explain to me why I have to adopt your definition of my self-interest. On what grounds are you proposing this mysterious universal definition of "self-interest."

And if “should” means that it’s in your self-interest, then you “should” harm other people under these conditions. He who says A must say B: if your position logically implies a certain conclusion, you’re stuck with that conclusion.

Self-interest is a value, BD. There's no objective definition of self-interest; hence, I reject it and you are without any means short of force to compel me to accept it. The problem lies in your problem selection. To you, the issue is why shouldn't people defect on social contracts. But of course, only a minority of social contracts actually have defections; the vast majority of social interactions proceed smoothly, unnoticed unless there is a defection, in fact, just as Alonzo focused on the thief, and not on the thousands of people who walked by his desk without stealing anything. So from my point of view, the question is, given the massive benefits of cooperation, why should anyone ever defect?

But that’s my point. why is self-interest self-evidently a more valid reason for doing something than other reasons? And if it isn’t, what sense does it make to erect a “moral system” on the assumption that it is?

You'll have to get Pompous to answer this one. My thinking doesn't work like his.

Not so. All that’s needed is that the effect on me of that particular act does not outweigh the advantages of doing it.

BD, you seem to be under the impression that there is some objective way I can calculate costs and benefits. Costs and benefits are values..

Further, you seem to be operating under the assumption that I have to hand you ONE ALL-ENCOMPASSING REASON not to take advantage of Smith, some "ground" or something, I am not sure. I can give you hundreds of reasons, but none will convince you unless you are willing to enter into moral discourse with me and have some basic ration of human empathy, self-awareness, self-esteem and social responsibility.

And what in the world do you mean by “an act of that heinous nature”, and why should I feel “moved” by it? These would seem to be holdovers from the old, primitive, superstitious, completely mistaken idea of “objective morality” that people like tron and PB are trying to supplant with their new, “enlightened” philosophy.

What holdover? Can you seriously argue that most people don't balk at taking human life? And if we take your swindling example, there are plenty of reasons aside from empathy not to do so.

In any case, I think taking a human life is a heinous act that will forever change me in a negative way, and so I will refrain from doing it. You may not think so. We could discuss the issue, but of course, if you still feel like killing Smith, all I can do is lock you up, since you give me no other recourse.

Michael

Alonzo Fyfe

Re: The abuse of language argument, I side with PB on this. Where a problem is built into the language, the language itself may be the problem and it would be a mistake to give it too much weight.

For example, the word 'atom' originally meant 'without parts' the way 'atheist' meant 'without theistic belief'). It would be fallacious to argue against the scientist who suggested that it was possible to split the atom that his theory suffered from an abuse of language because, by definition, it was impossible to split something that had no parts.

Similarly, it would be a mistake to assert that those who proposed a bacteria theory of disease that their theory is to be discarded because disease, by definition, is caused by bad air. 'mal-aeria' literally means (or meant) 'bad air'.

The only meaningful objection that can be raised against a proposal is that the person fails to use the terms consistently. If Einstein had written in one part of his theory E=MC^2 and in another E=MC^3, then this would have been grounds for an objection. As long as his theory is consistent, it would not be an appropriate objection to say 'this is not how we people typically use these terms.'

Many of my objections against PB have been probes to see if he will use his terms consistently. For the most part, he has proved willing to do so. I will not charge him with an 'abuse of language' because his consistent use of terms does not contain the inconsistencies or inaccurate assumptions of common discourse.

Be that as it may, one can raise a practical concern that somebody's language is more confusing than it needs to be. I think that PB provides an accurate account of practical-ought. He sometimes uses moral-ought terms, which -- as far as I can see -- are indistinguishable from his practical-ought terms. The use of two separate terms implies that they have two separate references -- indeed, it invites people to see his theory as containing the same distinction between what is in an agent's own interest and what he morally ought to do that is built into common language.

This confusion, in turn, inspires a great deal of the objections that PB has been forced to deal with repeatedly on these boards.

PB could more clearly present his theory, I believe, if he allowed for a distinction between practical-ought (what is in the agent's interest) and moral-ought, and say that he has no interest in discussing moral-ought (as it is used in popular language) because -- like atoms without parts and illness caused by bad air -- there is no such thing to talk about.

This is the same maneuver I make when I say that "What I call 'moral value' within my theory, you can call 'moral relpoints' if you like. If you insist that the term 'moral value' refer only to those things having the blessing of God, or only to those things with a built-in ought-to-be-doneness, then I am a moral eliminativist -- such things do not exist and, thus, are not worth talking about outside of a discussion of myth and folklore.


My 'moral ought' differs from PB's in that mine take into consideration Smith's desire to keep his wallet and to keep his life. That is, moral-ought differs from practical ought in that, where practical-ought considers only the interests that the thief-murderer has in the wallet, moral-ought includes the interest that the victim has in not having his wallet taken.

More broadly, I hold that moral-ought is distinct from practical-ought in that, where practical-ought evaluates an action relative only to the agent's interests (e.g., the interests that Smith's murderer has in killing Smith for his money), moral-ought evaluates an action relative to all of the reasons that exist independent of who has them (e.g., it includes the interests that Smith has in not being killed or having his money taken).

PB objects that my moral-ought is impotent for Smith's murderer, that I can point these reasons that exist out to Smith's murderer and he can still shrug his shoulders at them and kill Smith anyway. Which is true. PB objects that a motivationally impotent moral-ought is as worthless as a nonexistant moral-ought. That the only ought that is interesting and worth talking about is the ought that is linked to a person's own desires -- that relates to something that the agent might actually do given those desires.

This is a meaningful objection. I believe I have an answer, which I will address in a different post. But 'abuse of language' is not a meaningful objection. Language is an invention; it is not a special vessel holding ultimate wisdom. If the only objection that can be raised against a theory is its "abuse of language", then it is language that must yield, not the theory.

[ April 17, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Vorkosigan

More broadly, I hold that moral-ought is distinct from practical-ought in that, where practical-ought evaluates an action relative only to the agent's interests (e.g., the interests that Smith's murderer has in killing Smith for his money), moral-ought evaluates an action relative to all of the reasons that exist independent of who has them (e.g., it includes the interests that Smith has in not being killed or having his money taken).

Alonzo, it seems you are sneaking one by us here...

• moral-ought evaluates an action relative to all of the reasons that exist independent of who has them

It looks like you've sneakily &lt;admiring sound&gt; described an objective morality here. What reasons exist independent of the people who hold them? Wouldn't those be objective reasons?

I don't think any distinctions between practical-oughts and moral-oughts are defensible, because of the subjectivity of making a determination about what acts are moral and which are not. I do not see any exit from this web of subjectivity.

Michael